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The dissertation revisits the West German literary scene of the 1960s and 1970s to 
investigate how two of its Jewish participants, Jean Améry and Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, sought to promote ethical responses to the Holocaust. The study 
incorporates literary analysis and socio-political reflections on the ethics of public life. 
First, it is an analysis of the relationship between judicial confrontation of the German 
criminal past, the silence in the wider German cultural sphere in the wake of this 
confrontation, and the two writers’ efforts to expose and address this ethical 
disconnect (chapter I). Second, it draws attention to two very different modes of 
reactive affect, ressentiment and melancholia. Through readings of Hildesheimer’s 
novels Tynset (1965) and Masante (1973) in chapters II and III, on the one hand, and 
Améry’s essay “Ressentiments” (1966) and the essay-novel Lefeu oder Der Abbruch 
(1974) in chapters IV and V, on the other, the dissertation analyzes these two modes. 
Hildesheimer employed a register of ethical writing that articulated the 
interconnected processes of mourning and melancholia, but unlike recent scholarship 
that focuses on these categories and valorizes melancholia as source of productive 
socio-political action, Hildesheimer did not prescribe them as exemplary modes of 
affective reparation. For Hildesheimer’s narrators, mourning the victims of the 
Holocaust becomes an impossible task that leads to an affective and communicative 
   
impasse of permanent melancholia. As Améry conceived ressentiment, it is, in 
contrast to melancholia, an affect that seeks to engage the wider community. If met 
with empathetic attention, Améry’s affect of ressentiment enables future socio-
political dialogue between victims and their community. Améry thus argues for the 
moral superiority of ressentiments as the most appropriate ethical vehicle to redress 
crimes.  
By analyzing Améry’s philosophy of ressentiments, which challenges the 
privileged position of melancholia, and by investigating Hildesheimer’s approach to 
and ultimate rejection of melancholia, the dissertation argues for a nuanced 
understanding of the workings of affects and their ethical repercussions. The 
dissertation thus contributes to a growing body of international scholarship that 
elaborates—beyond melancholia and mourning alone—how various affects mediated 
in literature inform the ethics of public life after the Holocaust.
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Lot’s wife is struck down because she turns her gaze towards the burning ruins of her 
homeland to witness the destruction of the city where she had experienced evil. Bible 
commentators excuse her death on the grounds that by looking backwards, she 
disobeyed God. Lot survives and procreates incestuously; his wife is petrified as a 
pillar of salt. The lesson is straightforward: to look ahead (into the future) means 
survival and safety; to look back (into the past) causes immobilization, even death. 
What remains is the uneasiness over a future generation that is tarnished—soiled 
perhaps because the future was imagined in ignorance of the past. 
  An ethical tension exists between past and future. The bidirectionality of 
temporal understanding affects the domain of public politics as well as the private 
constitution of the individual subject, and whenever the individual’s gaze does not 
parallel that of the collective to which she belongs, her understanding of morality and 
the group’s are at odds. Morality—whether it is committed to shaping the future and 
therefore prescriptive, or aimed at judging mistakes of the past and thereby reactive—
relies on reflection on the past as a collective experience that must be sustained or 
bettered. For the group the ethical imperative to repair past damages allows for a 
future to be imagined in which the past will have been forgiven, but for the individual 
victim of wrongdoing, forgiving does not necessarily present itself as an option in the 
process of looking back. The purpose of historical justice, David Heyd writes, lies in 
restoring a desirable condition or, I would add, in (re-) erecting an ideal that describes 
a desirable condition, such that once restoration—of either the condition or the ideal—
has been achieved, the past becomes morally irrelevant.1  
                                                
1 David Heyd, “Ressentiment und Versöhnung. Zwei Antworten auf das Böse in der Geschichte,” Die 
Neue Rundschau 113, no. 1 (2002): 110-29, here 113.  
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Because collective repair does not equal individual forgiving, for the individual 
this restoration might not be moral but constitute itself as amoral. Even if the 
collective has passed judgment and attempted to correct misdeeds, for instance by 
imposing punishment or by paying reparations, the harmed individual has no moral 
obligation to forgive, and more often than not she finds herself abandoned by the 
collective in her continuing demand to undo the injustice she experienced individually 
as subject. Only rarely does the individual succeed in articulating her subjective stance 
against collective forgiving that is measured on a scale of objective ideals. Behind 
such an articulation stand affects deeply invested in the past, such as melancholia and 
ressentiment, which are oriented reactively towards the past and are therefore deemed 
counterproductive by the social body at large. In this dissertation I attend to 
melancholia and ressentiments to analyze their ethical implications for negotiating 
between past and future.   
In the wake of the Holocaust the Federal Republic of Germany implemented 
the program of Wiedergutmachung that accounted for the Nazi genocide of European 
Jewry largely through the payment of reparations and the judicial confrontation of a 
small number of Nazi criminals. While West German rhetoric fostered a climate of 
solemnity and remorse regarding the Holocaust, the unexpected economic miracle 
soon overshadowed early attempts at Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  In 1959 Adorno 
wrote about this practice of West German Vergangenheitsbewältigung, and his essay 
“Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?” is a critique of the deceptive appeal 
of the notion of coming to terms with the past, which in the particular postwar context 
of the fifties amounted to a denial or dismissal of the past.2 Adorno defends a more 
                                                
2 Theodor W. Adorno, “Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit,” in Theodor W. Adorno, 
Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. 10/2, Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft II, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1997), 555-72.  
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exacting process, closely related to forms of socio-political practice, of participatory 
enlightenment regarding the past and its effects on present and future.  
With this dissertation I ask how the demand for an ethical response to the 
Holocaust is met in the realm of literary and essayistic writing. Following the 1967 
thesis of Margarete and Alexander Mitscherlich on the inability to mourn, scholars and 
cultural commentators tended to consider mourning the primary ethical response to the 
Holocaust within the interconnected spheres of socio-political practice and cultural 
production. Many accounts of postwar social and cultural history have emphasized 
mourning as a moral standard and valorized it, in the words of Anna Parkinson, as “an 
ideal incarnation of emotive reparation.”3 In her study of affect in postwar German 
culture from the immediate postwar period to the 1980s, Parkinson convincingly 
argues that this single-minded emphasis on mourning obscured the consideration of 
other crucial dimensions of affect and emotion at work. Since the 1990s scholarship 
has begun to acknowledge the critical handicap an exclusive focus on mourning 
imparts, and in the process some commentators have privileged melancholia instead. 
With the emergence of W. G. Sebald as one of the most influential German writers, 
attention turned to a melancholic writing style that is celebrated today as the ethically 
condign literary response to twentieth-century catastrophes. This focus on mourning 
and melancholia, I contend, marginalizes such negatively connoted reactive affects as 
anger and ressentiment. These affects are currently undergoing a reevaluation by 
scholars of transitional justice, and my dissertation takes a cue from this scholarship to 
examine the ethics of public life in West Germany after the Holocaust, particularly 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  
                                                
3 Anna Parkinson, “Affective Passages. Emotion and Affect in Postwar West German Culture,” Diss. 
(Cornell University, 2007), i.   
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In my dissertation I revisit this period of the West German Literaturbetrieb to 
investigate how two of its Jewish participants, Wolfgang Hildesheimer (1916-1991) 
and Jean Améry (1912-1978), sought to promote ethical responses to the Holocaust. 
Both survived the Holocaust, one in exile and the other in Auschwitz, and emerged as 
writers following the two largest series of trials against Nazi criminals, the Nuremberg 
Trials and the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, respectively. Hildesheimer and Améry both 
chose to live outside of Germany while participating in the West German 
Literaturbetrieb from the periphery. Hildesheimer and Améry, who never met, came 
from different backgrounds and experienced the Holocaust under very different 
circumstances. Yet the two authors worked within the same context of the postwar 
Literaturbetrieb towards a common goal, namely to engage their audiences in 
remembrance of the Nazi past. They did so by drawing on two very different modes of 
reactive affect, melancholia and ressentiment, which effectively called for different 
responses.   
Because the literary careers of Hildesheimer and Améry were, in the 
beginning, closely entwined with the judicial procedures against Nazi criminals, I 
concentrate on the judicial confrontation of the past as one important aspect of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung and Wiedergutmachung. My first chapter appraises this 
dimension in order to summarize a relatively well-known aspect of postwar political 
culture, to tie judicial Vergangenheitsbewältigung to the cultural arena of literary 
production where it found little resonance, and, lastly, to introduce Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer and Jean Améry as two voices who intervened in this atmosphere of 
silence, denial, and suppression. Chapter I is organized around the Nuremberg 
Interregnum in the intermediate aftermath of World War II and the Frankfurt 
Auschwitz Trials of the mid-sixties. The two sets of trials serve as starting points for 
analyzing the relative silence of the Literaturbetrieb in the wake of the judicial 
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confrontation of the German criminal past. The first part of the chapter revisits the 
Nuremberg Trials and the question of German guilt as background to a discussion of 
the fledgling literary group, Gruppe 47, and its emphasis on war experience as catalyst 
for postwar literature, an emphasis by which the group’s leading members, Hans 
Werner Richter and Alfred Andersch, effectively excluded emigrants and Jews from 
participating. One of the few Jewish contributing members of the group—though only 
beginning in the fifties—was Wolfgang Hildesheimer, who had returned to Germany 
from Palestine and England to serve as a simultaneous interpreter at the Nuremberg 
court. 
 The second part of the first chapter turns to the largest of West German trials 
against Nazi criminals, the First Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, to contrast Jewish 
Attorney General Fritz Bauer’s hopes of bringing the Holocaust to the fore with the 
trial’s actual outcome. Jewish-German emigrant Peter Weiss’s Die Ermittlung is the 
notable exception in a literary scene that generally paid very little attention to the trial, 
a condition on which literary critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki commented in his appeal to 
German writers to observe the trial. My comparative reading of the only two non-
Jewish German texts regarding the Auschwitz Trial, personal essays by Martin Walser 
and Horst Krüger, shows that the majority of German writers, represented by the 
prominent Group 47 member Walser, by and large had no interest in confronting the 
past if framed differently from the war experience that served as the group’s credo. By 
contrast, Krüger’s empathic and self-critical conclusions were those of an outsider to 
the literary establishment. Krüger entered into a long-lasting friendship with Jean 
Améry, once the latter was provoked to break twenty years’ of silence and, 
encouraged by the public attention the Auschwitz trial received, wrote the “Auschwitz 
diary” Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne that established him in the Literaturbetrieb, 
albeit on the margin.  
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 Of the four subsequent chapters, two each concentrate on Hildesheimer and 
Améry. Because Hildesheimer is considered a melancholic writer—an assessment 
based on his prose writing of the 1960s and 1970s—I summarize the discourse of 
melancholia before critically engaging with the current intellectual trend of valorizing 
melancholia as an ethical response to traumatic events, which supposedly acts to 
catalyze socio-political action. Reinterpreting works by Sigmund Freud and Walter 
Benjamin, recent scholarship, of which Jonathan Flatley is exemplary (albeit not 
authoritative), has displaced an earlier focus on mourning and processes of working 
through by the contemporary emphasis on melancholic remembrance that, as I argue, 
impedes rather than promotes critical and productive engagement with the past by 
conflating cultural memory with the melancholic hypermnesia of trauma victims. 
While attempts at valorizing melancholia by associating it with creative productivity 
date back to the Renaissance and further, in the twentieth century György Lukács 
explicitly linked a melancholic aspect in novels to a utopian element that allows to 
imagine a better future. In the post-Holocaust context this linkage of literature and 
melancholia has become a subject of close scrutiny, in particular following Sebald’s 
emergence as the most prominent practitioner of a melancholic writing style lauded as 
responsibly engaging with the Holocaust. I argue that Hildesheimer’s novels Tynset 
(1965) and Masante (1973) serve as important predecessors of and stylistic guides to 
Sebald’s oeuvre. In my second chapter I conduct a reading of Tynset that focuses on 
the narrator’s traumatic “flashbulb” memories to analyze the novel’s melancholia. I do 
so to argue that the melancholic style, while defensible on the subjective level of the 
author and as an aesthetic choice, is ill-suited as a normative framework for engaging 
with the past.  
 In the next chapter I show that Hildesheimer arrived at the same conclusion 
with Masante. Drawing upon Stephan Braese’s seminal research on the author, I trace 
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Hildesheimer’s development from a writer who believed in the political mission of 
literature (1952) and who, out of this conviction, chose to settle in Germany and take 
on the duty of writing in order to change society, into an author who, fifteen years 
later and in the meantime emigrated to Switzerland, had revised his position 
considerably. In the aftermath of Tynset and in reference to Adorno, Hildesheimer 
argued in 1967 that after Auschwitz the writing of conventional novels, which he 
defined as novels that ignore the reality of Auschwitz and the postwar disorientation 
experienced by those attuned to that reality, was no longer an ethically viable choice. 
He defended literature based solely on whether it conveyed the inner microcosm of 
authors who felt ethically bound to consciously explore the subconscious dimension 
that contained knowledge of Auschwitz. In the process, Hildesheimer hoped, these 
authors indirectly change their readers’ attitude towards Vergangenheitsbewältigung 
and the role of Holocaust remembrance in socio-political practice. This, he argued in 
1967, was the limit of “literary engagement” (a term applied specifically to the 
political role assigned to author and literature). By 1975, after the publication of 
Masante, Hildesheimer finally arrived at the conclusion that literature, particularly as 
it regards socio-political change, had no consequence for society whatsoever. Even the 
engaged author is at the mercy of the reader and her willingness to accept the message 
of his work. Because he no longer saw a possibility to reach his audience, 
Hildesheimer stopped writing prose altogether. On a personal level Masante and its 
melancholic narrator had helped Hildesheimer to work through his Nuremberg 
experience, especially that of interpreting during the Einsatzgruppen trial, and to 
explore the Auschwitz dimension of his inner microcosm, which for him was marked 
by the affective disorientation produced by continuous fear. If in Masante 
Hildesheimer found a platform to melancholically mourn the past, he did not prescribe 
for his audience melancholia as affective reparation. 
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In my last two chapters I contrast melancholia with ressentiment, a reactive 
affect that Améry conceptualized as a direct intervention in the ethical landscape of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Améry’s moral philosophy of ressentiments, which I link 
in chapter IV to the concept of resentment in moral philosophy and situate vis-à-vis a 
specifically German understanding of Nietzschean ressentiments, was not well 
received, for it challenges his German audience to acknowledge and apologize for 
crimes of the past committed in their names. Améry’s ressentiments were 
misunderstood as recriminatory and vindictive, and his insistence on their moral 
purchase, which he argued in his essay “Ressentiments” (1966), was interpreted as 
bitterness obstructing social progress. I argue that Améry, rather than engaging in a 
series of accusations or demanding revenge, which was how both the text and his later 
public statements regarding violence were received, sought out the German 
populace—including generations too young for collaboration or participation in the 
crimes of the Nazis—in order to engage them in dialogue and encourage them to adopt 
an attitude of self-reflective mistrust similar to the concept of suspicion called for by 
Jürgen Habermas twenty years later, at the height of the Historians’ Debate. Reading 
Améry’s essay I argue that ressentiments point above all to an intersubjective 
dimension and serve as necessary and salutary stimulants of vibrant and participatory 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Ressentiments, I conclude, present a viable ethical 
alternative to melancholia because they prompt active coming to terms with the past 
that translates much more readily into socio-political action than melancholia does.  
Améry’s demands were not met. Group 47 member Alfred Andersch 
deliberately misread “Ressentiments,” and the general disinterest in answering his 
ressentiments led Améry, influenced by Jean-Paul Sartre’s reading of Frantz Fanon, to 
a short-lived flirtation with theories of redemptive violence. My last chapter concerns 
Améry’s Lefeu oder Der Abbruch (1974), a hybrid of essay and novel. Well-practiced 
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in essay writing, late in life Améry returned to his earlier ambition to become a 
novelist. In the essay-novel form Améry sought to work through autobiographical 
material essayistically in the fictional setting of a novel, for which he imagined a 
character who was acting on Améry’s fantasies of violence. The issue of redemptive 
violence transformed the Lefeu project, which Améry had intended as an essayistic 
contemplation of referential language that he wanted to affirm in the narrative 
passages of the essay-novel. With my reading of Lefeu I argue that Améry, despite his 
fascination with redemptive violence, finally rejects it as a means of ending injustice. 
Lefeu must be understood as a product of Améry’s evolving theory of ressentiments, 
in the development of which Améry emerged as a strong opponent of any valorization 
of violence. He returned to his philosophy of ressentiment as foundation of morality, 
albeit much disillusioned by the realities of postwar German society and doubtful that 
his ressentiment would be met with a response.  
 10 
CHAPTER I 
 
“Also es handelt sich, mit Verlaub, um Auschwitz”:
1
  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung and Its Discontents 
 
“[I]ch als Jurist sage Ihnen, wir Juristen in Frankfurt haben erschreckt gerufen, mit 
ganzer Seele gerufen nach dem Dichter, der das ausspricht, was der Prozess 
auszusprechen nicht im Stande ist.”2 Thus did Fritz Bauer, the Hessian Attorney 
General and lead prosecutor at the first Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial (1963-65), lament 
the impotence of the judicial process in the face of gargantuan evil.3 A jurist’s charge 
is to decide guilt and innocence according to rules and procedures fixed by particular 
laws and doctrines; jurists distill past events down to a handful of facts that suffice to 
tip the scale of justice, but legal dictates allow for only limited considerations of 
relevant subjective experiences. How is justice served when legal cultures are bound 
by formal objectivity? Bauer feared that the Auschwitz Trial, in its quest for judicial 
objectivity, rather than illuminating the character of Auschwitz and the Nazi system of 
extermination camps, had abstracted it, distorting and vitiating its true horror. 
Conceding that jurists were forced, “Auschwitz juristisch zu verfremden,” Bauer 
urged poets to complement the courts’ presentation of factual evidence with 
description of subjective experiences of the crimes and thereby to promote 
“menschliche[s] Engagement” as protest when “Böses” happens.4 Bauer’s call was 
met with deafening silence.  
                                                
1 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, "In einer deutschen Angelegenheit," in Literarisches Leben in Deutschland. 
Kommentare und Pamphlete (Munich: Piper, 1965), 201-204, here 201. 
2 Fritz Bauer et al., "Auschwitz auf dem Theater? Ein Podiumsgespräch im Württembergischen 
Staatstheater Stuttgart am 24. Oktober 1965 aus Anlass der Erstaufführung der Ermittlung," in Deutsche 
Nachkriegsliteratur und der Holocaust, ed. Stephan Braese et al. (Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 
1998), 71-97, here 76. 
3 The abbreviation Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials (or Auschwitz Trials) refers to a series of three trials 
against personnel at the Nazi extermination camp Auschwitz, which were held in Frankfurt between 
1963 and 1968, beginning with the 1963-65 trial, Strafsache gegen Mulka und andere, 4Ks 2/63.  
4 Bauer et al., "Podiumsgespräch im Württembergischen Staatstheater," 74, 76. 
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German writers’ vast silence in response to the first Auschwitz Trial suggests 
that either they did not share Bauer’s commitment or did not know how to articulate it. 
This chapter revisits the Auschwitz Trial and its limited impact on the literary 
establishment to point at lacunae in the West German landscape of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung vis-à-vis subjective experiences of German Jews during 
and after the Holocaust. Because they were largely excluded from constructing a 
communal public memory of the immediate past in Germany, German Jews sought 
alternative modes of articulating and coming to terms with their experience of 
persecution during the Third Reich.5  
However muted the response to the Auschwitz Trial by established writers, the 
trial led Jean Améry to find his voice as a German-speaking Jewish writer and 
Holocaust survivor. Twenty years earlier, the Nuremberg Subsequent Trials (1946-49) 
had confronted another German-speaking Jew, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, with evidence 
of the terrible fate he himself had escaped. These two writers indirectly answered 
Bauer’s call to speak to subjective experiences that the legal system failed to capture. 
Specifically, Améry and Hildesheimer voiced Jewish experiences of persecution, and 
they did so in distinctively different ways. 
As a prelude to my readings of works by Hildesheimer and Améry 
representative of their intervention in West Germany’s culture of memory, this chapter 
revisits the Nuremberg and Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials in order to trace the judicial 
foundations of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. This chapter additionally addresses the 
                                                
5 For the impact of the Auschwitz Trial on literature, cf. Irmtrud Wojak and Fritz-Bauer-Institut, eds., 
"Gerichtstag halten über uns selbst." Geschichte und Wirkung des ersten Frankfurter Auschwitz-
Prozesses (Jahrbuch 2001) (Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 2001). Stephan Braese analyzes in a 
seminal study the absence of Jewish-German voices in the process of constructing a West German 
public memory. Stephan Braese, Die andere Erinnerung. Jüdische Autoren in der westdeutschen 
Nachkriegsliteratur (Berlin: Philo, 2001). 
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trials’ limitations, the failures of the literary establishment to engage with the Nazi 
past, and the biographies of Hildesheimer and Améry.   
 
1945-1947: Nuremberg 
Collective Guilt, Victors’ Justice, and Kriegsverurteilte 
 Eight million Germans were members of the Nazi party on the day of 
Germany’s defeat in World War II.6 Had U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt resisted 
the pressures of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and continued his support of 
Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s plan for dealing with the Germans, anyone 
“closely identified with Nazism”—the majority of the male population—would have 
been arrested and, in the case of “arch-criminals,” summarily executed by a firing 
squad.7 Fearing its disastrous consequences for the future stability of Europe, Stimson 
and the Pentagon vehemently rejected the Morgenthau Plan. Stimson instead proposed 
a “constructive approach” for securing peace that included a war crimes policy 
whereby an international tribunal would target certain members of the Nazi elite to be 
tried according to the basic guidelines of the Bill of Rights.8 Stimson’s plan was 
realized with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), on which 
the Allies and nineteen supporting nations agreed by signing the London Charter in 
August 1945. The structure of the IMT as well as the actual proceedings at the 
Nuremberg Trial were largely shaped by U.S. policy, which served three additional 
purposes beyond the main goals of trying war criminals and making war a crime: to 
                                                
6 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory. The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 202. 
7 Henry Morgenthau Jr., "Memorandum for President Roosevelt," in The Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 
1945-46. A Documentary History, ed. Michael R. Marrus (Boston, New York: Bedford Books, 1997), 
24-26, here 25. Morgenthau’s plan included limiting Germany’s economy to agriculture, an idea to 
which Jean Améry later refers (chapter IV). 
8 Henry L. Stimson, "Memorandum Opposing the Morgenthau Plan," in The Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trial 1945-46. A Documentary History, ed. Michael R. Marrus (Boston, New York: Bedford Books, 
1997), 26-27.  
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secure evidence of Nazi crimes for future preservation, to bring Nazi crimes to the 
attention of the world, and to educate the German people and lay grounds for their 
democratization.9  
In December 1945 the Allies also ratified Control Council Law No. 10, which 
established the IMT as a test case for future trials to be conducted by the Allied forces 
individually and within their zones of occupation against Nazi criminals charged with 
war crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and membership in 
organizations declared criminal. Between November 1945 and October 1946, the IMT 
prosecuted twenty-four leading Nazis. Control Council Law No. 10 granted 
jurisdiction to the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS) to administer 
twelve subsequent trials in Nuremberg, between 1946 and 1949, which targeted the 
second tier of Nazi officials, a total of 185 individuals from the SS, the civil service, 
the medical professions, the military, and industry.10 In addition to the IMT and 
OMGUS, the Americans prosecuted over 1,700 war criminals under the jurisdiction of 
the Judge Advocate of the U.S. Army, and with the largest number of prosecutions and 
the ambitious plan of reeducation, the U.S. emerged as the “political and moral leader 
of the effort to punish Nazi war criminals in Germany.”11  
Often lumped together with the IMT under “Nuremberg Trials,” the twelve 
subsequent proceedings in Nuremberg, although similar to the trial of Major War 
Criminals overall, differed in small but important ways. A team of prosecutors and 
                                                
9 Cf. Peter Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland. Die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-
Diktatur von 1945 bis heute (München: C.H. Beck, 2001), 42. For a detailed overview of the U.S. 
American program of judicial reeducation, cf. Frank M. Buscher, "Bestrafen und erziehen. 'Nürnberg' 
und das Kriegsverbrecherprogramm der USA," in Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik. Der Umgang 
mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Norbert Frei (Göttingen: 
Wallstein, 2006), 94-139. 
10 Jonathan Friedman, "Law and Politics in the Subsequent Nuremberg Trials, 1946-1949," in Atrocities 
on Trial. Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes, ed. Patricia Heberer and 
Jürgen Matthäus (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 75-101, here 75f. 
11 Lisa Yavnai, "U.S. Army War Crimes Trials in Germany, 1945-1947," in Atrocities on Trial. 
Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes, ed. Patricia Heberer and Jürgen 
Matthäus (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 49-71, here 67. 
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judges working exclusively for the Americans administered the later trials, which 
avoided intra-Allied tensions. During the IMT the American chief prosecutor, Robert 
H. Jackson, repeatedly had to remind other Allies—in particular the Soviets, who 
toasted to the death of all Germans—to preserve “detachment and intellectual 
integrity” in order to meet “humanity’s aspirations to do justice.”12 During the 
Subsequent Trials the Americans adopted the safeguards from the Anglo-American 
legal tradition without intervention of other Allied powers. In spite of the “fairness and 
impartiality” that characterized these trials,13 Germans nevertheless accused the 
Americans of practicing victors’ justice: in the eyes of many Germans, the tribunals 
violated the ex post facto tradition, which holds that individuals may not be charged 
with crimes that were not illegal at the time of commission.14  
This charge had already been the main legal hurdle for the IMT. The 
prosecutors tried to resolve it by arguing that Nazi Germany had violated three major 
international treatises to which Germany was a signatory: the 1907 Hague regulations 
on warfare, the 1929 Geneva convention protecting the rights of prisoners of war, and 
most importantly, the 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact, which outlawed aggressive war.15  
To circumvent legal issues of ex post facto rulings, the IMT decided to 
prosecute only those crimes that were committed as acts of war, excluding, for 
instance, crimes of Germans against Germans. The IMT therefore prosecuted “crimes 
against humanity” only if they related to starting the war or if they violated laws 
governing the conduct of war.16 This strategy led to the (mis-)representation of the 
genocide against the Jews as a consequence of aggressive war, rather than a result of 
                                                
12 Robert H. Jackson, "Opening Address for the United States. November 21, 1945," in The Nuremberg 
War Crimes Trial 1945-46. A Documentary History, ed. Michael R. Marrus (Boston, New York: 
Bedford Books, 1997), 79-85, here 81. 
13 Friedman, "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials," 79. 
14 Cf. Buscher, "Bestrafen und erziehen," 100.  
15 Cf. Friedman, "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials," 81f. 
16 Cf. Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 44. 
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the racial politics of the Nazis. Although the Nuremberg Trial is remembered today 
primarily for establishing “crimes against humanity” as a criminal category, issues of 
aggressive war—“crimes against peace” and “war crimes”—actually dominated the 
agenda of the international tribunal. The IMT effectively marginalized the genocide of 
the Jews. For instance, the Americans deemed the 1944 massacre of American POWs 
by the Waffen-SS (at Malmédy) to be more important than the “Final Solution,” which 
the IMT discussed interchangeably with other Nazi war crimes.17  
By prosecuting a much larger number of Nazi criminals, the Subsequent Trials 
implicated a broader spectrum of society. They examined “many aspects of Nazi 
criminality in much greater depth than (…) the IMT trial,” and called on “victim 
witness testimony (…), thus broadening and thickening depictions of the crime.”18 The 
first of the Subsequent Trials, the Doctors’ Trial, called into question the IMT’s 
practice of excluding crimes committed by Germans against Germans. It investigated 
the euthanasia program Aktion T4, which caused the death of tens of thousands of 
mentally and physically handicapped Germans between 1939 and 1941. Because of 
the limitations imposed by IMT regulations, the prosecution was forced to connect T4 
to Nazi war crimes. It was eventually able to do, since T4 experimented with efficient 
ways of mass killings and was thus directly linked to the planning of the “Final 
Solution,” which in turn was equated with war crimes.19  
The subsequent proceedings tried 177 defendants (eight of the original 
defendants had died or been too sick to be tried) and convicted 142, twenty-five of 
whom were sentenced to death; the remaining defendants were sentenced to an 
                                                
17 Cf. Donald Bloxham, "Milestones and Mythologies. The Impact of Nuremberg," in Atrocities on 
Trial. Historical Perspectives on the Politics of Prosecuting War Crimes, ed. Patricia Heberer and 
Jürgen Matthäus (Lincoln, London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 263-82, here 275. 
18 Ibid, 274. 
19 Cf.  Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 60. 
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average of ten years in prison.20 However, changes in American policy towards West 
Germany affected the administration of the Subsequent Trials. With the termination of 
OMGUS (in 1949), the trials fell under the jurisdiction of its successor, the U.S. High 
Commission for Occupied Germany, and High Commissioner John J. McCloy took a 
much more lenient position towards the defendants than Henry Clay (of OMGUS). 
Telford Taylor, the chief prosecutor at the Subsequent Trials, reported in 1949 with 
concern that “the sentences became progressively lighter as time went on. (…) No 
doubt a number of factors played a part in this trend towards leniency, including (…) 
the shift in the focus of public attention resulting from international events and 
circumstances.”21 Taylor referred to the shift in American policy accompanying the 
emergence of the Cold War from denazification to reconstruction, integration, and 
democratization.22 Even before the subsequent proceedings’ completion, McCloy, 
responding to the pressure of American political leaders seeking to use West Germany 
as a bulwark against the westward spread of communism in Europe, addressed the 
issue of clemency.23 After just a few years of Allied attempts at aggressive prosecution 
of Nazi criminals, a transition period followed of shifting priorities from confronting 
the Nazi past to Cold War politics. In the 1950s American policies effectively turned 
to the issue of pardoning war criminals still held in American custody.24 Germany’s 
geopolitical significance for American foreign policy interests limited the extent to 
which the program of denazification and reeducation could succeed.  
The general consensus by historians and legal scholars is that the Nuremberg 
interregnum (the IMT and Subsequent Trials), in spite of its shortcomings, mark, in 
                                                
20 Cf. Friedman, "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials," 88. 
21 Qtd. in Friedman, "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials," 89f. 
22 Cf. Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067, signed by President Truman in April of 1945, to guide 
American occupation and denazification of Germany, and JCS Directive 1779, signed by Truman in 
July of 1947, to plan West Germany’s integration and reconstruction.  
23 Cf. Friedman, "Subsequent Nuremberg Trials," 93. 
24 Cf. Buscher, "Bestrafen und erziehen," 105. 
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Jeffrey Herf’s words, “the golden era of judicial confrontation with the Nazi past.”25 
The trials established beyond doubt that the Nazis were guilty of crimes against 
humanity, and Herf credits them for having “presented a detailed picture of the crimes 
of the Nazi regime in the postwar public.”26 However, as Donald Bloxham cautions, 
today’s positive assessment of the trials distorts the fact that the West German people 
decisively rejected “both the medium and the message” during the time when the trials 
mattered most.27 Much attention has been paid to the trials’ widespread news coverage 
in Germany, often mistaken as indicative of a genuine public interest in the 
proceeding; however, most articles on Nuremberg were distributed by a single news 
agency controlled by the Allies.28 A study comparing the news coverage of different 
Nazi trials, including Nuremberg, the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, and the 
Frankfurt Auschwitz trials, showed that the coverage of the IMT produced the largest 
number of articles, frequently appearing on page one. Unlike reporting for other trials, 
the news coverage at the IMT was consistent, unemotional, and neutral, and generated 
responses only once, namely after the pronouncement of judgment, suggesting that the 
population passively absorbed news of the trial but was emotionally invested only in 
the judgment.29 Polls conducted by OMGUS further support the inference that the 
German population’s interest waned dramatically; especially in the winter of 1946, 
Germans were little concerned with the trial.30 The perception among many Germans 
that their own war-time suffering equaled and even exceeded the suffering inflicted in 
their name quickly shaped attitudes towards Allied occupation, and rejection of the 
                                                
25 Herf, Divided Memory, 204. 
26 Ibid., 207. 
27 Bloxham, "Milestones and Mythologies," 267. 
28 Jürgen Wilke et al., Holocaust und NS-Prozesse. Die Presseberichterstattung in Israel und 
Deutschland zwischen Aneignung und Abwehr (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau, 1995), 60.  
29 Cf. ibid., 65, 76, 81, 124. 
30 Cf. ibid., 128. 
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trials figured prominently among negative responses to the occupation.31 By the time 
the U.S. Army released the film Nürnberg und seine Lehre in 1948, there was hardly 
an audience left willing to see it.  
The IMT failed as “Lehrprozess,” as Alfred Döblin had optimistically called 
the trial.32 The judgment of the Major War Criminals in fact furthered the self-
understanding of Germans as victims of a Nazi elite perceived as “other.” In the case 
of military personnel Germans openly opposed the Allied judgment by arguing with 
an ethic of service to the state. This defense soon replaced earlier excuses of ignorance 
or powerlessness, and was increasingly applied to everyone the Allies prosecuted, 
regardless of crime or membership in the armed forces. The revisionist nationalism 
that subordinated German crimes to German suffering, and by which perpetrators 
became victims, was captured in the rhetorical shift from “Kriegsverbrecher” to 
“Kriegsverurteilte.”33  
West German politicians adopted the revisionist stance in reaction to popular 
demands to draw a final line. During his first public appearance in October of 1945, 
future chancellor Konrad Adenauer focused his address on the suffering of the people 
in Cologne. Though he subsequently lost his mayorship of Cologne, he was elected 
leader of the newly founded Christian Democratic Party in January of 1946.34 Two 
months later, Adenauer explained his recovered pride in being German as stemming 
from the population’s ability to bear the burden of postwar occupation, evoking 
comparisons between the occupation and the Nazi regime as periods of equal injustice. 
                                                
31 Cf. Bloxham, "Milestones and Mythologies," 267.  
32 Cf. Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 46. Döblin used the pseudonym Hans Fiedeler. Alfred 
Döblin (=Hans Fiedeler), Der Nürnberger Lehrprozess (Baden-Baden: Neuer Bücherdienst, 1946). 
33 Bloxham, "Milestones and Mythologies," 269f.  
34 Cf. Herf, Divided Memory, 212f.  
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His speeches of 1946 regularly included appeals to end finally (“endlich”) the 
prosecution of “Mitläufer” altogether and to try criminals in German courts.35  
Herf concludes from his analysis of postwar political speeches that “one could 
speak openly about the Nazi past or win national votes, but not both.”36 Adenauer 
campaigned in the first German elections (in 1949) with a promise to end 
denazification and to fight for the amnesty of convicted Nazis, defeating by a majority 
of votes Social Democrat Kurt Schumacher, who had time and again during his 
election campaign stressed the importance of justice and restitution.37  Adenauer won 
because he had “clearly expressed his distaste for extensive trials for crimes of the 
Nazi past.”38  
The Allies approached the Nazi crimes coolly with an appeal to rationality and 
justice in order to secure order in Europe. They never charged the populace with 
collective guilt. Robert H. Jackson, during the opening argument at the IMT, made it 
clear that the U.S. would not incriminate “the whole German people” for the 
“abnormal and inhuman conduct” of a few.39 Reading the judgment on the crime of 
“the persecution of the Jews” one year later, Jackson stressed again “that mass 
punishment should be avoided” in favor of upholding the legal principle that “criminal 
guilt is personal.”40 German intellectuals, however, discussed the question of the 
collective guilt of all Germans long before the Subsequent Trials at Nuremberg 
recognized that a wide spectrum of different layers of society had been implicated in 
                                                
35 Qtd. in Herf, Divided Memory, 213-221, here 217. 
36 Ibid., 203. 
37 Cf. ibid., 270ff. 
38 Ibid., 266.  
39 Jackson, "Opening Address," 82.  
40 Robert H. Jackson, "Judgment: The Persecution of the Jews, September 30-October 1, 1945," in The 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trial 1945-46. A Documentary History, ed. Michael R. Marrus (Boston, New 
York: Bedford Books, 1997), 234-35, here 235. 
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the genocide of the Jews, thereby suggesting that the majority of Germans was at least 
knowing if not complicit.  
Philosopher and psychologist Karl Jaspers made the most famous contribution 
to the discussion over German Kollektivschuld with his 1946 Die Schuldfrage, which 
opened: “Fast die gesamte Welt erhebt Anklage gegen Deutschland und gegen die 
Deutschen. Unsere Schuld wird erörtert mit Empörung, mit Grauen, mit Hass, mit 
Verachtung. Man will Strafe und Vergeltung.”41 While he portrayed Germans as 
pariahs, he enriched the discussion of German guilt with a nuanced differentiation 
between types of guilt and responsibility that opened space for negotiating the future. 
Although his book was widely interpreted as an affirmation of collective guilt, he 
actually set out to dismiss the concept. 
Jaspers first delivered his investigations into the question of German guilt as 
part of a lecture series, held during the winter semester 1945/46 at Heidelberg 
University. He recognized the lack of a “gemeinsame ethisch-politische Grundlage” as 
one of postwar Germany’s chief problems and the main obstacle to reasoned debate 
over guilt (17). This problem was the result of a population that had experienced the 
previous twelve years very differently: for those to whom 1933 or 1938 (the year of 
pogroms) meant an “Erfahrung der nationalen Würdelosigkeit,” 1945 marked 
liberation; yet for those who had supported the Nazis until 1943 or 1945, the end of 
World War II was defeat (16). The only way to bridge the gap was to investigate one’s 
past with a commitment to “voller Offenheit und Ehrlichkeit”: 
 
[D]ieser Weg ist der einzige, der unsere Seele vor dem Pariadasein 
bewahrt. Was aus ihm sich ergibt, müssen wir sehen. Es ist ein geistig-
politisches Wagnis am Abgrund. Wenn Erfolg möglich ist, dann nur 
auf lange Fristen. Man wird uns noch lange misstrauen. (14)  
                                                
41 Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, in Die Schuldfrage. Für Völkermord gibt es keine Verjährung 
(Munich: Piper, 1979), 9-94, here 19. From now on page numbers are included parenthetically in the 
text. 
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Being willing (and able) to talk about the past, accepting Allied occupation and 
embracing the IMT as opportunity for moral reversal were a start on the path towards 
rehabilitation from pariah existence. Jaspers had great hopes for the trial; he expected 
it to mark the beginning of a process that would eventually lead to a new world order 
in which human rights reigned supreme (42f.).  
Jaspers distinguished between four different categories of guilt: criminal, 
political, moral, and metaphysical guilt. Though he considered only a small number of 
Germans to be criminally guilty, he held everyone to be morally accountable. The 
question of individual moral guilt is determined by one’s own conscience. In contrast, 
according to Jaspers, all humans bore metaphysical guilt, a concept bound to the idea 
of God. Metaphysical guilt tied humans together in an “absoluten Solidarität mit dem 
Menschen als Menschen,” and metaphysical guilt applied, for example, when “ich 
dabei bin, wo Unrecht und Verbrechen geschehen (…). Wenn es geschieht und wenn 
ich dabei war und wenn ich überlebe, wo der andere getötet wird, so ist in mir eine 
Stimme, durch die ich weiß: dass ich noch lebe, ist meine Schuld” (52). Anticipating 
the argument that policemen and soldiers could have done nothing to prevent the 
catastrophe, Jaspers wrote that answering to “einer absolut eigengesetzlichen 
Militärmaschinerie” was a question of criminal guilt to be decided in court, but not a 
matter of metaphysical guilt (53). As a consequence of metaphysical guilt, every 
German would have to renegotiate “sein Seinsbewusstsein und sein Selbstbewusstsein 
[in] der Einsamkeit des Einzelnen”; Germany’s future depended on the collective 
outcome of this solitary act of reconnecting with the God-given metaphysical bond 
between human beings (54). His notion of metaphysical guilt concerned all Germans, 
but Jaspers contended that it was the individual alone who affectively experiences 
metaphysical guilt and confirms his relationship to God because of it.  
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Jaspers added to the discussion his fourth concept of guilt—political guilt, 
which derives from citizenship. Here Jaspers offered concrete guidance for all 
Germans about making amends for the crimes committed in their name. Using the 
terms political guilt and political liability (Haftung) interchangeably, Jaspers argued 
that political guilt entailed responsibility for past crimes, which is built on the 
relationship between every citizen to a given state. In a discussion of Jaspers, Aleida 
Assmann succinctly summarizes:  
 
Politische Schuld entsteht als Haftung aller Staatsbürger für die 
Verbrechen, die im Namen des Staates begangen wurden. Sie sind 
schuldig nicht als Individuen, sondern als Kollektiv der Nation, das die 
Mitverantwortung aller mit einschließt. Die Strafen, die auf die 
politische Schuld antworten, z.B. in Gestalt der Einschränkung 
politischer Macht, der Auferlegung von Reparationen, der 
Entnazifizierung oder Wiedergutmachung, sind von der ganzen Nation 
zu tragen.42 
 
With the concept of political liability, Jaspers affirmed collective liability rather than 
collective guilt, which he explicitly rejected in any criminal sense.  All Germans, 
without exception, share political liability.43 In the section entitled “Politische Haftung 
und Kollektivschuld,” Jaspers concluded that political liability is “so etwas wie eine 
moralische Kollektivschuld in der Lebensart einer Bevölkerung, an der ich als 
einzelner teilhabe” (55f., emphasis mine). Although Jaspers was not primarily 
concerned with future generations of Germans, his concept of political liability 
extends into the future and applies until crimes of the past are amended.  
 While writing his lectures on German guilt in 1945, Jaspers reconnected with 
his former student, Hannah Arendt, whose article “Organisierte Schuld” he had just 
                                                
42 Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit--Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang 
mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), 84f.  
43 Jaspers is not singling out Germans per se. All citizens of any modern state are politically liable, and 
in the context of Jaspers’ writing, the German citizenry serves as example to make this point. 
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read.44 Arendt, who had written the essay in 1944, predicted an Allied trial of German 
war criminals, but was pessimistic about its outcome.45 Arendt argued that in a country 
where the majority of the population had consented to the Nazi regime, the line 
between criminals and innocents was too blurred for the Allies to sentence any war 
criminals, “weil man niemanden finden wird, auf den die Definition des 
Kriegsverbrechers nicht zutrifft” (26, emphasis mine). Arendt stated that the crimes of 
tens of thousands of murderers had required the work of a whole people of 
“verantwortungslos Verantwortliche[r]” to maintain the “ungeheuerliche(n) Maschine 
des ‘Verwaltungsmassenmordes.’” For the Nazis to have successfully mobilized a 
people to aid in genocide proved to Arendt that the Germans were incapable of 
“Verantwortungsfähigkeit”—and what use would a trial be if those tried were 
incapable of understanding the concept of responsibility (31)? Hence she disagreed 
quite strongly with Jaspers’ later approach towards the IMT and the question of guilt. 
Reformulating her own argument, Arendt wrote in response to her former teacher’s 
differentiation of criminal guilt: 
 
Mir ist Ihre Definition der Nazi-Politik als Verbrechen (“kriminelle 
Schuld”) fraglich. Diese Verbrechen lassen sich, scheint mir, juristisch 
nicht mehr fassen, und das macht gerade ihre Ungeheuerlichkeit aus. 
Für diese Verbrechen gibt es keine angemessene Strafe mehr; Göring 
zu hängen, ist zwar notwendig, aber völlig inadäquat. Das heißt, diese 
Schuld, im Gegensatz zu aller kriminellen Schuld, übersteigt und 
zerbricht alle Rechtsordnungen. (…) Mit einer Schuld, die jenseits des 
Verbrechens steht (…) kann man menschlich-politisch überhaupt nichts 
anfangen.46 
                                                
44 Cf. Jaspers, letter to Arendt, December 10, 1945, in Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 
ed. Lotte Köhler and Hans Saner (Munich, Zurich: Piper, 1985), 62.  
45 Hannah Arendt, "Organisierte Schuld," in In der Gegenwart. Übungen im politischen Denken II 
(Munich: Piper, 2000), 26-37. The article first appeared in English translation in 1945, and in the 
German original, which Arendt dedicated to Jaspers, in April 1946, in the journal Die Wandlung. From 
now on page numbers are inluded parenthetically in the text.  
46 Arendt, letter to Jaspers, August 17, 1946, in Arendt and Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 90f. 
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In his response to Arendt’s critique, Jaspers criticized her approach to dealing with the 
Nazis in postwar Germany: 
 
Was die Nazis getan haben, lasse sich als „Verbrechen” nicht fassen, —
Ihre Auffassung ist mir nicht ganz geheuer, weil die Schuld, die alle 
kriminelle Schuld übersteigt, unvermeidlich einen Zug von “Größe”—
satanischer Größe—bekommt, die meinem Gefühl angesichts der Nazis 
so fern ist, wie das Reden vom „Dämonischen“ in Hitler und 
dergleichen. Mir scheint, man muss, weil es wirklich so war, die Dinge 
in ihrer ganzen Banalität nehmen, ihrer ganzen nüchternen Nichtigkeit. 
(…) Ich sehe jeden Ansatz von Mythos und Legende mit Schrecken, 
und jedes Unbestimmte ist schon solcher Ansatz. (…) So wie Sie es 
aussprechen, ist fast schon der Weg der Dichtung beschritten. Und 
Shakespeare würde nie diesen Gegenstand angemessen gestalten 
können—ohne Unwahrhaftigkeit ästhetischer Herkunft—und er dürfte 
es darum nicht. Es ist keine Idee und kein Wesen in dieser Sache. Sie 
erschöpft sich als Gegenstand der Psychologie und Soziologie, der 
Psychopathie und der Jurisprudenz.47 
 
Jaspers took issue with Arendt’s tendency to tie the genocide to something so vast and 
incomprehensible that it was in danger of being conflated with a myth or legend that 
might lend itself to aesthetic falsification. He clearly rejected Arendt’s “poetic view of 
the Nazi crimes,”48 contrasting it with the banality of evil, which Arendt would later 
use as the subtitle to her Eichmann book.49 She clearly took Jaspers’ critique to heart. 
She wrote in response that she certainly wanted to avoid ascribing satanic greatness to 
the Nazis.50 
Many Germans openly and vigorously rejected the idea of collective guilt, but 
they were reacting to an accusation that had actually never been raised officially: no 
document exists in which any of the Allied powers asserted the Germans’ collective 
                                                
47 Jaspers, letter to Arendt, October 19, 1946, ibid., 98f.  
48 Wolf Lepenies, The Seduction of Culture in German History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 129.  
49 Cf. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York, London: Penguin Books, 1977). 
50 Arendt to Jaspers, December 17, 1946, in Arendt and Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 106.  
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guilt.51 Nevertheless, Dan Diner argues that Jaspers’ discussion of the collective guilt 
thesis is one of the “founding text[s] for the new (West) German collective identity,” 
adding that to this day the question of guilt is constitutive of German self-
understanding and “can be sensed everywhere.”52 The psychoanalytical concept of 
projection accounts for simultaneously internalizing and attacking the notion of 
collective guilt.53 Stephan Hermlin, who reviewed Jaspers’ Die Schuldfrage, early on 
interpreted the German defense against the (perceived) accusation of collective guilt as 
“Eingeständnis einer tiefempfundenen Schuld.”54 Helmut Dubiel argues that the 
German people had for so long identified as one Volksgemeinschaft that they 
approached guilt as a question affecting the collective. In doing so, Dubiel continues, 
they failed to engage with it in a differentiated manner on the individual level.55  
As part of their ongoing dialogue about German guilt, Jaspers and Arendt also 
addressed the possibility for the return of German Jews to Germany. Arendt declared 
that for Jews to live in Europe, a general acknowledgment of the crimes against them 
would be required: Jews could not simply return to Europe “als Deutsche oder 
Franzosen etc., als ob nichts geschehen sei.” Arendt, who remained in the United 
States but considered writing in German for a German audience, told Jaspers, 
“Schreiben ist doch eine Form des Zurückkommens.” She declared that she would like 
to write, but only for an audience that was fully aware of the genocide and welcomed 
her with this awareness as a Jewish writer.56 Jaspers, whose wife was Jewish, 
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responded to Arendt with “volle[m] Beifall”: “Durch meine Frau ist mir das längst 
selbstverständlich.”57 Sounding hopeful, in the same letter he mentioned a seminar he 
was teaching on Kant that was attended by intelligent young Germans eager to 
participate in the sort of discussion Jaspers had hoped for in his lecture on Germany. 
However, Jaspers became deeply disappointed over the next few years, for despite its 
discussions about collective guilt, the population was not interested in differentiated 
confrontations with the past. Jaspers and his wife left Germany for Basel in 1948; he 
explained their belated emigration with the Germans’ failure to meet the condition for 
Jewish life in postwar Germany: the acknowledgment of the genocide. He wrote, 
“Was uns forttrieb war klar: das Ausbleiben der Konsequenzen des Massenmordes an 
den Juden und der radikale Abstand vom totalen Verbrecherstaat.”58  
 
“Die Folgen eines historischen Irrtums”:59 New Rules of Literature 
On May 8, 1945, Klaus Mann entered Germany for the first time since his 
family’s emigration to the United States in 1933. He arrived in Germany as a member 
of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the U.S. Army, a capacity in which he had 
conducted interviews of German POWs since early 1944.60 In May and June of 1945, 
Mann visited the concentration camps Dachau, Theresienstadt, and Buchenwald, and 
he concluded that it was the policy of mass extermination that was essential to 
Nazism, not, as the Allies assumed, the waging of aggressive war. Writing for the 
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newspaper of the U.S. Army in Europe one month after Germany’s defeat, he noted 
that the Germans’ most often articulated sentiment was self-pity. Klaus Mann stated:  
 
The German people show no trace of a sense of responsibility, much 
less a sense of guilt. They don’t understand that their present calamity 
is the direct, inevitable consequence of what the German nation, as a 
collective body, has done to the world during the past five years. (…) 
They must not get away with their hypocritical pretense that they 
“didn’t know” (…). Of course, they knew—and if they didn’t, it was 
just because they found it more convenient to ignore certain ugly 
truths.61 
Convinced of the Germans’ moral bankruptcy and collective guilt, Mann, who had 
become an American citizen, decided that he would not resettle in Germany.62 He also 
warned his father, Thomas Mann, not to return to Germany either, for it was a 
“deplorable, terrible nation [that] will remain physically and morally mutilated, 
crippled, for generations to come.”63 
 The question as to whether Thomas Mann, the most accomplished German 
writer of the time, would return to Germany sparked “die große Kontroverse” of the 
immediate postwar period.64 In August 1945 the co-founder of German PEN, Walter 
von Molo, published an open letter in newspapers in Germany, the United States, and 
other countries, urging Thomas Mann to return to Germany and help rebuild it. Von 
Molo assured him that most Germans had not supported Hitler and that life in 
Germany had in fact resembled life in one large concentration camp.65 Like most 
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Germans, von Molo portrayed Germany as two countries, one being the Nazi regime, 
and the other—inhabited by the majority, who were the true and good Germans—
having been subjugated to evil forces. The writer Frank Thiess aligned himself with 
von Molo in asking Mann to return but took a sharper tone in an open letter defending 
writers of the so-called internal (or inner) emigration, who supposedly shared the 
suffering of the German people while resisting Nazism intellectually, spiritually, and 
emotionally, rather than abandoning their home country as Thiess implied that Mann 
had done. Eliding the fact that most emigrants had been forced out of Germany, Thiess 
evoked the Nazi rhetoric of German blood and soil when he accused Mann of having 
forfeited his right to be a German writer by giving up “German space, German earth, 
and the echo of German people.”66  
Unlike von Molo and Thiess, Thomas Mann had rejected the idea of two 
Germanys, most explicitly in a speech held at the Library of Congress in Washington, 
D.C., in 1945.67 In additon, Mann published an open letter, “Warum ich nicht nach 
Deutschland zurückkehre,” in which he not only insisted that he would always remain 
a German writer but dismissed all literature produced in Germany under the Nazis on 
grounds of complicity with the regime.68 Mann’s letter was met with a host of 
opinions articulated in print and on radio, and Stephan Braese speculates that a large 
majority of the German population followed the erupting controversy closely.69  The 
debate reached its culmination in 1946, when popular author Erich Kästner called it 
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foolishness to ask Mann to return: “Es war eine Torheit, ihn zu rufen. Man hätte ihn 
viel eher bitten müssen, nur ja und auf alle Fälle drübenzubleiben.”70  
The debate directly engaged emigrant writers and those who had remained in 
Germany, setting the tone for the future of German literature in important ways. 
Moreover, it served as a forum for ongoing discussion between Germans at home and 
abroad on the highly emotional question of German complicity. The debate figured 
importantly as a screen onto which Germans projected unresolved feelings of guilt. 
Mann became a target because many Germans viewed his series of BBC radio 
addresses, Deutsche Hörer (1941-1945), as attacking them for having failed to 
emigrate or resist the Nazis.71 Emigrant Hans Mayer noted upon his return to Germany 
that most Germans viewed repatriates (“Remigranten”) as traitors who had actively 
contributed to the Allied efforts to defeat Germany.72 As Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich argued in Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern in 1967, the Germans now 
understood that there had been an alternative to Nazism that they had failed to seek. 
This realization caused “Neid auf die größere Schuldlosigkeit,” kept in check by the 
insistence that emigration was a “Feigheit; Fahnenflucht.”73 The fabrication of an 
internal emigration as a movement of resistance to which one claimed membership 
served solely as defense against accusations of complicity. Most Germans who paid 
attention to the debate were concerned not with its literary character but with the 
greatest question of the day on which it touched: the Germans’ collective guilt.74  
                                                
70 Qtd. in ibid., 39.  
71 Thomas Mann, Deutsche Hörer! 55 Radiosendungen nach Deutschland (Stockholm: Bermann-
Fischer, 1945). 
72 Cf. Brockmann, Zero Hour, 96.  
73 Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern. Grundlagen kollektiven 
Verhaltens (Munich: Piper, 2001), 68.  
74 Jaspers, who recognized the German interest in the Mann case as engagement with the idea of 
collective guilt, only hesitantly addressed the issue in a letter to Arendt. Jaspers appreciated Mann as 
writer but disagreed with his 1945 speech on Germany. He would like to believe in Mann as “Ethiker” 
but told Arendt that, if “hier die Verwirrung durch ihn nicht behoben wird,” he would have to openly 
criticize Mann for giving the impression that all Germans were collectively guilty. Jaspers, letter to 
Arendt, December 10, 1945, in Arendt and Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 63. 
 30 
 As a literary debate, the discussion of Mann’s return presaged the 
marginalization of exiled writers that would characterize much of the postwar West 
German Literaturbetrieb (as distinguished from German literature as such). As Braese 
observes, the debate excluded Jewish writers altogether from the process of defining a 
new literature: Mann stood on one side, speaking for German writers in exile without 
representing Jewish German writers, and members of the internal emigration stood on 
the other, infusing the debate with an “Ausschlusscharakter” that kept Jews from 
participating.75  
The publication of the bi-weekly journal Der Ruf further evidenced this 
excluding process. The journal’s editors, Alfred Andersch and Hans Werner Richter, 
who had undergone a reeducation and democratization program while in custody at 
American POW camps in Rhode Island, returned to Germany as so-called Selected 
Citizens with the task to establish democracy, and were given a license to publish 
within the American occupation zone.76 But because their rhetoric, with its emphasis 
of the German defeat as a new beginning for a generation “zwischen 18 und 35 Jahren, 
getrennt von den Älteren durch ihre Nicht-Verantwortlichkeit für Hitler,”77 violated 
American directions to engage all Germans and educate them regarding their past 
crimes, the license was revoked after just eight months.78 During those eight months, 
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between August 1946 and March 1947, Andersch and Richter used Der Ruf as a 
platform to mobilize young war returnees against the Allied occupation, to oppose 
charges of collective guilt, and to promulgate the idea that the end of the war left a 
blank slate that absolved them for their actions in the past (including their own: 
Richter and Andersch had been members of the Reichsschrifttumskammer79). Subtitled 
Unabhängige Blätter der jungen Generation, their publication resonated well with 
those who interpreted “the generational divide [as] some kind of absolution from 
Nazism.”80 In commentary on the IMT in Nuremberg, Andersch defended young 
Germans and their “erstaunlichen Waffentaten” and disconnected them from “[den] 
‘Taten’ etwas älterer Deutscher, die gegenwärtig in Nürnberg verhandelt werden.”81 
He carefully avoided any mention of the extermination of the Jews, putting deeds in 
quotation marks (“Taten”); in the sentence that followed he cited crimes in Dachau 
and Buchenwald but omitted any reference to Auschwitz. 
Der Ruf also served as Richter and Andersch’s megaphone to conceptualize 
what they considered a new literature. In the editorial pages of the first issue, “Das 
junge Europa formt sein Gesicht,” Andersch emphasized the shared experience of war 
as the condition for participation in the shaping of postwar Germany. In this view not 
“re-education” by the Allies but the contemplation of “das große Erlebnis” of warfare 
would be the source of German political and cultural renewal.82 Richter elaborated in 
the second issue on Erlebnis as a decisive factor for the generation in charge of 
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rebuilding Germany;83 elsewhere he claimed “die Erfahrung der Erlebnisse” to be the 
source from which soldiers would give birth to a new literature.84 In his analysis of 
Der Ruf Klaus Briegleb charges Andersch and Richter with prolonging the soldier 
experience by actively using military language and an emphasis on camaraderie to 
exclude exiled Germans and German Jews from participating in shaping the public 
attitudes and literature of postwar Germany.85 Mention was made of political prisoners 
in concentration camps and Germans in displaced persons camps, but German Jews or 
extermination camps were left out of any discussion in Der Ruf; exiled Germans were 
addressed only when Andersch demanded of them to return to Germany: “Emigration 
kann überhaupt nur leben aus der Erwartung der Heimkehr.”86 
Once they had lost their publishing license, Andersch and Richter shifted their 
efforts to organizing a literary circle, Gruppe 47. The group’s history, its meaning for 
West German literature, and its role in the cultural sphere have been thoroughly 
assessed.87 As recently as 1989, Volker Wehdeking celebrated Richter for providing a 
forum for literary production during years of postwar chaos and thereby laying the 
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foundations for “Trauerarbeit” that began with the publication of Günter Grass’s Die 
Blechtrommel and Heinrich Böll’s Billard um halb zehn in 1959.88 The success of both 
novels established the group’s reputation as the conscience of West Germany: Gruppe 
47 was known for opposing Nazism and the Adenauer era of restoration, and for 
effectively promoting Vergangenheitsbewältigung. In the last fifteen years, however, 
scholars have revaluated Group 47 and identified many of its attributed characteristics 
as myths. For instance, while the public saw the group as opposing the Adenauer 
administration, most of the group’s members distanced themselves from politics not 
because of opposition but indifference; those who actually pursued distance from the 
regime—Günter Eich, Ilse Aichinger, Ingeborg Bachmann, and Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer—were marginalized within the group.89 Furthermore, by inviting the 
leading figures of the Literaturbetrieb into the group and fostering connections 
between authors and literary agents, editors, and reviewers, Richter effectively 
managed the marketability of the group and guaranteed its participation in the West 
German economic miracle rather than establishing it as opposition.  
The early group was recruited primarily from contributors to Der Ruf; Richter 
controlled the membership to realize his and Andersch’s vision of young, innocent war 
returnees who would shape postwar society. The group thus excluded former Nazis, 
anyone older than forty, and those belonging to the inner emigration.90 Because the 
group members’ war experiences condensed into a single “’Erlebnis,’ das nicht zu 
debattieren war,” the exclusive emphasis of this ur-experience as the foundation for 
literary production also kept emigrants and Jewish writers from participating in the 
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group.91 As Briegleb contends, all future members of the group had indeed returned 
from the war without a sense of guilt but with a feeling of having been betrayed by 
their superiors, who had left them vulnerable as targets of Allied hatred. Briegleb 
quotes group member Heinz Friedrich, who felt hated by the Poles and the French and 
compared himself to Jews if they were to become targets of anti-Semitism: “Und da 
fühle ich mich betroffen ebenso, wie sich der Jude betroffen fühlte, wenn man gegen 
das Jüdische vorginge.”92 The comparison of a German World War II veteran to a 
Jewish victim of anti-Semitism, and the use of the subjunctive, suggesting that 
Friedrich doubts anti-Semitism was practiced in Nazi Germany, shows an incredible 
disregard for the immediate past. At the same time, however, a concurrent past offered  
Erlebnis of war as the founding principle for the future and was constantly invoked. 
The past was thus simultaneously called upon and suppressed. This process was 
evidenced when Gruppe 47 members evoked death, fire, camps, trains, and terror, but 
refer to exclusively German experiences: DP camps, war returnees in trains, burning 
German cities. Briegleb calls this practice “Hineinsehenmüssen und Wegschreiben.”93 
At the second group meeting in November 1947, Andersch read from his 
essay, “Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung.” This was the only essay ever to be 
presented at a meeting,94 as Richter generally opposed essays because they led “zu 
Grundsatzdiskussionen, von denen es in anderen Gremien mehr als genug gab. Wir 
wollten es [sic] nicht. Sie standen unserer Absicht im Weg.”95 Andersch’s reading thus 
marked an extraordinary occasion, and his essay was furthermore received 
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extraordinarily, namely with almost no criticism but unanimous agreement.96 With the 
essay, Andersch attempted to analyze the literary situation of the postwar era and, as 
the title indicates, sought to clarify that German literature was at a decisive point that 
would determine its future orientation. Andersch set out his position vis-à-vis the inner 
emigration, which he defended against accusations of guilt made by exiled Germans 
abroad and “einigen hohen Wortführern der deutschen Intellektualität im Inlande”—
undoubtedly references to Jaspers and Mann.97 Andersch put forward the obscure 
argument that the aesthetic and the inhumane were categories that could never co-
exist; therefore literature automatically meant resistance to what he dubiously referred 
to as the “historische[n]” or “deutsche[n]” Irrtum” (189f.). The mere existence of 
literature proved, according to him, “die Absurdität der Behauptung” of collective 
guilt (192). Stylistically, however, the inner emigration failed; it produced mere 
“Kalligraphie” rather than literature (197). Andersch opposed the inner emigration to 
authors in exile, insisting that literature produced in emigration noticeably lacked 
something crucial that only the proximity to the German language and the “Strom des 
deutschen Lebens” offered (202). Echoing Thiess in the controversy surrounding 
Mann’s return, Andersch declared that exile writers could contribute to German 
literature only if they returned to Germany (203). Having thus acknowledged authors 
of both inner and actual emigration while simultaneously criticizing the stylistic 
choices of both groups, Andersch introduced an alternative to the literatures produced 
by both types of emigration. 
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 Rather than being trapped in isolation (actual emigration) or in “Sackgassen 
der Form” (inner emigration), the young generation—represented by the members of 
Gruppe 47—began from a “[t]abula rasa” with “einem originalen Schöpfungsakt” that 
would bring about the “Erneuerung des deutschen geistigen Lebens” (210).98 
Andersch speaks of a “Vorgefühl eines originalen Neu-Werdens” (211) that will lead 
his generation, unified by the intensity of Erlebnis, to “reine[m] Realismus” (212). 
The only obstacle his generation must surmount in order to fulfill its historical mission 
is overcoming Allied occupation, which Andersch compares to colonial power. It is 
the writer’s duty to fight against the Allies’ colonial measures, which have been 
sanctioned “durch die aufgedrungene Anerkennung einer Kollektivschuld” (214, 
emphasis mine). According to Andersch, German literature needs to free the German 
people from accusations of collective guilt; it needs to reveal the Allies’ appeal to the 
“höchste[n] ethische[n] Postulate[n]” of human rights as a mask behind which they 
hide plans for a war between capitalism and communism; therefore, German literature 
also needs to deny the value systems presented by the Allies (215).  
Twice in the essay, Andersch insists on the German writer’s ability to practice 
reflective self-criticism: in shaking off the Allied accusation of guilt (214) and in 
practicing a tolerance that is more far-reaching than “[d]ie Moral von Lessings 
Ringparabel” (217).99 It is astounding that in the two instances where Andersch evokes 
the necessity for self-criticism, he lacks precisely what he advocates. Prescribing self-
criticism as an antidote to guilt charges and suggesting that self-reflection is a tool 
with which one proves one’s innocence obscures the reality of actual guilt. From the 
dissonance between Andersch’s conformism during the Third Reich and his narrative 
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Weigel, "'Generation' als symbolische Form." 
99 Andersch refers to Lessing’s play Nathan der Weise (1779), which includes the parable of the rings. 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Trauerspiele. Nathan der Weise, Dramatische Fragmente, Anhang. Das 
dichterische Werk Bd. 2, ed. Herbert G. Göpfert (Munich: dtv, 1979). 
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of resistance, it appears that he himself was incapable of self-criticism. Rather than 
self-criticism, he effectively prescribes denial. Furthermore, for Andersch to demand 
tolerance beyond what Lessing had in mind with the parable of the rings—at heart a 
call for tolerance of and among the Abrahamic religions—attests to his lack of 
reflection on the racial policies practiced by the Nazis. By calling Lessing’s ring 
parable a lesson “der allgemeinen Duldsamkeit gegenüber Ideen” (217) Andersch 
reduces Nazi anti-Semitism to mere intolerance of an idea, rather than recognizing it 
as genocide. Elsewhere in the essay, Andersch writes about Josef Goebbels: “Nicht 
ohne Grund hat der Meister [der offiziellen] Progaganda am Ende nur noch einen 
Feind gesehen und verfolgt: die deutschen Intellektuellen, gegen die sich sein 
unversöhnlicher Haß richtete” (200). This statement is truly astonishing in light of the 
Holocaust, and it draws Andersch’s inability to reflect self-critically in even starker 
relief.  
In spite of an excursion into existentialist philosophy, which was reviewed as a 
radical move, Andersch’s emphases on the Allied occupation as colonialism, the 
denial of collective guilt, and the refusal even to mention the Shoah and to discuss 
Jewish authors, reflect a revisionist point of view. While stressing Sartre’s advice that 
the Germans overcome self-denial (and in Andersch’s interpretation Allied 
colonialism),100 he is silent regarding Sartre’s demand for the Germans to foster “die 
Erinnerung an die Fehler der Vergangenheit” (218), which would include self-
reflective engagement with anti-Semitism.101 
                                                
100 Andersch refers to Jean-Paul Sartre’s introduction to the German translation of Les Mouches, in 
which Sartre appeals to the Germans to replace their “willfährige Selbstverleumdnung” with a 
commitment to freedom and the future. Qtd. in Andersch, "Notwendige Aussage," 218. 
101 In spite of Andersch’s admiration for Sartre, clearly expressed in the essay, Andersch does not 
mention Sartre’s 1945 text on anti-Semitism. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Überlegungen zur Judenfrage 
(Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994). 
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As both Klaus Briegleb and Stephan Braese convincingly argue, the nascent 
Literaturbetrieb afforded little room for Jewish authors or Jewish literary subjects, and 
it failed to account for the German-Jewish past before and during the Nazi regime. 
Briegleb concludes regarding the literary scene in the late 1940s: “Das junge 
Deutschland blieb bei sich selbst. Ein Anfang ohne Juden nach 1945.”102 Elsewhere he 
wrote of the entire postwar literature of West Germany, “[d]ass Juden in der deutschen 
Literatur nach 1945 ‘eigentlich nicht’ vorkommen.”103  In his study of Zero Hour 
literature, Stephen Brockmann argues that this disinterest in Jewish authors and Jewish 
literary subjects should be interpreted as German resistance to perpetuating the 
attention given the so-called Jewish question by the Nazis. He calls this disinterest a 
passive response to racial obsessions and argues that Briegleb, who “is entirely correct 
in stating that for the most part ‘the German-Jewish difference after the Shoah was not 
thematized’ by postwar German writers,” is referring to a difference that emerged as a 
construct only much later.104 Here Brockmann seems to suggest that in order to show 
that they rejected the Nazi past, the German people avoided the literary treatment of 
Jewish victims and ignored Jewish writers as contributors to postwar literature out of a 
desire to distance themselves from their own history of racial discrimination. But 
given that the Nazis had murdered the vast majority of German Jews or forced them 
into emigration, it is surprising that Brockmann would assume that any lack of 
concern for Jews in postwar Germany might be indicative of a rejection of previous 
racial policies. On the contrary, at the least this lack of concern reflects a continued 
indifference to the fate of the Jews. The Nazis posited German-Jewish difference as 
                                                
102 Cf. Briegleb, "Neuanfang," 58.  
103 Klaus Briegleb, "Negative Symbiose," in Gegenwartsliteratur seit 1968, ed. Klaus Briegleb and 
Sigrid Weigel, Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zur 
Gegenwart 12 (Munich: C. Hanser, 1992), 117-51, here 121. 
104 Brockmann, Zero Hour, 8f. Cf. “Die jüdisch-deutsche Differenz nach der Shoah wurde nicht 
thematisiert” (emphasis in the original), Briegleb, Missachtung und Tabu, 12. 
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the basis of their racial policies, and for this reason Jews became the primary targets of 
extermination. Brockmann’s reading of the “German-Jewish difference after the 
Shoah” as a postwar construct is highly problematic, even if he is correct in pointing 
to the fact that many German Jews did not see such a stark German-Jewish difference 
until after the events of the 1930s and 1940s. Braese argues more convincingly that the 
experience of having survived genocidal policies equipped Jewish German writers 
with an entirely different perspective than that of non-Jewish authors, and thus the 
conditions under which they wrote in postwar Germany differed as well. Brockmann 
simplifies the role of Jewish voices in postwar German society by neatly 
distinguishing between two groups of Jews: those Jewish intellectuals who remained 
in or returned to Germany and who identified themselves as Germans and preferred 
not to discuss their Jewishness publicly; and those German Jews who identified 
themselves primarily as Jews and therefore chose to live outside Germany.105 He 
concludes that the absence of Jewish voices was not a consequence of marginalization 
within the Literaturbetrieb but a matter of choice. Brockmann’s line of argumentation 
raises an important question: is it true that Jews in postwar Germany did not 
problematize their specifically Jewish experience in the Third Reich and the role of 
that experience for the reconstruction of Germany? Regarding two specific Jews, Jean 
Améry and Wolfgang Hildesheimer, another question arises: why did German-
speaking Jews who strongly identified as Jewish victims of Nazi racial policies decide 
not to live in postwar, democratic Germany?  
 
“Mein Rang ist: Court-Interpreter.” Wolfgang Hildesheimer 
 Wolfgang Hildesheimer returned to Germany from exile in London to work as 
simultaneous interpreter at the Nuremberg court during the Subsequent Trials. Just a 
                                                
105 Cf. Brockmann, Zero Hour, 9.  
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few days after his arrival in Nuremberg in January 1947 he wrote to his sister, who 
lived with their parents in Haifa: 
  
In einem Occupations-land [sic] zu leben ist sehr merkwürdig und 
keineswegs leicht, aber davon werde ich in meinem nächsten Brief 
berichten. Vorläufig will ich von der Arbeit schreiben. Es ist mir 
übrigens schon gelungen Kontakte mit einigen Leuten herzustellen. Z. 
B. heute nachmittag bin ich bei Dr. Troche, dem Direktor des 
Germanischen Museums eingeladen. 
Mein Rang ist: Court-interpreter (und zwar von Deutsch ins 
Englische) das bedeutet, dass ich bei Gerichtsverhandlungen alles was 
ich durch den Kopfhörer [auf] Deutsch höre sofort simultan, 
automatisch ins Englische übersetze und zwar in das Mikrophon. Du 
kannst Dir vorstellen, dass das eine etwas nervenzerreibende Tätigkeit 
ist aber auch sehr verantwortungsvoll, aber dafür haben wir eine sehr 
“privileged position,” einen sehr hohen Rang und verhältnismäßig 
kurze Arbeitszeiten. (…) Meine Schreibmaschinistin ist eine 
Nürnberger Deutsche. Sigi Ramler habe ich kennengelernt. Er ist eine 
Art Chef von mir. Er ist sehr jung und macht einen entzückenden 
Eindruck. 
Nächstes Wochenende fahre ich nach München und Mitte 
Februar auf 3 Tage nach Garmisch. 106 
 
In February, while Hildesheimer was still training to be an interpreter by sitting in on 
other trials and translating older material, he wrote to his parents:  
 
Das Material was man in die Hand bekommt und auch die 
Zeugenaussagen die man bei den Ärzte-prozessen zu hören bekommt 
übersteigt manchmal alles vorstellbare. Während ich früher Skrupel 
hatte und nicht sicher war ob ich an der ganzen Nürnberg-maschine 
teilnehmen wollte, bin ich jetzt ganz sicher, dass alle Urteile die bis 
jetzt gefällt sind und auch gefällt werden, berechtigt sind.107 
 
                                                
106 Hildesheimer, letter to Eva Teltsch, January 1947, in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Briefe, eds. Silvia 
Hildesheimer and Dietmar Pleyer (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1999), 15f. Hildesheimer’s spelling and 
punctuation stand uncorrected.  
The Briefe collection includes only a fraction of the letters kept at the archive of the Berlin 
Akademie der Künste. Volker Jehle is in the process of preparing an edition that includes all surviving 
letters between Wolfgang Hildesheimer, his sister Eva Teltsch, and their parents. I cite excerpts 
published elsewhere (e.g., in Braese, Die andere Erinnerung) because the archival material was 
copyrighted during my visits to the archive in spring 2008.   
107 February 5, 1947, qtd. in Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 68f.  
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After he began interpreting at court in March, he added: “[Meine Arbeit] ist sehr 
interessant, lässt sich aber doch schlecht beschreiben, weil man schon bei diesen 
Prozessen dabei sein muss, um sich über die wirkliche Bedeutung klar zu werden.”108 
In April Hildesheimer reported about his “Debut” at the trial against Friedrich Flick et 
al., telling his family, in parentheses: “(Das einzige, was ich den ganzen Tag zu sagen 
hatte, war zwar nur: I am not guilty (sechs mal)).”109 During the following months, 
Hildesheimer interpreted at the trials of the Doctors, IG Farben, the Hostages, and the 
Einsatzgruppen. He reported home:  
 
Bei den Einsatztruppen geht es hoch her und das dolmetschen, obwohl 
ziemlich anstrengend, ist sehr interessant, da man unwillkürlich die 
Angeklagten nachmacht. Ich beherrsche schon das ganze Register von 
Ironie über Wut zu Tränen; man spielt unwillkürlich Theater. Die 
Angeklagten sind meist kleinbürgerliche Verbrecher und daher nicht so 
interessant wie zum Beispiel die Angeklagten der I.G. die eine rege 
Korrespondenz über alle möglichen Fragen mit uns führen. Auch 
schreiben wir uns gegenseitig Gedichte. Das kann man sich 
wahrscheinlich nicht vorstellen, wenn man nicht selbst dabei ist.110 
 
These few snippets do not represent Hildesheimer’s correspondence with his family in 
general; although he wrote very frequently and repeatedly promised to report in 
greater detail about his work, he rarely made more than passing mention of it. It is 
actually quite surprising how little he reflected on his work and on what he heard in 
court, and how little he said about his interactions with the Germans themselves. In his 
letters to his family, Hildesheimer mentioned more often the comfort of his living 
quarters (“Riesenzimmer mit Badezimmern”111), the rations of food, liquor, and 
cigarettes (far exeeding those available to the Germans and of much better quality), 
new friendships he had made with Americans, and his progress in the visual arts. 
                                                
108 March 3, 1947, qtd. in ibid., 69.  
109 April 26, 1947, qtd. in ibid., 69.  
110 October 25, 1947, qtd. in ibid., 69.  
111 Hildesheimer, letter to Teltsch, January 1947, in: Hildesheimer, Briefe, 15.  
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There is no word in his surviving letters as to why Hildesheimer returned to Germany 
as an interpreter. 
 Wolfgang Hildesheimer was born in Hamburg in 1916 to Dr. Arnold and 
Hanna Hildesheimer.112 Although his parents were secular, his family had Orthodox 
Jewish roots.113 Arnold Hildesheimer, a chemist at the Anglo-Dutch cooperation 
Unilever, was, unlike his forefathers, an “areligiöser Zionist und ging nur noch an 
höchsten Feiertagen zur Synagoge als eine Art Pflichtübung.”114 The parents of Hanna 
Hildesheimer, nee Goldschmidt, had been booksellers in Hamburg and considered 
themselves “zwar vage jüdisch, ging[en] aber niemals zum Gottendienst, das tradierte 
Kulturgut war deutsch, war Literatur, vor allem Schiller.”115 Because of Arnold 
Hildesheimer’s employment the family moved frequently, so that Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer grew up in Berlin, Cleve, Nijmegen, and Mannheim. From 1930 to 1933 
he attended the humanist boarding school Odenwaldschule, where he acted in 
Shakespeare productions and subsequently developed an interest in stage design.116  
After several years of planning the family moved to Palestine in 1933. In 
preparation for a career in stage design, Hildesheimer completed a carpenter’s 
apprenticeship in Jerusalem (1934-36). In the summer of 1937 he took design classes 
in Austria before enrolling at the London Central School of Arts in Crafts, where he 
                                                
112 Summary biographies of Hildesheimer are included in Franka Köpp and Sabine Wolf, Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer 1916-1991, Findbuch-Editionen (Berlin: Stiftung Archiv der Akademie der Künste, 
2002), 18-22; Hildesheimer, Briefe, 384f.; Heinz Puknus, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Autorenbücher 
(Munich: Beck, 1978), 156-158; Dierk Rodewald, ed. Über Wolfgang Hildesheimer (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp,1971), 165. (The biography included in Rodewald was compiled by Hildesheimer himself.) 
113 His paternal great-grandfather, Esriel, had been a prominent modernizer of Orthodox Judaism and 
the intellectual leader of the community Adass Jisroel in Berlin. The grandfather, Hirsch Hildesheimer, 
had started a career as professor of history at a rabbinical seminary and then became, like Esriel, an 
editor at the Berlin publication Jüdische Presse. Cf. Henry A. Lea, Wolfgang Hildesheimers Weg als 
Jude und Deutscher (Stuttgart: Hans-Dieter Heinz, 1997), 6f. 
114 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Mein Judentum (1978)," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer Gesammelte Werke in 
sieben Bänden. Bd. VII, Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 159-69, here 161.  
115 Ibid., 161. 
116 Cf. Köpp and Wolf, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 18.  
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took up painting, textile, and stage design. While still in school, he began working for 
the Tavistoc Little Theatre, designing stage and costumes for Chekhov, Shaw, and 
Büchner productions.117 At the outbreak of World War II Hildesheimer was traveling 
around continental Europe, and he fled from Bretagne to Switzerland, where he had to 
wait several months before returning to Palestine.118 Once in Tel Aviv he worked as an 
English teacher for the British Council; in 1943 he joined the Public Information 
Office of the British Mandate government in Jerusalem to publish the weekly journal 
Forum. There he began writing poetry and literary criticism, in addition to advancing 
his career as graphic designer; he first exhibited his work in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv 
(in 1945).119  
In 1946 Hildesheimer returned to London to work as a freelance designer and 
painter. After meeting the chief interpreter of the Nuremberg court, who was in 
London to hire interpreters for the Subsequent Trials, Hildesheimer took the 
interpretation test, which consisted of simultaneous interpretation from German into 
English of one of Hitler’s speeches. He was offered a position and moved to 
Nuremberg, where he worked as a simultaneous court interpreter and (from 1948 to 
1949) as editor of the trial protocols in preparation of their publication.  
 In a letter to Heinrich Böll in 1953 Hildesheimer explained his decision to 
return to Germany; he knew that Böll was in the process of preparing a radio broadcast 
on him and would use the information provided in the letter: 
  
                                                
117 Cf. ibid., 18.  
118 Many letters from Hildesheimer to his family survived and are now part of the Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer Archiv (WHA) in Berlin. While Hildesheimer had not been concerned about the situation 
of Jews in Germany as reported to him during his studies in London, did not identify as Jewish, and 
paid in general very little attention to politics—even displayed pride in his ignorance of politics, which 
would only hinder his creative output and interfere with his romantic pursuits—he was terrified to be 
trapped in France when the war broke out. His initial impulse after recovering from the shock and 
overcoming his fear for his life was to join the armed forces against Nazi Germany. Cf. WHA 456 (128 
letters by Wolfgang Hildesheimer to his family, 1947-1954).  
119 Cf. Köpp and Wolf, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 19.  
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Aus Interesse an dem mir damals völlig unverständlichen 
Simultandolmetschersystem machte ich eines Tages in der 
amerikanischen Botschaft eine Dolmetscherprüfung und wurde als 
Dolmetscher zu den Nürnberger Gerichten engagiert. Ich nahm dieses 
Angebot an, da ich mich von der damals vielzitierten Kollektivschuld 
überzeugen wollte, nicht aber, um endgültig nach Deutschland 
zurückzukehren. Diesen Entschluss fasste ich erst viel später, nämlich 
als ich mich überzeugt hatte, dass diese Kollektivschuld nicht existierte. 
(…) Ich habe während dieser Jahre viele anständige Menschen, 
Opportunisten und Verbrecher kennengelernt.120 
 
Hildesheimer cites his interest in simultaneous interpretation as his primary reason for 
taking the interpreting test, not any interest in the Nuremberg trials or in postwar 
Germany. Only after he was offered a post as interpreter in Nuremberg, he told Böll, 
did the issue of German collective guilt became relevant. According to the letter, he 
agreed to go to Germany to convince himself of the validity of the collective guilt 
thesis; he decided to stay in Germany after having concluded that there was no basis 
for the accusation. 
At that time the Nuremberg court was the only place in the world where 
simultaneous interpretation was used. The technology had not been employed since its 
debut in 1927, and it became the worldwide standard for international meetings only 
after gaining recognition at the Nuremberg court.121 Hildesheimer was fascinated by 
the technology, which connected everybody present in the courtroom via microphones 
and headsets, providing simultaneous interpretation between multiple languages using 
electronic equipment similar to the telephone system.  
                                                
120 Hildesheimer, letter to Böll, September 7, 1953, in Hildesheimer, Briefe, 39.  
121 IBM patented the technology in 1926 as Hushaphone Filene-Finlay System. IBM offered the Allies 
its products without charge, probably, as has been speculated by Cornelia Vismann, because IBM itself 
was implicated in Nazi crimes by having provided improved technology to process statistical data on 
race. Cornelia Vismann, "Sprachbrüche im Nürnberger Kriegsverbrecherprozeß," in Rechenschaften. 
Juristischer und literarischer Diskurs in der Auseinandersetzung mit den NS-Massenverbrechen, ed. 
Stephan Braese (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2004), 44-66, here 50. For the history of simultaneous 
interpretation, cf. Francesca Gaiba, The Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation. The Nuremberg Trial,  
(Ottawa: Ottawa University Press, 1998).  
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Because of simultaneous interpretation’s novelty, there was no established 
protocol for testing interpreters; the general guidelines called for fluency in at least 
two languages and the mastery of a broad vocabulary relating to law, medicine, and 
current affairs.122 By the time Hildesheimer tested for employment in Nuremberg, 
experiences at the IMT had winnowed the pool of suitable applicants down to male 
interpreters in their thirties who passed exams on concentration and mental composure 
under pressure; academics who translated philosophers with ease but stumbled when 
interpreting descriptions of daily life in the camps were often excluded. The U.S. 
Office Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, which hired Hildesheimer, concluded that 
only five percent of those who interviewed for a post actually succeeded in 
interpreting at court.123 Because the task of interpreting was so demanding, interpreters 
worked two shifts of 85 minutes on two out of three days and were present in court on 
the third day on a stand-by basis. The rewards included a generous monetary 
compensation, rations of goods otherwise not available, car service, professionally 
maintained living quarters, and dinner and entertainment at the Grand Hotel.124  
 Hildesheimer was one of the most gifted interpreters at the Subsequent Trials, 
and he advanced to “leader des Interpreter-teams [sic]” during the Einsatzgruppen 
trial, the “größten Mordprozess der Geschichte.”125 He reported this to his parents in a 
letter that is otherwise filled with information regarding his travels to Italy and to 
childhood vacation spots in Austria, and talk about literature and art, which mentions 
the completion of an oil painting that he wanted to exhibit at a Munich gallery. Briefly 
                                                
122 Cf. Gaiba, Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation, 46.  
123 Cf. ibid., 47f.  
124 Cf. ibid., 71, 122-26.  
125 Hildesheimer, letter to his parents, summer 1947, in Hildesheimer, Briefe, 17, 19. The second 
quotation is by Silvia Hildesheimer, who wrote the commentary to Wolfgang Hildesheimer’s letters for 
the edition.  
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he reflected on his future employment possibilities, which included a position at 
UNESCO in Paris.  
 Throughout his employment in Nuremberg Hildesheimer constantly made 
plans on where to go next. He travelled quite a bit across postwar Germany in his 
official capacity as interpreter as well as at his leisure. He planned to marry an 
American co-worker, and, for a period of a year, actively pursued the documents 
necessary to emigrate to the United States. As Hildesheimer also sought to advance his 
career as an artist, he established connections with artists in the Munich area who lived 
at Lake Starnberg.126 After completing his tenure in Nuremberg Hildesheimer moved 
to Ambach at Lake Starnberg and worked as a painter and graphic designer; in 1950 
he began to write short prose pieces as well, selling them very successfully to German 
newspapers and journals. That same year he contributed to the ZEN 49 exhibition in 
Munich and accepted Hans Werner Richter’s invitation to attend a meeting of Group 
47 in Bad Dürkheim. His complicated relationship with his American girlfriend, who 
was still married, coupled with his success in Germany as artist and writer, kept 
Hildesheimer from seeking an American visa more diligently, and by the end of 1951 
he dropped his emigration plans altogether.127 The following year Richter witnessed 
Hildesheimer’s marriage to Silvia Dillmann, mother of two teenage daughters, whom 
Hildesheimer had met in Ambach. The family lived in Munich from 1953 to 1957,  
when Wolfgang and Silvia Hildesheimer left Germany permanently, settling in the 
village of Poschiavo, Grisons, in the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland. When asked 
                                                
126 Cf. Hildesheimer, letter to his parents, summer 1947, in ibid., 18. 
127 Between 1948 and 1951 Hildesheimer and his parents frequently exchanged news on his emigration 
plans. Hildesheimer’s parents repeatedly asked about the status of his U.S. visa application process, and 
he informed them about complications, some of which may be attributable to his lack of focus. Even 
before his relationship ended, Hildesheimer did not seem fully committed to his emigration plans to the 
US and suddenly talked about plans to move to Great Britain, and even his UNESCO/Paris plans came 
up again. Finally he received a German passport—in order to further his emigration plans, as he 
explained to his parents. 
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why he had moved, Hildesheimer often replied that his and his wife’s health benefited 
from the Southern climate, but the unpublished 1963 article, “Weshalb ich nicht in der 
Bundesrepublik lebe,” offers an altogether different explanation: Hildesheimer 
claimed that he left because of rising anti-Semitism in Germany.128 
 In 1952 Lieblose Legenden appeared as a collection of Hildesheimer’s 
previously published stories. Throughout the 1950s, the author gained visibility as 
member of the Literaturbetrieb. He was part of Group 47 and elected into PEN in 
1955 and to the German Academy for Language and Poetry in Darmstadt in 1958. 
Until 1965 he worked almost exclusively as a writer producing novels, radio and stage 
plays, literary translations, and essays on literature and music presented as lectures or 
broadcasts. For some of these works Hildesheimer received prestigious literary prizes, 
most notably the Bremen Literature Prize and the Georg Büchner Prize for his 1965 
novel Tynset. Having more or less abandoned the visual arts for fifteen years, he 
participated in an art exhibition in 1965, after which many exhibitions followed in 
short order. With an increase in visual production (collages, in particular), the slow 
process of Hildesheimer’s withdrawal from literature set in. In 1971 he published 
Zeiten in Cornwall and thus ended a project that had engaged him since his visits to 
Cornwall in 1938 and 1946; finally, in 1973, he finished the novel Masante, on which 
he had worked for several years in tandem with the Cornwall text. With the exception 
of one radio play, Hildesheimer then turned to biography.129 Mozart (1977) became 
his commercially most successful book. The fictional biography, Marbot, for which 
                                                
128 “Die vier Hauptgründe, weshalb ich nicht in der Bundesrepublik lebe,” unpublished manuscript, 
WHA 190. I will return to this document in chapter III.  
129 In 1983, Hildesheimer furthermore published Mitteilungen an Max über den Stand der Dinge und 
anderes, which is, de facto, his last work of prose and grew out of a birthday greeting honoring Max 
Frisch. In 1987, Nachlese was published: a collection of aphorisms and very short prose pieces that 
Hildesheimer had collected over the years as writer but unable to use in his works. Both are included in 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke. Bd I Erzählende Prosa.  
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Hildesheimer received the Literary Prize of the Bavarian Academy of the Arts, 
followed in 1981.  
In 1981 Wolfgang and Silvia Hildesheimer also became honorary citizens of 
Poschiavo, which entitled them to Swiss citizenship. They chose to become citizens of 
Switzerland and forfeited their German citizenship in the process. Though 
Hildesheimer was no longer a German citizen, the Federal Republic of Germany 
nonetheless awarded him the Great Cross of Merit in 1984, presented by federal 
president Richard von Weizsäcker. Hildesheimer died of heart failure in August 1991, 
just months before his collected works were published. He was buried at the Protestant 
cemetery in Poschiavo.  
 
1963-1965: Frankfurt 
 “Die Staatsanwaltschaft in Frankfurt möge nunmehr Auschwitz aufklären.”130 The 
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial 
 Today the consensus holds that the Auschwitz Trials were a watershed event in 
West German Vergangenheitsbewältigung, for what followed was a shift away from 
the political and juridical realms towards memory culture. The first important 
indication of this shift came in 1959, when, during the Ulm Trial against members of 
Einsatztruppen, the public discovered—and furiously protested—the circumstance 
that the Bundestag, by reversing the denazification of the civil service, had 
rehabilitated a policeman implicated in the murder of several thousand Jews.131 As 
large numbers of POWs returned to West Germany, victims of Nazi crimes recognized 
                                                
130 Fritz Bauer, "Zu den Naziverbrecher-Prozessen. Gespräch mit dem NDR," in Fritz Bauer: Die 
Humanität der Rechtsordnung. Ausgewählte Schriften, ed. Joachim Perels and Irmtrud Wojak 
(Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 1998), 101-18, here 104. The interview dates to 1963. 
131 Article 131 was passed in 1951 and entitled circa 150,000 former civil servants in the Nazi regime 
who had been dishonorably discharged by the Allies to state pensions and reemployment. Cf. Herf, 
Divided Memory, 289. For the Ulm Trial, cf. Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 144.  
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more perpetrators and pressed charges against them, increasing the number of trials 
against former Nazis in the 1950s.132 It was survivors who identified and brought 
charges in the case of the Ulm Trial, not the West German government. The federal 
Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen zur Verfolgung nationalsozialistischer 
Gewaltverbrechen (Central Office) was founded in 1958 following public protests 
criticizing the government for rehabilitating Nazi criminals rather than prosecuting 
them on the state’s initiative. According to Jeffrey Herf, this brought “the era of 
democratization based on silence and integration [of former Nazis]” to an end.133 
 A former Auschwitz inmate, Adolf Rögner, wrote to the Stuttgart prosecutor’s 
office in March 1958 regarding Wilhelm Boger, an Auschwitz commandant who had 
devised a torture instrument known as the “Boger swing.” Rögner, who was serving a 
prison sentence for fraud, knew that Boger was still at large. Because the prosecutor’s 
office did not consider Rögner trustworthy, it took no action until Hermann Langbein, 
head of the survivor organization International Auschwitz Committee, confirmed 
Rögner’s charges in September and demanded the immediate arrest of Boger.134 Boger 
was arrested in October 1958, which marked the beginning of a close collaboration 
between Langbein’s IAC and the Central Office that resulted in several other arrests of 
former Auschwitz personnel.135  
Shortly after Boger’s arrest, the Frankfurt prosecutor Fritz Bauer received 
material that the Auschwitz administration had collected and which documented the 
practice of shooting prisoners. An Auschwitz survivor had taken these documents as a 
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“souvenir” after his liberation in 1945 and, unaware of their significance for a criminal 
investigation, held on to them until 1959, when a friend of his in Wiesbaden, Hessen, 
sent them to the Hessian regional court in Frankfurt.136 
 Fritz Bauer was a German Jew who escaped the Holocaust in Danish and 
Swedish exile after the Nazis had forced him to leave office as a judge in Stuttgart in 
1933 and imprisoned him for several months in a concentration camp. Bauer returned 
to Germany in 1949 with a genuine desire to help build a strong democracy.137 He 
established his reputation as relentless prosecutor of Nazi crimes during the Remer 
affair of 1950-51, in which he rehabilitated the planners of the assassination attempt at 
Hitler on July 20, 1944. Former Wehrmacht general Otto Ernst Remer had repeatedly 
called them traitors, but with Bauer’s intervention they were proclaimed resistance 
fighters.138 When Bauer later received the material pertaining to the Auschwitz 
shootings, he passed them on to the Central Office. Anticipating that Langbein’s and 
Bauer’s evidence would build to a large case, the Central Office consulted with the 
Federal Court of Justice as to how to proceed. In agreement with the prosecutor’s 
offices in Stuttgart and Frankfurt, the Bundesgerichtshof decided to move the entire 
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so-called Auschwitz investigation to Frankfurt, where Fritz Bauer would lead all 
pretrial investigations and prepare for the main proceedings.139 
 Immediately upon assuming prosecutorial jurisdiction over the Auschwitz 
investigation, Bauer’s office sent requests to survivors all over the world to submit 
written testimony against Auschwitz personnel. During three years of pretrial 
investigations, the prosecutor’s office interviewed more than 1,500 witnesses, 356 of 
whom would later testify in court, including 188 survivors from seventeen foreign 
countries.140 Bauer also commissioned a number of historians, most notably members 
of the Munich Institute for the Study of Contemporary History, to write a report on 
how the Nazis planned the “Final Solution” and designed the extermination camp 
system, with particular focus on Auschwitz.141 By calling such a multitude of 
witnesses and including expert historical testimony, Bauer intended to confront the 
public with the first coherent history of Auschwitz; he wanted to put the entire camp 
system on trial.142  
These measures were also necessitated by the peculiarities of the West German 
criminal code. The Federal Republic had adopted the penal code of 1871, which used 
subjective theory (subjektive Teilnehmerlehre) to distinguish murder from 
manslaughter or aiding and abetting murder. Only if an offender acted with a personal 
interest in a murder (as opposed to a superior’s interest), intentionally desired a lethal 
outcome (rather than acting negligently), and displayed a lust for killing arising from 
base motives (such as sadism or racial hatred), could the accused be convicted of 
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murder. In cases of trying “excess murderer” (Ezxessmörder) the stipulation of cruelty 
applied only to individuals rather than a group of perpetrators.143 Thus the prosecution 
needed detailed witness testimony to prove that excess murder had been committed 
cruelly according to the standards set forth by Auschwitz regulations, which were 
presented by historians. As Rebecca Wittmann observes, following the letter of the 
law meant abandoning Bauer’s ambition to indict the entire system as cruel, 
inhumane, and excessive, because the law, by accepting the legitimacy of camp 
regulations, restored some credibility to the camp system.144 
By regarding cases, in which the prosecution failed to prove excessive murder, 
as instances of Beihilfe (aiding and abetting murder) rather than Täterschaft 
(perpetration of murder), the penal code seriously limited the punitive possibility of a 
trial, “der die Vernichtung von etwa 2 Millionen Juden und anderen in Auschwitz 
betrifft und sicherlich der größte Prozeß der Bundesrepublik sein wird.”145 In a pretrial 
interview Bauer voiced his (subjective) conviction that millions of Germans had 
subscribed to the Nazi Weltanschauung and had conspired with Hitler in the “Final 
Solution”; all of them were “Mittäter.”146 He anticipated the defense strategy—that the 
camp SS had followed orders without a personal investment in the crime, under the 
threat of their own lives—and rebutted it immediately: Befehlsnotstand was not an 
issue here. None of the 20,000 SS documents examined since the Nuremberg trials 
showed that anyone who refused to participate in the slaughter of the Jews had been 
punished.147 The defense would thus plead superior orders as they were subjectively 
perceived.148  
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In the interview and elsewhere, Bauer confronts Germans with an alternative to 
following orders: the right to resist (Widerstandsrecht). Interpreting the Clausula Petri 
(by which man has to obey God rather than men)149 to mean that there is “ein(…) 
unverletzliche[r] und unveräußerliche[r] Bereich (…), den anzutasten dem Staat und 
dem Menschen verwehrt ist,” namely the realm of human rights (“Menschenrechte,” 
in the narrowest sense, the right to live),150 Bauer called it not only a right but a duty 
(“man [ist] nicht nur berechtigt, sondern verpflichtet”) to refuse Nazi orders in 
violation of these rights.151 The Nuremberg laws in particular, in paving the road to the 
gas chambers, were unlawful in this sense,152 and any “Anpassung” to unlawful laws 
that violated the right to live was, “wie unsere Prozesse demonstrieren sollen, 
möglicherweise Mord, gemeiner Mord.”153 Bauer’s intentions at the Auschwitz Trials 
were therefore twofold. He wanted to demonstrate the Germans’ more general 
complicity in the genocide of the Jews—a task made impossible by the restrictions 
imposed by the penal code. More importantly, he wanted to use the trial to teach the 
duty to resist: “Deswegen ist es das A und O dieser Prozesse zu sagen: Ihr hättet Nein 
sagen müssen.”154 “Worüber die NS-Prozesse aufklären, das ist das Recht, ja die 
Pflicht zum Nein gegenüber unmenschlichen Anordnungen. (…) Das ist die Moral der 
Geschichte, das ist der Beitrag der Prozesse zum politischen Bewusstsein.”155 These 
and other statements make clear that Bauer’s primary interest was not the judicial 
punishment of crimes whose quality and quantity foreclosed the possibility of 
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adequate recompense. He hoped instead that the trial would have a lasting impact, 
which would extend beyond the judicial framework and enter the historical and 
political realm.156 In short, he wanted to make a legal case for something akin to 
Jaspers’ concept of political guilt, and to impress upon the German population a 
respect for human rights and an acknowledgement of collective liability.  
The three hundred-page indictment presented by the court in the spring of 1963 
included the historians’ finding and charged twenty-four individuals with the murder 
of “Menschen in nicht genau bestimmbarer Zahl.”157 Twenty of the defendants were 
present when the trial began in December, with Chief Justice Hans Hofmeyer leading 
the jury court consisting of three professional judges and six jurists.158 As Bauer 
predicted, the trial became the longest in West German history, lasting until August 
1965 and attracting 20,000 visitors.159 No official transcripts of the trial exist, but five 
hundred hours of testimony recorded on audiotape—intended to be destroyed after the 
verdict was pronounced—survived in Hofmeyer’s basement.160 The combination of 
survivor and expert testimony provided detailed description of Nazi Judenpolitik and 
Auschwitz. Survivors testified for the first time in Germany before a large public.161 
The historians who testified, Martin Broszat among them, published their findings in 
Anatomie des SS-Staates, which became a cornerstone in German Holocaust 
historiography.162  
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Another novelty of the trial was the court’s visit of Auschwitz in December 
1964. Through skillful diplomacy, the lawyers Henry Ormond and Jan Sehn 
collaborated to secure an invitation from Poland and the cooperation of East Germany. 
The West German government’s reluctant approval followed only after the danger of 
losing face abroad outweighed pressure from Heimatvertriebene not to acknowledge 
Poland officially.163 In an extraordinary gesture, the Polish government granted visas 
to twenty-four members of the court, including interpreters, photographers, and author 
Peter Weiss, as well as several hundred journalists. Over the course of two-and-a-half 
days at the site of the former extermination camp, judges, defense lawyers, and 
prosecutors verified witness testimony by measuring distances and testing audibility 
and visibility.164  
 In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by survivors, supported by 
historians, and examined by the court in Auschwitz itself, the mild sentencing of the 
perpetrators, delivered after a week of deliberation, was disappointing for many and, 
for Bauer, devastating. Yet he was aware that it was less the judges’ lenience (as is 
claimed by much of the literature covering Nazi trials)165 and more the limitations of 
the criminal code that determined that most perpetrators were sentenced for the crime 
of aiding and abetting rather than murder because “a certain degree of ‘lack of will’ 
could almost always be proved.”166 Fritz Bauer judged the verdict a judicial failure 
and an affront to the victims: 
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Die Gerichte machten den Versuch, das totale Geschehen, z. B. den 
Massenmord an Millionen in den Vernichtungslagern, in Episoden 
aufzulösen, etwa in die Ermordung von A durch X, von B durch Y oder 
von C durch Z. Dem einzelnen Angeklagten wünschte man sein 
individuelles Tun im Detail nachzuweisen. Dergleichen vergewaltigt 
aber das Geschehen, das nicht eine Summe von Einzelereignissen war. 
(…) Der Auschwitzprozess war gewiss der bisher längste aller 
deutschen Schwurgerichtsprozesse, in Wirklichkeit hätte er einer der 
kürzesten sein können, womit freilich nicht gesagt sein soll, dass dies 
aus sozialpädagogischen Gründen auch wünschenswert gewesen wäre. 
Die Sach- und Rechtslage war ungewöhnlich einfach: Es gab einen 
Befehl zur Liquidierung der Juden in dem von den Nazis beherrschten 
Europa; Mordwerkzeuge waren Auschwitz, Treblinka, usw. Wer an 
dieser Mordmaschine hantierte, wurde der Mitwirkung am Morde 
schuldig, was immer er tat, selbstverständlich vorausgesetzt, dass er das 
Ziel der Maschinerie kannte, was freilich für die, die in den 
Vernichtungslagern waren oder um sie wussten (…) außer jedem 
Zweifel steht. Wer einer Räuberbande (…) angehört, ist, woran kein 
Strafjurist hierzulande zweifeln dürfte, des Mordes schuldig. (…) Von 
dieser hierzulande sonst ganz üblichen (…) Praxis wichen unsere NS-
Prozesse vielfach ab, wahrscheinlich, um das kollektive Geschehen 
durch Atomierung und Parzellisierung der furchtbaren Dinge sozusagen 
zu privatisieren und damit zu entschärfen. 
Die Strafen, die ausgesprochen wurden, lagen häufig an der 
Mindestgrenze des gesetzlich Zulässigen, was mitunter einer 
Verhöhnung der Opfer recht nahekam.167 
 
Hofmeyer was of a different opinion. Prior to proclaiming the sentence, he insisted 
before the two hundred journalists present throughout the proceedings that the trial, far 
from being a “Schauprozess,” was an ordinary trial. In defining the goals of the trial, 
Hofmeyer dismissed the idea of “Vergangenheit bewältigen [zu können]” 
completely.168 The court’s sole concern was to determine the criminal guilt or 
innocence of the offenders, and Hofmeyer warned against misinterpreting the trial as a 
judgment of moral or political guilt, referring directly to Karl Jaspers’ differentiation 
among forms of guilt.169 To defend this point, Hofmeyer argued that a summary trial 
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in which all SS members who had worked at Auschwitz would have been convicted of 
murder would have not only violated the West German penal code but would have 
reproduced the Nazi practice of incrimination based on membership.170  
Because the trial was indeed an ordinary trial under a criminal code that did 
not prosecute collective complicity and therefore built its evidence on testimony 
regarding particularly cruel murders committed by monsters, it represented Nazi 
perpetrators as a handful of sadists while technically acquitting those who followed 
orders without satisfying the legal conditions by which murder was defined. 
The press proliferated this representation.171  Wittmann concludes that the 
press coverage of the Auschwitz Trial resembled “almost a pornography of the 
Holocaust, that both sold papers and distanced the general public from the monsters on 
the stand whose actions were reported in graphic detail,” thereby hindering efforts at 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.172 Hannah Arendt, whose notion of the “banality of evil” 
had been widely discussed without, however, replacing the older notion of monstrous 
aberrations, wrote in the foreword of the English translation of FAZ journalist Bernd 
Naumann’s report on the Auschwitz Trial, that the trial had done nothing to change the 
public opinion of Germans about Nazi criminals.173 Fritz Bauer lamented the poll 
results of 1965, reporting that 40 percent of the population took no notice of the 
Auschwitz Trial, while almost half of those who did follow the trial wanted the 
prosecution of Nazi criminals to end.174 Bauer compared this statistic to one showing 
that most Germans “[t]rotz Auschwitz und Treblinka” still favored the death penalty 
(which the West German constitution had abolished).175 He wondered why, if so many 
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people demanded capital punishment in the abstract, no one had ever demanded it for 
Holocaust criminals in particular.176 In a country that considered human rights 
“Humanitätsduselei,” the paramount task of Bauer and a likeminded few was still to 
teach “Kritikbereitschaft, Vorurteilsfreiheit, Toleranz, Humanität.”177 
Although the verdict disappointed Bauer, the trial succeeded in confronting 
much of the German populace with historical documentation and survivor testimony 
on Auschwitz. The media coverage of the trial thrust it from the purely judicial realm 
into a larger cultural sphere. Among intellectuals and feuilleton readers, discussion of 
the verdict became a debate over the question as to whether a trial could aim to master 
the past, and this dialogue demonstrated the trial’s public impact.178 
  
“Subjektivität diktiert.”179 Literary Responses to the Auschwitz Trial 
A few months after the trial ended, Fritz Bauer made the following appeal:  
 
Es müsste eine Arbeitsteilung geben (…) zwischen dem Auschwitz-
Richter und dem Auschwitz-Dichter. (…) [I]ch als Jurist sage Ihnen, 
wir Juristen in Frankfurt haben erschreckt gerufen, mit ganzer Seele 
gerufen nach dem Dichter, der das ausspricht, was dem Prozess 
auszusprechen nicht im Stande ist.180  
 
His appeal was to German writers—and not Auschwitz survivors—to articulate the 
Auschwitz experience to the German public. The circumstances explain this, for he 
made his appeal at the opening night of Peter Weiss’s Die Ermittlung in Stuttgart. 
Weiss and Bauer had worked closely together for many months: Weiss observed the 
trial during several visits in 1964 and accompanied the court on its visit of Auschwitz 
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in the course of preparing to write the play.181 Bauer, who served as legal advisor to 
Weiss’s publisher Suhrkamp, followed the development of Ermittlung closely.182 
Weiss’s play was the first literary response to the Auschwitz Trial, and though, 
as Bauer regretfully noted, it portrayed the trial rather than Auschwitz itself,183 at least 
during a few months in the fall and winter of 1965 it succeeded in pushing Auschwitz 
to the fore of discussions within the literary establishment. Die Ermittlung received 
enormous media attention, comparable to the news coverage that followed the 
screening of the U.S. American TV series Holocaust (1979) and Stephen Spielberg’s 
Hollywood production Schindler’s List (1993).184 According to Christoph Weiß, 
within the framework of political Vergangenheitsbewältigung, Die Ermittlung 
signified a more serious turning point in the development of German literature than the 
Auschwitz Trial.185 The subject of roughly 1,200 to 1,500 newspaper and journal 
articles during the 1965/66 season,186 Die Ermittlung achieved an unmatched notoriety 
without, however, gaining the same level of popularity. In spite of having won the city 
of Hamburg’s prestigious literary Lessing Prize just a few months before, Weiss, a 
German Jew who never returned from his Swedish exile and expressed a political 
affinity to Marxism, suddenly received both anti-Semitic and anti-Communist reviews 
of Die Ermittlung.187 It is therefore misleading to interpret the media attention 
provoked by Weiss’s play only in terms of the German public’s interest in learning 
about Auschwitz.  
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 Fritz Bauer was not the only one who encouraged German writers to respond 
to the Auschwitz Trial. While the trial was still underway, the Polish-German Jewish 
literary critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki remarked on the great curiosity that “kein einziger 
prominenter deutscher Schriftsteller auch nur mit einem Wort [sich über diesen 
Prozess] geäußert hat.”188 Reich-Ranicki had permanently settled in Germany in 1958 
and noted that the German literary establishment understood literature as something 
that ought to please; if literature turned to atrocities in the past at all, audiences looked 
for those events that could be interpreted within a framework of national tragedy. 
Stalingrad, for instance, offered a story “vom deutschen Heldentum” (201). 
Auschwitz, on the other hand, was not “eine nationale Katastrophe” like Stalingrad. 
Summarized by Reich-Ranicki in two words, “deutscher Mord,” it had little to offer 
for German literature (201). This mode of “Kulturverständnis”189 was part of what 
Reich-Ranicki considered “die bundesrepublikanische Misere” that manifested itself 
in the trial in Frankfurt: former Nazi murderers and contemporary West German 
citizens were indistinguishable.190  
Reich-Ranicki’s reflections on the Auschwitz Trial appeared as part of a 
literary review for Die Zeit in May 1964; the reviewed author was Horst Krüger, who 
had just published the essay “Im Labyrinth der Schuld.”191 Reich-Ranicki urged all 
readers—not only of Die Zeit, but in Germany in general, as Krüger spoke “[i]n einer 
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deutschen Angelegenheit”—to read the text.192 Krüger had visited the Auschwitz Trial 
in February 1964; he stayed for four weeks and published his observations in the essay 
that three months later prompted Reich-Ranicki to wonder at the absence of German 
authors at the trial. (While Reich-Ranicki greatly admired Krüger’s essay—which was 
“kein einheitliches Prosastück” (201)—he did not consider Krüger a prominent 
writer.) Following the sudden recognition (“mir [fiel] plötzlich ein”) that no prominent 
writer had commented on the trial, Reich-Ranicki pondered on the authorial 
profession, and though he disagreed with Hans Erich Nossack that the writer was 
duty-bound to comment on current events, he insisted that a writer must react “in 
seinem Werk unmittelbar oder mittelbar auf die Zeit (…), in der er lebt” (203). He did 
not expect German authors to attend the Auschwitz Trial—although Krüger had done 
so and had shown that it was still (“noch”) possible to say something “unkonventionell 
und eindringlich” about Auschwitz—he wanted to know what German writers could 
write about “jene Vergangenheit, die sich angeblich aufarbeiten und bewältigen läßt”: 
“Ich bin jedoch, ich schäme mich dessen nicht, sehr neugierig. Ich möchte so gern 
lesen, was hierüber, ganz gewiss, ein Schriftsteller schreiben könnte” (ibid.). Reich-
Ranicki insinuated that there was much left to be said (“ganz gewiss”) without 
specifying what precisely, but he implied that if writers were to react to the times in 
which they lived—their Nazi past and West German present—they might prove the 
possibility of coming to come to terms with the past. Without actual effort this was 
only guesswork (“angeblich”). Reich-Ranicki’s line of thought turns on a long dash in 
the text, shifting abruptly from abstractly questioning what writers could say about 
Auschwitz to a single concrete question addressed to both writers and his readers. 
“Was fühlen und denken eigentlich diejenigen, die damals kleine Kinder waren, wenn 
erzählt wird, wie ihre Eltern drei Millionen Menschen in Auschwitz ermordet haben?” 
                                                
192 This is the title of Reich-Ranicki’s review essay. Cf. Reich-Ranicki, "Angelegenheit."  
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He adds, “[k]einer ist verpflichtet, sich dieser Frage anznehmen. Aber die deutsche 
Literatur unserer Zeit ist es” (204). One’s thoughts and feelings upon learning about 
one’s family’s murderous involvement in the genocide of the Jews is thus a pivotal 
question for postwar German literature, at least in the view of one Jewish literary critic 
who had lost both parents in the Holocaust. He ends his essay with a further question 
and an observation. He asks whether “deutsche(n) Schriftsteller (…) zu jenen 
[gehören], die zudecken oder zu jenen, die aufdecken?” (204). Reich-Ranicki here 
refers to Krüger’s distinction between those Frankfurt Germans who went about their 
business as if the Auschwitz Trial were not happening in their midst and those who 
attended it.193 Reich-Ranicki then notes that the trial would continue for several more 
months—an opportunity for German writers willing to find out in which category they 
fell. 
How did German writers respond to Reich-Ranicki’s pointed question? They 
largely ignored it. The only non-Jewish writer other than Krüger to observe the 
Auschwitz Trial and write about it was Martin Walser, whose text “Unser Auschwitz” 
first appeared in June 1965 and presented a stark contrast to Krüger’s.194 Comparing 
“Unser Auschwitz” to Peter Weiss’s 1964 Auschwitz essay “Meine Ortschaft,” 
Stephan Braese first notices the use of possessive pronouns.195 For Weiss the 
extermination camp symbolized the place for which he was destined and where he 
would have found certain death;196 he anchored his essayistic persona in Auschwitz 
and reflected on the camp from a highly subjective viewpoint. By contrast, Walser 
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der ich entkam,” in ibid., 222. 
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used “unser” and “wir” throughout the text, referring to a German collective that felt 
free of the accusation of “Kollektivschuld” and was little affected by the fact of 
Auschwitz and the trial: “Mit diesen Geschehnissen, das wissen wir gewiss, mit diesen 
Scheußlichkeiten haben wir nichts zu tun. (…) In diesem Prozess ist nicht von uns die 
Rede.”197 Walser fails to differentiate within the German collective. His “wir” refers to 
an apparently homogeneous group without distinction between Nazi perpetrator and 
his victim.  
As Braese notes, to differentiate would have meant to acknowledge guilt.198 
Opposed to Walser’s “us” were “die ‘Häftlinge’”—who are not part of the German 
collective, according to this logic, and whose difference Walser emphasizes with 
quotation marks (“Häftlinge”).199 The Jewish survivors who testified at the trial 
struggled to recount their experiences in court; according to Walser’s account, they 
were frequently unable to finish their sentences or to look at the defendants (190). 
Walser dismissed their testimony as tales that tell of “mittelalterlich bunte (…) 
Quälereien” that distort the truth about Auschwitz (192), prevent reflection (195), and 
abet forgetting (194). Thus he concludes: “Auschwitz ohne diese ‘Farben’ ist das 
wirklichere Auschwitz. Selektion an der Rampe, Transport in die Kammern, Zyklon 
B, Verbrennungsöfen” (192f.). But even factual knowledge of Auschwitz would not 
affect “us”: “Für uns aber wird Auschwitz keine Folgen haben” (202). Opening the 
essay with the claim that the Auschwitz Trial was less a judicial proceeding than an 
attempt at moral and political enlightenment (187), Walser goes on to suggest the 
complete failure of this project. He asserts in a somewhat prideful tone that he was not 
affected, by either the trial or Auschwitz: “Ich verspüre meinen Anteil an Auschwitz 
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nicht, das ist ganz sicher. Also dort, wo das Schamgefühl sich regen, wo Gewissen 
sich melden müsste, bin ich nicht betroffen” (198). Walser does not feel affected 
because the rhetoric of Der Ruf, which continued to be used by Group 47 members, 
convinced him that he belonged to an altogether different generation from those 
involved in Nazi cruelties: the notions of tabula rasa and zero hour shielded him from 
critical self-reflection.200 
Braese compares Walser unfavorably to Weiss, concluding that what 
distinguished the authors was Weiss’s determined commitment to subjectivity, which 
allowed him to examine his own participation in history. Expanding on Klaus 
Briegleb, who argues that an author is able to approximate the Nazi past poetically 
only when he is willing to update (“aktualisieren”) his own experience in history,201 
Braese considers Weiss’s “subjektgeschichtliche[n] Blick” vis-à-vis his past the 
paramount criterion for all literary production in the wake of the Auschwitz Trial. This 
was especially important for non-Jewish German writers, whose knowledge of the 
Jewish experience was necessarily mediated by others and depended on taking 
initiative to engage in the discourse. According to Braese, it was imperative for these 
writers to revisit the past and examine their own involvement. 
Horst Krüger was a freelance writer and the producer of literary late-night 
radio show at Südwestfunk. He frequently hosted prominent intellectuals such as 
Theodor W. Adorno, Ernst Bloch, and Alexander Mitscherlich, who responded to 
Krüger’s interest in psychoanalysis and the Nazi past.202 In 1964 Krüger moved to 
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Frankfurt—a city he chose because it had to offer a lot for “den kritisch engagierten 
Zeitgenossen”—where he met Fritz Bauer and accepted his invitation to attend the 
trial.203 As result of his month-long observation of the trial, Krüger embarked on a 
tour-de-force of self-analysis in order to examine “wie es wirklich war, das mit Hitler 
und den Deutschen.”204 As Braese notes, Krüger was one of the very few non-Jewish 
Germans to do so.205  
At the trial Krüger wanted to “nur dasitzen und zuhören, zusehen und 
beobachten” with the goal of gaining a differentiated impression of perpetrators and 
victims, who were “Menschen wie du und ich” rather than “Standbilder des 
Schreckens oder des Leidens.”206 As he listened to the testimony of Auschwitz 
survivors, including their pauses and silences, he realized that their survival rested 
partly on their determination, “einmal davon Zeugnis abzulegen, was hier der Mensch 
dem Menschen antat” (251). Krüger, who had fought on the Eastern front and took 
orders like “Millionen anderer Deutsche[r] auch” (254), began to wonder how he 
personally would have responded to an order sending him on detail to Auschwitz. No 
longer just observing the trial, Krüger was now involved in it.  
Krüger reflects on his own subject position and turns his 
“subjektgeschichtlichen Blick” (Braese) on his past: “Was hätte ich gemacht? Wäre 
ich wirklich ein Held gewesen?” (255) Searching for an answer, he is gripped by 
“Angst und Erschrecken” because he is unable to deny the possibility that he would 
have followed orders and worked at Auschwitz (257). The scenario lies in the past, but 
Krüger suddenly questions his present position, asserting that in this courtroom, no 
one could not question his or her own subject position: “Wo bin ich? Wo stehe ich? // 
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Ich bin als ein Fremder, ein deutscher Journalist gekommen und wollte nur Zuschauer 
sein, aber während ich jetzt wieder der Stimme [eines Verteidigers] folge, spüre ich, 
dass hier niemand Zuschauer bleiben kann” (257). Auschwitz constituted a “Labyrinth 
der Schuld,” where a myriad of shades of personal involvement existed between guilt 
and innocence.207  
Unable to find any distinction in appearance between perpetrators and victims, 
Krüger realizes that the title of the 1946 German film Die Mörder sind unter uns holds 
true twenty years later (260). Krüger suddenly recognizes: 
 
Und zum erstenmal begreife ich jetzt, warum es Juden gibt, die in diese 
zweite deutsche Republik, die doch wieder anständig und erträglich 
geworden ist, nicht zurückkommen. Angst, ganz private Angst: der 
Straßenbahnführer, der Schalterbeamte an der Post oder bei der Bahn, 
der Apotheker oder eben dieser tüchtige Krankenpfleger aus West-
Berlin—natürlich, sie alle könnten es gewesen sein. Man weiß es 
wirklich nie, New York oder Tel Aviv sind da sicherer, und wer nur 
Tote in diesem Land zu betrauern hat, darf er nicht, muss er nicht diese 
kleine private Todesangst vor uns Deutschen haben? (269) 
 
His seems a rhetorical question. He concludes that the only difference between the 
perpetrators and victims in his present is “die Psychologie der Erinnerung, der 
Mechanismus des Vergessens”: those who desperately want to forget are unable, and 
those who should remember have forgotten everything (270f.). Observing the 
perpetrators closely, Krüger sees evidence that Freud was mistaken to say that guilt 
can be repressed but never forgotten: none seem to have developed neuroses, as Freud 
would have predicted for those who repress their guilt (271). Free of guilty 
conscience, “Leute mit Zyklon-B-Erfahrung essen und schlafen und lieben in diesem 
Land wie alle anderen auch” (280). 
 Krüger does not focus his attention solely on defendants and witnesses. There 
is a third group in the courtroom, one to which he belongs: the visitors. Apart from a 
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large number of journalists, there were approximately 130 auditors who waited every 
morning in line to receive admission tickets. Many of the visitors were young, school 
children and college students, some were senior citizens, “denen man ansieht, dass sie 
hierher nicht aus Sensationslust kommen” (273). But where is Krüger’s own 
generation? 
 
[D]ie mittlere Generation, die es doch wohl angeht, die dabei war. Aber 
die wollen davon nichts mehr wissen, die wissen ja alles, die kennen es, 
die müssen jetzt (…) arbeiten, verdienen, müssen das 
Wirtschaftswunder in Gang halten. (…) Ich weiß es nicht (…), ich weiß 
nur plötzlich, dass ich nun wirklich im Auschwitz-Prozess bin und dass 
es gut war, zu kommen. (274) 
 
Unlike Walser, who, though slightly younger than Krüger, served as a Flakhelfer 
during the war and certainly belonged to the “middle generation,” Krüger did not go to 
the Auschwitz Trial without questioning his own involvement in the history of 
Auschwitz. Identification with the perpetrator—“Wie schuldig wärst du geworden?”—
was unavoidable for him; it would have been unavoidable for any German author 
visiting the trial, he thought.208 Krüger drew three important, morally radical209 
conclusions that would dominate much of his later literary work. He could not take 
moral superiority for granted, but rather he needed to accept the possibility that he 
might not have chosen to disobey an order if the Nazis had sent him to Auschwitz; 
former Nazi perpetrators were living en masse in contemporary Germany without fear 
of prosecution; and Jews were very likely to be suspicious, scared, and resentful to 
live in democratic West Germany. Ten years later, in an afterword to the new edition 
of Das zerbrochene Haus, Krüger explained that it was “zwanghaft die Frage nach der 
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eigenen Vergangenheit” and the literary credo, “Subjektivität regiert,” which helped 
him reach these conclusions.210  
 
“Eben fand in Frankfurt der große Auschwitz-Prozess statt.”211 Jean Améry 
 In the introduction of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne (1966), Jean Améry 
wrote: “Als im Jahre 1964 in Frankfurt der große Auschwitz-Prozess begann, schrieb 
ich den ersten Aufsatz im Zusammenhang mit meinen Erlebnissen im Dritten Reich, 
nach zwanzig Jahren Schweigen.”212 As will be shown elsewhere, Améry’s statement 
is not completely accurate, yet it is true that the essay collection was the author’s first 
thorough examination of his past. Encouraged by the media attention the Auschwitz 
Trial received, he intended his essays for a large West German audience.  
Améry wrote (and recorded) each of the five essays for the radio, and they 
were broadcast immediately upon completion between 1964 and 1966. He published 
them individually in Merkur and collectively in a single volume in 1966 and, again, 
with a new introduction, in 1977. Reflecting on their genesis in the autobiographical 
essay “Meine deutsche Szene,” he concludes that his authorial “ich” emerged in 
proximity to the Auschwitz trial, and that with the publication of Jenseits he entered 
the German scene: “Daraus wurde ein Buch, ‘Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne’, und mit 
diesem trat ich auf die deutsche Szene.”213 In the words of his biographer Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard, with Améry’s publication of Jenseits, “[a] star is born.”214 
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 Named Hans Maier (spelled variously; his birth record reads Chaim Maier), 
Jean Améry was born in 1912 into an assimilated Jewish family that had lived in the 
Austrian Vorarlberg, near the German border, since the seventeenth century.215 He 
started school in Vienna, where he met his lifelong friend Ernst Mayer, but after his 
father—more a “Tiroler Kaiserjäger” than a “jüdische[r] Weise[r]”216—died fighting 
for his fatherland, Améry and his mother, who had a few Jewish ancestors but 
identified as strictly Catholic, moved to the countryside where she ran an inn and 
raised her son as a Catholic. After finishing eight years of schooling without 
completing a degree, Améry returned to Vienna in 1926 and began an apprenticeship 
as a bookseller. From 1930 to 1938 he worked at the bookstore affiliated with the 
Volkshochschule in the Jewish neighborhood of Leopoldstadt. Under the mentorship 
of Leopold Langhammer, director, and Ernst Schönwiese, lecturer at the school and 
editor of the literary journal das silberboot, Améry audited classes in philosophy and 
literature and participated in discussion groups frequented by members of the 
Viennese intellectual elite, among them Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap. The 
intellectual environment fostered Améry’s interest in literature, writing, and neo-
positivist thought.  
In 1928 Améry published a short story (now lost),217 and in 1934 he and Ernst 
Mayer founded the literary publication Die Brücke. While he had admired the 
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Heimatliteratur particular to Austria—regionalist literature that idealized and 
nostalgically yearned for the rural home country as an alternative to modern city life—
Améry emerged in the 1930s as a political revolutionary, fighting on the side of the 
socialists against the clerico-Austro-fascist regime during the February Uprising of 
1934. From 1934 to 1936 Améry worked on the manuscript of a novel (Die 
Schiffbrüchigen) that he believed to be a “so großartiges Werk, das könne nur Thomas 
Mann überhaupt richtig würdigen.”218 The unfinished novel was finally published in 
2007, and according to Heidelberger-Leonard, Die Schiffbrüchigen is indeed a great 
piece of work that represents the “vollständige Auseinandersetzung mit [Amérys] 
Gegenwart.”219 
 Améry repeatedly stated that he did not feel Jewish growing up. Rather, it was 
the 1935 Nuremberg Race Laws that made him Jewish, that is: he was Jewish 
according to Nazi definition. Though he had left the Jewish religious community 
officially in 1933, he rejoined in 1937 to ease the process of marrying his first wife, 
Regina Berger. Prompted by the 1938 so-called Anschluss of Austria into Greater 
Germany by the Nazi regime, Améry’s mother offered to protect her son from racial 
persecution. If he were to divorce his Jewish wife, his mother would testify to an 
extramarital relationship with an “Aryan” man who had fathered her son. She would 
then obtain papers for Améry that would allow him either to remain in Austria or to 
emigrate legally. Améry refused the offer. Instead he and his wife bought the services 
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of a German smuggler and were brought to Antwerp, where Améry met Erich Schmid 
(a Viennese acquaintance) and Maria Leitner (Améry’s future second wife).  
When Nazi Germany invaded Belgium in May of 1940, all Germans in 
Antwerp, including Améry and Schmid, were incarcerated and deported to Camp de 
St. Cyprien in France. (Améry’s wife was able to go into hiding with the help of 
Leitner, who emigrated to the U.S.) Améry fled, but, after the German occupation of 
France and the release of German prisoners, he was arrested again, this time as a Jew 
and not a German, and sent to prison in Gurs, near the Spanish border, from which he 
escaped in June of 1941.220 With the help of a network of Jewish communities, Améry 
travelled to Brussels, where he reunited with his wife. There he joined the Austrian 
Front of Liberty, a political resistance group that produced leaflets urging German 
soldiers in Belgium to desert, and he edited the movement’s journal, Die Wahrheit.  
In July 1943 the Gestapo caught Améry with leaflets calling for “Tod den SS-
Banditen und Gestapohenkern!”221 They arrested him on political rather than racial 
grounds. He was sent to the Gestapo prison at Fort Breendonk. He remained there for 
several months and was tortured for information about the resistance movement. Once 
it became known that he was Jewish, he was sent to a transit camp in Mechelen, from 
which Belgian Jews were deported to the extermination camps in the East. In January 
1944 Améry was shipped to Auschwitz on transport XXIII; upon arrival, 417 of 655 
people on his train were immediately murdered.222 Améry survived the selection at the 
ramp and was sent to work in Auschwitz-Monowitz, the number 172364 tattooed into 
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his arm. From June 1944 he worked as a clerk at the Buna Werke factory, where he 
briefly met Primo Levi. The SS evacuated Auschwitz-Monowitz in January 1945, and 
Améry went first to Dora-Mittelbau and then to Bergen-Belsen in April, which was 
liberated by the British the same month. Améry arrived in Brussels in late April 1945, 
one of the 615 survivors of the 25,437 Jews who had been deported from Belgium.223 
His wife, Regina, had died the previous year of heart failure.  
Upon his return to Brussels, Améry immediately started writing again. In the 
long essay “Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes” that dated June 1945, but which 
he began in all likelihood at Auschwitz, Améry addressed the question of German 
guilt. He was confident that the German people—whom he differentiated into 
categories of the Nazi elite, the complicit majority of the population, and the small 
opposition—would be adequately punished and more importantly, would acknowledge 
responsibility. Améry, who believed that Allied policies and world opinion were on 
his side, optimistically spoke “sowohl von Bestrafung (…) als auch von Erziehung” in 
the process of the German people’s betterment.224  
Améry wrote several other pieces during the first three years after his 
liberation, mainly literary texts with autobiographical details, which he never 
published. He continued working on Die Schiffbrüchigen; in his later drafts his 
protagonist Althager was now identified as prisoner with the number 172364 
(Améry’s Auschwitz number), although it remained unstated where or why Althager 
had been imprisoned.225 In a film script, Améry exchanged the perspective of a Jewish 
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prisoner for that of the French war returnee and POW Pierre, who also carried the 
number 172364.226 Under the nom de plume Jean-Paul Mayster, Améry wrote Die 
Eingemauerten, a play in which he further developed the character Pierre; more 
important than the plot is Améry’s obvious engagement with—and admiration for—
Jean-Paul Sartre, whose Huis Clos loosely served as Améry’s model. From 1945 
onward, Sartre became Améry’s most important intellectual influence.227 These early 
attempts at writing autobiographically within a narrative framework are precursors for 
Améry’s later essay-novels, a hybrid form of writing he explored in order to work 
through autobiographical material (in essay form) in fictional settings.  
In none of these early works did Améry address the uniqueness of Jewish 
victims, but postwar circumstances of soldiers returning home, displaced people, and 
food and housing shortages loomed large. In the earliest letter that survived after 
Améry’s liberation, he wrote Maria Leitner: 
 
Du wirst mir bitte ersparen, Dir die elende Odyssee meines Lebens in 
diesen Jahren zu erzählen. Ich war nicht als Jude, sondern politisch 
verhaftet gewesen wegen einer, übrigens unerheblichen, Aktivität für 
das “Free Austrian Movement.” Jedenfalls genügte es, um mich auch 
alle Marterungen der Gestapoverhöre auskosten zu lassen, dann war ich 
in so einigen Konzentrationslagern gewesen. Zurückgeblieben ist ein 
Lungenleiden, und die Ärzte raten mir, in die Schweiz zu gehen, wozu 
ich allerdings weder das nötige Geld noch auch die Einreisebewilligung 
habe. Ich versuche, zu schreiben, komme aber, um die Wahrheit zu 
sagen, nicht erheblich vorwärts.228 
 
                                                
to a concentration camp. “Die Festung Dorleven” is the only part of the unpublished “Eugen-Althager-
Komplex” that is included in his collected works, Jean Améry, "Die Festung Derloven," in Jean Améry 
Werke. Bd. 1, Die Schiffbrüchigen. Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 2007), 582-608. 
226 Jean Améry, Die Selbstmörder, 1946/47 (DLA 81.1222). Cf. Jean Améry, “[Ohne Titel. Filmskript] 
1946/47, 96 pages” (DLA 81.1223). 
227 Cf.  Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 110.  
228 Améry, letter to Maria Leitner (Maria Améry), 1945, in: Jean Améry, Jean Améry Werke, Bd. 8. 
Briefe, ed. Gerhard Scheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 24f. 
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Améry downplayed his particular situation as a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz. Leitner, 
who had been a friend of Améry’s late wife in Vienna, and whom Améry met in 
Antwerp as Leitner and her Jewish husband were leaving for the U.S., became 
Améry’s closest friend. Ernst Mayer, who still lived in Vienna, tried to arrange for 
Améry’s return to Austria; from his letters to Leitner it is obvious how ambivalent 
Améry felt about returning. He confessed homesickness but lamented Austria’s 
economic situation; moreover, he identified with France more than Austria.229 In 
February 1946, he wrote Leitner: 
 
Immer noch sitze ich hier und kann mich nicht zur Rückreise nach 
Wien entschließen, trotz wirklichem Heimweh und à la longue besseren 
Berufsaussichten in Österreich. Es ist eine Art Furcht, die mich 
zurückhält, nicht so sehr vor den schwierigen Lebensumständen als 
vielmehr vor möglichen anderen Enttäuschungen. Nach so langer 
Abwesenheit hat man fataler Weise schon ein wenig den Kontakt mit 
einem Volke und einer Kultur verloren. Was Thomas Mann in Bezug 
auf seine nicht durchgeführte Rückkehr schreibt, bleibt gültig, auch für 
uns Österreicher. Inzwischen habe ich mir hier eine Art 
Zwischenexistenz geschaffen.230 
 
Over two-and-a-half years later Améry was still in Brussels. Despite Mayer’s efforts 
to ease his transition and Leopold Langhammer’s offer of employment, Améry could 
not decide, yet he steadfastly pursued the reinstatement of his Austrian citizenship. 
Once his Austrian passport was returned to him, and along with it the legal right to 
live in Austria, Améry dropped the issue of returning there permanently, though he 
visited his native country at least once a year, for the rest of his life.231  
                                                
229 “Aber die Nachrichten über das Leben in Österreich sind schlecht. Sehr schlecht. Les nouvelles sont 
horrifiantes, wir wir Franzosen sagen. Es gibt nichts zu essen. Es gibt keine Strassenbahnen, kein Licht, 
kein Gas, keinen Kleiser, nichts als Dysenthereie [sic], Hunger und Kälte.” Emphasis mine. Améry, 
letter to Leitner, December 23, 1945, in Améry, Briefe, 30. 
230 Améry, letter to Leitner, February 26, 1946, in ibid., 31. See above for a discussion on Thomas 
Mann vis-à-vis his return to Germany.  
231 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 127. In his letters to Ernst Mayer Améry reflects on the 
possibility of returning to Austria as late as in the 1970s.  
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Austria was not the only country he considered as an alternative to Belgium. In 
1946, Social Democrat Heinz Kühn, the future minister-president of North Rhine-
Westphalia, who had escaped from the Gestapo to Brussels and had met Améry there, 
offered his “comrade” a position in radio, most likely heading a literary program with 
Northwest German Broadcasting or writing for the Cologne newspaper of the Social 
Democrats, the Rheinische Zeitung. He also wanted Améry’s assistance educating 
young Social Democrats. It emerges from Heidelberger-Leonard’s reconstruction of a 
complicated letter exchange between several political emigrants in the process of 
returning to Germany that the Social Democratic movement began recruiting Améry 
in June of 1945, after Kühn circulated Améry’s  “Zur Psychologie des deutschen 
Volkes.”232 Améry had no interest in living in Germany, however. He considered 
London, Paris and Zurich, living in all three cities periodically between 1948 and 
1950, but in the end remaining in Brussels. 
 Through an acquaintance Améry met Frank Dukas in 1948. Dukas, the owner 
of a Swiss press agency, was a Jewish autodidact like Améry. The two men bonded 
over their experiences, and the Dukas agency contracted him, managing almost all of 
Améry’s journalistic output until the 1960s. Encouraged by his journalistic success, 
Améry offered Leitner, with whom he had become romantically involved, to work for 
him as personal secretary. He hoped that with her help he could maintain his level of 
journalistic output of three articles per week while gradually shifting his emphasis 
towards literary writing.233 Leitner, who still lived in the U.S. and visited Europe on 
business trips, moved to Brussels only in 1955, after she had divorced her husband; 
Leitner and Améry were married in Vienna a few months later. 
                                                
232 Cf. ibid., 130ff.  
233 Améry, letter to Leitner, November 13, 1948, in: Améry, Briefe, 36.  
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The same year Améry signified the finality of his decision to stay in Brussels 
by translating Hans and forming an anagram of Mayer, thus “Frenchifying” his name 
to Jean Améry, the pseudonym he used from then on. He had first written for Dukas as 
a ghostwriter, then under different aliases for numerous Swiss newspapers, most 
frequently for the St. Galler Tagblatt, as well as international papers in Holland and 
England. By 1965, he had written over 15,000 pages and 5,000 articles,234 including 
the series “Portraits berühmter Zeitgenossen,” covering pop culture celebrities, 
classical musicians, artists, writers, politicians, and philosophers. The series was so 
popular that it resulted in the publication of three books: Karrieren und Köpfe, 
Teenager Stars, and Im Banne des Jazz. A biography of Gerhart Hauptmann and one 
on Winston Churchill followed. In 1961 Améry published his first uncommissioned 
book, Geburt der Gegenwart (translated into English in 1964 as Preface to the 
Future), in which he reflected on postwar cultural developments. 
 Beginning in 1960 Améry worked occasionally for the West German radio 
station Süddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR), contributing pieces on cultural developments in 
Belgium and France. In January of 1964, he made SDR an offer to write 
 
ein rekonstruiertes Auschwitz-Tagebuch (…), und zwar keinen 
Dokumentarbericht, wie es deren ja schon viele gibt, sondern 
Reflexionen in Tagebuchform über fundamentale existentielle Probleme 
des KZ-Universums und namentlich die Reaktionen eines 
Intellektuellen. (…)  
Da nun eben in Deutschland der Auschwitz-Prozess läuft, frage 
ich mich, ob Sie nicht in einer Sendung ausgewählte Stücke meiner 
Arbeit bringen möchten: Ich glaube nämlich, dass man in dieser sehr 
speziellen und auf den Intellektuellen hin ausgerichteten Weise noch 
nicht über das KZ berichtet hat.235 
 
                                                
234 Jean Améry, "Nach fünftausend Zeitungsartikeln," in Wie ich anfing... 24 Autoren berichten von 
ihren Anfängen, ed. Hans Daiber (Düsseldorf: Claasen Verlag, 1979), 215-26. 
235 Améry, letter to Karl Schwedhelm, January 18, 1964, in Améry, Briefe, 101. 
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The head of the SDR department “Radio-Essay,” Helmut Heißenbüttel, was interested, 
and he and Améry collaborated on the project that eventually led to the publication of 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. The success of his essays, on radio and in print, was 
immense, in particular among the intellectual elite. Hans Paeschke, chief editor of 
Merkur, asked Améry to contribute regularly to the liberal journal; indeed, Améry 
wrote some sixty essays and reviews for Merkur between 1965 and his death in 1978. 
When the publishing house Klett (later Klett-Cotta) bought Merkur, its owner, Ernst 
Klett, and chief-editor, Hubert Arbogast, offered Améry a permanent contract, which 
he accepted. Améry published six more books under Klett, all of which he first read 
for radio: collected essays on aging and on suicide; two autobiographical essay 
collections; and two essayistic novels, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch and Charles Bovary, 
Landarzt. His essays earned Améry several important recognitions, including the 
literary prize of the Bavarian Academy of Arts (1972), the Cross of Merits, First Class 
(awarded by Federal President Gustav Heinemann, 1972), the honorary memberships 
of PEN and the Darmstadt Academy of Language and Composition (both 1976), the 
Vienna Prize for Journalism (1976), and the Lessing Prize of the City of Hamburg 
(1977); he refused an honorary doctoral degree from Austria.  
After Améry attempted suicide in 1974, he ended his life in 1978 in the 
Austrian city of Salzburg. He is buried in Vienna.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
“Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht”:
1
 
The Melancholy Discourse and Wolfgang Hildesheimer’s Tynset 
 
 
Melancholia has been called a German disposition.2 At the end of a long line of 
melancholic German artists and hommes des lettres that includes Albrecht Dürer, 
whose sixteenth-century Melencholia etchings figure in every humanist discussion of 
melancholia, we find an expatriate author, W. G. Sebald. The author’s melancholy 
style, manifest in all his prose and particularly pronounced in those works concerned 
with Holocaust remembrance, The Emigrants (1993) and Austerlitz (2001), has been 
lauded because of Sebald’s “responsible ownership” of the Holocaust.3 Sebald’s 
oeuvre has generated enormous international interest among literary critics and 
scholars, who are almost univocal in their praise of his example in engaging 
catastrophes of twentieth-century Europe and their expressions in memory, history, 
trauma, and experience. This focus on Sebald represents a trend that began in the late 
1980s, in which melancholia is favorably conceptualized as a model for collective 
cultural memory.4 The next two chapters of this dissertation will show that Sebald’s 
melancholy style finds a predecessor in Hildesheimer’s “monogische[r] Prosa” 
                                                
1 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, qtd. in Hilde Domin, "Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht," Neue deutsche 
Hefte 107, no. 12 (1965), 124-34, here 124. 
2 Cf. Joachim S. Hohmann, ed. Melancholie. Ein deutsches Gefühl (Trier: Ed. Trèves,1989). Wolf 
Lepenies lists several counterexamples, in which melancholia is believed to be a French or English 
habitus, to show the dubiousness of such stereotyping. Wolf Lepenies, Melancholie und Gesellschaft 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), 64f. 
3 Arthur Williams, "'Das korsakowsche Syndrom': Remembrance and Responsibility in W.G. Sebald," 
in German Culture and the Uncomfortable Past. Representations of National Socialism in 
Contemporary Germanic Literature, ed. Helmut Schmitz (Aldershot, Hants, UK; Burlington, Vt.: 
Ashgate, 2001), 65-86, here 72. 
4 Cf. Dieter Lenzen, "Melancholie, Fiktion und Historizität. Historiographische Optionen im Rahmen 
einer historischen Anthropologie," in Historische Anthropologie. Zum Problem der Humanwissenschaft 
heute oder Versuche einer Neubegründung, ed. Gunter Gebauer et al. (Reinbek/Hamburg: Rowohlt, 
1989), 13-48. 
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(Tynset, 1965, and Masante, 1973).5 More importantly, I examine this style’s 
suitability for creative engagement with memories of traumatic events, and I address 
the question of whether melancholia can adequately model collective memory. I 
particularly ask whether it is suited to enabling socio-political action. A broad recent 
current among literary and cultural theorists is to redefine and valorize melancholia 
and to affirm its symptoms as creative, critical, and productive for society. By 
focusing on one particular participant in this trend, Jonathan Flatley,6 I summarize in 
this chapter how melancholic remembrance is argued to include a revolutionary kernel 
that ties melancholia to socio-political consciousness and action. In the process of 
idealizing melancholia, practices of working through have been stripped of their 
critical dimensions and are interpreted in reduced terms. In considering Hildesheimer I 
hope to show that his melancholy works ought not to be separated from works of 
mourning and processes of working through. While in Hildesheimer’s case one may 
make a historically specific argument defending his melancholic response on a 
personal level, I argue that to posit melancholia as socio-politically effective is 
inadequate. Hildesheimer, as chapter III will show, withdrew his narrator, the 
melancholic narrator of Tynset and Masante, and stopped writing fiction altogether. 
For Hildesheimer, as I read his works, the melancholy style produced only more 
                                                
5 “Monologische Prosa” is the title of the volume in Hildesheimer’s collected works that contains 
Tynset and Masante, cf. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben 
Bänden. Bd. II Monologische Prosa, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1991). 
6 I deliberately choose Jonathan Flatley’s 2008 work which, while not ground-breaking or authoritative, 
is representative of a trend whose more prominent proponents are Judith Butler and Ranjana Khanna. 
Flatley’s introductory chapters (on the discourse of melancholia, with special emphasis on current 
exegeses of Sigmund Freud and Walter Benjamin) provide an overview of prevalent notions on 
melancholia in current theoretical writing. Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping. Melancholia and the 
Politics of Modernism (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2008). Cf. Judith Butler, 
The Psychic Life of Power. Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Ranjana 
Khanna, Dark Continents. Psychoanalysis and Colonialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2003). 
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melancholia and thus proved inadequate beyond a personal level for engaging with the 
past in a critical and creative manner.  
Several aspects have been emphasized repeatedly within discussions of 
melancholia, which span more than two thousand years, and it is these elements that 
make melancholia both a suitable topic of literature and a likely disposition affecting 
writers: these are an inclination towards cognitive constituents of melancholia, 
memory and imagination; an affinity toward and preference for the past over the 
present and the future; and a preferred medium, the written word. According to the 
consensus in Hildesheimer scholarship, melancholia is a major, if not the “Grundzug 
im literarischen Werk Wolfgang Hildesheimers.”7 The perception of a “Mode 
Melancholie” among Hildesheimer scholars particularly applies to the reception of 
those works written in the 1960s and early 1970s that earned Hildesheimer prestige 
and a reputation as a serious West German author. This set includes the short prose 
fragment “Hamlet” (1961), the essayistic monologue Vergebliche Aufzeichnungen 
(1962), the play Nachtstück (1963), the radioplay Monolog (1964), the novels Tynset 
                                                
7 Dietmar Goll-Bickmann, Aspekte der Melancholie in der frühen und mittleren Prosa Wolfgang 
Hildesheimers (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1989), back cover. The literature on Hildesheimer includes several 
monographs as well as a number of articles, but overall it is not very voluminous. The most important 
work is Stephan Braese’s study on Jewish writers in West Germany, which includes several chapters on 
Hildesheimer, cf. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung. Braese also provides an encyclopedic entry to 
Hildesheimer, Stephan Braese, "Wolfgang Hildesheimer. Das Ende des Übersetzens," in Shoah in der 
deutschsprachigen Literatur, ed. Norbert Otto Eke and Hartmut Steinecke (Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 2006), 237-43. Melancholia in Hildesheimer’s oeuvre is not only the topic in Goll-Bickmann’s 
study but also the focus of: Günter Blamberger, Versuch über den deutschen Gegenwartsroman. 
Krisenbewußtsein und Neubegründung im Zeichen der Melancholie (Stuttgart: Metzlersche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1985). 
Other monographs, focusing on history, temporal-spatial models, and the figure of the artist in 
Hildesheimer, are: Peter Hanenberg, Geschichte im Werk Wolfgang Hildesheimers (Frankfurt/M. et al.: 
Peter Lang, 1989); Wolfgang Hirsch, Zwischen Wirklichkeit und erfundener Biographie. Zum 
Künstlerbild bei Wolfgang Hildesheimer (Hamburg: Lit, 1997); Lena Christolova, "Die Zeit ist niemals 
in den Fugen gewesen." Raum-zeitliche Modelle in der poetischen Welt von Wolfgang Hildesheimer 
(Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre-Verlag, 1999); Christine Chiadò Rana, Das Weite suchen. Unterwegs in 
Wolfgang Hildesheimers Prosa, Literatura (Würzburg: Ergon, 2003). Two comprehensive 
interpretations of Hildesheimer’s oeuvre are Puknus, Wolfgang Hildesheimer; Volker Jehle, Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer. Werkgeschichte (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1990). For an excellent early introduction to 
Hildesheimer, cf. Thomas Koebner, "Wolfgang Hildesheimer," in Deutsche Literatur seit 1945 in 
Einzeldarstellungen, ed. Dietrich Weber (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1970), 202-24. 
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(1965) and Masante (1973), and the autobiographical prose piece Zeiten in Cornwall 
(1971).8 These works coincide with a phase in which Hildesheimer’s creative 
production underwent a process of radicalization and politicization, in which the 
thematization of the Nazi past, the inadequate processing of the past in the present, 
and victims’ attempts at working through trauma come to the fore. Thus the discussion 
of Tynset (in chapter II) and Masante (chapter III) attends to the political implications 
of the author’s melancholic work, in particular regarding Hildesheimer’s approach to 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.9 
Before turning to Hildesheimer at approximately the midpoint of this chapter, I 
provide a preliminary summary of the historical discourse of melancholia and offer a 
reading of two canonical theorists of melancholia: Sigmund Freud and Walter 
                                                
8 Goll-Bickmann, Aspekte der Melancholie, 1. Included in the Tynset/Masante complex are several 
shorter pieces that had been intended for inclusion in the novels but ultimately were published 
elsewhere. These include the last of Hildesheimer’s Lieblose Legenden, “Schläferung” (1962), the prose 
piece “Die Margarinefabrik” (1965), the fragments “Der Ruf in die Wüste (1963) and “Cal Masante” 
(1969), and the radio plays Maxine (1969) and Hauskauf (1975). All the above have been republished in 
Gesammelte Werke. 
9 Important contributions to scholarship focusing on Tynset and Masante include Wolfgang Rath, 
Fremd im Fremden. Zur Scheidung von Ich und Welt im deutschen Gegenwartsroman (Heidelberg: Carl 
Winter, 1985), 79-161; Ernst Nef, "Die absurde Geschichte. Die Fälscher, die Häscher, der 
Melancholiker," Schweizer Monatshefte 51 (1975/76), 37-45; Uwe-K. Ketelsen, "Fremd unter fremden 
Namen. Erzählen in Wolfgang Hildesheimers Masante," in Literatur und Geschichte. Festschrift für 
Wulf Koepke zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Karl Menges (Amsterdam, Atlanta: Rodopi, 1998), 277-89; 
Jonathan J. Long, "Time and Narrative. Wolfgang Hildesheimer's Tynset und Masante," German Life 
and Letters 52, no. 4 (1999), 457-74; Jonathan J. Long, "Power, Desire, Perfomance. Narrative 
Exchanges in Wolfgang Hildesheimer's Masante," Neophilologues 85 (2001), 601-19; Mary Cosgrove, 
"Netzwerk und Erinnerung in Wolfgang Hildesheimers Tynset," in Netzwerke. Eine Kulturtechnik der 
Moderne, ed. Jürgen Barkhoff et al. (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau 2004), 251-59.  
Hildesheimer commented on Tynset and Masante in a number of significant interviews. Cf. 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer and Dierk Rodewald, "Wolfgang Hildesheimer im Gespräch mit Dierk 
Rodewald," in Über Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 
141-64; Wolfgang Hildesheimer and Jens Walter, "(Interview)," in Selbstanzeige. Schriftsteller im 
Gespräch, ed. Werner Koch (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1971), 89-99; Wolfgang Hildesheimer and 
Matthias Prangel, "Interview mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," Deutsche Bücher 1 (1973), 1-10; Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer and Manfred Durzak, "Ich kann über nichts anderes schreiben als über ein potentielles 
Ich. Gespräch mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," in Gespräche über den Roman. Formbestimmungen und 
Analysen, ed. Manfred Durzak (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 271-95; Wolfgang Hildesheimer and 
Hanjo Kesting, "Das Ende der Fiktion. Gespräch mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," in Dichter ohne 
Vaterland. Gespräche und Aufsätze zur Literatur (Berlin, Bonn: Dietz, 1982), 52-68; Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer and Hans Helmut Hillrichs, Wolfgang Hildesheimer: Ich werde nun schweigen. Gespräch 
mit Hans Helmut Hillrichs, ed. Ingo Hermann (Göttingen: Lamuv, 1993). 
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Benjamin. In recent years scholars have returned to Freud and Benjamin to explore 
various nexuses between melancholia and socio-political action in an attempt to rescue 
a utopian element from melancholia. Traditionally the discourse of melancholia, as 
shaped by Freud and Benjamin in relation to loss in the early twentieth century, 
considered melancholic texts to be those, in which a melancholic character views the 
world allegorically as a field of ruins in which past and present collapse into each 
other, but does not image a viable future. The individual introjects losses into his ego 
and practices endless melancholic remembrance; his “geschichtsphilosophische 
Verzweiflung gleitet in reflexiv-ästhetische Melancholie über.”10 In this model 
melancholic mourning for loss is unending and produces only more melancholia, but it 
is otherwise unproductive. In a more recent model of melancholia, advocated by 
Flatley and other scholars who have set different emphases within works by Freud and 
Benjamin, melancholia anticipates an idea of the future and prepares for it. Here 
melancholia becomes a productive, transformative state that gives way to a better 
future. This model posits melancholia as a privileged literary style for approaching the 
past. Before these two alternatives, which appear to be mutually exclusive, the 
melancholic novel today stands at a crossroads between static contemplation of the 
past and the productive imagination of the future, one prohibiting and the other 
encouraging socio-political agency. The present chapter and the next examine 
Hildesheimer’s position regarding the creative productivity of melancholia particularly 
vis-à-vis socio-political engagement.  
 
                                                
10 Ludger Heidbrink, Melancholie und Moderne. Zur Kritik der historischen Verzweiflung (Munich: 
Fink, 1994), 164. 
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The Discourse of Melancholia 
Melancholia, alternatively called melancholy,11 has for centuries been a 
favorite topic and motif in literature and the fine arts, as attested to by a large number 
of studies on individual works.12 Fewer studies attempt to grasp the concept more 
broadly.13 With a plethora of case studies and general descriptions of melancholia, the 
concept has become malleable, meaning substantively different things to different 
authors and their readers at different times. Wolf Lepenies, author of the influential 
                                                
11 The English equivalents for Melancholie are melancholy and melancholia, but recent critical 
literature tends to favor the term melancholia, perhaps because of the influence of Sigmund Freud’s 
“Trauer und Melancholie,” translated into English as “Mourning and Melancholia,” cf. Sigmund Freud, 
"Mourning and Melancholia," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud. Vol. 14, A History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and 
Other Works (1914-1916), ed. James Stratchy (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), 237-58. Melancholia 
is the preferred term in psychiatric and psychoanalytical discussions as well as for proponents of trauma 
theory. Although the valorization of melancholia as a source of social-political productivity (a trend I 
discuss later in this chapter) is a cultural phenomenon, this cultural phenomenon cannot be separated 
from the medicalized discourse of melancholia, and to emphasize the link between the two I use the 
term melancholia throughout the dissertation. This does not mean that I focus exclusively on 
interpretations of melancholia derived from medical assessments. On the contrary, I believe that the 
medicalized discourse of melancholia is itself a cultural phenomenon that interacts with other cultural 
phenomena.  
12 A few recent studies include: Rüdiger Görner, ed. The Anatomist of Melancholy. Essays in Memory of 
W.G. Sebald (Munich: Iudicium, 2003); Alexandra Stäheli, Materie und Melancholie. Die Postmoderne 
zwischen Adorno, Lytotard und pictorial turn (Vienna: Passagen, 2004); Angus Gowland, The Worlds 
of Renaissance Melancholy. Burton in Context (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Markus Scheffler, Kunsthass im Grunde. Über Melancholie bei Arthur Schopenhauer und deren 
Verwendung in Thomas Bernhards Prosa (Heidelberg: Winter, 2008). 
13 Influential studies in the German context are in chronological order of their publication: Raymond 
Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy. Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and 
Art (London: Nelson, 1964); Lepenies, Melancholie; Hans-Jürgen Schings, Melancholie und 
Aufklärung. Melancholiker und ihre Kritiker in Erfahrungsseelenkunde und Literatur des 18. 
Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1977); Ludwig Völker, Muse 
Melancholie--Therapeutikum Poesie. Studium zum Melancholie-Problem in der deutschen Lyrik von 
Hölty bis Benn (Munich: Fink, 1978); Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly, Melancholie und die melancholische 
Landschaft. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Bern: A. Francke, 1978); Franz 
Loquai, Künstler und Melancholie in der Romantik (Frankfurt/M.: P. Lang, 1984); Gert Mattenklott, 
Melancholie in der Dramatik des Sturm und Drang (Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, 1985); Günter 
Blamberger, Versuch Gegenwartsroman; Roland Lambrecht, Der Geist der Melancholie. Eine 
Herausforderung philosophischer Reflexion (Munich: Fink, 1996); for a shorter version of the same 
text: Roland Lambrecht, Melancholie. Vom Leiden an der Welt und den Schmerzen der Reflexion 
(Reinbek/Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1994); Heidbrink, Melancholie und Moderne; Anette Schwarz, 
Melancholie. Figuren und Orte einer Stimmung (Vienna: Passagen-Verlag, 1996); Martina Wagner-
Egelhaaf, Die Melancholie der Literatur. Diskursgeschichte und Textfiguration (Stuttgart, Weimar: 
Metzler, 1997); Ludger Heidbrink, ed. Entzauberte Zeit. Der melancholische Geist der Moderne 
(Munich, Vienna: Carl Hanser, 1997); Peter Borchmeyer, ed. Melancholie und Heiterkeit (Heidelberg: 
Winter, 2007); Flatley, Affective Mapping. 
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monograph Melancholie und Gesellschaft, speaks of melancholia’s aura, the 
attractiveness of which, he believes, stems from the concept’s “Unbestimmtheit” and 
its “kaschierte[m] Sinn.”14 In the German preface to what constitutes one of the 
standard works on melancholia, Saturn und Melancholie, Raymond Klibansky writes 
that the discourse on melancholia resembles the tower of Babel in which “ein jeder zu 
verstehen [glaubt], sei es auf seine eigene Weise, was gemeint ist.”15 Despite the 
absence of a concrete definition, melancholia as an anthropological category remained 
relatively uniform until the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when melancholia 
became an object of interest within the emerging fields of psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis and began to be associated with depression.16 From the Hippocratic 
writings to today’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, general 
descriptions of the melancholic type or the depressive are surprisingly consistent. 
They include, in various formulations, mention of sadness, feelings of hopelessness, 
the inability to sustain enjoyment and interest, sleeplessness, tendency to suicide, and 
difficulties in communicating,17 all symptoms that appear spontaneous but often occur 
                                                
14 Lepenies, Melancholie, 7. 
15 Raymond Klibansky et al., Saturn und Melancholie. Studien zur Geschichte der Naturphilosophie 
und Medizin, der Religion und der Kunst (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), 13. 
16 For medical-historical overviews of melancholia and its psychiatric relative, depression, cf. Michael 
Schmidt-Degenhard, Melancholie und Depression. Zur Problemgeschichte der depressiven 
Erkrankungen seit Beginn der 19. Jahrhunderts (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1983); Stanley W. Jackson, 
Melancholia and Depression. From Hippocratic Times to Modern Times (New Haven, London: Yale 
University Press, 1986). For a psychoanalytic (post-Freudian) reading of melancholia, cf. Julia Kristeva, 
Black Sun. Depression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989). 
17 Cf. Flatley, Affective Mapping, 33ff. Flatley does not mention the difficulties of melancholics in 
articulating themselves, however, melancholic stuttering and melancholic silence are prevalent in the 
critical literature. Cf. Hellmut Flashar, Melancholie und Melancholiker in den medizinischen Theorien 
der Antike (Berlin: Gruyter, 1966), 46f.; Schings, Melancholie und Aufklärung, 281; Wagner-Egelhaaf, 
Melancholie der Literatur, 206. Freud notes the “aufdringliche(n) Mitteilsamkeit” of the melancholic 
but concludes that her talkativeness is a loud silence, Sigmund Freud, "Trauer und Melancholie," in 
Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 10, Werke aus den Jahren 1913-1917 (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1981), 428-46, 
here 433. Benjamin too notes the tendency of the melancholic “zur Sprachlosigkeit” and melancholia’s 
silence. See Walter Benjamin, Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. I.1, Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 
1980), 398. 
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in response to loss. The list of symptoms is the same in clinical assessments of 
depression and in cultural artifacts of (and on) melancholia. I am not interested here in 
the psychiatric evaluation of depression, but I do focus on melancholia as a cultural 
phenomenon. As such, it cannot be separated from medicalized discourses, including 
psychiatry and psychoanalysis. For this reason I frequently engage with other writers’ 
interpretations of psychoanalysis and exegeses of Freud. 
 
The Children of Saturn 
 Known since the Corpus Hippocratum, compiled between the fifth and the 
third centuries B.C.E., melancholia described the temperament caused by one of four 
humors that, when in equilibrium, signified a person’s health.18 The classic teachings 
on the humors, viz. blood, yellow and black bile, and phlegm, speak to an ideal order; 
an excess of any of the humors threatened the universal order. For the individual, an 
imbalance among the humors either characterized one’s general constitution or 
marked—if the humor was present in great excess—a pathological state. Black bile, 
the source of melancholia, was something of an exception to the system of humors, for 
the distinction between pathology and temperament was here much slighter than for 
the other humors. The state or illness of melancholia was exceptional in another 
regard: black bile was the only humor to cause symptoms of mental changes, 
including misanthropy, depression, and madness. This peculiarity helped the 
conception of melancholoa shift into the later realm of psychology, and aided it the 
process of transforming the teachings of the four humors into a theory of mental 
                                                
18 The teachings of the four humors and their corresponding temperaments and qualities result from the 
Pythagoreans’ belief in four as the perfect number, and their attempt at finding simple primary 
elements, in this case four, to which the irrational structures of the world and life could be traced. Cf. 
Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 3-10. For the earliest articulation of melancholia, cf. 
Hippocrates, "On the Nature of Man," in Hippocrates IV (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1992), 1-41. 
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types.19 In opposition to a widespread equation of melancholia and “all that was evil 
and nocturnal,”20 Aristotle remarked with curiosity that all outstanding men, in the 
realms of the arts, poetry, philosophy, and statesmanship, were melancholics, and he 
proposed the new idea that their “remarkable gifts” stemmed not from “disease but 
from natural causes.”21 He admitted that too much black bile might cause a serious 
illness of the mind not unlike “epilepsy,” but claimed that it positively influenced the 
temperament at a moderate temperature towards more creativity, diplomacy, and 
geniality.22 Aristotle was the first to distinguish manic and depressive phases that 
accounted for the melancholic’s range of moods spanning cheerfulness to suicidal 
tendencies.23 From his reading of Aristotle Günter Blamberger concludes that from the 
                                                
19 Cf. Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 14f. 
20 Ibid., 16. 
21  Book III, Problem I, known as "A Monograph on Black Bile," Aristotle, The Complete Works of 
Aristotle. Vol. 2, Problems, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1502. 
Cf. “Why is it that all those who have become eminent in philosophy or politics of poetry of the arts are 
clearly of an atrabilious temperament [are clearly melancholics], and some of them to such an extent as 
to be affected by diseases caused by black bile, as is said to have happened to Heracles among the 
heroes? (…) There are also the stories of Ajax and Bellerophon, of whom the former became insane, 
while the latter sought out habitation in desert places (…). And many other of the heroes seem to have 
been similarly afflicted, and among men of recent times Empedocles, Plato, and Socrates, and 
numerous other well-known men, and also most of the poets.” Aristotle, Problems, 1498f. Text in 
square brackets refers to the translation provided in Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 18f. Cf. 
Hildesheimer’s narrator in Tynset and Masante, who seeks the desert and disappears there. 
22 Aristotle, Problems, III.1, 1499. Aristotle distinguishes between different degrees of melancholia, 
calling the effect of black bile “variable,” thereby producing a “variation” of melancholics (1502): 
“[T]hose who possess an atrabilious temperament in a slight degree are ordinary, but those who have 
much of it are quite unlike the majority of people. For, if their condition is quite complete, they are very 
atrabilious; but, if they possess a mixed temperament, they are men of genius” (1501). Attributing 
melancholia to an excess of heat or cold, causing either dullness and stupidity or “frenzy,” Aristotle 
writes of those melancholics who, while affected by an excess of black bile, maintain a balanced, 
consistent temperature of black bile, the following: “Those in whom the excessive heat dies down to a 
mean temperature are atrabilious, but they have more practical wisdom and are less eccentric and in 
many respects superior to others either in education or in the arts or in public life.” Even those 
melancholics suffering from hot black bile and who therefore are “frenzied” have access to geniality: 
The poet Maracus, Aristotle writes, “was actually a better poet when he was out of his mind.” Those, 
however, whose bile is cold “beyond due measure,” are suicidal (1501).  
23 “[W]ine and the atrabilious temperament are similar in nature” (1500). Wine and melancholia make 
men “irritable, benevolent, compassionate, or reckless.” A small amount of wine may turn a man 
talkative, while a large amount of wine may have the effect on him of seeking absolute silence. The 
quantity of black bile and its temperature affect men differently in a similar vein. “[O]ne man is 
loquacious, another emotional, another easily moved to tears. (…) Other become compassionate or 
savage or taciturn; for some maintain a complete silence, especially those atrabilious subjects who are 
out of their minds” (1499). Ibid. 
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melancholic’s tightrope walk between mania and depression, she more than others 
comes to know the “Abgründe menschlichen Daseins.” Knowing fully the dangers to 
human existence and continuing to live regardless—therein lies her accomplishment.24  
 Although Aristotle’s thoughts on the melancholia of great men were frequently 
quoted, it was not until the fifteenth century that the Renaissance established a firm 
link between melancholia and genius, especially artistic genius.25 Until then, all that 
had survived of Aristotle’s assessment of melancholia was the vague notion that a 
special connection existed between melancholia and intellectual life.26 Melancholia 
was otherwise generally treated as a pathology. Moral theologians of the middle ages 
discussed it primarily in terms of blasphemy or affiliation with the devil.27 Within the 
medieval Christian worldview, the melancholic was suspected of acedia (apathy, 
literally non-caring) and tristitia (despair), attitudes that were interpreted as a rejection 
of God or the failure to experience God’s presence.28 
Concurrent with a theological interpretation of melancholia as sin, and perhaps 
as an expression of concern with church dogma, late medieval narrative poetry and 
prose made favorable use of the concept in depicting mental states. In this sense 
melancholia began increasingly to describe a temporary mood caused by external 
circumstances, such as a melancholic night or melancholic nature: melancholia was 
transferred from the individual who experienced it to a situation that was believed to 
                                                
24 Blamberger, Versuch Gegenwartsroman, 15. 
25 The connection between melancholia and creative productivity has been widely examined, most 
prominently in: Rudolf Wittkower and Margot Wittkower, Born under Saturn. The Character and 
Conduct of Artists: A Documented History from Antiquity to the French Revolution (New York Random 
House, 1963), 98-132. Cf. Ulrich Horstmann, "Die Kunst des Großen Umsonst. Melancholie als 
ästhetische Produktivkraft," in Kunstgriffe. Auskünfte zur Reichweite von Literaturtheorie und 
Literaturkritik. Festschrift für Herbert Mainusch, ed. Ulrich Horstmann and Wolfgang Zach 
(Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 1989), 127-38; Völker, Muse Melancholie, Therapeutikum Poesie.  
26 Cf. Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 42. The authors discuss a few medieval scholars who 
were exceptions in that they attempted (unsuccessfully) to reintroduce Aristotle’s thought on 
melancholia; cf. Saturn and Melancholy, 67-74. 
27 Cf. ibid., 75-82, 165-70. 
28 Cf. ch. 2, Lambrecht, Leiden an der Welt, 35-58; Michael Theunissen, Vorentwürfe von Moderne. 
Antike Melancholie und die Acedia des Mittelalters (Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1996). 
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have caused the experience.29 In the literature of the early modern period, melancholia 
was invoked to establish a positively inflected association with an ambiguous, 
bittersweet mood that described pleasurable pensiveness and lonesomeness, and by the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it had become synonymous with 
indefinite, painful yet pleasant Weltschmerz.30  
 Independent of this reappraisal of melancholia from the pathological and sinful 
to the poetic, by which melancholia gradually gained credibility as a subjective, 
sentimental, and pleasurable mood, the notion of melancholia as an intellectual force 
leading to creative or contemplative productivity developed as part of both Italian 
humanism (in the person of Marsilio Ficino) and, following the Italian model, the 
northern Renaissance (e.g., Albrecht Dürer).31 It was through the writings of Ficino, 
the 1482/89 Three Books on Life, that the idea of “the melancholy man of genius,”32 in 
particular the artist-intellectual or homo litteratus,33 found widespread acceptance. 
Ficino had fully embraced Aristotle’s thesis of melancholic great men and, in 
combination with Arabic teachings on the planet Saturn,34 devised a system in which 
Saturn’s “immanent contradiction” was given “redemptive power”: “The melancholic 
should (….) apply himself of his own accord to that activity which is the particular 
                                                
29 Cf. Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 217ff. 
30 Cf. ibid., 228-40. The poetic and philosophical aesthetic melancholia is related to hypochondria, the 
“weltschmerzliche Empfindlichkeit” of German Romanticism. Melancholia was an especially frequent 
theme and/or often invoked mood in German Sturm und Drang and Romanticism (ch. Goethe’s Die 
Leiden des jungen Werthers, 1774; Kant’s Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und 
Erhabenen, 1764; Novalis’ Heinrich von Ofterdingen, 1802/19). Cf. ch. 3, Lambrecht, Leiden an der 
Welt, 59-92.  
31 Cf. Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 241ff. 
32 Ibid., 255. Marsilio Ficino, Three Books on Life, trans. Carol V. Kaske and John R. Clark (Temple, 
AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1998). 
33 Cf.Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 20.  
34 The discourse of melancholia absorbed Arabic teachings on melancholia once they had been 
translated into Latin in the eleventh century. As consequence, the planet Saturn (and its Greek name-
giver, the internally divided Cronos) was firmly established in connection with melancholia and the 
melancholic disposition described as Saturnine. Saturn was believed to reside over a host of 
contradictory properties, including loneliness, sadness, writing, loss, and reflection. Cf. Klibansky et al., 
Saturn and Melancholy, 82ff., 127-35. 
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sublime star of speculation, and which the planet [=Saturn] promotes just as 
powerfully as it hinders and harms the ordinary functions of body and soul—that is to 
say, to creative contemplation.”35 The children of Saturn—melancholics—were given 
to strong impulses of the imagination; according to Arabic teachings on Saturn, this 
capacity to imagine is associated with an inclination for mathematics and geometry. 
Panofsky and Saxl discerned from Dürer’s etching Melencolia I—“[dem] Bild der 
Bilder”36 that translated Ficino’s melancholia into its most iconic image—that Dürer 
believed (as did others) that the imaginative disposition, linked to a talent for 
mathematics, came at a cost, in that it “renders the mind incapable of metaphysical 
speculation.” Absent metaphysical insight, melancholia meant an “intellectual 
limitation” that left its carrier with the “feeling of imprisonment within enclosing 
walls.”37 In her study on melancholia in literature, Martina Wagner-Egelhaaf contrasts 
the melancholic’s sensibility for (spatial or mathematical) order with disorderly 
conduct vis-à-vis society, and she situates the Renaissance discourse of melancholia in 
a field of tension between order and disorder.38 With the help of Dürer’s Melencolia, 
she theorizes that the melancholic geometrician projects geometric order onto a world 
that would otherwise be empty of meaning for him. Because he lacks “[den] höhere[n] 
Ein- und Überblick,” the melancholic compensates with a peculiar form of 
melancholic order.39 With Ficino and Dürer the discourse of melancholia thus changed 
                                                
35 Ibid., 271. 
36 Cf. Peter-Klaus Schuster, "Das Bild der Bilder. Zur Wirkungsgeschichte von Dürers 
Melancholiekupferstich," Idea. Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunsthalle 1 (1982), 72-134. 
37 Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy, 338. 
38 Cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 202f.  
39 Cf. ibid., 198. Wagner-Egelhaaf finds evidence for her theory in the psychiatric literature of the 
twentieth century, in which the melancholic’s pathological obsession for order leads him to experience 
“überall nur Unordnung” (200). Long before Dürer, in the thirteenth century, Henricus de Gandavo 
stated that the melancholic’s thoughts “must have extension or, as the geometrical point, occupy a 
position in space. For this reason such people are melancholy, and are the best mathematicians, but the 
worst metaphysicians; for they cannot raise their minds above the spatial notions on which mathematics 
is based.” Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibeta, trans. Roland J. Teske (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1993). Qtd. in: David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, "Mourning Remains," in Loss. The Politics of 
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not only to include a notion of heightened self-awareness and geniality, but also of 
alienation and indecision. All four traits are present in Shakepeare’s Hamlet, often 
considered the quintessential melancholic literary character. 
 Wolf Lepenies, in his sociological study on eighteenth-century bourgeois 
melancholia, observed in absolutist Europe a curious connection that scholars 
established between melancholia, order, and utopia. Robert Burton in particular, in his 
1612 The Anatomy of Melancholy, drafted a utopian plan that prescribed, in essence, 
the absence of melancholia (and therefore the absence of disorder).40 In the eighteenth 
century the relationship between melancholia and order shifted, and it became an 
excess of order imposed by external forces that caused internal boredom, 
dissatisfaction, and melancholia.41 Lepenies in short discovered a dialectical and 
reciprocal relationship between melancholia and utopia qua order. Important here is 
his twofold argument that utopian thinking arises from the desire to banish 
melancholia, and that too much order provokes in turn rebellion in the form of 
melancholia. 
Concurrent with the establishment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of 
an autonomous cultural sphere separate from the political realm and driven by a 
growing reading public, which absorbed much of the discourse of melancholia, an 
entirely different, medicalized interest in depression emerged. Melancholia was no 
longer an umbrella term for all mental illnesses, but rather it became a differentiated 
disease in need of specific study, observation, and treatment. With the birth of 
psychiatry, literally the medical treatment of the mind, the discourse bifurcated. One 
of the canonical texts on melancholia is Sigmund Freud’s essay “Mourning and 
                                                
Mourning, ed. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of 
California Press, 2003), 1-25, here 18. 
40 Cf. the preface, “Democritus to the Reader,” Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, 3 vols., vol. 
1 (London: Everyman's Library, 1932), 15-123. Cf. Lepenies, Melancholie, 22-30. 
41 Cf. Lepenies, Melancholie, 46-78. 
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Melancholia.” Freud’s confrontation of mourning and melancholia is of such 
“formelhafter Einprägsamkeit,”42 that it has had an enormous influence on our 
contemporary discussion of melancholia, even (and especially) outside psychiatric 
frameworks as pertaining to questions of cultural significance. This holds particularly 
true in the present study of Hildesheimer, since the text “Mourning and Melancholia” 
is central to Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlichs’ seminal work on a German 
inability to mourn the losses of World War II.43 Both the Mitscherlichs’ and Freud’s 
texts thus play pivotal roles in the discussion of postwar German identity. 
 
The Works of Mourning and Melancholia: Sigmund Freud  
While melancholia has long been associated in modernity with loss and grief, 
earlier theories of melancholia have discussed loss as only one of many of its possible 
causes. A connection between loss and melancholia has often been made as a fleeting 
observation rather than a core element in discourses of melancholia that predate the 
twentieth century. Sigmund Freud posits in his 1917 essay “Mourning and 
Melancholia” that melancholia constituted a failure or dysfunction to mourn loss. This 
marks the first occasion where loss conceptually plays a critical role in the 
phenomenology of melancholia. Freud’s focus on loss may partly be explained by the 
time in which he lived, inasmuch as modernity is linked to loss. The word implies a 
state separated from the past and thus evokes in its name (modernus: “of today,” as 
distinct from “of yesterday”) a sense of a lost past. In reference to World War I 
Jonathan Flatley argues that “one of the central problems of modernity is the attempt 
to grapple with (…) the fact of a new scale, scope, and quality of loss itself.”44 This 
does not exclude an optimistic or even revolutionary impulse through which the 
                                                
42 Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 164. 
43 Mitscherlich, Unfähigkeit zu trauern. 
44 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 31, cf. 28f.  
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project of European modernity promises social transformation and progress. However, 
realities of modernization in the early twentieth century did not live up to those 
promises, leaving the modern individual precariously suspended between hope and 
disappointment. An atmosphere of heady excitement for modern potential mixed with 
grave disappointment characterized the experience of World War I. The atrocities of 
the war, in which a human propensity for mass murder tangibly betrayed the promise 
of progress, produced losses on such a hitherto unimaginable scale that they were 
difficult to mourn. A heightened sense of loss and separation became a central feature 
of life, perhaps a new mode of experience.45 Written during the war, Freud’s text on 
loss and the practices of coping with it can be understood as a symptomatically 
modern text.46 
 Freud’s initial linkage of mourning and melancholia dates to his 1885 draft 
“Melancholia,” in which he observes that “[t]he affect corresponding to melancholia is 
that of mourning—that is, longing for something lost.” He adds, “in melancholia it 
must be a question of a loss.”47 Only later, following the development by his colleague 
Karl Abraham of the thesis that in melancholia mourning for a loss was delayed or 
dysfunctional, did Freud return to the idea of melancholia and loss.48 Freud begins 
“Mourning and Melancholia” with a rather vague description of mourning that gives 
the impression that mourning is a concept commonly understood. The “normal affect” 
of mourning is, Freud writes, “regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to 
                                                
45 This is Flatley’s argument, cf. ibid., 30. 
46 At the same time, Freud’s text is not free of images of melancholia that derive from the traditional 
discourse. He too paints melancholia as an opaque mystery that needs examination (like black bile). 
This is one of several examples on which Wagner-Egelhaaf draws to argue for traditional imagery in 
Freud. Cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 22, 160ff. 
47 Sigmund Freud, "Draft G. Melancholia," in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 1, Pre-Psycho-Analytic Publications and Unplublished Drafts (1886-
1899), ed. James Stratchy (London: The Hogarth Press, 1966), 200-206, here 200. 
48 Cf. Karl Abraham, "Notes on the Psycho-Analytical Investigation and Treatment of Manic-
Depressive Insanity and Allied Conditions," in Selected Papers of Karl Abraham (New York: 
Brunner/Mazel, 1927), 137-56. Freud refers to Abraham’s text, published in Zentralblatt für 
Psychoanalyse 2:6 (1912), in “Trauer und Melancholie,” 428.  
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the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one’s country, 
liberty, and ideal, and so on.”49 Mourning is not pathological, though it interrupts the 
routine of an individual’s life; melancholia, by contrast, is a “pathological disposition” 
(ibid.) marked by “profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside 
world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-
regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings, 
and culminates in a delusional expectation of punishment” (244). According to Freud, 
one of the marked differences between mourning and melancholia is that while the 
mourner experiences loss of interest in the world, in other people, in activity, and in 
love, he does not engage in the self-critical and self-deprecating mental exertions of 
the melancholic.  
 Freud describes the process of mourning as a strenuous “work of mourning” 
(Trauerarbeit): at the loss of an object “reality testing has shown that the love object 
no longer exists, and it proceeds to demand that all libido be withdrawn from its 
attachments to that object.”50 Withdrawing libido is painful, for “people never 
willingly abandon a libidinal position.” The process of detachment, which requires the 
mourner to withdraw libidinal energy even from every memory of the object, therefore 
takes considerable time and necessitates a temporary hallucination of the object to 
bridge that time: while detaching from it, the mourner pretends the object is still there. 
Finally, “respect for reality gains the day,” and the mourner is free to make other 
libidinal attachments (244f.).  
                                                
49 Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 243. From now on page numbers are included parenthetically in 
the text. 
50 Flatley argues that the concept of libido, which in Freud usually stands for either “the raw stuff of the 
sexual instinct” or an emotional tie defined by a love relationship, has a different meaning in “Mourning 
and Melancholia.” Since the defining feature of melancholia is the self-critical stance vis-à-vis the ego 
that results from negative feelings towards the lost object, the term libido is expanded here to include 
any kind of affective attachment. Flatley, Affective Mapping, 44. 
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Freud identifies two crucial differences between mourning and melancholia. 
First, in mourning the object lost is known to the mourner, who also knows why this 
loss affects him, but in melancholia either the melancholic is unclear what was lost, or, 
if the object is known, why the loss is important: he knows “whom he has lost but not 
what he has lost in him” (245). For the melancholic, the instigating loss remains 
unclear, and so to make sense of melancholia, Freud then concentrates on the second 
difference. Distinct to melancholia but absent in mourning is “an extraordinary 
diminution in his [=the melancholic’s] self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a 
grand scale [eine großartige Ichverarmung].” Consequent to this difference, “in 
mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the 
ego itself” (246).51  
 At the origin of this devaluation Freud detects an internal splitting of the ego: 
“one part of the ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it 
were, takes it as its object” (247). Freud suggests that whereas the mourner has 
experienced the loss of an object, the melancholic struggles with the loss of her self. 
Yet criticism of the self is in reality criticism of the lost object that has been 
transferred onto the melancholic’s own ego. That split portion of the ego that exercises 
criticism over the rest of the ego is, Freud writes, “commonly called ‘conscience’ 
[Gewissen]” (Freud later calls this first the ego-ideal and then the super-ego). Its 
complaints are the expression of “dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds” 
(247f. [433f.]). Once Freud posits an analogy to mourning, by which self-criticism is a 
redirected criticism of the lost object, he reconstructs the logic of this process: 
  
An object choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had 
at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment 
coming from this loved person, the object relationship was shattered. 
                                                
51 Freud, "Trauer und Melancholie," 431. Hereafter parenthetical bibliographic information in italics 
refers to the German original. 
 95 
The result was not the normal one of withdrawal of the libido from this 
object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something 
different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem to be 
necessary. The object cathexis proved to have little power of resistance 
and was brought to an end. But the free libido was not displaced on to 
another object; it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was 
not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an 
identification of the ego with the abandoned object. (249) 
 
In melancholia, as in mourning, cathexis is detached from the lost object to which it 
had been attached, but unlike in mourning, it is not redirected to an internal 
hallucination of the lost object before becoming available for a new attachment. 
Instead, it attaches to the ego itself via identification of the ego with the lost object.  
 It is unclear, however, if the process at work here is identification. As Freud 
continues to explain identification in melancholia, he describes it as a “shadow of the 
object” that falls onto the ego. The ego is then judged as if it were the object, so 
thereby “the object-loss was transformed into a ego-loss.” Conflict between the ego 
and the lost object thus becomes an antagonism between “the critical activity of the 
ego and the ego as altered by identification” (249). In the logic of this interpretation, 
the object has been identified with the ego, but as Jonathan Flatley argues in a 
speculative reading of the passage, Freud’s use of the “shadow” metaphor may 
complicate matters. For Flatley the image of the shadow implies “not that the object 
has been identified with the ego but that it has gotten between the ego and the light” in 
a kind of shadow play that merely outlines the contours of the object onto a part of the 
ego.52 What is internalized is not the object itself (which is not identical to the ego) but 
the libidinal attachment (which serves as projector) and, more precisely, its negative 
aspects (the projection onto the ego). The term “identification” is, according to Flatley, 
misleading. “Introjection,” a term that Freud borrowed from Sandor Ferenczi and that 
                                                
52 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 46. Flatley’s argument remains speculative because Flatley does not 
sufficiently explain the mechanics of this so-called shadow play, and it remains unclear what the source 
of light is for him.  
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literally means “to throw in,” more suitably describes the interior projection of the 
object that casts a shadow on to the ego.53  
 The introjected libidinal attachment, as mentioned, does not recapitulate the 
conflict between ego and object. It instead produces a conflict between parts of the 
ego. The conflict between ego and object is introjected as conflict between “Kern-Ich 
und Rand-Ich.”54 Freud proposes that at the origin of this conflict lies an ambivalence 
present in libidinal attachments. An object’s loss is, Freud writes, “an excellent 
opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and 
come into the open” (250). This is particularly true in cases where loss was the result 
not of death but of rejection, slight, or disappointment, and where the rejected or 
disappointed party experiences negative feelings on top of loss. When ambivalent love 
for a lost object is introjected, that is, when it “takes refuge in narcissistic 
identification,” then hatred operates toward the ego, “abusing it, debasing it, making it 
suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering” (251). This description 
appears to explain why melancholics, who have turned their violent impulses inwards 
and against themselves, often become suicidal, but it does not explain how mourners, 
unlike melancholics, deal with ambivalence when the loss of the love object occurs. 
Flatley argues that in the case of death, the prohibition not to speak ill of the dead 
promotes instant repression of negative feelings, whereas in the case of rejection or 
disappointment where there is no such prohibition in force, these feelings dominate.55 
                                                
53 Cf. ibid., 47. Introjection is also the terminus operandi for J. O. Wisdom in his comparative study of 
psychoanalytical theories of melancholia, J. O. Wisdom, "Die psychoanalytischen Theorien über die 
Melancholie," Jahrbuch der Psychoanalyse 4 (1967), 102-54. Maria Torok and Nicolas Abraham use 
the concept of introjection in their revised and differentiated theory of melancholia that focuses on the 
crypt as locus of the melancholic; their articles are collected in Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, The 
Shell and the Kernel. Renewals of Psychoanalysis, trans. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994), esp. 107-24, 125-28, 139-56. For a discussion of the crypt, cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, 
Melancholie der Literatur, 169-72.  
54 Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 167. 
55 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 48. 
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This appears logical, but one might ask whether it is not the very prohibition that 
blocks the normal process of mourning and causes a melancholic reaction to loss.  
 Freud observes with curiosity but without explanation that melancholia, like 
mourning, sometimes simply abates.56 He speculates that the devaluation of the object 
(projected onto the ego) encourages the object’s unconscious abandonment. 
Alternatively, it may be via the process of introjection that the emotional attachment 
itself is altered and thereby wanes. Whether one process or the other is in place, Freud 
concludes that after the completed “work of melancholia [melancholische Arbeit],” the 
ego enjoys “in this the satisfaction of knowing itself as the better of the two, as 
superior to the object” (257 [445]).  
 In comparing the work of mourning and the work of melancholia, at the end of 
both of which stands the ego’s freedom to find a new libidinal attachment, Flatley 
asserts that melancholia, like mourning, includes potential for active productivity. He 
argues that melancholia is “active, transformative [and] ultimatively antidepressive.”57 
His reading is based on Freud’s The Ego and the Id, published six years after 
“Mourning and Melancholia,” in which Freud casts all losses as melancholic losses, so 
that therefore not even mourning leaves the ego unchanged.58 By this account, the ego 
comprises accumulated loss. Flatley (among others)59 interprets Freud’s revision in 
                                                
56 Aristotle had observed the same, cf. Aristotle, Problems, 1502. 
57 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 48. 
58 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. 19, The Ego and the Id and Other Works (1923-25), ed. James Stratchy (London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1961), 3-140. 
59 This reading is certainly not unique to Flatley. Judith Butler, for instance, argues that the 
incorporation of lost objects into the ego forms its psychic topography: melancholia, by her account, is 
“precisely what interiorizes the psyche, that is, makes it possible to refer to the psyche through such 
topographical tropes. The turn from object to ego is the movement that makes the distinction between 
them possible, that marks the division, the separation of loss, that forms the ego to begin with.” By this 
logic it is melancholia that makes the separation between self and otherness possible. Butler essentially 
argues that subjectivity is formed on the basis of a constitutive melancholia. Butler, The Psychic Life of 
Power. Theories in Subjection, 170, cf. 72f. Elsewhere, Butler erases the distinction between 
melancholia and mourning altogether: “[T]he distinction finally between mourning and melancholia 
does not hold.” Judith Butler, "After Loss, What Then?," in Loss. The Politics of Mourning, ed. David 
L. Eng and David Kazanjian (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003), 
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such a way that loss—as ego-transforming melancholic mourning, if not melancholia 
itself—forms the very character of the ego. And if the ego is shaped by loss, it must in 
return contain lost objects, “like an archive or archeological site.” In Flatley’s reading, 
Freud appears to suggest that “our losses become us.”60 Under this interpretation, 
every lost object is archived by the ego. This reading has led to a dubious valorization  
of melancholia on which I comment later. 
 Freud’s essay on mourning and melancholia gained renewed currency in 
another German postwar context when psychoanalysts Alexander und Margarete 
Mitscherlich published Von der Unfähigkeit zu trauern in 1967. Their provocative 
study on the inability to mourn established, for a considerable period of time, 
mourning as the moral standard of ethical response to the Holocaust and the war 
horrors,61 though in fact the Mitscherlichs propounded the thesis that the Germans 
should have reacted not with mourning but with severe melancholia.62 Combining 
Freud’s theses in “Mourning and Melancholia” and “Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego” (1921), the Mitscherlichs argued that the majority of Germans 
had libidinously bound together as a mass collective through their shared narcissistic 
love for their leader, Hitler, whom they established as their omnipotent ego-ideal to 
                                                
467-73, here 472. For a critical reading of Butler, cf. Dominick LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," in 
Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 43-85, here 
72-74. 
60 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 49.  
61 In her dissertation Anna Parkinson analyzes the effects this emphasis on mourning as a moral 
standard has had on understanding cultural production in West Germany. Cf. Anna Parkinson, 
"Affective Passages. Emotion and Affect in Postwar West German Culture," Diss. (Cornell University, 
2007). 
62 While the Mitscherlichs’ thesis on the inability to mourn stimulated important discussions regarding 
the Nazi past and must be considered one of the foundational texts of the discourse of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, it is also important to note that the Mitscherlichs chose Hitler as the lost 
object of mourning and/or melancholia and addressed other losses—those of the murdered, deported, 
and exiled Jews, the German civilian population, or the victims of warfare—only in passing. The 
crucial loss to be realized was that of Hitler, but with the derealization of the past “[erfolgte] auch später 
keine adäquate Trauerarbeit um die Mitmenschen.” With the emphasis on Hitler as the object of 
mourning, the Mitscherlichs seem to prescribe what proper or improper lost objects are. Mitscherlich, 
Unfähigkeit zu trauern, 35.  
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compensate for their own individual impotence (e.g., over the perceived shame of the 
First World War).63 The libidinal focus on Hitler entailed a narcissistic phase, as the 
ego-ideal, which had formerly been conditioned by society not to act out aggressions, 
promised once again the realization of an infantile ideal of omnipotence and defeated 
formerly present forms of conscience: aggressions were lived out against outsiders. 
The old conscience only resurfaced with the death of Hitler. Because of the 
narcissistic love towards Hitler, his loss was experienced as a loss of the ego, and for 
this reason the Germans should have suffered from massive collective melancholia. 
Instead, libidinous energy was immediately cut off from Hitler and all personal 
involvement in the criminal past denied:64  
 
Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern um den erlittenen Verlust des Führers ist 
das Ergebnis einer intensiven Abwehr von Schuld, Scham und Angst; 
sie gelingt durch den Rückzug bisher starker libidinöser Besetzungen. 
Die Nazivergangenheit wird derealisiert, entwirklicht. 
 
It is not the inability to mourn but the inability to be melancholic that is at stake here; 
thus the Mitscherlichs continue: 
  
Als Anlass zur Trauer wirkt übrigens nicht nur der Tod Adolf Hitlers 
als realer Person, sondern vor allem das Erlöschen seiner Repräsentanz 
als kollektives Ich-Ideal. Er war (…) ein inneres Objekt. (…) [S]ein 
Tod und Entwertung durch Sieger bedeutet auch den Verlust eines 
narzissistischen Objekts und damit eine Ich- oder Selbstverarmung und 
–entwertung.65 
 
                                                
63 Cf. ibid., 71ff. Sigmund Freud, Group-Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, in The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 18, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, Group Psychology and Other Works (1920-1922), ed. James Stratchy (London: The Hogarth 
Press, 1957), 65-143. 
64 The Mitscherlichs speak of conscious denial, not unconscious repression: “Wir sprechen 
korrekterweise von Verleugnung und nicht Verdrängung. Verleugnung ist ein Abwehrmechanismus, 
der sich auf störende Wahrnehmung der äußeren Realitäten bezieht. Störend heißt, dass die 
Wahrnehmung Unlust erweckt. Verdrängung gilt der Unlust bereitenden Wahrnehmung eigener 
Triebregungen,” Mitscherlich, Unfähigkeit zu trauern, 39n1. 
65 Ibid., 34f. 
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The Mitscherlichs arrived at their conclusion by observing dominant forms of 
behavior in West Germans, which was marked on the one hand by 
“Abwehrmechanismen gegen die Nazivergangenheit” and on the other by 
“Reaktionsträgheit” on the socio-political level and “politische[r] Apathie (bei 
gleichzeitiger hochgradiger Gefühlsstimulierung im Konsumbereich).”66 That is to 
say, the melancholic response was replaced by manic economic productivity and 
consumption. Apathy towards the postwar democratization process and the refusal to 
participate in building new democratic traditions resulted from preoccupation with the 
present consumer culture, coupled with the simultaneous derealization of a past that 
was dismissed as mere “Infektionskrankheit in Kinderjahren.”67 A true melancholic 
response—which would have, according to Freud, eventually lifted and given way to 
mourning—would have been realized in the processes of remembering, repeating (or 
acting out), and working through the past: that is, in the coming to terms with the past, 
rather than devaluing it.68  
 
Allegorical Ersatz-World: Walter Benjamin 
With Walter Benjamin, the discourse of melancholia shifts away again from a 
psychiatric paradigm of depression. But Benjamin’s notion of the melancholic as an 
archive of lost objects is undoubtedly informed by Freud.69 Born, as he once noted, 
“under the sign of Saturn,” Benjamin himself suffered from persistent depression,70 
                                                
66 Ibid., 17f. 
67 Ibid., 25, cf. 21. 
68 “Erinnern, wiederholen, durcharbeiten” is the title of a text in which Freud describes a sequence of 
consecutive steps that lead to coming to terms with, or bewältigen, the past. Sigmund Freud, 
"Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through," in The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 12, Case History of Schreber, Papers on Technique and 
Other Works (1911-1913), ed. James Stratchy (London: The Hogarth Press, 1958), 146-56. 
69 Benjamin makes no reference to Freud’s “Mourning and Melancholia” in his work, but it has been 
argued that Benjamin was quite familiar with the text and Freud’s concept of melancholia. Cf. Wagner-
Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 175. 
70 The statement appears in both versions of Walter Benjamin, "Agesilaus Santander," in Walter 
Benjamin. Selected Writings, Vol. 2, ed. Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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and themes of loss and melancholia infuse his writings.71 Two of Benjamin’s works 
stand out in this regard. Both the 1925 Der Urprung des deutschen Trauerspiels and 
the unfinished 1939 notes on French poet Charles Baudelaire, Zentralpark, elaborate 
on allegory and melancholia. 
While Benjamin seems to focus on the Baroque play in the Trauerspiel book, 
he also makes a connection to German Expressionism, thereby establishing the 
relevance of his study for the twentieth century well. What links the Baroque and 
modernity for Benjamin is that both are “Zeiten des Verfalls.”72 In Trauerspiel 
Benjamin set out to illuminate an opaque Baroque genre, and key to his analysis were 
forms of expression peculiar to Baroque plays: “Beschäftigung mit deren Formenwelt, 
das ist der einzige Zugang zu dieser Dichtung. (…) Die Formen der barocken 
Dichtung (…) sind vor allem Formen des Ausdrucks (…). Mag diese Dichtung in der 
Formensprache wie immer dunkel und sinnlos erscheinen, das Studium ihrer 
Sprachform erhellt sie.”73 The form of expression at stake here is the allegory, but 
before turning to the allegory in part two of his book, Benjamin examined the 
historical context of the mourning play. 
                                                
1999), 172f., 14f. Cf. Susan Sontag, "Under the Sign of Saturn," in Under the Sign of Saturn (New 
York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1980), 109-34.  
71 The literature on Benjamin and melancholia is vast. For the most thorough examination of 
Benjaminian melancholia, cf. Max Pensky, Melancholy Dialectics. Walter Benjamin and the Play of 
Mourning (Amherst, Mass.: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1993). See also Beatrice Hannsen, 
"Portrait of Melancholy (Benjamin, Warburg, Panofsky)," in Benjamin's Ghosts. Interventions in 
Contemporary Literary and Cultural Theory, ed. Gerhard Richter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002), 169-190; Françoise Meltzer, "Acedia and Melancholia," in Walter Benjamin and the Demands of 
History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 141-69; Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life. 
Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Wolfgang Bock, Walter 
Benjamin--die Rettung der Nacht. Sterne, Melancholie und Messianismus (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2000); 
Marcus Bullock, "Bad Company. On the Theory of Literary Modernity and Melancholy in Walter 
Benjamin and Julia Kristeva," Boundary 22, no. 3 (1995), 57-79; David Kaufman, "Angels Visit the 
Scene of Disgrace. Melancholy and Trauma from Sebald to Benjamin and Back," Cultural Critique 70, 
no. 1 (2008), 94-119; Heidbrink, Melancholie und Moderne, 164-79. 
72 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, 235. From now on page numbers are included 
parenthetically in the text. 
73 Walter Benjamin, "Porträt eines Barockpoeten," in Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften III, ed. 
Hella Tiedemann-Bartels (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1972), 86-88, here 87. 
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The theological and epistemological situation of the Baroque was marked by 
two new developments: the sudden “Ausfall aller Eschatologie” (259) and the 
understanding of absolute princely sovereignty (245). The former forced recognition 
of the ephemeral quality of things, while the latter included recognition of the 
possibility of princely fallibility and, consequently, catastrophe (246). The religious 
person held on to the world, even though she “[fühlt] mit ihr [=der Welt] sich einem 
Katarakt entgegentreiben. (…) Es gibt keine barocke Eschatologie; und eben darum 
einen Mechanismus, der alles Erdgeborene häuft und exaltiert, bevor es sich dem Ende 
überliefert” (246). With the secularization of history, the Baroque individual is 
reduced to a “Kreaturzustand” (270). The content of the Baroque mourning play, 
Benjamin argues, describes the individual’s existence in this “Naturgeschichte,” which 
is marked by her “Erleben nämlich der tötenden Zeit, der unausweichlichen 
Vergänglichkeit, des Sturzes aus den Höhen” (270).74  Referencing the discourse of 
melancholia from the teachings of the four humors to Dürer’s Melencolia, Benjamin 
defines melancholia75 as the “eigentlich kreatürliche [Intention]” from which the 
Baroque individual—and, in particular, the descendant of the Renaissance genius—
suffers (324). The specific historical configuration of the Baroque replaces the 
melancholic Renaissance genius with the melancholic Baroque allegorist, whose 
“Kunstwollen” is equally strong (235) but whose medium is allegory with which he 
attempts to rescue “Dinge” from the ephemeral to the eternal.  
                                                
74 For a useful and concise discussion of the Benjaminian progression from (eschatological) history to 
natural history, exemplified in the mourning play by the changing role of the sovereign, cf. Burkhardt 
Lindner, "Allegorie," in Benjamins Begriffe, Vol. 1, ed. Michael Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 50-94, here 56f. 
75 Benjamin does not distinguish between mourning and melancholia but uses both terms 
interchangeably. Wagner-Egelhaaf argues that Benjamin’s concept of mourning is identical to that of 
melancholia; according to her the lack of differentiation is due to Benjamin’s disinterest in melancholia 
as psychiatric condition. Cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 175, 80. 
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The strongest motive of the allegorist is “die Einsicht ins Vergängliche der 
Dinge und jene Sorge, sie ins Ewige zu retten,” which places allegory “wo 
Vergänglichkeit und Ewigkeit am nächsten zusammenstoßen” (397). It also puts the 
allegorist near the “Abgrund des bodenlosen Tiefsinns” (404): the allegorist’s intuition 
of mortality and transitoriness causes the breakdown of the physical world into an 
“aggregation of signs” that seek interpretation.76 Tirelessly and “verwandelnd, deutend 
und vertiefend,” the allegorist “vertauscht” these signs to escape his creaturely 
existence by discovering metaphysical importance in life (404). In this way 
allegorizing is “das einzige und das gewaltige Divertissement, das dem Melancholiker 
sich bietet” (361), and yet, the signs into which the allegorist transforms things are 
“Phantome von Phantomen, Reflexionen von Reflexionen, Kulissen, die nur andere 
Kulissen darstellen.”77 In the process, he shatters things around him to give meaning to 
their shards, and in the end, his frenzy leads him to a “Trümmerfeld” (405). All the 
allegorist achieves is “die entleerte Welt maskenhaft neu[zubeleben]” (318, emphasis 
mine). This means that the allegorist does not imagine an “organisches, sondern ein 
dürres, abgestorbenes Leben.”78 History thus appears in allegory as “erstarrte 
Urlandschaft”; the ephemeral “Antlitz” as eternal “Totenkopf” (343). While in 
allegory the thing is thus rescued as sign, it cannot shake its deadness.  
This inescapable lifelessness is allegory’s patent failure, and yet Benjamin 
defends allegory: the power of the allegorist is to imagine the signs into which his 
melancholic gaze transforms things as he pleases. The devalued world of things 
becomes the elevated world of signs. Benjamin writes:  
 
Wird der Gegenstand unterm Blick der Melancholie allegorisch, lässt 
sie das Leben von ihm abfließen, bleibt er als toter, doch in Ewigkeit 
                                                
76 Bainard Cowan, "Walter Benjamin's Theory of Allegory," New German Critique 22, Special Issue on 
Modernism (1981): 109-22, here 110. 
77 Schwarz, Melancholie, 406. 
78 Ibid. 
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gesicherter zurück, so liegt er vor dem Allegoriker, auf Gnade und 
Ungnade ihm überliefert. Das heißt: an Bedeutung kommt ihm das zu, 
was der Allegoriker ihm verleiht. (359) 
 
Jonathan Flatley detects in the Benjaminian emphasis on the arbitrariness of the sign 
the melancholic’s freedom to imagine a world as he pleases, for instance, without 
ruins. Therein lies according to Flatley the potential revolutionary element of the 
allegory.79 The melancholic gaze allows for a differentiated historical insight (by 
interpreting history by its ruins, not its victories) and, by extension, Flatley argues 
tenuously, for political action. Flatley points to a 1931 review essay in which 
Benjamin sharply criticized Erich Kästner for practicing a self-indulgent left-wing 
melancholia bordering on nihilism. Benjamin writes that Kästner engaged in political 
radicalism not to the left of any real movement, but on the left of all possible 
movements, thus rejecting everything on principle. Such radicalism cannot translate 
into “corresponding political action,” and as its (perhaps unintended) consequence it 
indirectly advances an attitude of “complacency and fatalism.”80 Reading and 
reinterpreting Benjamin’s “Zentralpark,” Flatley argues for an opposing concept of 
melancholia that, by dwelling on historical losses while simultaneously connecting 
those losses to present concerns, promotes a political interest in the present that in turn 
leads to political action.81 In what follows I hope to outline how Flatley arrives at this 
conclusion, which is hardly his alone but stands in for a recent current that valorizes 
melancholia based on its presumed productivity.   
                                                
79 Cf. Flatley, Affective Mapping, 37. 
80 “Kurz, dieser linke Radikalismus ist genau diejenige Haltung, der überhaupt keine politische Aktion 
mehr entspricht. Er steht links nicht von dieser oder jener Richtung, sondern ganz einfach links vom 
Möglichen überhaupt. Denn er hat ja von vornherein nichts anderes im Auge als in negativistischer Ruh 
sich selbst zu genießen.” Walter Benjamin, "Linke Melancholie," in Walter Benjamin. Gesammelte 
Schriften. Vol. III, ed. Hella Tiedemann-Bartels (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1972), 279-83, here 281. 
Trans. in Flatley, Affective Mapping, 65. 
81 “What emerges is the picture of a politicizing (…) melancholy.” Flatley, Affective Mapping, 65. 
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In “Zentralpark,” Benjamin establishes a modernist counterpart to the Baroque 
allegory, an equivalent he locates at the center of tension between Erlebnis (isolated 
experience devoid of emotional or mnemonic ties to other experiences) and Erfahrung 
(integrated, cohesive, and cumulative experience).82 For the Baroque allegorist the 
outside world appeared as ruins; for Baudelaire, the internal landscape of memories 
lay in ruins: this is the connection Benjamin draws between Baroque and modernist 
allegory. He writes, “[b]ut melancholy in the nineteenth century was different from 
what it had been in the seventeenth. The key figure in early allegory is the corpse, in 
late allegory it is the ‘souvenir’ [Andenken].”83 Here the melancholic gaze is turned 
inwards and picks out an endless progression of mnemonic souvenirs:  
 
The souvenir is the complement to “isolated experience” [Erlebnis]. In 
it is precipitated the increasing self-estrangement of human beings, 
whose past in inventoried as dead effects. In the nineteenth century, 
allegory withdrew from the world around us to settle in the inner world. 
The relic comes from the cadaver, the souvenir comes from the defunct 
experience which thinks of itself, euphemistically, as living.84  
 
Benjamin draws a distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis to mark the 
impoverishment of experience in modernity. Where previously people had entertained 
external bonds and experienced the outside world emotionally, namely as Erfahrung, 
they now guarded themselves against the “shocks” of modern life and experienced 
events as moments merely lived through (Erlebnis).85 Erlebnis is without content 
because the past, discretized from the event, leaves no trace in the individual living 
through the moment. By contrast, Erfahrung is marked by “certain contents of the 
                                                
82 The distinction is first introduced in Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," in Walter 
Benjamin Selected Writings. Volume 4, 1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings 
(Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 313-55. 
83 Walter Benjamin, "Central Park," in Walter Benjamin Selected Writings. Vol. 4, 1938-1940, ed. 
Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass., London: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2003) 161-99, here 190. 
84 Ibid., 183. 
85 Benjamin, "Baudelaire," 319. 
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individual past [that] combine in memory [Gedächtnis] with material from the 
collective past.”86 Rather than collecting Andenken, in Erfahrung we practice 
Eingedenken: in contrast to fleeting memory without emotional tie (Andenken), 
Benjamin’s coinage Eingedenken describes something akin to commemoration.87 In 
Erfahrung and Eingedenken, an emotional tie exists between the individual and the 
collective, but this bond is lost in Erlebnis and Andenken. Baudelaire’s melancholic 
inward gaze attended to what had been overlooked, or lost, by Erlebnis, and thus also 
to the fact of the impoverishment of modernity itself. It is unnecessary to examine 
Baudelaire’s inward gaze here, but it is of interest to note how Benjamin’s criticism of 
modernity—of shock Erlebnisse—relates to his concept of history. 
Benjamin’s critique of modernity developed in tandem with his critique of 
historicism (Historismus), the predominant practice of historians who came after 
Leopold von Ranke in the nineteenth century. Von Ranke had advocated documenting 
history “the way it really was,”88 focusing on political events judged by their 
victorious outcomes at the expense of documenting social change or the history of 
losers.89 Benjamin took specific issue with the historicist practice of sympathizing 
“with the victor,” who in each case is heir to “prior conquerors.”90 Benjamin argues 
that current rulers show their gratitude to the victors of the past by honoring “cultural 
treasures” of the past, yet these  
                                                
86 Ibid., 316. 
87 Ibid., 345n12. 
88 Walter Benjamin, "On the Concept of History," in Walter Benjamin Selected Writings. Volume 4, 
1938-1940, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 389-400, here 391. The original Ranke quote reads: “[Die Historie] 
will bloß sagen, wie es eigentlich gewesen.”   
89 By treating every event as completely accounted for by its specific historical context without 
assessing its merit, historicism has been criticized for generalizing and relativizing values and norms, 
such as religion (Ernst Troeltsch’s criticism of historicism). For a detailed study of the history of 
historicism, its critics, and its revival, cf. Annette Wittkau, Historismus. Zur Geschichte des Begriffs 
und des Problems (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1992). For an analysis of Jewish-German 
criticism of historicism in particular, cf. David N. Myers, Resisting History. Historicism and its 
Discontents in German-Jewish Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).   
90 Benjamin, "Concept of History," 391.  
 107 
 
owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great geniuses who 
created them, but also to the anonymous toil of others who lived in the 
same period. There is no document of culture which is not at the same 
time a document of barbarism. And just as such a document is never 
free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in which it was 
transmitted from one hand to another. The historical materialist [as 
opposed to the historicist] therefore dissociates himself from this 
process of transmission as far as possible. He regards it as his task to 
brush history against the grain.91 
 
Brushing history against the grain is not the practice of the historicist, who delves into 
the past and “blot[s] out everything he knows about the later course of history.”92 
Benjamin rejected the notion of studying history without connecting it to the present. 
Like Kästner and left-wing melancholics, the historicist, in Benjamin’s account, is an 
escapist. The historicist works under the assumption that time is homogeneous and 
flows blindly in the direction of the future, leaving behind the past once it has 
happened and is over and done with, thus forestalling any chance for the past to have 
consequence in the present.93 Benjamin suggests a different method of historical 
consciousness, which Flatley names “a practice of melancholic remembrance,”94 
“wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation.”95 In melancholic remembrance the concern is for the present (via the 
emotional tie established through Erfahrung) while the gaze is directed towards the 
past, a past from which images blast forth to show us “the constellation into which 
[our] own era has entered along with a very specific earlier one.”96 Erfahrungen, past 
and present, can enter into a connection because the emotions associated with them are 
                                                
91 Ibid., 391f. 
92 Ibid., 391. 
93 Cf. Flatley, Affective Mapping, 71. 
94 Ibid., 72. 
95 Walter Benjamin, "N (On the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress)," in The Arcades Project 
(Cambridge, Mass., London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1999), 456-88, here 462. Cit. in 
Flatley, Affective Mapping, 72. 
96 Benjamin, "Concept of History," 397. 
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immune to homogeneous time, i.e., they are not lost nor do they even fade.97 This 
admits the coexistence of present- and past-time affects, and when the contemporary 
student of history establishes an emotional connection with the past and its losers and 
links it to his present condition, he realizes “how long his present misery has been in 
preparation.” Therein lies “what the historian must inwardly aim to show.”98 The 
student of history equipped with melancholic remembrance grasps history not as 
homogeneous or empty time, but as “time filled full by now-time [Jetztzeit].” Thus 
Robespierre, for instance, read ancient Rome as “a past charged with now-time, as 
past which he blasted out of the continuum of history. The French Revolution viewed 
itself as Rome incarnate.”99 Flatley interprets this passage to mean that Robespierre’s 
revolutionary impulse followed from melancholic remembrance of the past—the 
understanding of history as a connection between the past and the present, in which 
the past is not remembered as Andenken but Eingedenken. Flatley thus concludes that 
for Benjamin “the structure of revolutionary consciousness is necessarily melancholic; 
and, conversely, melancholia contains within it a revolutionary kernel.”100 
 Flatley’s interpretation of historical materialism as a practice of revolutionary 
melancholia that brings the past and the present into a productive relationship is but 
one example of a recent reading of Benjamin’s melancholia. A more traditional 
reading, which focuses on the Trauerspiel book and the allegorical gaze onto the ruins 
of history, has given way to an interpretation of melancholia as a moment of 
productivity. David L. Eng and David Kazanjian, for instance, also view in 
melancholia a creative process of “active mourning” that mediates “a hopeful (…) 
relationship between loss and history.”101 Challenging the traditional interpretation of 
                                                
97 Cf. Flatley, Affective Mapping, 73. 
98 Benjamin, "N (Theory of Knowledge)," 481. 
99 Benjamin, "Concept of History," 395. 
100 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 74. 
101 Eng and Kazanjian, "Mourning Remains," 2. 
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Benjamin’s and Freud’s theories of melancholia, which established similar 
relationships between hopelessness and despair, Eng and Kazanjian—and most 
authors who contributed to their volume Loss: The Politics of Mourning—suggest “a 
better understanding of melancholic attachments to loss.” On the one hand, they rely 
on Benjamin’s insistence that knowledge of the past must inform political activism in 
the present, and on the other, they rely on Freud’s description of the process of 
withdrawing libidinous energy from the lost object in a number of “countless separate 
struggles.”102 This “better” understanding in their view focuses on the melancholic’s 
continuing relationship with the past and her ongoing engagement with loss. “While 
mourning abandons lost objects by laying their histories to rest,” Eng and Kazanjian 
claim, “melancholia’s continued and open relation to the past finally allows us to gain 
new perspectives on and new understandings of lost objects.”103 The melancholic 
return to losses, in other words, creates a hermeneutic domain of  “traces open to 
signification.”104 The result is a continuous revaluation of lost objects that challenges 
and changes the socio-political and cultural realms. Herein, Eng and Kazanjian 
essentially argue, lies the creative productivity of melancholia “for history and for 
politics.”105 Judith Butler expands this position further by arguing that loss, and the 
melancholic mourning that results from it, are preconditions for a sense of community, 
“where community does not overcome a loss, where community cannot overcome the 
loss without losing the very sense of itself.”106 By this interpretation, loss is revaluated 
as absolute foundation for community.107  
                                                
102 Ibid., 3, cf. 5, 4. “Countless separate struggles,” Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," 256.  
103 Eng and Kazanjian, "Mourning Remains," 4. Emphasis mine. This argument essentially dismisses 
mourning—and related processes of working through—altogether.  
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 5. 
106 Butler, "After Loss, What Then?," 468.  
107 Cf. LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," 51. LaCapra has engaged in a critique of the volume Loss in 
particular in his recent work, cf. “‘Traumatropisms’: From Trauma via Witnessing to the Sublime,” in 
History and Its Limits. Human, Animal, Violence (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 
59-89, here 82n44, cf. 82-85. 
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 The valorization of melancholia, as practiced by Flatley, Eng and Kazanjian, 
and Butler, amounts to an idealization of a community of loss, which leaves important 
questions unanswered. The contributors to Loss argue that their understanding of 
melancholia is “better” because it establishes the link between melancholia and socio-
political (or revolutionary, in Flatley’s words) productivity, yet it is unclear how a 
continuing and open relationship with the past via hermeneutics and signification 
engages productively with the socio-political realm of the present. Continuous 
revaluation of loss undoubtedly pertains to the socio-political sphere, but theorists of 
productive and creative melancholia fail to explain how such challenge translates 
effectively into action and change. To be politically and socially effective, 
melancholia cannot sufficiently address loss without being supplemented by other 
processes, such as those of working through, that help to imagine a future. The 
valorizaton of melancholia effectively marginalizes these other processes, which is 
why theorists of melancholic communities sometimes privilege trauma as a conceptual 
framework, because trauma is often believed to produce endless melancholia that 
forecloses working through. The confusion of historical trauma with a transhistorical 
register of trauma that posits melancholia as the foundation of community is highly 
problematic for reasons I explain at the end of the chapter.  
 
Melancholia and the West German Novel 
Benjamin’s melancholic remembrance and melancholic gaze mark memoria 
and imaginatio as the two cognitive powers constitutive of melancholia. Throughout 
the centuries, the discourse of melancholia stressed these two traits.108 Ficino’s 
melancholic prototype, the scholar, was possessed of a good memory with which he 
first imagined and then recognized universal connections. Dürer’s Melencholia 
                                                
108 Cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 152, 203.  
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presents us with an image of melancholia that was the product of the artist’s own 
melancholic imagination. Likewise, Burton’s Anatomy, which is so unstructured and 
disorderly that it performs the disorderly melancholia the author attempts to fight, 
presents itself as a large catalogue of thematic quotations, and thus as an archive of 
melancholia itself. Claiming encyclopedic completeness but apparently lacking any 
systematic order, Burton’s multi-volume work has the structural quality of a literary 
Wunderkammer or, as Jean Starobinski conceptualizes the melancholic’s mental 
processes, a labyrinth.109 Memory and imagination are the melancholic’s curses: 
Aristotle had already noted that the melancholic’s memory does not serve him, as it 
does the talented orator, but rather takes possession of him. His imagination, too, is 
not just a mark of genius but, like a river without banks, floods the melancholic and 
sweeps him along.110 In psychiatric literature, the melancholic tendency to dwell on 
the past and to resist participating in the present has been widely remarked upon,111 
and it is the goal of psychoanalysis to help the melancholic to retrieve from his 
unconsciousness the memory of the lost object. It is melancholia’s backwards turn to 
the past in connection with its uninhibited imagination that makes it fertile ground for 
reflection and an unspooling of associative chains. The cognitive powers of 
remembering, thinking, reflecting, and associating mark the melancholic as an 
intellectual, and often her preferred medium is writing.  
In addition to the melancholic activity of writing, writing is also the refuge 
sought by the melancholic to escape melancholia. Related to both poetic melancholia 
                                                
109 Jean Staborinski, "L'encre de la mélancolie," La Nouvelle Revue Française 11, no. 123 (1963), 410-
23. For a discussion of Staborinski and the figure of the labyrinth, cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie 
der Literatur, 16ff., 213. 
110 Cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 204. 
111 Cf. Ludwig Binswanger, Melancholie und Manie. Phänomenologische Studien (Pfullingen: Naske, 
1960), 23ff; Hubertus Tellenbach, Melancholie. Zur Problemgeschichte, Typologie, Pathogenese und 
Klinik (Berlin: Springer, 1961), 135ff.  
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and the melancholy genius of the Renaissance, “heroic melancholy”112 denoted the 
melancholic’s attempts to escape melancholia by aesthetic production, mainly through 
writing. As Burton wrote in his Anatomy of Melancholy, “I write of melancholy, by 
being busy to avoid melancholy.”113 The notion of writing as means of giving form to 
melancholia, defined by Julia Kristeva as an otherwise “non-communicable grief,” in 
particular during times when one does not suffer from it and wants to prepare for the 
next melancholy episode, survives today, as when Kristeva writes that “for those who 
are racked by melancholia, writing about it would have meaning only if writing sprang 
out of that very melancholia.”114 Writer Djuna Barnes found additionally that reading 
about melancholia helped her combat her own depression, and The Anatomy of 
Melancholy was one of the books she cherished most. In line with Burton’s 
assessment that writing had a therapeutic effect she wrote Nightwood (1936), the 
working title of which had been Anatomy of the Night. One of the author’s friends 
called it “‘a second Anatomy of Melancholy.’”115 The German translation of 
Nightwood was prepared by Wolfgang Hildesheimer, the main subject of this chapter, 
who was greatly influenced by Barnes and considered that writing his novel Masante 
would have been impossible had he not had knowledge of Nightwood.116 Writing and 
melancholia are thus intimately connected for many commentators and practitioners: 
melancholia is a destructive muse, and writing is deemed to be its therapy. As Ludwig 
Völker argues in his study Muse Melancholie—Therapeutikum Poesie, the connection 
between melancholia, memoria, imaginatio, and writing makes literature, among other 
                                                
112 Flatley, Affective Mapping, 36. 
113 Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, 20. 
114 Kristeva, Black Sun, 3. 
115 Garry Sherbert, "Hieroglyphics of Sleep and Pain. Djuna Barnes' Anatomy of Melancholy," in 
Response to Death. The Literary Work of Mourning, ed. Christian Riegel (Edmonton, Alberta: 
University of Alberta, 2005), 117-44, here 119. 
116 Djuna Barnes, Nachtgewächs, trans. Wolfgang Hildesheimer (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959). Cf. 
Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 275. 
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kinds of writing, a privileged field of the melancholic.117 Similarly, Wagner-Egelhaaf, 
in her work of melancholia and literature, concludes that melancholia underlies the 
“Produktionsprinzip des kryptischen Textes, dessen Dechiffrierung vielfach 
verschlungene, labyrinthische Erzählungen freisetzt,”118 referring to modes of writing 
and reading characteristic of twentieth-century texts in particular. 
Within the field of literature, György Lukács’s 1914/15 Theorie des Romans 
situates the twentieth-century novel vis-à-vis melancholia. Lukács’s assertion that the 
novel is an expression of “transcendental homelessnesss” has frequently been cited to 
explain melancholia in literature.119 The modern novel, as opposed to the epic 
articulating a “totality of life,” no longer had access to the historico-philosophical 
reality of an integrated civilization such as ancient Greece, but communicated a 
problematic or broken society.120 The novel expressed melancholia over the historical 
process of trading the experience of totality for fragmented, prosaic experiences. 
Hence Lukács writes: “The novel is the epic of an age in which the extensive totality 
of life is no longer directly given, in which the immanence of meaning in life has 
                                                
117 Völker, Muse Melancholie.  
118 Wagner-Egelhaaf, Melancholie der Literatur, 23. 
119 György Lukács, The Theory of the Novel. A Historico-Philsophical Essay on the Forms of Great 
Epic Literature (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971), 41. Cf. the introductory essay in Manfred 
Durzak, Gespräche über den Roman (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1976), 9-49. Blamberger makes use of 
Lukács’s theory in defining Hildesheimer’s melancholic work, cf. Blamberger, Versuch 
Gegenwartsroman, 20-23. 
120 Lukács’s theory of the novel is based on Hegel’s differentiation between the epic and the novel. 
Hegel conceptualized the epic as the expression of the ancient totality of life, whereas he defined the 
novel as an expression of the contemporary broken world, which aimed at totality but failed to achieve 
it. Hegel wrote that the epic’s form and content were defined by “[der] gesamte[n] Weltanschauung und 
Objektivität eines Volksgeistes.” He continued, “[z]u dieser Totalität gehört einerseits das religiöse 
Bewußtsein von allen Tiefen des Menschengeistes; andererseits das konkrete Dasein, das politische und 
häusliche Leben, bis zu den Weisen, Bedürfnissen und Befriedigungsmitteln der äußerlichen Existenz 
hinunter” (330). The content of the epic is “das Ganze einer Welt, in der eine individuelle Handlung 
geschieht” (373). By contrast, the modern novel—“[die] moderne(n) bürgerliche(n) Epopöe”—aims at 
expressing the “Hintergrund einer totalen Welt,” but because it “setzt eine bereits zur Prosa geordnete 
Wirklichkeit voraus,” it fails at accomplishing its goal (392), G. W. F. Hegel,  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel Werke. Bd. 15, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik III, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel 
(Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1986).  
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become a problem, yet which still thinks in terms of totality.”121 The novel therefore 
operates under a utopian or epistemological mission: it becomes for Lukàcs the 
medium to reflect on reality, to point out reality’s brokenness, and to motivate the 
search for overcoming this imperfect condition. According to Lukàcs, the novel 
performs the task of experimentally imagining a meaning or purpose to existence that 
is no longer experienced in reality. Because it never arrives at a satisfactory answer or 
conclusion and confirms “the fundamental dissonance of existence,” the affirmation of 
dissonance is “the form [of the novel] itself” (71). In the formal perseverance of 
dissonance the novel answers the search for totality dialectically:  “[T]he immanence 
of meaning required by the form is attained precisely when the author goes all the 
way, ruthlessly, towards exposing its absence” (72). Searching for totality by 
postulating its absence leaves the novel in a state of incompletion; the novel is 
permanently in “process of becoming” (73). Lukács identifies this process as the 
novel’s “inner form,” and the direction it takes is that of the “individual’s journeying 
towards himself” on the “road from dull captivity (…) towards clear self-recognition” 
(80). Through self-recognition, totality appears to move within reach, but it remains 
unattainable. 
Lukács warns of two dangers inherent in the modern novel’s epistemological 
mission: on the one hand, the search for totality may lead to escapism, which produces 
novels that paint a conventionally idyllic picture no longer concerning reality and 
thereby providing mere “entertainment” (71). On the other hand, if the author’s 
subjective reflection on her existence becomes the central concern of the novel, the 
epistemological mission stops short of suggesting ways of overcoming the defunct 
present and leads instead to resignation in the face of reality (ibid.). The writer must 
therefore master a balance between too much and too little reflection. The reflective 
                                                
121 Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 56. From now on page numbers are included parenthetically in the text.  
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moment, which holds a mirror up to the present condition and provokes “the deepest 
melancholy of every great and genuine novel,” is for Lukács both absolutely necessary 
and potentially harmful to the utopian project and the writer alike (85).122 Should the 
author succumb to too much reflection, the novel fails to communicate a utopian 
project. In other words, it gives way to traditional melancholia, which pathologically 
mourns, endlessly and without hope. Just the right amount of reflection (which Lukàcs 
fails to identify), on the other hand, allows for imagining of how the world could be, 
setting a goal to reach in an ideal future.  
One of Lukács’s readers who distinguished between productive, future-
oriented melancholia and unproductive, past-oriented melancholia is Günter 
Blamberger. Writing forty years after the Holocaust, but ignoring the differences 
between the post-Holocaust context and Lukács’s operative framework, Blamberger 
located the contemporary West German novel under the sign of melancholia.123 
Starting with Adorno’s assessment of melancholia as “würdevolle Verzweiflung” that 
marked “die einzig noch angemessene Haltung angesichts der Insuffizien 
menschlicher Ratio”124 and reading works by Hildesheimer, Heinrich Böll, and Günter 
Grass,125 Blamberger concluded that postwar melancholia, as articulated by literature, 
spoke for “ethische[s] Engagement” by West German writers. No longer was 
                                                
122 Emphasis mine. Melancholic reflection is harmful to the author because “the writer’s naivety suffers 
extreme violence and is changed into its opposite.” “Pure reflexion [sic]” is, according to Lukács, 
“profoundly inartistic,” Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 85.   
123 Cf. the full title of his study, Versuch über den deutschen Gegenwartsroman. Krisenbewußtsein und 
Neubegründung im Zeichen der Melancholie. After providing a summary of the discourse of 
melancholia, Blamberger turns to Lukács’s theory of the novel to argue that, in the twentieth century, 
melancholia no longer posited a metaphysical but an ethical and social problem. Despite this claim, 
Blamberger fails to situate melancholia vis-à-vis the specific post-Holocaust context he seeks to 
analyze.  
124 Blamberger, Versuch Gegenwartsroman, 7. Blamberger paraphrases Adorno without reference to 
specific texts by Adorno. 
125 Blamberger promises in the introduction a close interpretation of Hildesheimer’s absurd prose, 
Böll’s Ansichten eines Clowns, and Grass’s Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke, however, his discussion 
of each author is cursory at best. Cf. the critical review-essay, W. G. Sebald, "Review of: Versuch über 
den deutschen Gegenwartsroman. Krisenbewußtsein und Neubegründung im Zeichen der Melancholie," 
The Modern Language Review 82, no. 4 (1987), 1042f. 
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melancholia invoked or a melancholic mood described to express a metaphysical 
dilemma, but in Blamberger it addressed pressing questions of social and ethical 
concern.126 Blamberger saw West German literature, especially as represented by Böll 
and Grass, as having answered the Mitscherlichs’ demand for a morally responsible 
literature, namely “durch [der Schriftsteller] Gestaltung von melancholischen 
Außenseitern und deren stellvertretender Trauer.”127 Through the efforts of writers, the 
dimension of mourning entered political discourse: “[ihrer] Vorarbeit ist es 
mitzuverdanken, dass das Zeichen der Trauer auch die offizielle deutsche Politik in 
den siebziger Jahren bestimmt.”128 It is unnecessary to assess the accuracy of 
Blamberger’s conclusion here, although there is much evidence that at the time of his 
writing, in 1985, German politics in fact took a relativist turn before addressing in 
more focused ways issues of commemorating and mourning the past.129 It is 
interesting to note, however, that Blamberger distinguishes between Grass and Böll, 
on the one hand, and Hildesheimer, on the other. Blamberger detects in Grass and Böll 
a melancholia in dialogue with practical reason and societal demands, one that aids the 
process of recognizing failures in the past so as to pave the way for a better future. 
This transitory melancholia assists “vom Schlechten zum Nächstbesseren.” 
Melancholia here includes a utopian kernel; although it knows its limits and seeks 
mere mitigation, not abolition of suffering, melancholia is, according to Blamberger 
and in reference to Lukács, the “Wegbereiterin der Utopie.”130 Hildesheimer’s 
melancholia, in contrast, acts not in the service of society but against it: it seeks 
                                                
126 Blamberger, Versuch Gegenwartsroman, 7, 47. 
127 Ibid., 55. Blamberger does not cite where the Mitscherlichs make this demand.  
128 Ibid. 
129 The so-called Bitburg affair, during which Ronald Reagan visited the Bitburg cemetery to honor the 
German war dead, including members of the SS, occurred in 1985. The Historians’ debate began the 
next year. Cf. Geoffrey H. Hartman (ed.), Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986); Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and the 
Historians' Debate, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989). 
130 Blamberger, Versuch Gegenwartsroman, 58. 
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pleasure in grievances and uses existential categories such as life, suffering, and death, 
to point to the “immerwährende und unaufhebbare Defektheit menschlicher 
Gemeinschaft und menschlichen Daseins hin.” Blamberger argues that this form of 
melancholia, as practiced by Hildesheimer (and, he adds, Adorno) is accompanied by 
an “Eliteanspruch” of having exclusive knowledge of this defective condition and 
living with it “in Würde.”131 
Blamberger was not the only critic to read Hildesheimer through Lukács’s 
conceptualization of the novel. Manfred Durzak observed of Hildesheimer that the 
author of Tynset and Masante failed to meet Lukács’s standard: in both novels  
 
zeichnet sich der Reflex auf eine als sinnleer empfundene Wirklichkeit 
in einem zunehmenden Verzicht auf die Sinnsuche des Helden [aus], 
der bei Hildesheimer zum reinen reflektierenden Ich geworden ist, das 
im äußerlichen Moment des Reisens seine innerliche Unrast und 
Sinnsuche kompensiert und nur noch in einzelnen verbalen 
Aufschwüngen ein Existenzgefühl zu verwirklichen vermag, das den 
Verlust der faktischen Realität augenblickhaft vergessen lässt.132 
 
Hildesheimer thus succumbed, according to Blamberger and Durzak, to what Lukács 
called the danger of the modern novel: reflection on the narrator’s subjective existence 
replaces concern for totality, and the narrator resigns vis-à-vis reality. Where Durzak 
compares Hildesheimer’s work with Lukács’s theory of the novel without value 
judgment—pointing instead to the possibility that Tynset and Masante should not to be 
categorized as novels at all133—Blamberger negatively assesses Hildesheimer’s work 
                                                
131 Ibid., 57f. . 
132 Durzak, Gespräche über den Roman, 38. 
133 Ibid., 39. Durzak bases his statement on Hildesheimer’s own insistence that Tynset is not a novel. In 
an interview Durzak presses Hildesheimer to acknowledge that Masante carries the classification “Ein 
Roman” as subtitle. Hildesheimer responds that this was a choice by his publisher and not his own, 
suggesting that in his view Masante too does not fit the category of the novel (although he admits that it 
is “mehr Roman (…) als Tynset.”) Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 287. In the collected 
works edition (which Hildesheimer supervised), Tynset and Masante appear in the volume entitled 
“Monologische Prosa,” as opposed to the volume “Erzählende Prosa” that contains Hildesheimer’s first 
novel, Paradies der falschen Vögel, or “Biographische Prosa,” which includes his fictional biography 
 118 
in his study on the melancholic German postwar novel. Taking Lukács’s theory as a 
standard of measuring, Blamberger judges only the works of Grass and Böll as 
novelistic successes, since they contain, in his assessment, the utopian kernel that he 
values in melancholia. For him, this kernel must be present in order for the novel to 
fulfill the Mitscherlichs’ request for responsible literature. 
 At the end of this chapter I discuss a comparative study of Hildesheimer and 
Grass that results in vastly different findings. Its author is W. G. Sebald, who voices 
his preference for melancholy writing as practiced by Hildesheimer, which today is 
often considered the ethically adequate literary response to the Holocaust. Before 
discussing Sebald’s reading of Hildesheimer and the inherent dangers of postulating 
melancholia as an ethical response to loss, I now consider Hildesheimer and his 
melancholic work Tynset (1965). I do not dispute the status of Tynset as a melancholic 
text; however, I do argue that reading the novel exclusively under the aspect of 
melancholia is reductive and obscures other processes at work.  
 
Melancholia or Weltschmerz? Hildesheimer’s Tynset 
Interpreters of Hildesheimer’s work often base their assessments of his 
melancholia on comparisons between the author, his narrators, and several of 
Shakespeare’s melancholy characters that resurface in Hildesheimer’s work. Thus 
Hildesheimer’s melancholia has been compared to that of Hamlet, Yorick, and 
Jacques.134 Tynset, whose narrator repeatedly engages with Hamlet (in the form of 
                                                
Marbot. Cf. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden, ed. 
Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991). 
134 For the comparison with Hamlet, cf. Burckhard Dücker, Wolfgang Hildesheimer und die deutsche 
Literatur des Absurden (Bensberg-Frankenhorst1976), 87; Puknus, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 87; 
Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig, "Flucht--Trotz. Eine Collage aus und mit und über Wolfgang 
Hildesheimers Ästhetik des Zwischenraums," Neue Rundschau 98, no. 2 (1987), 82-99, here 83; Walter 
Jens, "Hamlet. Das Genie der Poeten," Mythen der Dichter. Modelle und Variationen (Munich: Kindler, 
1993), 99-128; Franz Loquai, Hamlet und Deutschland. Zur literarischen Shakespeare-Rezeption im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, Weimar: Metzler, 1993), 192-214. For Jaques (of Shakespeare’s As You Like it), 
cf. Klaus Reichert, "Aus der Fremde und zurück. Wolfgang Hildesheimer zum Siebzigsten," Neue 
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Hamlet’s ghost, his father’s ghost, or a production of Hamlet)135, especially provoked 
a critical assessment of the novel that focused on the narrator’s and Hildesheimer’s 
own melancholia or, as one of Tynset’s first reviewers, Reinhard Baumgart, called it, 
“Weltschmerz.”136  
 
The Reception: Weltschmerz 
Baumgart’s review of Tynset, published in Der Spiegel and as such one of the 
most influential of its reviews, was not sympathetic to Hildesheimer’s narrator, who in 
one night wanders through his house and allows objects inside it to excite his 
imagination and spur his memory. “Vor der Klagemauer,” the title Baumgart intended 
for his review, was published as “Schlaflos schluchzend,” and both titles, with their 
operative verbs klagen (to lament or elegize) and schluchzen (to weep or sob), already 
point to Baumgart’s main criticism: Hildesheimer’s “Weltschmerz-Rhetorik.”137 The 
novel struck Baumgart as a series of incomplete notes (not as “Buch”) that existed “im 
ratlosen Nebeneinander” and pointed to the author’s inability to finish “das hier 
Geplante.”138 Baumgart summarized Tynset in one sentence, citing the narrator’s 
                                                
Rundschau 98, no. 2 (1987), 67-81, here 67ff. Finally, for Yorick, cf. Puknus, Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 
147. 
135 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Tynset (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1965), 20, 89, 107, 86, 266.  
136 Reinhard Baumgart, "Vor der Klagemauer [Schlaflos schluchzend]," in Über Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 115-18. Most reviewers of Tynset 
remarked upon the role of the Hamlet motif, e.g., considering it problematic and identifying it as a 
weakness of the novel, cf. Rudolf Hartung, "Hamlet in Graubünden," Der Monat 17, no. 6 (1965), 322-
25. “Die Auschweifungen eines Melancholikers” are remarked upon as tiresome and even as obstacles 
to finishing reading the text, Jens Hoffmann, "Im Winterbett. Die Auschweifungen eines 
Melancholikers," Christ und Welt, March 19, 1965. Hildesheimer’s melancholia is lamented in terms of 
a loss of his previous humor, cf. Uwe Schulz, "Tynset oder Der Abschied vom Humor," Frankfurter 
Rundschau, June 26, 1965. Positive reviews of Tynset that discuss Hildesheimer as “gebildeten 
Melancholiker” include Günter Blöcker, "Stegreifspiel der Motive," Merkur 19 (1965), 486-87, here 
486; Helmut Heissenbüttel, "Nur Erfindung, nur Täuschung?," Die Welt, March 18, 1965, reprinted in 
Rodewald, 118-21; Domin, "Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht."  
137 Cf. Rodewald, ed. Über Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 115 fn; Baumgart, "Klagemauer [Schlaflos 
schluchzend]," 116. 
138 With heavy sarcasm Baumgart calls Hildesheimer “aufrichtig” because the author did not call his 
“Aufzeichnungen” a novel. Baumgart, "Klagemauer [Schlaflos schluchzend]," 115. 
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insomnia and his reflections, which are interrupted by self-contained stories. These 
short narratives were to Baumgart’s liking, but they have one shortcoming:  
 
Diese Geschichten haben nur einen Fehler: Sie hören auf. Denn das 
letzte Wort behält immer der Erzählende selbst, der schlaflos 
weiterläuft und weiterliegt, der die breiten Zwischenräume zwischen 
seinen Geschichten ausfüllt mit schwermütiger Spekulation. Es ist, als 
würden dauernd Milchglasscheiben zwischen die Erzählungen 
geschoben, beschlagen mit einem Hauch von tiefempfundenen 
Seufzern über das Sinnlose an Gott und Welt, Leben und Tod. 
Weltschmerz hätte das früher geheißen, heute tauft es sich gern auf den 
strengen Namen “Entfremdung.” Diese Klagerede möchte offenbar 
radikal sein durch Allgemeinheit, gerät aber durch ihre Allgemeinheit 
nur unverbindlich, zu Weltschmerz-Rhetorik. (116) 
 
For Baumgart, the interrupter who disturbs the flow of the narratives with his 
metaphysical sighs is not the narrator of Tynset but its author: “er scheint Satz für 
Satz, Geste um Geste bitterlich mit dem Redenden einverstanden zu sein. Das Rede-
Ich ist niemand anders als der Autor selbst: Wolfgang Hildesheimer.” Hilderheimer’s 
Weltschmerz explains for Baumgart why the reflective passages in the book stand 
between “der Wahrheit des Berichts oder Tagebuchs und der anderen Wahrheit des 
Erfindens und Erzählens” (117). In choosing this unfortunate “Mittelweg” between 
fact and fiction “[bleiben] die bekennenden Partien so gekünstelt und durchaus 
unpersönlich (…). Unermüdlich schwingt sich die Sprache in Höhen und fällt kläglich 
zurück auf Gemeinplätze. Klischees werden abgeweidet wie blühende Wahrheit.” In 
contrast to the Weltschmerz of the author, the embedded narratives, which tell “von 
Labyrinthen, von jähem Tod, ratloser Schuld, von vergeblichen Ausblicken in ein 
Jenseits zu diesem Diesseits,” are “von einem melancholischen Weitblick 
herangezogen.” Baumgart thus proposes a dichotomy between phony and real 
melancholia, between Hildesheimer’s reflections (which Baumgart considers fact and 
the source of phony melancholia) and his narratives (fiction and real melancholia). He 
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then asks, why was “eine Klagemauer nur aus Geschichten” not enough? Why did 
Hildesheimer send himself “als Maurer und schluchzend auf die Szene?” Referring to 
new trends in literary criticism and theory, Baumgart speculates that Hildesheimer 
heard the rumors “aus Paris” of the end of fiction, which by Baumgart’s interpretation 
required writing about factual experience. Experience, Baumgart writes, is evoked 
often enough in Tynset without finding real expression in the text: “Fortwährend wird 
so Erfahrung beteuert, fast nie erscheint sie.” He continues, “[d]enn bloße Meinung, so 
gut oder tief oder schmerzhaft sie sich auch fühlen mag, zählt nichts in der Literatur, 
es sei denn, sie beglaubige sich durch Sprache. Das Unerhörte in fein klischierten 
Sätzen ist nicht länger unerhört, sondern lästig bekannt” (117). Here Baumgart 
connects Hildsheimer’s calling on experience with something outrageous (unerhört, 
similar to ungehört, unheard of and suggesting something unknown) that is, according 
to the reviewer, long and annoyingly well known. The outrageous or unknown of 
which Baumgart speaks must, if we follow his argument, be the narrator’s (and 
therefore Hildesheimer’s) Weltschmerz, which according to Baumgart laments the 
pointlessness of God, the world, life and death. Is that really “das Unerhörte” that is 
“lästig bekannt”? Before answering this question, we consider one more review:139 
                                                
139 Several reviewers mirror Baumgart’s (and Neumann’s, see below) tenor: Franz Schonauer, whose 
review appeared in several smaller newspapers all over West Germany, laments that Hildesheimer has 
nothing “tatsächlich Wichtiges mitzuteilen” and instead bores the reader, who cannot make it past page 
11. The monologue is “trist und larmoyant (…); Fragen, Seufzer, müde, mit halber Stimme 
vorgebrachter Klagen, auf die es keine Antworten gibt,” Franz Schonauer, "Denk ich an Tynset in der 
Nacht," Kölner Stadtanzeiger, April 1, 1965. Rudolf Hartung recommends: “Er [=Hildesheimer] wird 
sie [=die Gefahren des Schreibens], vielleicht, vermeiden können, wenn er sich nach diesen 
Erinnerungen und Meditationen einer schlaflosen Nacht der Gegenwart und dem Tag zuwendet,” 
addressing, however indirectly, that the narrator’s nightly reflections concern events of the past, 
Hartung, "Hamlet in Graubünden." One review is particularly dismissively entitled “Das Plätschern 
plätschert…,” and its (unnamed) author summarizes Tynset as follows: “Er [=Hildesheimer] versteht es 
auch allzu gut, Nichtigkeiten, platte Banalitäten in dem nie stockenden Fluss seiner Gedanken 
unterzubringen. Die Seichtheit solcher Passagen wird duch das überstrapazierte Kunstmittel der 
Wiederholung nur umso deutlicher,” N. N., "Das Plätschern plätschert..." Mannheimer Morgen, 
September 8, 1965. Paul Hübner finally calls Hildesheimer’s method of discussing “gewisse” criminal 
themes as “eine ziemlich primitive Krimimethode,” several newspapers, cf. Paul Hübner, "Tynset," 
Rheinische Post, May 15, 1965. 
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 Just days after Baumgart’s review appeared, Peter Horst Neumann published 
his review in Stuttgarter Zeitung under the title “Hamlet will schlafen.”140 Referring to 
Shakespeare’s melancholic character and the much-noted interlocutor of 
Hildhesheimer’s work, but making light of the tragic hero’s cause for lament, 
Neumann echoes Baumgart in his pejorative review vis-à-vis the narrator’s work of 
mnemonic reflection. He too criticizes Hildesheimer for including too much of 
something well known: “Zuviel fällt Hildesheimer ein, aber es ist ein Altes. An Stoff 
herrscht eher Überfluss statt Mangel, freilich an abgenutztem.” He calls this surfeit 
“Überflüssige[s],” “Banale[s],” “Belanglosigkeiten,” and “Platitüde[n],” accusing the 
copy editor at the publishing house Suhrkamp, who should have served Hildesheimer 
as “schützende[r] Engel,” of having failed in his task by not deleting those passages 
containing platitudes. Most offensive to Neumann is Hildesheimer’s tactlessness in 
establishing parallels—to what, Neumann leaves unsaid. If Hildesheimer had kept 
discretion, Tynset could “vielleicht” have become “ein Meisterwerk”:  
 
Ein Autor, dessen Stärke und Not zugleich die Fülle seiner literarischen 
und historischen Reminiszenzen ist, sollte mehr Sorgfalt darauf 
verwenden, diejenigen Parallelen, um derentwillen er ein solches Werk 
schreibt, zu verdecken. Verstößt er gegen diese Diskretion, aus der 
allein die echte Spannung der Kunst entsteht, so setzt er sich der Gefahr 
aus, die Aufmerksamkeit seiner Leser nicht selten zu suspendieren. Ein 
Buch, das den Namen eines Geheimnisses als Titel führt, darf selber 
nicht ohne Geheimnis sein. Ein Rest, der Schweigen ist, bestimmt den 
Rang eines Kunstwerkes. (Emphasis mine) 
 
Both Baumgart and Neumann remark on the surfeit of something so well known that 
they themselves choose not to name it. Neumann additionally appeals to 
Hildesheimer’s sense of discretion not to reveal the secret of this knowledge. Where 
does Neumann detect parallels to Tynset’s historical reminiscences? And why should 
                                                
140 Peter Horst Neumann, "Hamlet will schlafen," Stuttgarter Zeitung, March 13, 1965. For a discussion 
of Baumgart’s and Neumann’s reviews of Tynset, cf. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 302ff. 
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Hildesheimer refrain from showing parallels already in existence and which allegedly 
prompted his writing in the first place? To answer these questions and assess the 
novel’s significance for a contemporary theory of melancholia, I now turn to 
Hildesheimer’s melancholic novel. In doing so I pay particular attention to instances in 
which traumatic memory disrupts the narrator’s chain of association and redirects it in 
a manner that is uncontrollable by the narrator. The agitation of constant memory—
hypermnesia—is a characteristic common to both melancholia and trauma, and it 
constitutes an important link between them.  
 
“Das Entsetzliche leuchtet auf:” Traumatic Memory  
The structure of Tynset—the framing story of the narrator’s insomnia in a 
single night and embedded narratives telling of a multitude of people who lived at 
different times—makes it counterproductive to speak of a plot. Jonathan J. Long 
remarks that “[t]he curious thing about (…) Tynset (…) is that not a great deal 
happens.”141 On the surface, the novel tells of a middle-aged insomniac who lives in a 
mountainous region in a house he shares with his housekeeper. The narrator is in the 
herb business, presumably selling herbal mixtures to customers in Germany, where he 
once lived. While Celestina, the housekeeper, spends her nights in alcohol-induced 
stupor, the narrator wanders through different rooms in his house to contemplate the 
history of objects contained within them. Not only objects but also sounds the narrator 
perceives serve him as catalysts for the histories he either remembers or imagines for 
them. The sound of a village rooster reminds the narrator of “die Hähne Attikas,” 
shorthand for his memory of the Acropolis in Athens, where at one time he incited a 
chorus of roosters by crying “Kikereki.”142 Telephoning for the weather report (47-
                                                
141 Long, "Time and Narrative," 457. 
142 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Tynset (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1992), 37, 39, 63-70. From now on page 
numbers are included parenthetically in the text. 
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50), the narrator remembers Wesley B. Prosniczer, who froze to death in his 
snowbound car (50-55) after he had been to the last of the narrator’s parties and 
attempted to proselytize his guests, an activity for which he had almost been murdered 
by the party’s angry mob (160-173). The narrator owns two beds, one winter and one 
summer bed. Lying in the winter bed the narrator tells the story of one of its previous 
owners, Don Carlo Gesualdo, who committed double murder when he found his wife 
with her lover in bed together (128-130, 237-241). The antique summer bed acts as 
starting point for a narrative, referred to as bed fugue, of seven travelers who slept in 
the bed in 1522 and contracted the plague (187-203).143 All of these embedded 
narratives carry associations of decay, death, or even murder.  
Coupled to his interest in the history of certain objects and in associations that 
sounds produce is the narrator’s almost obsessive engagement with information 
encoded by numbers. Periodically the narrator refers to his phone book or to the 
memory of using phone books in the past, a practice by which he introduces names of 
people on whom he then reflects. Railroad timetables hold a similar fascination for the 
narrator. In the timetable of the Norwegian railroad system he notices the town of 
Tynset, a place he considers for a future journey and to which he returns with great 
frequency during the course of the night. After the completion of Tynset, Hildesheimer 
remarked that he had intended for his novel “die Rondo-Form,” a musical form that 
describes the alternation between a principal theme and several digressions (or 
episodes) and in which the principal theme always returns (the predecessor of the 
form, ritornello, derived its name from the verb ritornare, Italian for “to return”). 
Reflections on Tynset recur nineteen times, and after each of his stories the narrator 
returns to Tynset as the principal theme. The structure of the novel supports 
                                                
143 This list of embedded narratives is far from complete. I merely highlight the four narratives that 
received the most attention and which I mention again later, albeit in passing. Long’s list of embedded 
narratives in Tynset is identical, Long, "Time and Narrative," 457f. 
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Hildesheimer’s description of Tynset as rondo, and following Patricia Stanley’s 
analysis of rondo-like qualities of the novel, many commentators have accepted music 
as one of the conceptual models for Tynset.144   
Less obvious than the mention of Tynset, albeit much more numerous, are 
subtly inserted remarks regarding the deaths of people the narrator knew and about 
those who were responsible for these deaths. It requires attention on the reader’s part 
to join the pieces together and realize that the narrator either is Jewish himself or 
identifies with Jewish victims of the Holocaust. Remarks concerning his present, for 
instance in reference to an already outdated newspaper from 1961, are the narrator’s 
commentary on postwar life in West Germany in general and failures of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung in particular, a failure that forces the narrator “ein wenig 
auf[zu]arbeiten” in the Germans’ stead (101). The relationship between the narrator, 
his experiences with Nazi Germany, and postwar German society is almost 
unintelligible but reveals itself in the manner in which reflective associative chains 
compulsively switch directions and evoke memories the narrator would prefer to 
suppress. Fleeting memory fragments reveal that the narrator, if not a victim himself, 
witnessed the murder of his father and the persecution of a Jewish friend, and the 
narrator tries to come to terms with these events in the context of postwar Germany.  
In what follows I pay particular attention to information the narrator imparts 
regarding the Nazi past and his position vis-à-vis German postwar society. In doing so 
I inevitably give the impression that in Tynset this information is presented in a 
straightforward fashion. It must be emphasized that Hildesheimer’s approach favors a 
much more subtle presentation of historically informed knowledge that is often strictly 
                                                
144 Patricia Haas Stanley, Wolfgang Hildesheimers "Tynset" (Meisenheim: Hain, 1978); Patricia 
Stanley, "The Structure of Wolfgang Hildesheimer's Tynset," Monatshefte 71, no. 1 (1979), 29-40. Long 
provides for a critical reading of reducing the structure of Tynset to the rondo form, Long, "Time and 
Narrative." 
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associative in style. I translate Hildesheimer’s elusive stylistic qualities into precise 
and certain knowledge for the sake of my argument, even at the risk of bypassing the 
texture of the novel’s style.  
In “Antworten über Tynset,” a short text published in 1965 to promote the 
novel, several of Hildesheimer’s replies to an imaginary interviewer consider the truth 
content of Tynset. Does Hildesheimer suffer from insomnia? No. Is he identical to his 
narrator? Not in terms of sleeplessness. Does he grow herbs, like the narrator? Yes. Do 
the objects Tynset’s narrator examines exist? Has Hildesheimer been to the places his 
narrator describes? And so forth. Responding to the imagined question of what Tynset 
is about—what constitutes the plot or its main theme—Hildesheimer says the 
following: 
 
Gern: das Hauptthema—das Entsetzliche, verkörpert durch die 
Straßenlaternen, Kabasta, den Lampenschirm, die Mörder „aus Wien 
oder aus dem Weserland,“ das Gegenüber im Speisewagen—leuchtet 
nur auf, es wird nicht ausgeführt, ist nur kurzer Anlass der 
Nebenthemen. Die Nebenthemen—die verschiedenen Geschichten, 
Reminiszenzen, Rückblenden—stoßen sich daran ab.145 
 
The flashing (“aufleuchten”) of the horrendous appears relatively minor throughout 
the text, yet for Hildesheimer it determines the main theme.  Because it appears to be 
marginal and at the same time of such intensity that it possesses determinative force, 
the flashing of “das Entsetzliche” mirrors the modus operandi of traumatic memories. 
As Benjamin has argued, some moments in time flash up but disappear before we can 
make sense of them, and therefore the coherence of memory depends on embedding 
those flashbulb moments into a greater narrative that keeps them from remaining 
statically fixed, like isolated photographs.146 Trauma theory has established the need 
                                                
145 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Antworten über Tynset," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke 
in sieben Bänden. Bd. II, Monologische Prosa, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 384-87, here 385. 
146 On the flashing of history, cf. Benjamin, "Concept of History," 390f.  
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for embedment strategies for trauma victims to cope with traumatic experiences that, 
unless they are worked through, remain isolated Erlebnisse and do not become 
integrated Erfahrung. It is the Erfahrung of loss that makes mourning possible; faced 
with Erlebnis alone, victims of loss may be trapped in endless melancholia.147 In 
Tynset “Nebenthemen” and “das Entsetzliche” provoke one another, however, there is 
no causal relationship that helps to integrate memories of horror into a coherent 
narrative that would allow the narrator to make sense of his past. While the narrator’s 
efforts at storytelling speak of his desire—perhaps even his need—to turn events into 
narratives and, consequently, to experience (erfahren) these events within the larger 
context of his history, he cannot process memories of cruelties and persecution, which 
                                                
147 Dominick LaCapra correlates the processes of acting out and working through with Benjamin’s 
notion of Erfahrung/Erlebnis: “Trauma and its post-traumatic acting [out], reliving, or reenactment are 
modes of Erlebnis-‘experience’ that is often radically disorienting and chaotic. Working through is a 
mode of Erfahrung which need not be seen in stereotypically Hegelian terms as implying full dialectial 
transcendence or narrative closure,” Dominick LaCapra, "Writing History, Writing Trauma," in Writing 
History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1-42, here 22n28. 
Elsewhere LaCapra provides a useful definition of trauma, which summarizes the findings of trauma 
theory as well as offering LaCapra’s own critical intervention: “In traumatic memory the event 
somehow registers and may actually be relived in the present, at times in a compulsively repetitive 
manner. It may not be subject to controlled, conscious recall. But it returns in nightmares, flashbacks, 
anxiety attacks, and other forms of intrusively repetitive behavior characteristic of an all-compelling 
frame. Traumatic memory (at least in Freud’s account) may involve belated temporality and a period of 
latency between a real or fantasized early event and a later one that somehow recalls it and triggers 
renewed repression of foreclosure and intrusive behavior. But when the past in uncontrollably relived, it 
is as if there were no difference between it and the present. Whether or not the past is reenacted or 
repeated in its precise literality, one feels as if one were back there reliving the event, and distance 
between here and there, then and now, collapses. To use Heidegger’s term, one might perhaps refer to 
traumatic Dasein as experientially being back there, anxiously reliving in its immediacy something that 
was a shattering experience for which one was not prepared—for which one did not have, in Freud’s 
terms, Angstbereitschaft (the readiness to feel anxiety). Traumatic Dasein haunts or possesses the self, 
is acted out or compulsively repeated, and may not be adequately symbolized or accessible in language, 
at least in any critically mediated, controlled, self-reflexive manner. Words may be uttered but seem to 
repeat what was said then and function as speech acts wherein speech itself is possessed or haunted by 
the past and acts as a reenactment or an acting out. When the past becomes accessible to recall in 
memory, and when language functions to provide some measure of conscious control, critical distance, 
and perspective, one has begun the arduous process of working over and through the trauma in a 
fashion that may never bring full transcendence of acting out (or being haunted by revenants and 
reliving the past in its shattering intensity) but which may enable processes of judgment and at least 
limited liability and ethically responsible agency. These processes are crucial for laying ghosts to rest, 
distancing oneself from haunting revenants, renewing an interest in life, and being able to engage 
memory in more critically tested senses,”  Dominick LaCapra, "Holocaust Testimonies. Attending to 
the Victim's Voice," in Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001), 86-113, here 89f.  
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confront him as flashing, static imprints. The memory of the narrator is structured like 
a labyrinthine web in which not linear narrative but compulsive associations force 
single flashbulb images into his consciousness. Words and names such as 
“Straßenlaternen,” “Kabasta,” “Lampenschirm,” “Wien oder Weserland,” and 
“Speisewagen” become shorthand for particular chains of memory associations 
pointing to crimes committed by Nazis, which are irreconcilable with narrative 
memory, and thus the narrator recalls them only partially and without establishing a 
context for them. By the light of street lamps seventeen inhabitants of the Norwegian 
town of Hamar were killed by a German commandant “im letzten Krieg,” readers 
learn from an isolated memory that flashes up while the narrator browses through his 
Norwegian railroad timetable (18f.). Kabasta is the murderer of the narrator’s 
acquaintance, Bloch (63), yet when the narrator telephones Kabasta and chooses 
“Bloch” as his alias, he does so without knowing why: “dieser Name fiel mir grade 
ein, er bedeutete mir nichts” (44). Walking through his dark house and touching the 
surfaces of objects within it, the narrator is suddenly reminded of a lampshade “aus 
heller menschlicher Haut, verfertigt in Deutschland von einem deutschen Bastler, der 
heute als Pensionär in Schleswig-Holstein lebt,” but he cannot recall where or whether 
he has seen it (139). He says nothing about his father except that he had been 
murdered by Christian family men from Vienna and Weserland, but he offers no 
explaination of the circumstances of the killing (156). While the narrator mentally 
revises orders for his herb business, the thought of the German dislike for strong 
spices conjures up the image of a bulky man in a dining car who removed hipbones 
from Danish prisoners during the war (246). These sorts of references to Nazi crimes 
are subtly woven into the fabric of the entire text.  
Hildesheimer’s explicit list of “das Entsetzliche” is short and incomplete. In 
Tynset readers encounter, for instance, a flashing memory of Bloch’s wife, Doris 
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Wiener, who died in “einer Gaskammer” (63). The narrator remembers the name of 
the company that engineered the gas chamber—“an Firmennamen erinnere ich mich 
unfehlbar und genau”—but how well does he remember the victim? He thinks of her 
in terms of her cosmetically altered nose and associates her with Karl Mädler, who 
changed his name to Roland Fleming (61f). Although in Nazi propaganda  “Namen 
und (…) Nasen” (70) were indicators of Jewishness, the narrator fails to make an 
explicit connection between Jewish victims and Nazi perpetrators, a connection the 
careful reader does not miss. The reader’s suspicion that the narrator himself fell 
victim to Nazi persecution or identifies with its Jewish victims is confirmed, albeit not 
fully and only halfway into the book, when the narrator refers to himself as belonging 
in the “Judengasse” located near “Adolph-Platz” (118f.). Knowledge of the narrator’s 
Jewish identity helps to decipher the ending of the Hamar episode. In that reflection on 
a wartime memory, the narrator writes: 
 
Es ist spät. Ich will versuchen zu schlafen, aber irgend etwas hat mich 
aufgestört, ich habe schon vergessen, was es war, und ich will 
versuchen, mich nicht daran zu erinnern; ich will versuchen, sanft in 
andere Bahnen zu gleiten, an anderes zu denken, ich will hoffen, dass 
dieses andere nicht auch etwas Verstecktes enthält, das mich aufstört. 
(19) 
 
Directly following the description of a murderous event, the notion that the narrator no 
longer remembers what it was that disturbed his sleep is disquieting. Precisely because 
the narrator is a Jewish witness of the Holocaust who suffers from multiple losses, 
every memory poses the danger of including something hidden, static, irresolvable, 
and so he desires not to remember at all. “[D]er Ich-Erzähler,” Hildesheimer said in an 
interview more than twenty years after the publication of Tynset, adding “wenn man 
so will, ich als Wolfgang Hildesheimer,” wants to forget “das Schreckliche, das 
Furchtbare (…). Und immer wenn dieses Thema, wenn die furchtbare Gegenwart oder 
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die furchtbare Vergangenheit näher heranrücken (…) werden sie wieder abgestoßen, 
und er [=der Ich-Erzähler] erzählt sich eine neue Geschichte.”148 
In an article on Jean Améry Sebald once empathically described a peculiar 
mode of traumatic memory in which “Inseln der Amnesie” coexist with “einer ans 
Pathologische grenzenden Hypermnesie.”149 The latter results from constant 
stimulation of past memories “in einer ansonsten ausgeleerten Vergangenheit,” which 
produces recurring but static flashbulb memories. Hypermnesia leads, Sebald writes, 
to compulsive repetition of past moments producing death anxiety in the present, 
while its counterpart, amnesia, brackets out all memories that could help make sense 
of an original traumatic event and integrate it into the past. Freud argued that trauma 
occurs when victims of sudden and unforeseeable encounters with danger or death are 
unable to fend off the shock with “Angstbereitschaft” (the readiness to feel anxiety). 
In this situation external excitations tear through psychic defenses to flood the psychic 
apparatus.150 To bring this excess of stimuli under control (“zu bewältigen”), such 
excitations must be bound and then discharged. The process of binding and 
discharging is difficult, however; victims are psychically fixed to the moment of 
trauma and unconsciously return to it over and again (in order to make up for the lack 
of original Angstbereitschaft and retrospectively prepare for the event), while 
consciously trying not to think of it, but to forget it.151 The unconscious must be made 
conscious before it can be processed, but the traumatized victim remembers less, and 
more importantly, does not even remember the essential part (“das Wesentliche”) of 
                                                
148 Hildesheimer and Hillrichs, Ich werde nun schweigen, 42. 
149 W. G. Sebald, "Mit den Augen eines Nachtvogels. Über Jean Améry," in Campo Santo, ed. Sven 
Meyer (Munich, Vienna: Hanser, 2003), 149-70, here 153. 
150 Trauma is the breaking through of an otherwise strong barrier against overstimulation by external 
stimuli, cf. Sigmund Freud, "Jenseits des Lustprinzips," in Gesammelte Werke. Bd. 13, Jenseits des 
Lustprinzips und andere Arbeiten aus den Jahren 1920-1924 (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1981), 3-69, here 
31, 29. 
151 Ibid., 10f., 32. 
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the event. She is thus “vielmehr genötigt, das Verdrängte als gegenwärtiges Erlebnis 
zu wiederholen, anstatt es, wie der Arzt es lieber sähe, als ein Stück der Vergangenheit 
zu erinnern.”152 Until this process concludes, the victim of trauma may be unable to 
agree fully with and believe in the factual reconstruction of the traumatic event but 
repeatedly act out instead. Traumatic events, which made no sense at the time of their 
occurrence and received interpretation only belatedly from an external source, cannot 
be genuinely remembered, and they agitate traumatic memories on behalf of which the 
victim acts out and repeats.153  
Traumatized by the deaths of his father, Bloch, and others whom he knew, and 
perhaps convinced that he, too, had been meant to die (“die Judengasse, wo ich 
hingehöre,” 118), the narrator in Tynset is drawn to images that repeat the sudden 
shock of life-threatening situations, but at the same time he is unable to remember 
them. The house in the alpine region, where the narrator seeks refuge while former 
perpetrators continue to live comfortably in postwar Germany, marks a physical 
separation of past and present that is not paralleled by any conscious distinction of the 
two on the part of the narrator. Thus “Schläger [und] Mörder” who disclose their 
“furchtbare Vergangenheiten” (117) continue to menace the narrator, for instance on a 
wending drive through the labyrinthine streets of “Wilhelmstadt” (114), a generic term 
that stands for all German state capitals and perhaps also connotes Nazi government 
officials who Hildesheimer met during the so-called Wilhemstraßenprozess at the 
Nuremberg Subsequent Nuremberg.154 In the narrator’s chthonic world of 
                                                
152 Ibid., 16. 
153 “[T]he patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out. 
He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is 
repeating it.” Freud, "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through," 15. 
154 Also called the Ministries Trial, this was the eleventh of twelve subsequent trials in Nuremberg, 
against officials of various Nazi ministries, including the Foreign Office that had been located on 
Wilhelmstraße in Berlin. Hildesheimer interpreted at this trial, which took place from January 1948 
until April 1948. Ernst von Weizsäcker was one of the defendants; his son, Richard von Weizsäcker, 
served on the defense team and later became federal president of West Germany, in the capacity of 
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melancholia, the destruction and decay of every Wilhelmstadt is already included. 
According to the narrator, it is unquestionable that in some future even the city will be 
“wieder Wüste,” and here his thoughts drift from Wilhelmstadt to the desert.  
The topos of the desert is prominent in Tynset (even more so in Masante, 
which actually takes place in the desert). Both labyrinth and wasteland generally index 
melancholic despair in the face of a world filled with secrets and riddles, two 
additional motifs Hildesheimer frequently employs. The inclusion of the desert in 
Tynset poses one of the most puzzling enigmas of the text. While the image conjures 
feelings of solitude and despair, the narrator apparently visited the desert in the 
company of a woman. Yet she remains unidentified. Henry A. Lea is the only critic 
who has commented, if only in passing, on the role of the woman, who appears on 
four occasions but of whom the reader learns almost nothing. But Lea errs in stating, 
“[e]s ist also klar, dass [der Erzähler] sich von ihr getrennt hat, nicht sie sich von 
ihm.”155 Precisely because the narrator, who remembers phone numbers and the names 
of companies to a degree that borders on hypermnesia, does not recall either the 
physical appearance or, until the very end, the name of the woman and whether or not 
he loved her, the absence of this woman appears to compromise his psychic stability. 
The narrator suffers from the loss of this woman, Vanessa, and this unrembered loss is 
experienced as absence and causes melancholia. With the melancholic disposition in 
mind, the “Besetzungsprobleme” mentioned in Tynset refer, then, not only to the 
Wagner singer born in and the military occupation of Hamar (18), but also to cathexis. 
 The narrator experiences the absence of Vanessa, but he cannot make sense of 
it. The first time the narrator recalls Vanessa, the images of a ship, a pier, and wooden 
planks cloud the memory of her person. The scene is one of departure, but it is unclear 
                                                
which he awarded Hildesheimer the Federal Cross of Merit in 1984. Cf. Lea, Hildesheimers Weg, 22, 
66f. 
155 Ibid., 235. 
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who left and who stayed behind. The narrator leaves us with two possibilities, as he in 
his memory stands simultaneously “auf dem Kai und (…) auf dem Schiff” (74). 
Though he recalls the environs in great detail—the name of the ship, the rust of the 
anchor, the path of the seagulls—Vanessa falls victim to the narrator’s amnesia that 
accompanies this hypermnesia. The memory of the wind, “in dem wir standen, zu 
zweit” (74), reappears at a point later in the text, but the narrator actively denounces it 
as “Täuschung,” repeating the word three times (96). The narrator does not forget 
landscapes—the backdrops of his life—“nein, diese Dinge vergesse ich nicht” (96), 
but he cannot recall those with whom he visited these landscapes, including the sea 
and a labyrinth: 
 
Ich war zu zweit— 
—zu zweit? Aber mit wem? Sie hatte eine dunkle Stimme, die 
sagte: „Komm, es wird dunkel,“ oder: „it’s getting dark“—, oder sagte 
sie: „fa buio“?—Nein, das sagte sie nicht, ich erinnere mich nicht an 
ein u, es war ein a, dark—dark—. Welche Farbe hatten ihre Augen: Ich 
weiß es nicht mehr, ich habe es vergessen wie ihren Namen, ich 
entsinne mich nur noch der Hintergründe, der Szenerie, die Darsteller 
sind mir entschwunden, haben sich längst umgekleidet und verwandelt, 
vielleicht haben sie sich artig und lächelnd vor mir verbeugt, aber 
diesen Moment habe ich versäumt, vielleicht hielt ich die Augen 
geschlossen in dem Moment. (98, emphasis mine)  
 
Although the narrator blames himself for actively having missed the moment of 
Vanessa’s disappearance, it is more likely that the working dynamics of trauma 
disabled him from consciously experiencing (erfahren) and thereby knowing the 
event. 
Vanessa and the narrator feel growing anxiety in a labyrinth they visit at Villa 
Barbarigo. Each has the impression of seeing the other for the first time, and this 
disorienting experience may signify that, threatened by the danger of separation in the 
labyrinth, both finally realize the danger posed by barbaric German places such as the 
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labyrinthine Wilhelmstadt (253). But the narrator cannot infer this meaning from his 
memories (253).  At the end of the novel, on the morning following his sleepless 
night, the narrator suddenly recalls the woman’s name and his feelings for her: 
 
Jetzt fällt es mir ein: Vanessa hieß sie. Vanessa, ein guter Name. Und 
ich muss sie geliebt haben. Ich erinnere mich— 
ich erinnere mich, dass ich mich manchmal nachts im Dunkel, in jäher 
lähmender Angst um ihr Leben, über die Schlafende neigte, um zu 
horchen ob sie noch atme.  
Ob sie noch atmet? (sic, 267f.) 
 
 The narrator’s memory of his companion’s name makes the search for Tynset 
superfluous. Tynset is “hinfällig” (268). It no longer poses an enigma that busies the 
narrator at night. Tynset “entschwinde[t] (…) wie ein letzter Atemzug” (269), but the 
riddle of Vanessa—if she still breathes and, therefore, is alive—returns to occupy the 
narrator.  
 
Tynset = Tyskland + Hamlet 
The narrator yearns for protection by inanimate, concrete objects that anchor 
his thoughts, preferably phonebooks and train schedules, which are books “voller 
gedrängter Wiedergabe, nirgends [begeben sie] sich auf den Boden der Spekulation” 
(28). Nevertheless, the dense timetable of the Norwegian railroad feeds his 
imagination with place names and arrival times, registering an alternative time and 
space to which the narrator repairs during his nights without sleep. This alternative 
reality, however, is not without threatening elements. On one of his ritualistic mental 
journeys, the narrator discovers Tynset, “diese Nebenstation an der Nebenlinie 
zwischen Hamar und Stören” (55, cf. 13). The narrator is less than fascinated with the 
actual city of Tynset in Norway (which disappointed Hildesheimer once he visited it 
 135 
after the completion of Tynset156), but he displays a curious interest in the letter “y” in 
the virtual city’s name. Much like the Nebenlinien of the railroad system, the “y” 
occupies an in-between space that demands attention. The passage in which the 
narrator articulates the letter’s allure has profound importance for understanding the 
narrator’s mindset and the overall thrust of Hildesheimer’s melancholic text: 
 
Tynset. Das klingt nach (…) Tynset, daran bin ich im Vorbeigehen 
haften geblieben, dieses Wort umkreisen meine Gedanken, sie kreisen 
es ein. Dieses Ypsilon! Indem es schräg nach links unter die Zeile ragt 
und daher zwischen den Zeilen steht, hat es einen Fang ausgestreckt, an 
dem die Fetzen der Gedanken, müde und in wachsendem Maße bereit, 
ein Hindernis wahrzunehmen, ja, es sogar willkommen zu heißen, sich 
weit aufgerissen und hängen geblieben sind. 
Dabei ist dieses Ypsilon noch nicht einmal recht aussprechbar. 
Oder zumindest: es ist Sache des Zufalls, ob dem Mund die Stellung 
gelingt, um der Stimme den Laut zu erlauben. Das, neben seiner 
Schräge, hebt das Ypsilon von allen anderen Buchstaben ab, macht es 
zu einer trügerischen Komponente inmitten lapidarer Tatsachen. Da 
liegt es denn, auf dem Weg zwischen I und Ü, liegt genau auf der 
Mitte, aber das Ü selbst liegt auf der Mitte eines Weges, es liegt auf der 
Hälfte des doppelt so langen Weges von I zu U. Die zweite Hälfte 
dieses Weges, die Strecke von Ü zu U, hat keine Mitte, hat kein 
Zeichen, das sie markiert. Hier liegt nichts, liegt Schweigen, liegt, im 
wahren Sinne des Wortes, das Unausprechliche, hier beginnt es, in 
diesen unscheinbaren Dingen tritt es plötzlich hervor, um dann in den 
scheinbaren ins Unermeßliche anzuwachsen, ins Entsetzliche. (25ff.) 
 
The letter “y” has extended its hook, dangling between the lines in an indeterminate 
space void of language but nonetheless marked by writing, and the narrator, who was 
just passing by, is snared as its first catch. Now that he is on the hook, so to speak, his 
thoughts become the next “Fang,” but only the unarticulated and incoherent tatters of 
those thoughts. Because of the narrator’s somnolence, his defenses are lowered and his 
attempts to forget are weakened, so the hook finds easy prey.  Moreover, the narrator’s 
drifting thoughts welcome the barrier the hook presents, and here the text hints at the 
                                                
156 Cf. Hildesheimer and Hillrichs, Ich werde nun schweigen, 45. 
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narrator’s compulsive behavior. His traumatic memories, involuntarily thrust into the 
light by the compulsion to repeat, are caught in the hook of the “y”; the process 
indexes associative memory work that resists narrative embedding. The “y” stands in 
for unpredictable origins and associative chains, for it is itself unpronounceable and 
unspeakable. The phonetic undecidability forces its articulator to attend to a silence 
from which “Entsetzliche[s]” accelerates and accumulates ad infinitum.  
 The name Tynset, home to this “y,” is not accidental. It recalls “Tyskland,” as 
Germany is known in Norway (as well as in Sweden and Denmark). The unspeakable 
hook that catches the horrendous is a German hook. “Denk ich an Tynset in der 
Nacht,” as several critics entitled their reviews of Tynset,157 should thus read more 
correctly as “Denk ich an Deutschland in der Nacht.” The famous opening line of 
Heinrich Heine’s 1843 poem “Nachtgedanken,” followed by the lines “Dann bin ich 
um den Schlaf gebracht / Ich kann nicht mehr die Augen schließen / Und meine heißen 
Thränen fließen,”158 has often been construed as an example of Heine’s political 
poetry. Written in the pre-revolutionary atmosphere of the 1840s and after Heine had 
already been in exile in Paris for twelve years, the first and final stanzas (in which the 
French wife dispels the “deutschen Sorgen” of yet another insomniac) are interpreted 
as the poet’s criticism of German Kleinstaaterei and censorship. Most of the poem 
(stanzas 2-7) concerns the author’s fear of not seeing his aging mother again before 
her death. Vis-à-vis Hildesheimer’s Tynset, the central concern of Heine’s 
“Nachtgedanken” is expressed in the two stanzas not yet mentioned (8 and 9): 
 
Seit ich das Land verlassen hab’ 
So viele sanken dort in’s Grab, 
Die ich geliebt—wenn ich sie zähle, 
So will verbluten meine Seele.  
                                                
157 Cf. Schonauer, "Denk ich an Tynset in der Nacht"; Urs Jenny, "Denk ich an Tynset in der Nacht," 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 6/7, 1965. 
158 Heinrich Heine, Heinrich Heine, Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke. Bd. 2, Neue 
Gedichte, ed. Elisabeth Genton (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1983), 129. 
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Und zählen muss ich—Mit der Zahl 
Schwillt immer höher meine Qual, 
Mir ist als wälzten sich die Leichen 
Auf meine Brust—Gottlob! sie weichen! 
  
The reason for sleeplessness and tears in “Nachtgedanken” is Heine’s mourning of the 
deaths that occurred in the twelve years of his exile, much as the narrator in Tynset 
mourns the deaths of the twelve years during which Hildesheimer was exiled. The 
corpses weigh heavily on the minds of Hildesheimer’s narrator as well as Heine’s 
lyrical I, but in the case of Heine’s poem they disappear as daylight nears (“Gottlob! 
sie weichen! // Gottlob! durch mein Fenster bricht / Französisch heit’res Tageslicht”). 
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the weight of the dead is not as easily shaken. The 
comparison of “Nachtgedanken” and Tynset is not based on the titles of Tynset 
reviews; Hildesheimer’s affiliation with Heine and the importance he ascribed to 
“Nachtgedanken” is evidenced in the guestbook of a small literary society in Southern 
Germany, in which Hildesheimer left the message: “Denk ich an Deutschland in der 
Nacht, dann bin ich um den Schlaf gebracht.” He added, “Und verzeihen Sie, dass ich 
nichts anderes schreiben kann.”159 Visiting Germany on professional business, 
Hildesheimer cannot but think of those who died at the hand of Germans; he cannot 
but think of Entsetzliches that permeates past and present and is caught by the “y” of 
Tynset. 
 If the name Tynset recalls in its first syllable Tyskland, its second syllable 
bears resemblance to that of Hamlet.160 Hamlet was Hildesheimer’s “ständiger 
Begleiter, ein guter Gesell” and his “Lieblingsfigur” already during his school years in 
                                                
159 Qtd. in: Domin, "Denk ich an Deutschland," 124. 
160 “Tynset—klingt das nicht wie Hamlet? Ja, es klingt wie Hamlet,” Hildesheimer, Tynset, 155. 
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Germany.161 Interviewed about Tynset, Hildesheimer said that his fascination with 
Hamlet, the most famous tragic insomniac, was “sein sehr stark gebrochenes 
Verhältnis zur Realität, und sein Zögern, das Zaudern.” He added, “So sehe ich mich 
selbst ein wenig, auch immer beherrscht von einem gewissen Schuldgefühl, dass ich 
nicht aktiv eingreife, und darin besteht meine Identifikation mit Hamlet.”162 Elsewhere 
Hildesheimer identifies Hamlet as the quintessential melancholic character because 
Hamlet’s world—as opposed to that of Jacques, another of Shakespeare’s 
melancholics —“ist in der Tat furchtbar, und er kann sie mit einer besseren 
vergleichen, die er noch gekannt hat.”163 Herein lies the similarity between Hamlet 
and the narrator, a likeness that stems from the shared experience of having lost one’s 
father to murder. The ghost of Hamlet’s father—he appears to the narrator because he 
is “dry,” that is, of melancholic disposition164—demands that the narrator avenge his 
father’s death as well as his own, which Hamlet himself was incapable of doing. But 
the narrator refuses to answer Hamlet’s father; his own father “war anders—mein 
Vater war ein besserer Mann (…), er hält nicht (…) nach Möglichkeiten einer Rache 
Ausschau, obgleich sein Ende nicht so sanft war wie das Ende dieses Mannes hier, 
nein, kein Gift bei einem Nachmittagsnickerchen ins Ohr geträufelt, er ist nicht sanft 
ins Jenseits hinübergeschlummert,” instead, he was “erschlagen von christlichen 
Familienvätern” (156). In Vergebliche Aufzeichnungen, a text that precedes Tynset by 
three years, Hildesheimer sowed the seeds of this episode, referring to the poisoning of 
                                                
161 Hildesheimer, "Antworten über Tynset," 386; Jens, "Hamlet. Das Genie der Poeten," 109. Cf. Geno 
Hartlaub, "Tynset ist keine Endstation. Gespräch mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," Deutsches Allgemeines 
Sonntagsblatt, February 20, 1967. 
162 Hildesheimer and Hillrichs, Ich werde nun schweigen, 47f. 
163 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Büchners atemlose Melancholie. Zur Verleihung des Georg-Büchner-
Preises," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII, Vermischte 
Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 31-42, 
here 38f.  
164 “Geister beschränken ihr Wirken auf das Gebiet des Trockenen,” Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 
"Vergebliche Aufzeichnungen," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke. Bd. I, Erzählende 
Prosa, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 273-302, 
here 277. In the teachings of the four humors, black bile is associated with dryness.  
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Hamlet’s father as mere hearsay. The true cause of his death may be the starting point 
for a story “von dem tragischsten Nachtwandler aller Zeiten,” but in Aufzeichnungen 
Hildesheimer is not yet ready to follow this “Ansatzpunkt.”165 When he does so in 
Tynset, not Hamlet’s father but the narrator takes the role of the sleepwalker. The 
cause of death for Hamlet’s father is accepted, and so is the father’s demand for 
revenge. Hamlet’s father seeks to avenge his own murder and the murder of the 
narrator’s father (20, 186). But despite the narrator’s identification with Hamlet, the 
narrator does not seek to punish his father’s murderers: “ich verzichte, ich handele 
nicht, andere handeln, ich nicht” (107). This passage was profoundly misinterpreted in 
the reception of Tynset; Gunter Schäble, for instance, who prefaces his observation 
that the narrator had made “einmal eine furchtbare Erfahrung” with a distinct 
“vielleicht,” thus questioning the authenticity of the narrator’s experience, reads him 
as a man who seeks revenge. “Hamlets unmögliche Rache”—so the title of Schäble’s 
review—is, according to Schäble, the narrator’s impossible revenge, impossible not 
because the narrator is reluctant to act, but because “er konnte nicht ein ganzes Volk 
erdolchen.”166 The narrator’s melancholic inertia—his inaction—and his rejection of 
the entire concept of revenge is framed here as a logistic inability to avenge mass 
murder and genocide. 
The narrator explains his refusal to act—whether in revenge or otherwise—
differently. Surprisingly, he connects this with guilt. He explains his inaction by 
pointing to his innocence. According to him, action (“Handlung”) is primarily 
necessary as reaction, that is, after one has become guilty of something for which one 
must then take responsibility. Action is responsibility; it is the responsibility to make 
amends and to acquit oneself of guilt:  “ich bin ohne Schuld—besser vielleicht, 
                                                
165 Ibid., 301. 
166 Gunter Schäble, "Hamlets unmögliche Rache," Tagesspiegel, May 1/2, 1965. Qtd. in: Braese, Die 
andere Erinnerung, 308ff. 
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vorsichtiger gesagt: ohne wesentliche Schuld—, daher auch ohne Pflicht. Ich habe 
nichts gutzumachen, nichts reinzuwaschen, jedenfalls wüsste ich nicht was” (99). 
Handlung is demanded of the perpetrators, not of the narrator! The narrator does not 
identify as victim, but he is sure that he is not a perpetrator. Or is he? To his 
assurances of his own guiltlessness he adds, „[n]iemand hat, soweit ich weiß, durch 
mich gelitten.“ The sentence somewhat undermines the credibility of the narrator’s 
innocence; the repeated notion of his innocence throughout the text—“ich trage selbst 
wenig eigene Schuld, sehr wenig” (24)—is suspicious and discloses his feeling of 
survivor guilt. Moreover, the narrator undermines his testimony of innocence at other 
points of the text, for instance, by expressing a desire to be free from the burden of 
guilt (51). The randomness of surviving Nazi persecution contrasts with the causality 
that associates responsibility with agency. Survivor guilt is destructive because it 
blames the survivor for taking no responsibility when the survivor had no agency. The 
many recurrences of the word Schuld, in twenty different contexts, speak to 
Hildesheimer’s departure from the “post-1945 Jasperian concept of (…) guilt”; guilt is 
in Tynset an all-encompassing “attitude which does not lead to atonement and 
transformations, but only to destructive desire for (…) self abasement (…) and, 
ultimately, more misery.”167 Guilt is an important theme in the book—perhaps the 
most important beside the work of remembering the Nazi past. It is irrelevant whether 
the narrator’s guilt is imagined or real; the unconscious conviction that he unjustly 
survived his father and perhaps Vanessa creates a powerful sentiment of guilt that 
forms the subtext of Tynset. The particular form of guilt he feels leaves him unable to 
act decisively in the present.  
 
                                                
167 Giles R. Hoyt, "Guilt in Absurdity. Wolfgang Hildesheimer's Tynset," Seminar 14, no. 2 (1978), 
123-40, here 130. 
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The Work of Melancholia 
The narrator’s attention to the town of Tynset, a minor town located along a 
secondary rail route, emphasizes Hildesheimer’s insistence on the “Nebenthemen” in 
Tynset. The “Nebenlinie” Hamar-Stören, recalling the German verb for disturb, stören, 
leads to the “Nebenthemen,” and because it draws a wide arc (93), these embedded 
narratives have nothing apparent to do with the horrors of the Nazi past. Some of the 
early scholarship on Tynset focuses almost exclusively on these stories; especially the 
narratives known as “Bettfuge” and “die Hähne Attikas,” and the Prosniczer and 
Gesualdo episodes have drawn much attention.168 The embedded narratives point more 
generally towards death, decay, and disintegration throughout history, much in the 
fashion of Benjamin and in the novels of Sebald a few decades later. Entsetzliches 
hovers beneath all so-called civilization. Notable is Hildesheimer’s fascination, or 
perhaps obsession, with the railway system, which immediately conjures up 
connections to the use of the railroad during the Holocaust. 
The narrative technique Hildesheimer employed reproduces the compulsive 
nature of traumatic memory outlined above. While the narrator drifts off, reminiscing 
about a past with which the reader becomes acquainted only in intervals, he repeatedly 
returns to Tynset: out of the eighty-odd distinct thematic breaks within the text, 
references to Tynset account for nineteen ruptures. The interlocking of the framing 
story—to which all references to Tynset belong—and the embedded narratives imitate 
memory’s intimate linkage with the present: Entsetzliches erupts into the present 
regardless of the linear progression of time, which is thus experienced as fragmented 
and incoherent. In an article on Tynset, Jonathan J. Long contests earlier arguments 
that ignore the temporal nature of the text or reduce it to an “a-historical concept of 
                                                
168 Cf. Gerhard F. Probst, "Die Kategorien von Zeit und Raum und das Steigern von Realität. Wolfgang 
Hildesheimers Tynset," Archiv 215 (1978), 272-80. 
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time,” by proposing an understanding that “pits linear progression against cyclical 
return.”169 Because Long defines cyclicality within the framework of recurring natural 
phenomena and the liturgical calendar (in reference to Masante), he unfortunately 
subsumes the repetition of certain motifs under an order that accounts poorly for the 
pattern of memory. The concept of cyclicality is productive only if its movements are 
not reduced to cycles that are identical in their temporality, such as the changes of the 
season. The narrative cycles concentrated about the thought and memory complex 
Tynset are of varying circumference, mimicking the “Ring[e] des Saturn” (177) and 
indexing the psychological disposition of the melancholic narrator, who cannot finish 
the work of mourning and remains trapped in cyclical melancholia. Hildesheimer’s 
frequent inclusion of rings and circles (e.g., 39) speaks to the multitude of Saturnine 
rings that are formally represented by the varying lengths and structures of the 
embedded narratives. For instance, the scenes of the roosters of Attica and the bed 
fugue are narrated almost uninterruptedly; other motifs, such as the invocation of 
Hamlet’s father, are called upon with great frequency, without, however, building up 
to a coherent narrative. Thus Hildesheimer’s structural and stylistic choices identify 
Tynset as a project of melancholia and melancholic memory. 
Albeit not obvious initially, the largest cluster of thematic references concerns 
memory.  The narrator’s exclamation (one of few in the text), “Sinnlose Erinnerung!” 
(36) speaks to the frustration caused by the inability to make sense of memory. He 
would prefer to ignore this “unsichtbare(s) Irrlicht” of memory that mocks and 
confronts him with death and decay (52): “Erinnerungen (…) ziehen mir scheinheilig 
entgegen, ich nehme sie auf, und plötzlich enthüllen sie einen entsetzlichen Kern, 
angesichts dessen Grinsen der Schlaf entflieht” (126, emphasis mine). The destructive 
nature of his melancholic memory, which is in part traumatic, causes the narrator to 
                                                
169 Long, "Time and Narrative," 461, 63. 
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long for a nothing that is different from philosophical Nothingness. He reflects upon 
the former while he is at the highest point of his house, using a telescope to escape 
into the universe:  
 
Mit “Nichts” meine ich nicht das modische Etwas, genannt Nichts, das 
sogenannte “absolute Nichts”, voll von unerträglichem Pathos, das 
unbestimmbare, dehnbare Nichts der Philosophen, Thema lebloser 
Gespräche am runden Tisch, im schalltoten fensterlosen Raum, 
strapaziert, aufgebläht, ein Ballon voller Nichts, und nur „Nichts“ 
genannt, weil nichts Besseres darauf passt, die Nichtung oder 
Nichtigkeit alles Seienden, deren Walten mich nichts angeht und nur 
ihre Verwalter interessiert—nein: ich meine das geographische Nichts, 
den leeren Raum zwischen Bündeln, den Mengen, den Gruppen von 
etwas, von viel oder von zuviel, das Unsichtbare zwischen dem 
Sichtbaren, das Loch im Himmel, das große Rohr, das meine Sehnsucht 
in den Himmel bohrt, das Verlangen, (...) Verlangen nach einem Ort, an 
dem nichts ist und nichts sein kann und nie etwas gewesen ist, das 
treibt mich hinauf, seinethalben schlage ich Wurzeln hier, älter als die 
des Instruments, so alt wie die der ersten Sterngucker. (...) Nichts ist 
das, wo Zwischenraum ist und sonst nichts. (180f.) 
 
Once each night, the narrator visits his telescope, which is too old and too simple to 
penetrate the depths of the universe, but which allows at least for a view “tief genug 
für den Ring des Saturn” (177), and which pushes 
 
tief in die unendliche Vergangenheit, hier gleichbedeutend mit 
unendlicher Zukunft, und immer gezogen von meiner Sehnsucht, 
nirgends zu sein, dorthin, wo kein Stern, kein Licht mehr sichtbar ist, 
wo nichts ist, wo nichts vergessen wird, weil nichts erinnert wird, wo 
Nacht ist, wo nichts ist, nichts, Nichts. Dorthin—  (185f., emphasis 
mine) 
 
His search for the existence of a “Zwischenraum” is motivated by the narrator’s desire 
to shut off all memories. Due to his impaired memory, he is unable to locate his 
identity in a meaningful way. Because psychological processes of remembering and 
working through circulate in the text, but are not contained in the narrator’s 
understanding of his own psyche, he suffers from difficulties discerning himself in the 
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world. The narrator is dislocated; he is in-the-world and outside it (“ich war innen und 
außen,” 98), he experiences and remains outside experiences (“ich bin im Bild und ich 
bin nicht im Bild, ich betrachte es von außen,” 74). Torn between belonging and not 
belonging, he seeks a geographical nothing as a “Zwischenraum” to collapse this 
dichotomy. Staring into the universe and searching for geographical nothingness 
reflects the narrator’s ideal of an absolute absence of light, which is, moreover, 
articulated by his admiration for an entirely black painting (87). The desire for nothing 
is the only operating drive working in the narrator; he prefers the space of nothing to 
the constant agitation of memory.  
 In a similar vein, the narrator abstains from any form of communication with 
the outer world. Long ago his house was filled with guests, but the last of the parties 
he hosted ended disastrously in the near-murder of American evangelist Prosniczer 
(160-172). Since then, no one has entered the narrator’s house, and he does not leave 
it. His means of transportation are gone; the car that helped him cross the mountain 
pass broke down and froze, like that of Prosniczer, and will remain this way for 
eternity (51f., 54f.). Celestina, the housekeeper, and the narrator do not interact. After 
“die große Krise in unserer Beziehung,” brought about by Celestina’s suspicion that 
the narrator had supernatural powers, silence dominates their decade-long relationship 
(242). Only three possible channels of communication are left to the narrator, and 
because they are inanimate objects, they only appear to allow the narrator access to 
the outside world. He reads the phone book without using the phone; he considers the 
train schedule without riding the train; and he watches the movement of the sky with 
his telescope, focusing, however, on black, empty spots. His means of communication 
are dead ends. Where interaction with people fails, he converses with ghosts (e.g., 
Hamlet). Surprisingly, the sleepless night ends with the hopeful, concrete intention of 
leaving the house and joining the village community in mourning the death of a 
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villager’s child (263f.). At the memory of Vanessa’s name, however, this plan is 
quickly abandoned, and the narrator is drawn back into his past that blocks 
participation in the present. The narrator does not leave his bed, and Tynset ends with 
the following description of the narrator: 
 
in diesem Bett der Winternächte, der Mondnächte und der dunklen 
Nächte, in dem ich nun wieder liege, tief gebettet, obgleich es Tage ist, 
liege und für immer liegenbleibe und Tynset entschwinden lasse—, ich 
sehe es dort hinten entschwinden, es ist wieder weit weg, jetzt ist es 
entschwunden, der Name vergessen, verweht wie Schall und Rauch, 
wie ein letzter Atemzug— 
 
The Ethics of Melancholic Writing 
Tynset does not have a happy ending. The narrator does not leave his bed, let 
alone his house; he avoids contact with his housekeeper as much as the outside world. 
How can we say that his melancholic remembrance serves nonetheless as a precursor 
to socio-political action? Blamberger’s critical comparison between the work of 
Hildesheimer and Grass concluded that Grass’s melancholic work promoted political 
involvement via the utopian message of his texts. By contrast, Blamberger argued, 
Hildesheimer’s prose worked not for but against the improvement of society. 
 
Sebald Reads Grass and Hildesheimer 
In a comparative study of Hildesheimer and Grass published just prior to 
Blamberger’s, W. G. Sebald arrived at a radically different conclusion. Reading 
Hildesheimer’s Tynset and Grass’s Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke, Sebald looks 
for evidence of genuinely performed “Trauer” to examine whether the deficit of 
mourning for the victims of the Nazi regime, which the Mitscherlichs diagnosed for 
West German society, was present in literature. He concludes that with few exceptions 
literary authors practiced “political apathy” until the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials and 
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the victory of the Social Democrats in 1969 brought about a change in the cultural-
political climate.170 Once he notes a perceivable shift provoked by the 1960s, Sebald 
distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic mourning, accusing Grass of the 
latter. 
Grass’s Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke (1972) documents the author’s 
engagement for the Social Democrats on the campaign trail in a pedagogical effort to 
educate the disillusioned generation of 1968. Embedded into the diary is the history of 
the Danzig Jews under the Nazi regime; through the fictional Danzig schoolteacher 
Zweifel, who refuses to participate in the persecution of the Jews, Grass tells his 
children the story of “Danziger (…) Juden als Mitbürger und Mitmenschen und nicht 
nur als ein nebuloses Kollektiv.”171 It is through this dimension of concrete 
“Eingedenken(s),” together with Grass’s reflections on melancholia that he undertakes 
as part of a third narrative strand (in connection with preparing for a lecture for the 
Dürerjahr celebrations in 1971), that Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke gains 
substance.172 Through the figure of Zweifel, Grass puts the past in touch with the 
present, urging his audience—the young generation—to adopt a doubtful attitude 
towards political power and governance and, perhaps, to exercise melancholic 
remembrance of Holocaust victims. It was his experience as a member of the Hitler 
Youth and—as we know today—the Waffen-SS that prompted Grass to warn the 
youth of the dangers of political ignorance.173 Despite Grass’s ambitious intention, 
                                                
170 Cf. W. G. Sebald, "Konstruktionen der Trauer. Günter Grass und Wolfgang Hildesheimer," in 
Campo Santo, ed. Sven Meyer (Munich, Vienna: 2003), 101-27, here 108. Hans Erich Nossack’s 1948 
Der Untergang marks an exception. Sebald also names Peter Weiss’s Die Ermittlung  and Heinrich 
Böll’s Frankfurter Vorlesungen, remarking critically, however, that these works only appeared in the 
1960s—that is, much too late. Hans Erich Nossack, Der Untergang (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1961); 
Heinrich Böll, Frankfurter Vorlesungen (Cologne, Berlin: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1966); Peter Weiss, 
Die Ermittlung. Oratorium in 11 Gesängen (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1965). 
171 Sebald, "Konstruktionen der Trauer," 110. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Cf. Günter Grass, Schreiben nach Auschwitz. Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesung (Frankfurt/M.: 
Luchterhand, 1990), 33f. The controversial revelation of his Waffen-SS membership became public 
with his recent autobiography, Günter Grass, Beim Häuten der Zwiebel (Göttingen: Steidl, 2006). For a 
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Sebald critizices that Grass, who is “in Danziger Dingen sonst so bewandert(en),” was 
unable to bring to life the memory of the Danzig Jews on his own account but heavily 
relied on a study conducted by Jewish historian Erwin Lichtenstein. Lichtenstein’s 
book was published after Grass’s Tagebuch, yet in the preface Lichtenstein writes that 
much of Grass’s information on the Danzig Jews was based on material provided by 
Lichtenstein prior to publication. Thus the reader of the Tagebuch, Lichtensein writes, 
finds “in den die Endzeit der Geschichte der Juden in Danzig nachzeichnenden 
Kapiteln des Buches von Günter Grass den Niederschlag meiner Informationen.”174 
Sebald concludes from Grass’s practice that, although Grass views himself as a dog 
sniffing for truth (an image Grass borrows from Benjamin who, in his Trauerspiel 
book, named the dog the heraldic animal for the melancholic intellectual and 
ponderer), Grass has little interest in researching the “reale(n) Schicksal der verfolgten 
Juden” himself.175 Worse still, says Sebald, is the figure of Zweifel, who helps to 
confirm the widespread belief in the so-called other or good German: the German who 
did not collaborate with the Nazis but resisted them actively. Although true resistance 
fighters made up but a small minority of Third Reich society, it was the creation of 
fictional resistance fighters, Sebald argues, that lent West German literature the 
reputation of the moral backbone of postwar society. By offering his readers Zweifel 
as a character with whom to identify, Grass diminishes the need to properly mourn the 
Danzig Jews: Zweifel is, Sebald concludes, “ein der programmatischen Intention der 
Trauer entgegenstehendes Alibi.”176 Rather than mourning the loss of the Danzig Jews 
                                                
documentation of this controversy, cf. Martin Kölbel, Ein Buch, ein Bekenntnis. Die Debatte um Günter 
Grass’ "Beim Häuten der Zwiebel" (Göttigen: Steidl, 2007). 
174 Erwin Lichtenstein, Die Juden der freien Stadt Danzig unter der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus 
(Tübingen: Mohr, 1973), viii. Qtd. in: Sebald, "Konstruktionen der Trauer," 257n17. 
175 Sebald, "Konstruktionen der Trauer," 111. For Benjamin’s discussion of the dog as ancient emblem 
of melancholia, cf. Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, 329-32. The characteristics of the 
dog—“Spürsinn und (…) Ausdauer des Tieres”—remind of “das Bild des unermüdlichen Forschers und 
Grüblers” (ibid., 329).  
176 Sebald, "Konstruktionen der Trauer," 114. 
 148 
himself, Grass delegates this act to the woman depicted in Dürer’s Melencholia, that 
is, to melancholia itself. Grass’s reflections on melancholia, Dürer’s etching, and the 
dog-like sniffing of a writer do not, however, amount to an act of mourning. For this 
reason Sebald accuses Grass of inauthentic mourning: Grass’s excursus on 
melancholia appears to him as “etwas mühselig Konstruiertes, [das] etwas von einer 
historischen Pflichtübung an sich hat.” By contrast, Hildesheimer’s Tynset seems “aus 
dem Zentrum der Trauer selber entstanden zu sein.”177 
Sebald supports his rejection of Grass’s Tagebuch einer Schnecke with reasons 
and examples, but he fails to tell his audience why he much prefers Hildesheimer. He 
lists evidence of Hildesheimer’s use of the discourse of melancholia, and he concludes 
that Tynset speaks to the reader “aus dem festen Haus der Melancholie.”178 Yet it is 
unclear from Sebald’s summary of Tynset how Hildesheimer achieves this effect and, 
more importantly, whether and how this melancholic register causes genuine 
mourning. Returning to Sebald’s introduction regarding German literature in general, 
it is important to note that what he laments here is the failure of German literature to 
provoke “einen authentischen Versuch zur Trauer in der Identifikation mit den 
wirklichen Opfern.”179 Only the identification with the victims constitutes an authentic 
attempt to mourn them, and from this statement it becomes clear that for Sebald the 
crux of the matter is the process of identification. Recall that for Freud it is 
identification with the lost object that hampers Trauerarbeit and provokes 
melancholia, that is, dysfunctional mourning. Sebald is thus not concerned with 
mourning at all, as the title of his essay, “Konstruktionen der Trauer,” might suggest, 
but with melancholia. Following this logic Sebald posits not mourning but 
melancholia to be the ethically responsible response to past crimes.  
                                                
177 Ibid., 119. 
178 Ibid., 121. 
179 Ibid., 106. Emphasis mine. 
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Melancholia: Transhistorical Register? 
Since penning his Hildesheimer essay, Sebald, himself a melancholic, as he 
confessed frequently,180 has emerged as the most prominent contemporary practitioner 
of a melancholic writing style. The “Sebald phenomenon,” as Scott Denham, in the 
preface to a Sebald reader titled History—Memory—Trauma, calls the incredible 
popularity of Sebald, especially in the Anglo-American world, is based on the German 
author’s singular position as “the most thoughtful and eloquent writer to approach the 
specifically German catastrophe of modernity that is murder, exile, loss, and grief.” 
Denham continues that Sebald “does so with modesty and tact, but incessantly and 
with a kind of helplessness in the face of the experiences of others.”181 As result there 
seems to be unanimous consensus that identifies Sebald as the “Musterschüler der 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.”182 Perhaps because of the Sebald phenomenon, 
promoted by prominent intellectuals like Susan Sontag, James Wood, and Cynthia 
Ozick and carried out in prestigious literary magazines, the melancholy style is today 
celebrated as the ethically condign literary response to twentieth-century catastrophes. 
All too often Sebald’s notion of melancholia as “das Überdenken des sich 
vollziehenden Unglücks” and “eine Form des Widerstands” has been readily accepted, 
and among the plethora of studies on Sebald only a few critical voices emerged.183 
                                                
180 “Ich bin schon ein Melancholiker. Das ist eine emotionale Disposition.” W. G. Sebald and Sven 
Siedenberg, "Anatomie der Schwermut. Interview mit W. G. Sebald. Über sein Schreiben und die 
Schrecken der Geschichte," in W. G. Sebald, ed. Franz Loquai (Eggingen: Isele, 1997), 146-48, here 
147. Cf. W. G. Sebald and Marco Poltronieri, "Wie kriegen die Deutschen das auf die Reihe?," in W. G. 
Sebald, ed. Franz Loquai (Eggingen: Isele, 1997), 138-44, here 142; Michaël Zeeman et al., "Transcript 
of an Interview Given by Max Sebald," in W. G. Sebald. History--Memory--Trauma, ed. Scott Denham 
and Mark McCulloh (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 7-20, here 25.  
181 Scott Denham, "The Sebald Phenomenon," in W. G. Sebald. History--Memory--Trauma, ed. Scott 
Denham and Mark McCulloh (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 1-6, here 6. 
182 Ben Hutchinson, W. G. Sebald. Die dialektische Imagination (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
2009), 2n2. Cf. Anne Parry, "Idioms for the Unrepresentable. Postwar Fiction and the Shoah," in The 
Holocaust and the Text. Speaking the Unspeakable, ed. Andrew Leak and George Paizis (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2000), 109-24. 
183 W. G. Sebald, Beschreibung des Unglücks. Zur österreicherischen Literatur von Stifter bis Handke 
(Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1994), 12. The literature on Sebald and melancholia is vast and includes: 
Bettina Mosbach, Figurationen der Katastrophe. Ästhetische Verfahren in W. G. Sebalds Die Ringe des 
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These critics have made important scholarly contributions, however, by challenging 
the dubious conflation of cultural memory with melancholic mourning and trauma that 
gained some currency among trauma theorists and proponents of melancholic 
communities.184 It is worth examining one study in particular, in which author Mary 
Cosgrove examines how Sebald’s melancholy understanding of history emerges 
precisely in his reading of Grass and Hildesheimer.185  
                                                
Saturn und Austerlitz (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2008), esp. 122-55; Kaufman, "Angels”; Katja Garloff, 
"Kafka's Crypt. W. G. Sebald and the Melancholy of Modern German Jewish Culture," The Germanic 
Review  (2007), 123-140; Michael Niehaus and Claudia Öhlschläger, eds., W. G. Sebald. Politische 
Archäologie und melancholische Bastelei (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 2006). Several of the essays collected in 
Denham and McCulloh thematize melancholia, most importantly Mark Ilsemann, "Going Astray. 
Melancholy, Natural History, and the Image of Exile in W. G. Sebald's Austerlitz," in W. G. Sebald. 
History--Memory--Trauma, ed. Scott Denham and Mark McCulloh (Berlin, New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2006), 301-14. In addition, see: Peter Morgan, "The Sign of Saturn. Melancholy, 
Homelessness and Apocalypse in W. G. Sebald's Prose Narratives," German Life and Letters 58 (2005), 
75-92; Graham Jackman, "Gebranntes Kind? W. G. Sebalds 'Metaphysik der Geschichte'," German Life 
and Letters 57 (2004), 456-71; Anne Fuchs, Die Schmerzensspuren der Geschichte. Zur Poetik der 
Erinnerung in W. G. Sebalds Prosa (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), esp. 165-205; Sigrid Löffler, 
"'Melancholie ist eine Form des Widerstands.' Über das Saturnische bei W. G. Sebald und seine 
Aufhebung in der Schrift," Text + Kritik 158 (2003), 103-11; Andreas Huyssen, "On Rewritings and 
New Beginnings. W. G. Sebald and the Literature about the Luftkrieg," LiLi 31 (2001), 72-90; Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard, "Melancholie als Widerstand," in Verleihung des Heine-Preises 2000 der 
Landeshauptstadt Düsseldorf an W. G. Sebald, ed. Georg Aehling and Kulturamt der Landeshauptstadt 
Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf, 2000), 5-16. For an excellent review essay of recent publications on Sebald in 
general (i.e., not focusing exclusively on melancholia), cf. Richard Sheppard, "Woods, Trees, and the 
Spaces in Between. A Report on Work Published on W. G. Sebald 2005-2008," Journal of European 
Studies 39, no. 1 (2009), 79-128. 
184 Anne Fuchs, in her study on Sebald’s ethics and aesthetics, diagnoses the “geradezu obsessive 
Beschäftigung mit dem Konzept des geschichtlichen Traumas” and hopes to provide a more 
differentiated account of Sebald than merely stamping him as “Holocaust-Autor.” Fuchs, 
Schmerzenspuren der Geschichte, 17, 12. 
185 Mary Cosgrove, "Melancholy Competitions. W. G. Sebald Reads Günter Grass and Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer," German Life and Letters 59, no. 2 (2006), 217-32. Despite a growing scholarship on 
intertextuality in Sebald’s work and on literary influences, to my knowledge only Cosgrave has 
critically examined Sebald’s Hildesheimer text and firmly established the connection between the two 
authors. This is surprising: Sebald scholars such as Franz Loquai, editor of the first collection of texts 
on Sebald in 1997, and Jonathan J. Long, author of an exceptional monograph on Sebald and editor of 
the Sebald Companion, are among the few scholars who have recently contributed to the critical 
reception of Hildesheimer’s work, and who therefore distinguish themselves from the vast majority of 
German studies scholars by having published on both authors. More interesting is, of course, Sebald’s 
own engagement with Hildesheimer in the “Trauer” text. It is curious that Sebald’s interpreters, who 
frequently emphasize the Freudian concepts of melancholia and mourning, have not yet sufficiently 
accounted for Sebald’s essay and have consequently overlooked what Cosgrove—and I—find to be a 
striking similarity of the themes the two authors address, and of the melancholy style in which they 
pursue these topics. Cf. Franz Loquai, ed., W. G. Sebald (Eggingen: Isele, 1997); Franz Loquai, "Auf 
der Suche nach Weite. Zur Prosa Wolfgang Hildesheimers," Text + Kritik 89/90 (1986), 45-63; 
Jonathan J. Long and Anne Whitehead, eds., W. G. Sebald. A Critical Companion (Seattle: University 
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In Sebald’s need to identify with the victim to account for the past, Cosgrove 
detects a tendency that, she argues, he shares with the psychoanalytically influenced 
branch of trauma theory that interprets all of history as continuous trauma.186 
Likewise, melancholia marks for Sebald a transhistorical register that, while it sets out 
to explore the past, defies historical explanation. In melancholia and trauma—and here 
Cosgrove relies on Dominick LaCapra’s critique of the transhistorical understanding 
of trauma—identifiable loss is presented as unidentifiable absence. According to 
Freud, only an identifiable loss can be mourned. If the lost object remains unknown, 
the process of mourning is hindered by pathological melancholia. LaCapra warns 
against positing a loss that occurred in a concrete historical setting (such as the 
Holocaust) as absence, i.e., as being transhistorical or lying outside historical tenses 
(past, present, future).187 “When absence and loss are conflated,” LaCapra continues, 
“melancholic paralysis (…) may set in.” His concern is that the melancholic response 
to absence leads to the generalization of a historical loss and invites everyone to 
identify as victim in the context in which all history is trauma.188 This constellation 
does not allow for the process of working through the past but makes mourning 
impossible and transmutes it into “endless melancholy.”189 It also blurs the distinction 
between victims, perpetrators and bystanders, but as LaCapra emphasizes, “victim” is 
not a psychological, but “a social, political, and ethical category.”190 It is therefore of 
                                                
of Washington Press, 2004); Jonathan J. Long, W. G. Sebald. Image, Archive, Modernity (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2007); Long, "Time and Narrative"; Long, "Power, Desire."  
186 The most prominent proponent of this branch is Cathy Caruth, who conceives all of history as 
trauma. Cf. ch. 1, Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience. Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore, 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). For a critical examination of trauma theory, cf. Ruth 
Leys, Trauma. A Genealogy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). For an exploration of 
trauma as history within the context of literature, cf. Sigrid Weigel, "Télescopage im Unbewußten. Zum 
Verhältnis von Trauma, Geschichtsbegriff und Literatur," in Trauma. Zwischen Psychoanalyse und 
kulturellem Deutungsmuster, ed. Elisabeth Bronfen, et al. (Cologne, Weimar, Vienna: Böhlau, 1999), 
51-76. 
187 LaCapra, "Trauma, Absence, Loss," 48f. 
188 Ibid., 64. 
189 Ibid., 46. 
190 Ibid., 79. 
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utmost importance to insist on this distinction. Whereas victims of historical trauma 
may relive traumatic events and thus be hindered from acting responsibly in the 
present, melancholic identification as such, in which one is possessed by the past, is 
not an ethically responsible position.  
In Sebald’s essay on Grass and Hildesheimer, Cosgrove identifies Sebald’s 
historical attitude as it “communicates a preference for the transhistorical register, 
history as melancholy apathy, and an interesting identification (…) with the Jewish 
victims of the Holocaust.”191 She explains Sebald’s preference for Hildesheimer by 
pointing to the older author’s “tendency towards abstraction which effects the 
reduction of historical time to a melancholy present,” a practice that Sebald too 
employed in his writing.192 It is not important here to reiterate Cosgrove’s argument in 
favor of Grass, but her final conclusion is valid and deserves emphasis: while she 
defends the melancholy position on the past “on the level of subjective experience,” 
she warns against turning it into a normative framework for understanding history.193 
If Sebald indeed drew on Hildesheimer’s example to formulate guidelines on how to 
write about Jewish suffering and to mourn victims of genocide—this is essentially 
Cosgrove’s argument—his reading of Tynset and the set of recommendations that 
consequently emerged ought not be confused with Hildesheimer’s intention.  
LaCapra and Cosgrove show the limits of melancholia as a transhistorical 
category. While Flatley, Kazanjian, and Eng postulate melancholia as creative 
productivity for political life, as transhistorical register it promotes socio-political 
paralysis. The work of melancholia, as opposed to the work of mourning, does not 
necessarily allow for working through, and while Kazanjian and Eng discover therein 
the potential to continuously negotiate a connection between past and present, endless 
                                                
191 Cosgrove, "Melancholy Competitions," 221. 
192 Ibid., 225. 
193 Ibid., 232. 
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melancholia threatens to empty the future of meaning: endless melancholia does not 
enable socio-political action, as they argue, through a permanent relationship to the 
past; instead they are opposites. Melancholia obstructs the path into the future. 
In the two public statements regarding the function of literature that he made 
(in The Frankfurt Lectures, 1967, and “The End of Fiction,” 1975), discussed in the 
next chapter, Hildesheimer emphasizes that literature does not aim to change society. 
He does not engage in his melancholy writing style for the sake of socio-political 
action, nor is he an uninvolved onlooker either. Far from it: Hildesheimer’s political 
position underwent a process of radicalization throughout the sixties and seventies that 
was motivated by his own experience as Jewish writer in West Germany. This 
politicization found resonance in his work, and it is in the context of Tynset that 
Hildesheimer emerges as politically engaged writer, without, however, proclaiming 
that literature can bring about change. Finally it is with Masante that Hildesheimer 
draws his own conclusion as to the function of literature, and as a consequence he 
leaves the literary scene (almost) altogether.
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CHAPTER III 
 
“Niederschreiben um abzustreifen”:
1
  
Wolfgang Hildesheimer’s Masante 
 
Tynset earned Hildesheimer a reputation “als ernstzunehmender Autor.”2 More than 
one hundred and thirty reviews, published in every major newspaper and magazine, 
discussed Tynset. As the examples of Reinhard Baumgart’s and Peter Horst 
Neumann’s reviews have shown, many of the early reviewers assessed Tynset 
negatively, belittling it as covering well-trodden ground and taking a limited view that 
saw its plot as merely the tale of an insomniac recounting memories that have no 
bearing on the reader.3 Other reviews, in which Tynset is discussed quite positively for 
its style and which helped Hildesheimer achieve some popularity, paradoxically factor 
out the book’s main theme altogether. Stephan Braese thus concludes that the 
thematization of the Nazi past was placed under a strict taboo in these positive reviews 
and that praise for the book was limited to those aspects of the text unrelated to 
Hildesheimer’s Entsetzlichem.4 Crucial exceptions were reviews by Walter Jens and 
Hilde Domin. Jens, whose repeated mention of his own friendship with Hildesheimer 
almost amounts to an apology for addressing the author’s concern with the Nazi past, 
calls Tynset “klassische Prosa” that, despite a timeless aesthetic gained from 
“melancholischen Geschichten, mit denen der homo nocturnus sich seiner Lage 
                                                
1 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Masante, in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden, 
Bd. II, Monologische Prosa, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1991), 155-366, here 348. I am indebted to Braese’s work reconstructing Hildesheimer’s 
experience as Jewish writer in West Germany, and in this chapter I draw heavily on his research, cf. 
Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 365-428. 
2 Jehle, Werkgeschichte, 88. 
3 For the reception of Tynset, cf. Patricia Haas Stanley, Wolfgang Hildesheimer and His Critics 
(Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1993), 18-31. 
4 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 306. 
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versichert,” includes “das Porträt eines Saturniers im Auschwitz-Jahrhundert.”5 While 
Jens is “[g]ern bereit, [s]ich widerlegen zu lassen,” he recommends several of Tynset’s 
passages—those describing the murderer Kabasta, the labyrinthine Wilhelmstadt, and 
the “Traktat über Namen und Nasen”—for inclusion in German schoolbooks to show 
students, “wie man anno 65 deutsche Prosa schreibt.”6 Entsetzliches hovers 
underneath these passages, and while this kind of prose is in fact not exemplary of 
what was written in 1965, Jens wishes that it were. What Jens truly celebrates is the 
way Hildesheimer connected the black—that is, melancholic—“Erfahrungsbericht 
eines Menschen” with “der distanzierenden Heiterkeit des Fiktiven,” thereby pointing 
to the balance of Haupt- and Nebenthemen. He shows in his review of Tynset, as 
Braese writes,  
 
wie erinnerndes Schreiben eines jüdischen Schriftstellers deutscher 
Sprache “nach Auschwitz” unter Einschluss eines Blickes auf die 
Verbrechen gewürdigt werden kann, ohne sich weder „unbewältigter 
Gegenwart“ noch dem Nachleben der NS-Verbrechen als konkreter 
Konstituante dieses Schreiben aussetzen zu müssen.7 
 
In his review Jens demonstrated how to honor Hildesheimer as a Jewish writer who 
wrote about the Nazi crimes without limiting himself to Holocaust fiction. With this 
assessment Jens released Hildesheimer from the status to which he had been relegated 
by Baumgart and Neumann, who accused him of writing only about what is so 
“annoyingly well known.” Jens did not, however, avoid acknowledging the 
thematization of the genocide, as other positive reviewers of Tynset did.8 More 
                                                
5 Walter Jens, "Ein Ausgelieferter übertönt die Nacht," in Über Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk 
Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971) 121-27, here 126, 124, 126. (Originally written for Die Zeit, 
March 19, 1965.) 
6 Ibid., 126. 
7 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 307. 
8 In yet another set of reviews references to the Nazi past are acknowledged; however, these references 
are interpreted as if they stood for a general concern for the past that is shared by all. Wiegenstein, who 
stood in close connection to Group 47, presents in his 1965 review for Frankfurter Hefte (May 1965) 
the “Phobie (…), dass die Mörder noch unter uns leben” positively because it is not “dick aufgetragen” 
and “wird (…) nie zum Hauptthema.” The reading of Tynset as a general memory book blurs the 
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significant is Domin’s review, in which the Jewish poet, herself an emigrant and 
returnee, acknowledges Tynset’s narrator as a victim of Nazi persecution who suffers 
from “[dem] immer noch umgehende[n] Grauen jener zwölf Jahre.”9 Despite the time 
that has passed since 1945, the narrator remains  
 
ein(es) aus dem Zentrum verstoßene[r] Zeitgenosse(n). Großen Wert 
lege ich auf das Wort „Zeitgenosse.” Dies [=Tynset] ist, versponnen 
und abseitig, wie es scheinen mag, eines der zeitgenössischsten Bücher 
der ganzen deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur. Das Politische daran ist 
durch so viele Erfahrungen hindurchgefiltert, dass es immer da ist, doch 
zugleich nicht da ist, uns plötzlich anspringt und sich dann wieder 
verbirgt.10 
 
Domin marks the contemporaneity of the book by relating it to debates surrounding 
the statute of limitations: on March 10, almost simultaneous with the publication of 
Tynset, the German Bundestag lifted the statute of limitations for murder and 
introduced a separate category of genocide so as to continue prosecuting Nazi 
murderers. The debate reached its highpoint when Christian Democrat Ernst Benda, 
who had previously favored extending the statute of limitations from twenty to thirty 
years, changed his mind and sided with the Social Democrats, advocating abolishment 
of the statute altogether. Domin reads Hildesheimer’s Tynset, in particular the episodes 
in which the narrator telephones former Nazis urging them to flee, claiming that their 
secret pasts have been disclosed, as a sentiment Benda originally articulated in the 
                                                
distinction between who is remembering; for Wiegenstein, who points out “unser 
Erinnerungsvermögen, unsere Schlaflosigkeit,” the difference between perpetrator and victim is non-
existent. Roland H. Wiegenstein, "Nacht ohne Schlaf," in Über Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk 
Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 127-33, here 132. Schäble’s review is similar, cf. Schäble, 
"Hamlets unmögliche Rache." Heißenbüttel acknowledges that the narrator comes from “Judengasse” 
but adds that this “kurze mögliche Bezugszipfelchen” is too elusive to base the interpretation of the 
book on; after all, the narrator’s Jewish heritage—and, connected with it, his history of persecution—
could be “Täuschung,”  Helmut Heißenbüttel, "Nur Erfindung, nur Täuschung?," in Über Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 118-21, here 119. 
9 Domin, "Denk ich an Deutschland," 124. 
10 Ibid. 
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Bundestag by proclaiming: “Ich mag keinen Mörder zum Nachbarn.”11 Tynset is 
Hildesheimer’s poetic expression of the same sentiment, and therein, Domin argues, 
lies its political message.12 In an environment where the public generally eschewed 
engagement with the Nazi past and Vergangenheitsbewältigung was practiced 
primarily within a judicial framework and in the context of foreign relations, I assign 
political power to Hildesheimer’s public confrontation with this past as evidenced in 
Tynset and other works discussed in this chapter. By political I mean a concern with 
and an involvement in public life as it relates to questions of the polis, that is, the 
political community, and to processes by which groups and individuals negotiate their 
public interests so that they may be realized. In Germany of the 1950s and 1960s 
public references to the Holocaust by a Jewish minority living in Germany or, as is the 
case for Hildesheimer, writing for a German audience, must be considered as having 
political significance.     
 With this chapter I turn attention to Hildesheimer’s development from an 
author perceived as harmless by the Literaturbetrieb to the author of Masante, his 
most political prose work and the final product of his career as prose writer. His 
subsequent decision to stop writing was ultimately consistent with his conviction that 
after Auschwitz writing fiction had become impossible, a conviction he articulated in 
reference to Adorno’s famous words regarding poetry after Auschwitz. 
 
 
                                                
11 Qtd. in: Domin, "Denk ich an Deutschland," 127. 
12 On the topic of the 1965 debate on the statute of limitations, Hildesheimer expressed his deep concern 
succinctly: “Das Verjähren dieser [Verbrechen] am 8. Mai 1965 ist eine Schande—ich kann es noch gar 
nicht glauben, bis es soweit ist—und ich bin fest überzeugt, dass es sich bitter rächen wird. Denn es ist 
noch gar nicht abzusehen, wer da aus seinem Schlupfloch wieder hervorkommt. Es wird sich 
herausstellen, dass es noch unzählige kleine und große Eichmänner und Eiseles gibt. Aber dann ist es zu 
spät,” Simon Wiesenthal, ed. Verjährung? 200 Persönlichkeiten des öffentlichen Lebens sagen nein. 
Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt/M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt,1965), 76f. 
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The Radicalization of Hildesheimer’s Political Melancholia 
Despite the mixed reception of Tynset—blunt criticism, on the one hand, and 
appreciation that ignored central issues in the novel, on the other hand—Hildesheimer 
received two prestigious literary prizes, an event which by itself was controversial and 
created another flood of newspaper articles. In January 1966 Hildesheimer accepted 
the Bremen Literary Prize of the Rudolf Alexander Schröder Foundation, and in 
October of the same year the Georg Büchner Prize, awarded by the German Academy 
of Language and Poetry. At the award ceremonies Hildesheimer gave speeches 
concerning politics and melancholia, respectively, the two issues that underlie Tynset 
as a whole.13 Both speeches are worth examining, for they are rare examples in which 
Hildesheimer directly references the German political culture of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung and melancholia. 
 
Bremen Literary Prize 
Hildesheimer, known as a polite member of Group 47,14 uses the Bremen 
speech as a platform to polemicize against the insincerity of West German politicians 
whose revisionist rhetoric drives German democracy “dorthin, wo der Faschismus auf 
uns wartet, um uns wieder aufzunehmen.”15 His speech also sets out to contradict the 
reception of Tynset as a book in which the Nazi past has no significance. Hildesheimer 
rigorously, and for the first time publicly, addresses with this speech the continued 
threat of the past, doing so because he cannot “die Gelegenheit zu einer öffentlichen 
Ansprache ungenutzt vorbeiziehen (…) lassen”: to do so would be an act 
                                                
13 Cf. Jehle, Werkgeschichte, 90. 
14 Cf. Wolfdietrich Schnurre, "Seismographen waren sie nicht," in Die Gruppe 47. Bericht--Kritik--
Polemik, ed. Reinhard Lettau (Neuwied, Berlin: Luchterhand, 1967), 159-63, here 160. Qtd. in: Braese, 
Die andere Erinnerung, 233. 
15 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Zur Verleihung des Bremer Literaturpreises," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 
Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII, Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig 
and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 27-30, here 29. 
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“lebensfremden Leichtsinns” (29, emphasis mine). Giving voice to his objections is 
arguably a matter of life and death.   
With the opening lines of his speech Hildesheimer thematizes both the past, by 
referring to Hitler, and the present, by emphasizing that the past has not yet been 
worked through. After acknowledging the financial part of the award, he says: 
 
Mehr als dies [=das Geldgeschenk] freut mich die Anerkennung meiner 
Arbeit durch Vertreter einer Stadt, die sich einer guten Vergangenheit 
rühmen darf. Mit Vergangenheit meine ich hier nicht die hanseatische, 
sondern vielmehr jene Vergangenheit, die man noch immer als „die 
jüngste“ bezeichnet, obgleich sie ziemlich alt ist, wenn auch leider noch 
nicht vom Tode durch Bewältigung gezeichnet. Hier in dieser Stadt 
aber hat sich Hitler nicht wohlgefühlt, und er hat sie daher kaum 
besucht. Möge der Glanz einer solcher Abwesenheit niemals stumpf 
werden. (27) 
 
The polite gesture of praising his host city clashes with the content of Hildesheimer’s 
praise. He does not indulge in such clichés as remarking upon the city’s beauty or 
hospitality, or celebrating Hanseatic history. Instead, Hildesheimer defines Bremen’s 
outstanding feature via a negative, as an absence: he appreciates Bremen because 
Hitler had not appreciated it; Bremen has a good, even shining past because Hitler 
rarely spent time there. No one can take credit when receiving such praise, least of all 
politicians, to whom Hildesheimer turns after this first mention of the Nazi past. He 
points more generally, and perhaps in reference to chancellor Ludwig Erhard’s 
disparaging remark of writers as pinschers (a breed of fighting dog)16 to the fact that 
                                                
16 In the 1965 publication, Plädoyer für eine neue Regierung. Keine Alternative, twenty-five German-
speaking authors took up on the 1961 manifesto Die Alternative. Brauchen wir eine neue Regierung?, 
in which authors had questioned Christian Democrat leadership and suggested a different course in 
politics. In the 1965 collection, authors directly demanded a change in leadership and spoke (albeit not 
univocally) in support of the Social Democrats. In response to Plädoyer, chancellor Erhard (CDU) 
accused the authors of “Intellektualismus, der in Idiotie umschlägt.” To Rolf Hochmuth’s criticism of 
his government, Erhard responded, in a public speech, as follows: “Da hört bei mir der Dichter auf, und 
es fängt der ganz kleine Pinscher an, der in dümmster Weise kläfft.” Out of solidarity to those authors 
who took a critical stance vis-à-vis West Germany’s government, Hildesheimer referred to himself as 
“Pinscher.” Hans Werner Richter, ed. Plädoyer für eine neue Regierung oder Keine Alternative 
(Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rororo, 1965); Martin Walser, ed. Die Alternative oder Brauchen wie eine neue 
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politicians and writers do not share a common language. Where writers like himself 
“ein wenig tiefer an der Wurzel ansetzen [wollen] und (…) von moralischen 
Grundlagen der Politik [sprechen],” politicans remain on the surface, primarily 
because the moral foundation of politics is “den regierenden Politikern bei uns wenig 
geläufig, weil es sie nicht interessiert, weil es ihnen als wirklichkeitsfremd erscheint” 
(27).17 Instead of humbly accepting the moral responsibility that accompanies political 
office, politicians settle into a moral “Hohlraum” from which they speak 
 
bestürzende Banalität, wenn nicht gar die kläglische Floskel, 
bedenkenlos oder zynisch angewandet. Nur nach unten reicht die Skala 
weit. Hinab nämlich zur dumpfen und militanten Lautmalerei, dorthin, 
wo der Affekt des Unbelehrbaren sein widerliches Wesen treibt, wo 
jedes Wort der Vernunft als Zumutung zurückgwiesen wird. (28) 
 
While Hildesheimer does not directly say so, perhaps he associates anti-Semitism with 
the affect of the uneducable, as he warns against the contemporary reactionary who 
carries “beängstige [sic] Züge dessen, was er vor einem Vierteljahrhundert einmal 
war” and whose dreams quickly became “Forderung, [und] aus ihr Wirklichkeit” (28). 
The politician’s moral void is positioned on the right: “Die rechte Position wird 
soeben eingenommen, und zwar von uns. So will es unsere Politik” (29). By 
extension, the West German public’s values also slant in this direction, towards the 
edge of a void. 
 
 
                                                
Regierung? (Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rororo,1961). Cf. N. N., "Im Stil der Zeit," Der Spiegel 19, no. 30 
(1965), 17-18; Hildesheimer, "Zur Verleihung des Bremer Literaturpreises," 29. 
17 From the examples Hildesheimer lists it is clear that he does not only refer to political office holders 
but also to high-ranking clergymen who articulate their political opinions publicly: their opinions 
regarding the corrupt one-party system of Portugal, which was viewed positively, and the Soviet 
population, which was dismissed with a comparison to degenerate dogs, “fallen wie faule Äpfel. Die 
eine [Meinung] ist die eines Ministers, die andere die eines Kardinals. (Beide heißen übrigens Jaeger, 
aber daran—wenigstens!—sind sie schuldlos.)” Hildesheimer, "Zur Verleihung des Bremer 
Literaturpreises," 29. Hildesheimer refers to justice minister Richard Jaeger, former member of the SA 
and, after 1945, prominent CSU politician, and cardinal Lorenz Jaeger.  
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The Second Emigration 
When Hildesheimer speaks of “our politics,” he refers to German politics. In 
1965 Hildesheimer was, once again, a citizen of Germany. In Braese’s account, no 
other German-speaking Jewish author tried as hard as Hildesheimer did to enter the 
West German literary scene and become a successful German postwar author.18 When 
he first arrived in Nuremberg, his letters to his parents in Palestine were quite critical 
of the German population, whose only response to the war and the genocide 
Hildesheimer perceived as self-pity wholly overshadowing any sense of 
responsibility.19 While he adopted a “policy of non-cooperation and disinterest” in his 
dealings with German civilians,20 in 1949 he had already written his parents that 
Germans were “vielleicht nicht zum groessten aber doch zum grossen Teil 
schuldlos.”21 His involvement with Group 47 played a significant role in his decision 
to remain in Germany, a decision that his parents worriedly anticipated and attempted 
to influence. Knowing their concern, Hildesheimer wrote in 1951, before his first 
participation in a Group 47 meeting: 
 
Ich war wahrscheinlich noch nie so ereignisbewusst wie jetzt und ich 
bin mir auch völlig klar darüber, was in Deutschland passieren kann, 
wenn es die anständig denkenden Intellektuellen  nicht verhindern. (...) 
[I]ch gedenke, ein Jude zu bleiben. Ich kann nicht leugnen, dass ich 
erwogen habe, hier zu bleiben, denn ich bin hier sehr glücklich, weil ich 
gewissermaßen hierher gehöre. Dass ich hier bleiben werde glaube ich 
nicht, aber ich bin noch nicht ganz entschlossen. Ich gedenke mich 
nächstens mit Herrn v. Cube, Dirks, Guggenheimer darüber zu 
unterhalten, außerdem mit den Schriftstellern der „Gruppe 47“ die die 
maßgebendsten—und wirklichkeitsnächsten—Schriftsteller 
Deutschlands sind, und die mich eingeladen haben, bei ihnen zu lesen 
wonach ich wahrscheinlich in die Gruppe aufgenommen werde.22  
                                                
18 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 236. 
19 Hildesheimer, letter to Arnold and Hanna Hildesheimer, March 3, 1947, WHA 456. 
20 July 26, 1949, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 22. 
21 Hildesheimer, letter to Arnold and Hanna Hildesheimer, September 15, 1949, WHA 456, qtd. in: 
Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 238. 
22 Hildesheimer, letter to Arnold and Hanna Hildesheimer, no date [early 1951], WHA 456, qtd. in: ibid.  
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Hildesheimer here connects his decision to stay in Germany with the success of Group 
47—his success within it as well as the group’s dynamics in general. Knowing the 
dynamics within the group—Hans Werner Richter’s insistence, for instance, on 
wartime Erlebnis as central category for postwar literature—one might guess that 
Hildesheimer’s participation in the Dürkheim meeting in 1951 might have convinced 
him not to seek membership.23 However, it was this meeting, which Hildesheimer 
described as international and inclusive of Jews and therefore not with “nationale[m] 
Charakter” or anti-Semitic, as his parents had feared, that helped him reach a decision: 
“Ich werde wohl hierbleiben, das bedeutet nicht, dass ich mir der Gefahren nicht 
bewusst bin.”24 After he told his parents that he had accepted the invitation to 
contribute short essays on contemporary literature for Richter’s publication Die 
Literatur,25 they were even more alarmed and questioned Hildesheimer’s role in 
managing German “Kulturgut,” referring to a 1912 essay by Mortiz Goldstein in 
which the Jewish literary critic had defined the work of Jewish Germanists as the 
administration of “den geistigen Besitz eines Volkes, das uns die Berechtigung und die 
Fähigkeit dazu abspricht.”26 In Hildesheimer’s response to his parents, in which he 
defends his first article for Die Literatur, an essay critical of popular German authors 
Waldemar Bonsels and Ernst Wiechert that his father had urged him to withdraw, he 
defines his position as a German-speaking Jewish writer: 
 
[I]ch „verwalte kein Kulturgut“ indem ich einen solchen Aufsatz 
schreibe. Von „Verwalten“ kann nicht die Rede sein. Wohl aber tue ich 
                                                
23 For an excellent discussion of Hildesheimer’s role in Group 47, cf. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 
236-52. 
24 Hildesheimer, letter to Arnold and Hanna Hildesheimer, May 30, 1951, WHA 456, qut. in: ibid., 241. 
25 Die Literatur: Blätter für Literatur, Film, Funk und Bühne was edited by Hans Werner Richter and 
appeared twice a month from March 15 to November 1, 1952. Hildesheimer contributed ten articles, 
reprinted in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Mit dem Bausch dem Bogen. Zehn Glossen mit einer Grafik, ed. 
Volker Jehle (Warmbronn: Keicher, 1990). 
26 Moritz Goldstein, "Deutsch-jüdischer Parnaß," Der Kunstwart 25, no. 11 (1912): 281-94, here 283. 
Qtd. in: Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 242. 
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etwas, zu dem mich diejenigen, die ich als kulturelle Vertreter der 
Nation anerkenne, aufgefordert haben. (...) Ich bin kein Literaturkritiker 
(obwohl ich einer sein könnte). Ich schreibe eine satirische Spalte in 
einer Literaturzeitschrift, in welcher ich mich mit einem Metier befasse, 
das ich selbst zu beherrschen glaube. Außerdem schreibe ich 
Geschichten und einen Roman, der ebenso, wie alles, was ich angreife, 
angegriffen werden kann. (...) Ich glaube, Ihr seht das alles heute etwas 
verzerrt, in einer Art jüdischen Selbsthass mit umgekehrten 
Vorzeichen. (...) [Ich bin kein politischer Publizist.] Bei mir geht es in 
erster Linie um ästhetische Dinge, weshalb auch die Tatsache, dass ich 
ein aus Palästina zurückgekehrter Jude bin, kein Argument ist. Ich 
kritisiere als Schriftsteller, der der deutschen Sprache mächtig ist, 
diejenigen[,] die sie missbrauchen. (...) Ein stichhaltiges Argument 
dagegen ist, dass man in solchen Artikeln den Geist ja nicht ändert, 
denn den wird es immer geben. Das ist zwar richtig, aber man versucht 
es eben trotzdem: wenn man nicht trotz Allem versucht bestehende 
Missstände zu bessern—eine der wesentlichen Aufgaben der 
Literatur—dann könnte man sich ebenso gut aufhängen.27  
 
Hildesheimer not only identifies as a German author to whom his Jewishness, at least 
as expressed here, is of little meaning in writing for the West German Literaturbetrieb, 
but he also defines the role of literature. Even though he is not a political publicist by 
his own assessment but is concerned primarily with aesthetics, he considers, in 1952, 
one of the primary functions of all literature, including his own, to be political. The 
role of literature is to try to remedy existing shortcomings, and as a German author it 
is his duty to address them. He invokes the tradition of using art as means of political 
enlightenment, with which his parents essentially agree, but in order to give his 
argument for his involvement in Group 47 more weight, he must furthermore prove 
that the cultural sphere of postwar Germany is not, like Goldstein’s Germany, anti-
Semitic. He points to the inclusiveness of the group by drawing on the three 1952 
candidates for the Group 47 prize, two of whom are Jewish: himself and Ilse 
Aichinger.28 That he and Aichinger are considered for the award is evidence of the 
                                                
27 February 4, 1952, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 29f. 
28 Ibid., 30. 
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quality of their work, he argues, and not, as his parents seem to suggest, an indication 
“dafür, dass sich die Juden wieder in das deutsche Kulturleben zwängen.”29 Were his 
parents to respond affirmatively to his rhetorical question as to whether he or 
Aichinger should, if chosen, reject the prize because of their Jewishness, it would 
show that there is a categorical and exclusive difference between Germans and Jews, a 
difference Hildesheimer knows that his parents do not insist on per se. Hildesheimer 
thus argues in this letter for his fundamental right to want to remain in Germany, even 
if he is motivated less by the desire to be German in any general sense than to be part 
of Group 47 and the German Literaturbetrieb.  
 Despite Hildesheimer’s momentary definition of literature as an attempt to 
remedy abuse, his work during the fifties was hardly received as political. Rather than 
directly confronting the horrors of the Nazi past, he wrote absurd, satirical prose and 
plays that scrutinized the world of artists and the consumer-oriented society during the 
early economic miracle. Richter remembered that Hildesheimer, with his “Humor und 
seine[r] (…) satirische[n] Art” promised a welcome “Erfrischung in der zu Ende 
gehenden ‘Kahlschlagperiode,’”30 attesting to Richter’s misguided understanding of 
early postwar literature as serious confrontation with the past and praising 
Hildesheimer’s work as a turn towards lighter, more entertaining topics. Only abroad 
did Lieblose Legenden, Hildesheimer’s successful book debut (1952), provoke interest 
in the author’s background, for instance, when Dutch critic Adriaan Morriën 
commented that fortunately not even genocide had entirely eliminated Jewish humor 
in German literature.31 Although Walter Jens and W. E. Süskind cautiously connected 
Lieblose Legenden and Hildesheimer’s 1953 novel Paradies der falschen Vögel, to a 
                                                
29 Ibid., 31. 
30 Hans Werner Richter, Im Etablissement der Schmetterlinge. Einundzwanzig Portraits aus der Gruppe 
47 (Munich: Hanser, 1986), 141. 
31 Adriaan Morriën, "Die Satire kehrt in die deutsche Literatur zurück," in Über Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 83-85. 
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narrative tradition no longer present in Germany,32 his prose became synonymous with 
harmless entertainment:33 “Hildesheimer tut nicht weh. Mit gewissen, immer 
wiederkehrenden wehmütigen und resignierten Handbewegungen bietet er in seiner 
sehr komprimierten Prosa zeitgenössisches Leben an.”34 Hildesheimer thus met the 
wishes and expectations of the West German reading public: his prose was satirical, 
absurd, funny, and altogether harmless—at least if read superficially.35  
 Braese carefully reconstructs the events that lead to fissures in Hildesheimer’s 
relationship to Group 47. In response to Fritz J. Raddatz’ request, during the group’s 
1955 meeting, that Hildesheimer not write exclusively “Luxus-Hotel-Persiflagen,” the 
Jewish author replied that he was missing “das innere Erlebnis der Nazizeit” necessary 
to write serious literature. The reaction of the group, which included Richter, Böll, 
Kaiser, Walser, Grass, and Heißenbüttel, but also Aichinger and Bachmann, was 
laughter: “Man ‘lachte (…), aber nicht böse,’ und ‘[sagte] nur: Seien Sie froh!’”36 As 
Braese concludes, ten years after the war and four years after Hildesheimer joined the 
group, the sine qua non of belonging remained the wartime Erlebnis that superseded 
any concern for how those not directly involved in warfare as German soldiers had 
experienced the Nazi regime. Instead of such curiosity “tritt verräterisch die 
vermeintliche Gewissheit eines deutlichen Vorsprungs an Leiden (‘Seien Sie froh!’).” 
                                                
32 Walter Jens, "Altväterliche Betrachtung," in Über Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk Rodewald 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 81-83; W. E. Süskind, "Paradies der falschen Vögel," in Über 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Dierk Rodewald (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1971), 86-88. 
33 This is one of Braese’s main points of criticism regarding the reception of Jewish-German literature 
in West Germany in general, cf. Braese, Andere Erinnerung. 
34 Karl Krolow, "Mit Anmut modern," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1989), 156.  
35 Lea shows in his reading of Hildesheimer that the theme of prosecution was omnipresent in his early 
prose. Lea, Wolfgang Hildesheimers Weg, e.g., 95-104, 59-82. For a concrete example see Braese’s 
illuminating discussion of “Kleines Reisetagebuch um Robert Neumann,” in which Hildesheimer refers 
directly to the murder of the Jews of Salonika, Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 252ff. Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, "Kleines Reisetagebuch um Robert Neumann," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte 
Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII, Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker 
Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 570-72.  
36 Qtd. in: Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 251. 
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Braese continues: “Das kennzeichnende Wir-Gefühl der Gruppe—exklusiv gegenüber 
jedem, der ein anderes hatte—war unerschüttert.”37 Hildesheimer was quite aware of 
the gulf between Jewish and non-Jewish participants in the group, a perception to 
which a letter to Paul Celan attests. Celan had previously acknowledged to 
Hildesheimer that Group 47 considered him (Celan) an “Überempfindlichen” and “an 
Verfolgungswahn Leidenden.” In the same letter he appealed to Hildesheimer to take 
seriously his “Pflicht (…), Hitlerei nicht stillschweigend hinzunehmen,” regardless of 
the “Spielregeln des Literaturbetriebs” to dismiss unpleasant references to the past as 
“(jüdische(n)…) Überempfindlichkeit.”38 In his response letter, Hildesheimer 
expressly sides with Celan as a Jewish writer: “Es wäre mir unerträglich, wenn Sie 
auch mich zu den indolenten oder gar den ‘Anderen’ zählen wollten.”39 He 
emphasizes that he is not one of the others—that is, not one of the German rule 
makers—but belongs to those accused of Jewish hypersensitivity. He is, as Celan 
writes in response, one of the “unhappy few [sic]”: both men “haben (…) den neuen 
und alten Verfinsterungen nichts entgegenzusetzen als unsere Freundschaft und 
Solidarität.”40 When Hildesheimer tests how the “others” in Group 47 react to the later 
prose pieces of Lieblose Legenden, added to the 1962 edition but written in the mid- to 
late fifties, which were meant “aufhorchen zu lassen,”41 he discovers that no one 
bothers to listen. 
 Disillusioned with Group 47 and, as he later admits, with life in postwar 
Germany, Hildesheimer emigrates a second time in 1957, thereby declaring his 
                                                
37 Ibid., 252. 
38 Parenthesis and ellipsis in the original. December 23, 1959, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 98. 
39 December 27, 1959, ibid., 99. 
40 January 2, 1960, ibid., 100. Hildesheimer agrees with Celan in his reply, emphazing again their 
“Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl,” January 5, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 101. 
41 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Zu den Lieblosen Legenden," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte 
Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. I, Erzählende Prosa, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 506-07, here 507. 
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remigration failed. Although Hildesheimer names most frequently his and his wife’s 
health issues as reason to move to the more Southern climate of Poschiavo,42 Grisons, 
and though his letters to his mother and his sister reveal no overt disappointment with 
German society per se, retrospectively Hildesheimer takes a clear stance against the 
German mindset in which, as he famously formulated in 1967, “die Dimension 
Auschwitz (…) nicht enthalten ist.”43 In 1962, following the invitation of Hermann 
Kesten to contribute to the collection Ich lebe nicht in der Bundesrepublik, 
Hildesheimer composes a document, “Die vier Hauptgründe, warum ich nicht in der 
Bundesrepublik lebe,” which, although he withdrew it for publication, is perhaps one 
of the essential texts for understanding postwar German-Jewish identity.44 
 “Ich bin Jud [sic]. Zwei Drittel aller Deutschen sind Antisemiten. Sie waren es 
immer und werden es immer bleiben” is the one passage from Hildesheimer’s text that 
made it into print in 1964 and was later quoted by Marcel Reich-Ranicki in his study 
on Jews in German literature.45 This is the first reason why Hildesheimer does not live 
                                                
42 Cf. Hildesheimer’s statement in an 1982 interview: “Ich bin dann auch nicht emigriert, sondern meine 
Frau und ich suchten einfach, und zwar systematisch, einen Wohnsitz südlich der Alpen, weil wir als 
Rheumatiker nördlich der Alpen, in Bayern, wo wir es schön fanden, nicht aushielten. Deshalb sind wir 
nach Poschiavo in Graubünden gezogen. Von einer Emigration, zumindest von einer bewussten 
Emigration, kann eigentlich nicht die Rede sein. Ich fühle mich auch gar nicht als emigriert,” 
Hildesheimer and Kesting, "Ende der Fiktionen," 58. When compared to Peter Weiss and his decision to 
remain in exile, Hildesheimer vehemently denies that he is an emigrant: “Das ist etwas völlig anderes 
und wird immer wieder missverstanden. Peter Weiss war tatsächlich im Exil. (…) Das Exilbewußtsein 
oder Exilgefühl habe ich niemals verspürt,” Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 272. Lea 
argues that Hildesheimer’s refusal to be compared to Weiss stems from his lack of feeling at home 
anywhere in the world: having moved frequently since a child, Lea writes, Hildesheimer has no sense of 
“Heimatgefühl” and therefore experiences no “Exilbewusstsein,” Lea, Hildesheimers Weg, 38. Richter 
is convinced that Hildesheimer did not leave for political reasons: “Er [=Hildesheimer] zog in die 
Schweiz, nicht, weil es ihm in Bayern nicht mehr gefiel, sondern weil er glaubte, seine Frau Sylvia 
[sic], die etwas schwerhörig war, könne dort in Poschiavo besser hören. Es kann aber auch sein, dass es 
die Luftveränderung war, die ihn dazu veranlasste,” Richter, Etablissment der Schmetterlinge, 143.  
43 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte 
Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII, Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker 
Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 43-100, here 57.  
44 The five-page typescript is archived in Berlin (WHA 190). Lacking Silvia Hildesheimer’s permission 
to cite from the unpublished text, I rely on excerpts published by Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 265-
68. Cf. Hermann Kesten, ed. Ich lebe nicht in der Bundesrepublik (Munich: List,1964). 
45 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, Über Ruhestörer. Juden in der deutschen Literatur (Munich: Piper, 1973), 46. 
Reich-Ranicki lists as source Twen 1964:1, n. pag. It is unclear how Hildesheimer’s statement made it 
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in Germany. In the typescript, the passage continues: “Zwar ist den Ergebnissen 
demoskopischer Untersuchungen nach nur die knappe Hälfte, nämlich 463 von 1000 
Befragten ‘betont antisemitisch,’ aber das ist ja auch genug, vor allem, wenn man an 
die vielen Unbetonten denkt.”46 After a concise sketch of different forms anti-
Semitism takes in Germany—in politics and among intellectuals, as a fashionable 
accessory one displays “wie eine Taschenuhr,” or a permanent conviction by which 
“alle Juden ausgerottet werden müssten”—Hildesheimer names the second reason for 
not living in Germany: the “Intoleranz und Engstirnigkeit, (…) Torheit und 
Böswilligkeit, Feigheit und Bigotterie, (…) Mangel an Einsicht und Selbstkritik.”47 
This list is again followed by an enumeration of examples from public life in which 
injustice, intolerance, ignorance, and incompetence meet no resistance except by a 
small minority (including writers), who count for nothing in the German public. 
Hildesheimer cites as his third reason the general apathy “gegenüber allen 
Geschehnissen, die nicht unmittelbar Deutschland angehen,” a plight for which he 
primarily blames the German press, which was provincial and consequently made 
reliance on foreign press necessary. The fourth and final reason is Hildesheimer’s 
membership in the Jewish minority that might suddenly be forced to leave Germany 
again:  
 
Es ist gut, ein Refugium zu haben, in welchem man Mitglieder der 
Minderheit aufnehmen kann, sollten sie sich vielleicht einmal genötigt 
sehen, Deutschland bei Nacht und Nebel zu verlassen. (…) Ich gehöre 
                                                
into Twen; Lea speculates that List, Kesten’s publishing house, included it in an advertisement for the 
book before the book itself went into print and before Hildesheimer withdrew his contribution. Cf. Lea, 
Hildesheimers Weg, 43. Reich-Ranicki had asked Hildesheimer for permission to quote him and to send 
additional statements of Hildesheimer’s regarding his Jewishness. Hildesheimer responded that he had 
“keine Ahnung, um welche Äußerungen es sich handeln mag, aber wenn sie wirklich von mir sind, 
dürfen Sie sie gerne benutzen. Sonstige Äußerungen zu diesem Thema [=Judentum] habe ich nicht—
natürlich sind sie in TYNSET enthalten und werden in meinem nächsten Buch noch zahlreicher und 
schärfer enthalten sein.” Reich-Ranicki, letter to Hildesheimer, September 23, 1969; Hildesheimer, 
letter to Reich-Ranicki, October 4, 1969, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 161, 62. 
46 Qtd. in: Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 265f. 
47 Qtd. in: ibid., 266. 
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nicht zur Mehrheit, die antisemitisch ist, und ich mag nicht zur 
Minderheit gehören, die eine solche Mehrheit in Kauf nimmt. Kurz: ich 
mag nicht dazugehören.48 
 
Hildesheimer identifies directly in opposition with the “others” of whom he spoke in 
his letter to Celan: he is Jewish, and as such he cannot live in Germany. Quite 
suddenly he has adopted the position even his parents were reluctant to take in 1952, 
namely that there is an irreconcilable difference between Jews and Germans, which 
cannot be resolved despite the fact that Hildesheimer continues to consider himself a 
German-speaking writer. This position is incompatible with remaining in Germany. 
Between 1951, the time of his decision to stay in Germany, and 1957, when he 
emigrated to the Italian-speaking part of Switzerland, his interest in “hierzubleiben” 
gave way to his conviction, “nicht dazuzugehören.” During those years he realized 
that those guilty of Nazi crimes or complicit with the Nazi system permeated German 
public life. Prefacing the four reasons why he does not live in Germany, Hildesheimer 
writes: 
 
Als ich 1947 nach Deutschland zurückkehrte, hatte ich in Nürnberg viel 
mit—meist minderen—Kriegsverbrechern zu tun. Die meisten 
behaupteten, bevor die Last des Gegenbeweises sie erdrückte, keine 
Nazis gewesen zu sein. Es waren meist ziemlich unangenehme, oft 
unheimliche, Leute, aber nicht unangenehmer und unheimlicher als 
Viele, die heute im öffentlichen Leben beider Deutschlande eine Rolle 
spielen. Damals aber spielten solche Leute eben noch keine Rolle, 
damals war noch alles in der Schwebe, die Möglichkeit bestand, dass 
alles sich zum Guten wende, und das Gefühl, dass es mit Deutschland 
moralisch aufwärts gehe, war nicht abwegig. (...) [I]ch fühlte mich in 
Deutschland wohl, denn ich huldigte dem Glauben, dass die Schuldigen 
in der Minderheit wären. Heute weiß ich, dass sie in der Mehrheit 
waren: nicht als aktive Mörder, sondern als Untermauerer oder willige 
Mitläufer, als Opportunisten und Nutznießer eines Systems, in dem die 
Mörder eine wichtige Funktion hatten.49 
 
                                                
48 Qtd. in: ibid., 267f. 
49 Qtd. in: ibid., 265. Emphasis mine. 
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This statement summarizes Hildesheimer’s changing position vis-à-vis Germany—
from his cautiously hopeful attitude and his feeling of belonging (which stemmed, as 
shown above, from his affiliation with Group 47) to his utter disillusionment and 
disappointment. The withdrawal of the text from Kesten’s collection ought not to be 
seen as evidence that Hildesheimer developed doubts or that his submission had been 
written hastily and without consideration of its consequences. Kesten acknowledged 
receipt of the document in January 1963;50 Hildesheimer withdrew it ten months later, 
in November, after the book had appeared during neither the spring nor the fall 
publication season. Pressure on chancellor Konrad Adenauer had increased in the 
intervening months due to the Spiegel affair51; in mid-October, Adenauer resigned and 
Erhard followed in office. Hildesheimer explains the withdrawal of his text, one 
month after the reformation of the government, with the hope that Adenauer’s 
resignation meant a change in the political climate: “[E]in anderer Kanzler ist da, dem 
ich gern the benefit of the doubt geben möchte. Die von mir beschriebenen Zustände 
gelten nicht mehr richtig, zwar hat sich nichts gebessert, aber die Lage hat sich doch 
ein wenig geändert. Wahrscheinlich bleibt alles furchtbar, aber man sollte mit seinem 
Urteil noch ein wenig zurückhalten.”52 The withdrawal of the document must be seen 
in the context of the governmental change, not as a change of heart by Hildesheimer. 
In place of Hildesheimer’s contribution Kesten published a letter by an author who 
refused to participate in his project, and though Kesten did not disclose the name, it is 
quite possible that the excerpt comes from Hildesheimer. Kesten wrote:  
 
                                                
50 Kesten, letter to Hildesheimer, January 10, 1963, WHA 503, qtd. in: ibid., 268. 
51 In an 1962 article, the news magazine Der Spiegel questioned the ability of the military to withstand 
an attack and defend West Germany; as result, journalists were arrested by order of defense minister 
Franz Josef Strauß and accused of treason. The instance provoked an enormous outcry among the 
public. Cf. Joachim Schöps, Die Spiegel-Affäre des Franz-Josef Strauß, Spiegel-Buch (Reinbek b. 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983; David Schoenbaum, Ein Abgrund von Landesverrat. Die Affäre um den 
Spiegel (Berlin: Parthas, 2002). 
52 November 16, 1963, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 122, 24. 
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„Weggezogen,“ schreibt ein Autor, der nach dem Kriege aus der 
Emigration zunächst in die Bundesrepublik zurückgekehrt war, 
„weggezogen sind wir, weil uns das (meteorologische) Klima in Bayern 
nicht mehr gefiel. Es war uns zu feucht. Dass uns nun das Klima in 
weiteren Sinne hier besser gefällt, liegt auf einer anderen Ebene (...). 
Tatsache ist, dass wir, wenn wir nach Deutschland fahren, nicht selten 
das Gefühl haben, wir seien emigriert.“53 
 
This is the only instance in which Hildesheimer, if indeed he is the letter’s author, 
refers to himself as an emigrant, thus directly contradicting official statements in 
which, when asked about his second exile, he refutes the idea and vehemently denies 
that he is an emigrant.54  
In a much later interview, recorded in 1984 for an educational film, 
Hildesheimer returns once again to the question of hierbleiben vs. nicht dazugehören, 
and interestingly, he refers to his parents’ warning that he, as a Jewish intellectual, 
ought not become a curator of German culture. Asked why he withdrew from public, 
he responds: 
 
Was mich gehindert hat, in der Öffentlichkeit in Aktion zu treten, oder 
überhaupt meine Stimme abzugeben—ist die Tatsache, dass, wie 
Moritz Goldstein es bereits vor der Nazizeit gesagt hat, wir verwalten 
das—wir verwalten das Kulturgut einer Nation, die uns nicht dazu 
aufgefordert hat. Da meinte er die Juden, nicht wahr? Und deshalb wäre 
für mich, sagen wir mal, eine offizielle Position oder eine Position im 
                                                
53 Kesten, ed. Ich lebe nicht in der Bundesrepublik, 165. Lea identifies the anonymous author as 
Hildesheimer, cf. Lea, Hildesheimers Weg, 42. I agree with his assessment, especially since Peter 
Henninger concludes that only two writers—Hildesheimer and Hans Sahl—left Germany a second time 
after they had lived in exile during the Nazi period and initially returned to Germany. Only 
Hildesheimer matches the description of having settled in Bavaria and giving health issues as the 
official explanation for the second emigration. Cf. Peter Henninger, "Über ex(-)territoriales Schreiben 
am Beispiel von Wolfgang Hildesheimer," in Was bleibt? Ex-Territorialisierung in der 
deutschsprachigen Prosa seit 1945, ed. Bart Philipsen et al. (Tübingen, Basel: Francke, 2000), 1-254. 
The author states that the climate in Germany was too damp for his liking, which, if read with the 
theory of the four temperaments in mind, indicates that Germany was too reasonable, unemotional, and 
also too hopeful for him to remain there. The quality of melancholia is dry; moisture is attributed to the 
sanguine and phlegmatic temperaments.  
54 Cf. 158n42. 
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Literaturbetrieb oder in einem der Medien [sic], im Rundfunk oder in 
der Zeitung als Redakteur, unmöglich gewesen.55 
 
Thirty-two years after he defended his position as a German writer who had been 
invited to participate in the Literaturbetrieb, he publicly takes his parents’ position 
that this active participation, for instance as critic or regular member of Group 47, is 
impossible because he is, above all, a Jewish writer. Instead he had decided to take up 
a position on the periphery and contribute to the Litaraturbetrieb as a German-
speaking writer living abroad.  
 
From Absurd Theatre to Melancholic Prose 
 Between his emigration in 1957 and the publication of Tynset eight years later, 
Hildesheimer’s writing underwent a process of radicalization paralleling the 
development of his political consciousness. While allusions to the Nazi past arguably 
are present in his work from the beginning, Hildesheimer did not take up direct 
engagement with the topic until immediately after his move to Switzerland. At that 
juncture he wrote a critical review of Vermächtnis, conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler’s 
posthumously published diaries, the title of which referred to a legacy Hildesheimer 
rejected because it was tainted by Furtwängler’s controversial ties to the Nazi party.56 
This review entailed a critique of how the past appeared in a revised and edited form 
in the political and intellectual climate of the late 1950s. Hildesheimer then published 
Spiele, in denen es dunkel wird (1958), a collection of three plays similarly concerned 
with the Nazi past and its repercussions in the present.57  
                                                
55 Wolfgang Hildesheimer et al., "Dokument 2b: Gesprächsauszüge, Transkription," in Schriftsteller der 
Gegenwart. Fragen an Wolfgang Hildesheimer in Poschiavo. Film für die gymnasiale Mittel-, 
Oberstufe (1984), 13. The transcript is available at WHA 216. 
56 Cf. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Das 'Vermächtnis' Furtwänglers," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 
Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig 
and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 284-90. 
57 Spiele, in denen es dunkel wird (1958) include Landschaft mit Figuren, Die Uhren, and Pastorale, all 
of which are reprinted (Pastorale in its 1965 version) in Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker 
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With Spiele, Hildesheimer announced his poetic preference for the theatre of 
the absurd, which he loosely and in reference to Albert Camus identifies in 1960 as the 
“‘Gegenüberstellung des Menschen, der fragt, mit der Welt, die vernunftwidrig 
schweigt.’”58 In the Frankfurt lectures on poetics, Hildesheimer later makes an 
important addendum: the world not only remains silent but it “[verweigert] dem 
Menschen die Antwort auf seine Frage.”59 He continues: 
 
Die Welt schweigt, sie gibt keinen Urtext mehr. Pathetisch gesagt: der 
Sinn der Schöpfung enthüllt sich nicht, im Gegenteil: er wird immer 
rätselhafter—wir können hinzufügen: seit Auschwitz. Hier denn ist der 
Ansatzpunkt der absurden Prosa: nicht das Auffinden des Urtextes, 
sondern des Sich-Abfindens damit, dass er nicht gefunden wird; das 
Registrieren der Ersatzantworten, die Objektivierung des individuellen 
Ichs als Empfänger dieser Antworten, die Möglichkeiten, sich in dem 
zur Verfügung gestellten Raum einzurichten, und nicht zuletzt: das 
niemals endende Erstaunen darüber, wie gut sich andere in diesem 
Raum eingerichtet haben. Der Schriftsteller, für den dies ein Thema ist, 
hat kein anderes.60 
 
With the addition “seit Auschwitz” Hildesheimer marks his poetics as political: his 
work expresses continuous astonishment over how others have arranged themselves in 
a world that made Auschwitz possible. According to Hildesheimer the post-Auschwitz 
world was either mute or offered ersatz noise in order to distract from its silence. One 
also detects in Hildesheimer’s definition of the absurd the seeds of Tynset, in as far as 
the melancholic and the absurd appear to share an affiliation. Absurd theatre or prose, 
like Benjamin’s play of mourning, express the absence of an “Urtext,” but unlike in 
Lukács’s concept of the novel, in absurd prose no attempts are made to retrieve it. 
                                                
Jehle, eds., Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VI Theaterstücke 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp,1991). 
58 Hildesheimer is paraphrasing Camus. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Über das absurde Theater," in 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII Vermischte Schriften, ed. 
Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 13-26, here 17. 
59 Hildesheimer, "Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen," 50. Emphasis mine. 
60 Ibid., 60. 
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Hildesheimer’s “seit Auschwitz” indicates the occurrence of a loss, and absurd prose 
registers—and accepts—it as an insurmountable absence that cannot be undone. One 
may suggest that absurd prose engages in endless melancholia, but it does not involve 
affect at all and lacks the emotional side of melancholia. Regarding absurd theatre, 
Hildesheimer writes that it does not ask questions; it does not expect answers.61 The 
flatness that Hildesheimer ascribed to the absurd led the German reception of Spiele to 
overlook the political element “seit Auschwitz.” Spiele was reduced to a “Vokabular 
des Unspezifischen,” and perhaps it was this misconception that led Hildesheimer in 
1962 to recall his exclusive commitment to the absurd62 and negotiate anew his 
concern for the past in connection with his poetic strategies.   
 Ingeborg Bachmann’s intervention in this process of negotiation is an instance 
where one can pinpoint the transition from Hildesheimer’s theatre of the absurd to 
Tynset. Following her reading of one of his Spiele plays, Landschaft mit Figuren, 
Bachmann, a close friend of Hildesheimer’s, wrote in a letter that the play reminded 
her of sailing a great boat in water that was smooth yet slow from the absence of wind: 
 
Das Boot ist gut, das Wasser ist gut, aber Wind fehlt und ich frage mich 
warum (...) [Man] wird (...) vertrieben aus dem Stück, wird immer 
gleichgültiger, immer weniger betroffen, obwohl man sehr gut 
betroffen sein müsste und könnte. (...) Du hast mir geschrieben, dass 
einige meinen, Du solltest zurückkehren zu Deinen früheren 
Ausgängen. Das hielte ich für verfehlt, Du darfst es auch nicht mehr, 
aber ich glaube, Du kannst die Situation überprüfen und mit den neuen 
Mitteln sie verändern, zu einer neuen [Situation]. Die Veränderung 
freilich—und das ist wie das meiste sehr persönlich und für Dich daher 
vielleicht nicht fruchtbar gedacht—denke ich mir weder in der 
Veränderung des Stils, noch in irgendeiner Hinsicht literarischer Art, 
sondern in der schmerzhaftesten und schwersten Wendung—zu einem 
Warum, einem Woraufhin, einem Wozu. (...) [I]ch kann Dir nur etwas 
von einer Forderung mitteilen, die ich selber noch nicht zu erfüllen 
                                                
61 Cf. Hildesheimer, "Über das absurde Theater," 15. 
62 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 259. Cf. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Die Realität selbst ist absurd," in 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VI Theaterstücke, ed. Christiaan 
Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 826-28, here 827. 
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weiß und die mich quält; sie liegt vor dem Schreiben, vor jeder 
Errungenschaft.63 
 
In Hildesheimer’s appreciative reply, he writes: 
 
Was du freilich von der „schmerzhaften Wendung“ schreibst, das ist 
nur allzu gültig und berührt die Quelle meiner allertiefsten Zweifel. Ich 
habe noch nie jemandem—außer Silvia—gesagt, dass für mich das 
Schreiben ein ewiges Herumdrücken und Winden vor dem Eingangstor 
zu diesem Schmerz ist. Ich will nicht hindurch, weil ich die Folgen 
nicht absehe, (oder vielleicht allzu klar absehe?)[.] Ich fürchte, dass 
ich—zum Teil unbewusst—vor der allerletzten Konsequenz des 
Schreibens zurückschrecke, nämlich: meine Lebenssubstanz 
dazuzugeben.64 
 
With Tynset and Masante Hildesheimer accomplishes the turn towards a fuller poetics 
that processes and articulates some of his “life essence.” In these two “praktisch 
autobiographische[n] Monologe[n]”65 he radicalized the “poetische(e) 
Vergegenwärtigung jenes Fluchtpunkts, der [seine] Arbeit auch schon zuvor bestimmt 
hat—der ‘Urszenen der Verfolgung.’”66 Previously too cautious to put to paper too 
much of his life’s substance, Hildesheimer explained that with Tynset his writing and 
his life had become “eigentlich dasselbe.”67 Masante became even more so “ein Stück 
streng individualistischer Literatur, eine Art Selbstentblößung.”68 Adding a part of his 
self to his texts, Hildesheimer shifts the abstraction of the absurd to the 
autobiographically inflected melancholic.  
 The first fruits of Hildesheimer’s new poetics of self-exposure are his 
Vergebliche Aufzeichnungen, written at approximately the same time as his 
contribution to Kesten’s collection, in which he explained that he did not live in 
                                                
63 Mid-November, 1959, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 94f. 
64 End of November, 1959, ibid., 96. 
65 Hildesheimer, qtd. in: Jehle, Werkgeschichte, 117. 
66 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 261. Braese cites Briegleb, "Vergangenheit in der Gegenwart," 79.  
67 Hildesheimer, "Antworten über Tynset," 387. 
68 Qtd. in: Lea, Hildesheimers Weg, 269 
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Germany because of continuing anti-Semitism there. Vergebliche Aufzeichnungen is 
an essay in which Hildesheimer publicly repositions himself as an author, this time in 
proximity to Vergangenheisbewältigung. Published in Die Zeit in 1962, 
Aufzeichnungen begins with the programmatic sentence, “Mir fällt nichts mehr ein.”69 
Braese reads the opening line as Hildesheimer’s response to Karl Kraus’ statement, 
“Mir fällt zu Hitler nichts mehr ein,” which figures in a text in which Kraus articulated 
his skepticism that literature could be used as weapon against Hitler’s regime.70 
Without mentioning it by name, Hildesheimer thus establishes the Nazi past as his 
point of reference. He expands the catastrophe Kraus had signaled with Hitler’s name 
to a general state of disorienation and loneliness understood as a direct consequence of 
the Nazi past. In light of this state, all writing must be in vain. This reasoning is 
Hildesheimer’s point of departure for investigating what possibility of writing remains 
when no writing can undo a general catastrophe. The essayistic I in Aufzeichnungen 
walks along the beach looking for objects for consideration as an “Ansatzpunkt” (280) 
for stories. He picks up several—pieces of oilskin and wood—but while they tell of 
fatal disasters on sea and murderous intrigues on land, none of them offer “Greifbares 
(…), was sich in die Gedanken einfrisst” (285), and Hildesheimer refuses them all. It 
is not via concrete objects that he is led to an answer, but via observations, 
reminiscences, and thought associations, of which three stand out: the first is that “hier 
nichts von Versuchen einer Bewältigung [zeugt]” (280). The second suggests that 
there is something that ought to have required attempts at Bewältigung: noticing the 
absence of sea gulls and their cries, Hildesheimer nevertheless hears “ihren 
schrecklichen Schrei. Mein Ohr ist eine Muschel, die noch lange, zu lange, wiedergibt, 
was sie früher einmal aufgenommen hat” (281). Whose cries are echoing from the 
                                                
69 Hildesheimer, "Vergebliche Aufzeichnungen," 275. From now on page numbers are included 
parenthetically in the text. 
70 Qtd. in: Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 270. 
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past? The third thought association, sparked at last by a concrete object—a human 
skull! (278f.)—provides an answer, referring to a doctor from Padua: 
 
Er war vielleicht ein Jude, an der Schädelform kann ich es nicht 
erkennen, weiß aber, dass es Leute gibt, die es auch unter dem Fleisch 
noch feststellen können und sich am liebsten ein Leben lang damit 
beschäftigen, das Fleisch vom Schädel zu schälen, um ihren Drang 
nach Wissen zu stillen; übrigens eine gesundheitsschonende 
Beschäftigung, deren Anhänger meist sehr alt werden. (291) 
 
With the assessment of the present in which the past is not examined critically and in 
which past murderers, who peeled flesh from skulls, live long lives, prosperous and 
unprosecuted, Hildesheimer appears to affirm his initial skepticism that “[k]ein Stoff 
mehr, keine Fabel, keine Form” is available to writers (275). Towards the end, 
however, he mentions that not possibility but necessity may be the one valid reason to 
write: “Notwendigkeit [ist] vielleicht der einzig gültige Beweggrund, die Feder ans 
Papier zu setzen” (293). It is with this consideration that Hildesheimer decides that the 
human skull is not the doctor’s, but rather must belong to Yorick, the deceased court 
jester whose skull is dug up in Hamlet and occasions the melancholic prince to 
contemplate the ephemeral quality of life.71 This makes Yorick’s skull a quintessential 
symbol for melancholia for Hildesheimer. In Aufzeichnungen Yorick is remembered as 
follows: 
 
[Er] bediente (...) sich der Weise eines melancholischen und doch 
zotigen Liedchens, und das scheint mir noch heute die beste, wenn 
nicht gar die einzige Art zu sein, wie man die Wahrheit einigermaßen 
überzeugend zum Ausdruck bringen kann: indem man sie still für sich 
hersingt, wie eine plötzliche, aber nebensächliche Erinnerung einer 
früheren, halbvergessenen Ahnung; wobei es auf die Melodie 
ankommt; der Text bildet sich von selbst, dort, wo einer zufällig 
aufhorcht und sich davon fesseln lässt, oder überhaupt nicht, meist 
überhaupt nicht. (295)  
 
                                                
71 Cf. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act V, Scene I.  
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This outline of Hildesheimer’s new poetics already includes the blueprint for Tynset.  
To write out of necessity rather than possibility is to conjure up a quiet melancholic 
song, which attends to memories that are sudden and evoke half-forgotten inklings, in 
this case, to traumatic memories. Whether the song is audible depends on its aesthetic 
form, its melody. According to Hildesheimer, the text presents itself to whoever listens 
attentively and at exactly the right time—or else the text is lost altogether. In Tynset 
the hook of the “y” caught his memory fragments because the narrator paid attention 
and spun them to a melancholic melody in rondo form.  
 Following Bachmann’s advice and overcoming his fears of adding 
Lebenssubstanz to his writing, Hildesheimer abandoned the theatre of the absurd that 
too often left the audience “immer weniger betroffen” (Bachmann) and became with 
Tynset, as Domin observed, a political writer. The Bremen speech marks the zenith of 
Hildesheimer’s poetic-political interventions; at no other time did he speak publicly 
with such vehemence in defense and admiration of the political writer. The second 
speech that he gave in recognition of an award for Tynset, the Büchner prize, is much 
different, and at this point, ten months after Bremen, Hildesheimer resignedly 
accepted that the reception of Tynset, while positive overall, had refused to grasp the 
implications of Entsetzliches and connect it to the politics of the day.72 Domin, who 
found the publication of Tynset to be the most important “jetzt geschriebenen 
deutschen Prosaband” and who closely identified with Hildesheimer, “weil wir Juden 
                                                
72 How little self-reflection the Literaturbetrieb practiced is evidenced by the fact that in 1966 the 
Darmstadt German Academy for German Language and Poetry also awarded, side-by-side to the 
Büchner prize, the Sigmund Freud Prize for non-fiction to Emil Staiger. Staiger had been an outspoken 
proponent of the Nazis’ book burnings. Two months after his Darmstadt appearance, in a speech that 
prompted an enormous literary debate, Staiger asked that Peter Weiss’s art be labeled as degenerate 
(“entartet”). Cf. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 319f., 330f; Briegleb, Unmittelbar, 132-34. For 
Staiger’s text, “Literatur und Öffentlichkeit,“ and a (conservative) documentation of the controversy, cf. 
Erwin Jaeckle, ed. Der Zürcher Literaturschock. Bericht (Munich, Vienna: Langen/Müller, 1968). See 
also Walter Höllerer and Norbert Millers, "Der Zürcher Literaturstreit. Eine Dokumentation," Sprache 
im technischen Zeitalter 22 (1967); Walter Höllerer and Norbert Millers, "Beginn einer Krise. Zum 
Zürcher Literaturstreit," Sprache im technischen Zeitalter 26 (1968). 
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sind,”73 urged him to use the occasion of the Büchner speech to speak out “über die 
deutsche Situation.” She continued: “Ich hoffe ja sehr, Ihre Büchnerrede wird kein 
l’art pour l’art. Wir sind verpflichtet, die Plattformen zu nutzen, solang wir sie noch 
haben.”74 Hildesheimer’s speech must have disappointed Domin in this regard; unlike 
in Bremen, in Darmstadt he did not speak directly about German politics, as “die 
Höflichkeit er mir verboten [hätte], dieses Thema bis zu seinem Ende zu behandeln.”75 
His criticism is present nonetheless, but disguised as a reading of Georg Büchner’s 
political satire Leonce und Lena (1836) that Hildesheimer interprets as melancholic 
play.  
 
Darmstadt: Büchner-Prize 
Hildesheimer ascribes much of Leonce und Lena’s melancholia to its author. 
Büchner, who had been persecuted for the publication of Der Hessische Landbote 
(1834), in which he had called for the agrarian population to revolt against its 
oppressors, lived a conflicted life in exile. Hildesheimer writes: 
 
Der Konflikt wurde durch äußere Umstände verursacht, nicht durch 
eine innere Konstellation; wir finden keinen Riss im Wesen Büchners. 
Der Zwiespalt begann nach der Flucht aus Darmstadt, als sein Antrieb 
und sein Drang zur Aktion erlahmt waren, als seine Hoffnung sich zu 
Enttäuschung und schließlich zur Resignation wandelte, als er seiner—
von je latenten—Melancholie zumindest ein Theaterstück lang freien 
Lauf ließ. Auch Büchner hat schließlich eingesehen, dass er und 
seinesgleichen das Rad der Geschichte nicht drehen würden, dass Leute 
seines Schlages die Politik nicht ändern, dass er es mit den Mächtigen 
nicht aufnehmen konnte. Dass der freie Geist in Deutschland nicht 
willkommen ist, auch bei den Unfreien nicht. Sein Traum war 
ausgeträumt, und so flüchtete er für kurze Zeit in einen anderen Traum. 
Dieser Traum hieß „Leonce und Lena“, er ist ein melancholisches 
Meisterwerk, eine Tragikomödie des Leerlaufs und der Frustration. (33) 
                                                
73 Domin, letter to Hildesheimer, April 10, 1965, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 135. 
74 Domin, letter to Hildesheimer, September 29, 1966, WHA 381. Qtd. in: Braese, Die andere 
Erinnerung, 319n297. 
75 Hildesheimer, "Büchners atemlose Melancholie," 42. 
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Much like Tynset’s narrator and thus, if we believe that Hildesheimer identifies with 
his narrator, Hildesheimer himself, Büchner had been latently melancholic all along in 
this description, but it was the conflict from outside—persecution, flight, exile—that 
converted latent melancholia into manifest melancholia because Büchner realized that 
“Leute seines Schlages”—writers, victims of political persecution, and, for 
Hildesheimer, Jews in Germany—were powerless and without influence in either 
politics or history. According to Hildesheimer, the realization that an open mind was 
unwelcome in Germany led Büchner to write a melancholic masterpiece. He struck out 
because of his “bittere(n) Erkenntnis, dass in Deutschland Selbstlosigkeit, 
Gerechtigkeitswille und Integrität nicht zu den Qualifikationen gehören, die zur 
Verwirklichung eines politischen Zieles beitragen” (42). These words echo 
Hildesheimer’s documentation of his own reasons for leaving Germany; he wrote 
Tynset after he left the country that he had identified as anti-Semitic, intolerant, and 
uninterested.  
Only at the end of the speech does Hildesheimer draw a parallel between 
Büchner and contemporary society. “Zwar wird, wer die Wahrheit sagt, nicht mehr 
gehenkt, aber er wird auch nicht gehört. Die Resignation vor dieser Tatsache, denke 
ich, wäre heute wie damals ein Grund zur Flucht in die Poesie.” Though a 
consequence of resignation, the flight into poetics is identified by Hildesheimer as 
flight from politics, saying of whomever condemns such flight, “[dass] der (…) die 
deutsche Wirklichkeit nicht begriffen [hat]” (42). This is the most direct attack on 
German politics in the speech, which Hildesheimer ends on an almost apologetic note: 
he did not say “die letzten Worte (...) weil sich hier die Gelegenheit bot, sondern weil 
sie sich aufdrängte” (42). 
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 If Büchner’s flight from politics ended in a melancholic play, does this imply 
that Tynset resulted from Hildesheimer’s own flight from politics? Neither Tynset nor 
Leonce und Leona is apolitical; rather, these works are highly political. Neither 
Büchner nor Hildesheimer was uninterested in politics, but both authors resigned in 
the face of its overwhelming status quo. Their characters were inert and passive; by 
these signs Hildesheimer recognizes the melancholia of Leonce und Lena and, by 
extension, of his own narrator. In Büchner’s play and in Tynset the plot is not driven 
by dialogue; every sentence, Hildesheimer diagnoses for Leonce und Lena, operates as 
a retarding element. Speech is an end in itself, “aber das vergisst man über dem 
Reichtum an Einfällen” (35). Despite the apparent inertia,  
 
offenbart sich [überall] zugleich die Hast, das Atemlose, Überhitzte, 
das gleichsam Fiebrige des Autors, der manches zu überspielen hat und 
in Eile ist: er muss disponieren, drängen, muss aus seinen 
seismographischen Feststellungen ein Stenogramm machen, muss in 
Stichworten Unaussprechliches, Hintergründiges beschwören. (…) 
[Schon hier] ersetzen Satzfetzen ganze Sätze und werden gerade durch 
ihre Kürze zu genialischen Würfen, jederzeit verfügbar und jederzeit 
verwerfbar: sogar die Paralipomena sind voller Schätze. Und alles, 
Sätze, Fetzen, Bilder, ist in tiefe Melancholie gehüllt. Nun schafft die 
Darstellung der Melancholie stets eine Verzauberung, denn sie bedeutet 
Abgewandtheit von den realen Dingen des Lebens, die ja für den 
Melancholiker nicht real, weil allzu vergänglich sind. Melancholische 
Lethargie (...) ist ein vollwertiger Ersatz für Aktion. (36) 
 
This description fits Leonce und Lena as well as Tynset. Hildesheimer’s prototype of 
the melancholic is also the mirror image of Tynset’s narrator: “Der Melancholiker (…) 
greift nicht ins Geschehen ein, er bleibt passiv und lässt sich treiben. Er wandelt wie 
im Schlaf und schafft sich (...) Ersatz durch Tagträume.” But unlike the melancholic’s 
audience, which enjoys these digressions, the melancholic experiences them as 
“Misslingen” of the task to develop his seismographic observations. This failure in 
turn creates more melancholia (36). The melancholic appears inert and apolitical; after 
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all, his melancholic lethargy is his only “Aktion.” The point of the Büchner speech, 
however, is that this inertia is the consequence of a certain historical constellation, and 
that the state of melancholia in itself—inaction, inertia—expresses protest against its 
cause. By protesting against the circumstance of its own formation, melancholia 
becomes political. The melancholic cannot act socio-politically herself; she is trapped 
in a dynamic of endless mourning and resignation. But her melancholia culminates in 
the exhortation to others to work through on her behalf. In the postwar environment of 
surpression and denial, this call is intrinsically political, even though it might not 
produce results of political consequence.  
The melancholic aspect in Tynset was widely acknowledged, but its political 
register by and large was not. Though the product of the steady radicalization of 
Hildesheimer’s political conceptualization of literature, Tynset was only an early 
result, one that was often accused of and later dismissed as being too formalistic by 
the Literaturbetrieb.76 Having cautioned that Germany “dem Faschimus wieder 
[zutreibe],” Hildesheimer took the anti-authoritarian movement of the mid-1960s as an 
occasion to speak to students on the political engagement of a leftist author. In this 
movement students and other members of the left sought to redefine the concept of 
fascism by applying it to Germany, Israel, and the United States alike without 
necessarily working critically through the concrete historical example of National 
Socialism.77 
                                                
76 A “Vorwurf des Formalismus” was often voiced against Hildesheimer in connection with Tynset, cf. 
Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 291. The accusation may have stemmed from 
Hildesheimer’s Pastorale, a play he coined his “Bekenntnis zum Formalismus.” Hildesheimer 
explained that Pastorale was “um der Form willen geschrieben, um des reinen Spiels willen.” 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Die Entstehung des Pastorale," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte 
Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VI Theaterstücke, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 817. Because of its rondo form, Tynset was similarly discussed as 
formalistic play.  
77 For a discussion of Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s question whether Germany was “faschistisch, prä-
faschistisch, neo-faschistisch oder faschistoid,” voiced in one of the cornerstone texts of the movement, 
Gemeinplätze, and the resulting controversy that ensued between Enzensberger and Arendt, cf. Braese, 
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The Frankfurt Lectures: Recommendations for a Poetics of Remembrance 
In the summer semester of 1967 Hildesheimer gave a series of three lectures at 
Frankfurt University in his capacity as the ninth docent of the Frankfurt Lectures on 
Poetics. This was one of only two occasions when Hildesheimer espoused a literary 
theory.78 Collectively entitled “Aspekte und Grenzen der dichterischen Freiheit,” 
Hildesheimer’s individual lectures returned to the topic of the absurd (first and third 
lectures) and “Reaktionäre” Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot. In none of the lectures does 
Hildesheimer explicitly state his opinion on the political and literary events of the 
day—neither on the student movement, which after the death of student protester 
Benno Ohnesorg three weeks earlier had undergone a process of radicalization, nor on 
the controversial Princeton meeting of Group 47.79 However, he formulates a poetics 
opposed to the practice of the Literaturbetrieb. Because the poetics he outlines is 
informed by a politics of memory that was then controversial, Hildesheimer 
essentially makes a political argument, albeit one disguised as “subjektive 
Empfindung.”80  
                                                
Die andere Erinnerung, 321-29; Klaus Briegleb, 1968. Literatur der antiautoritären Bewegung 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1993).  
78 Fischer publishing house sponsored the Frankfurt lectures annually from 1959-68; since 1979 
Suhrkamp has been the main organizer. The list of docents includes the most prominent of German 
writers, among them many Group 47 members, e.g., Ingeborg Bachmann, Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, 
and Martin Walser. Hildesheimer said in a 1976 interview that the lectures were the only time, “dass ich 
versucht habe, mich theoretisch mit Literatur zu beschäftigen,” Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles 
Ich," 295. This is not quite correct, as the 1975 speech, “The End of Fiction,” in many ways serves as a 
sequel to the first Frankfurt lecture. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "The End of Fiction," in Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII, Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas 
Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 125-40. 
79 Cf. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 329. At the 1966 Group 47 meeting in Princeton, the youngest 
author present, first-timer Peter Handke, lashed out against established writers for writing decorative 
prose; he accused them of “Beschreibungsimpotenz” vis-à-vis reality. This incidence initiated a well-
publicized literary debate. Cf. several documents by Jochen Ernst, Hans Schwab-Felisch, Fritz J. 
Raddatz, Walter Höllerer, and Horst Krüger in Reinhard Lettau, ed. Die Gruppe 47. Bericht--Kritik--
Polemik (Neuwied, Berlin: Luchterhand,1967), 401-45. Parkes and White, eds., The Gruppe 47, 142f.  
Hildesheimer discussed the possibility of his own participation in Princeton with Böll before rejecting 
Richter’s invitation, cf. Hildesheimer, Briefe, 143, 146f. 
80 Hildesheimer, "Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen," 45, cf. 43.  From not on page numbers are included 
parenthetically in the text.  
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 Hildesheimer stakes out a clear position vis-à-vis the German cultural sphere 
by declaring that he has nothing in common with Emil Staiger, recipient of the other 
prize awarded in Darmstadt in 1966. There is no need for Hildesheimer to clarify this 
comment; the literary controversy surrounding Staiger’s thinly veiled opinion that 
Peter Weiss’s art was entartet, which replicated Nazi rhetoric regarding modern and 
Jewish art, had been the “die literaturpolitische Debatte der letzten Monate.”81 
Hildesheimer distances himself from Staiger’s opinion and also from the 
Literaturbetrieb’s bestowal of honors upon a Jewish writer together with a former 
Nazi sympathizer. This practice proved in Hildesheimer’s mind that “die Dimension 
Auschwitz” was missing in the “Wirklichkeit” of German authors (57).  
 Reality—Wirklichkeit—is the topic of the first lecture in Frankfurt, and 
Hildesheimer takes his cue from a statement made by his friend, the much admired 
poet Günter Eich. In a speech given ten years earlier, Eich had said that it was through 
writing that “Dinge Wirklichkeit [erlangen]. Sie [=Wirklichkeit] ist nicht meine 
Voraussetzung, sondern mein Ziel. Ich muss sie erst herstellen.”82 Hildesheimer agrees 
with Eich’s polemic against novels whose authors assume they know what reality is 
(49). Both writers instead favor a riddle, something unknown that needs to be 
deciphered. While the process of deciphering may be “eine ewige Quelle des 
Unbehagens, wenn nicht der Trauer,” it is also the source of all creativity (50, 
emphasis mine). With the mention of “Trauer” Hildesheimer connects the work of 
mourning with the absurd, which he summarizes as a situation in which “[d]er Mensch 
fragt [und] [d]ie Welt schweigt” (50). The author’s true object, Hildesheimer 
continues, must be “die Darstellung des Menschen, der fragt, und der Welt, die 
                                                
81 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 71n. 
82 Günter Eich, "Der Schriftsteller vor der Realität," in Günter Eich, Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. 4, 
Vermischte Schriften, ed. Ilse Aichinger and Susanne Müller-Hanpft (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), 
613f. Qtd. in: Hildesheimer, "Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen," 48. 
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schweigt oder, um das Schweigen zu übertönen, ihre mannigfachen irreführenden 
Ersatzantworten erteilt” (54). Therein lies the author’s “Engagement” (43). To 
illustrate his point, Hildesheimer reads Samuel Beckett’s Molloy (an example Eich had 
also used).83 The narrator Molloy confronts the silence of the world, manifest in 
absurd ersatz responses, and slowly disintegrates: “Er registriert die Symptome der 
Welt, unter denen er sich einmal einzurichten versucht hat, und er erzählt, wie sie ihm, 
eines nach dem anderen, abhanden kommen, wie er stetig an Boden verliert” (56). 
Beckett describes the failure of an individual but offers no hint as to how to stop the 
process of losing ground. The Wirklichkeit that Molloy constructs is a reality void of 
utopian promise. Herein Hildesheimer sees the link between Molloy and postwar 
Germany: reality has lost the promise of a future for Jewish victims of the Holocaust. 
The postwar world is emptied of meaning, but filling the void with ersatz noise is 
inadequate.  
 From this short discussion of the novel—a term Hildesheimer avoids for 
novels like Molloy that capture but also create Wirklichkeit, reserving for them instead 
the term “Gedicht” to indicate that narrative closure is impossible for life after the 
Holocaust—he swiftly shifts to Adorno’s dictum that to write a poem after Auschwitz 
is barbaric. But he turns the dictum on its head, arguing that “nach Auschwitz nur 
noch das Gedicht möglich sei, dazu allerdings auch die dem Gedicht verwandte 
‘absurde Prosa.’” He continues: 
 
Ich möchte weiterhin behaupten, dass nach Auschwitz der Roman nicht 
mehr möglich sei. Auschwitz und ähnliche Stätten haben das 
menschliche Bewusstsein erweitert, sie haben ihm eine Dimension 
hinzugefügt, die vorher kaum als Möglichkeit bestand. Diese 
Dimension zu berücksichtigen, steht nicht in der Macht des Romans 
                                                
83 Beckett’s 1951 novel gained critical attention for its unconventional plot that is revealed by the inner 
monologues of two characters, bedridden Molloy and private detective Moran. Certain stylistic parallels 
between Tynset and Molloy are obvious but, to my knowledge, have not yet been examined. Samuel 
Beckett, Molloy (New York: Grove Press, 1955). 
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(...). Aber die Wirklichkeit ist andrerseits ohne diese Dimension nicht 
mehr denkbar und—wenn sie überhaupt jemals darstellbar war—nicht 
mehr darstellbar. Das Gedicht aber und jene Romane, die Eich zu den 
Gedichten zählt, also Beckett, stellen Wirklichkeit her, schaffen sie also 
nicht aus jenem präfabrizierten Material, in dem Auschwitz vielleicht 
nicht enthalten ist, sondern aus Elementen des Bewusstseins, in dem die 
Dimension Auschwitz enthalten ist (...). Und wenn sie im Bewusstsein 
nicht enthalten ist, so ist sie ins Unterbewusste gesunken, sie gehört 
zum inneren Mikrokosmos des Dichters. Er kann—und sollte—sich auf 
diese Dimension verlassen. (...) Ich trete nicht für den 
Konzentrationslagerroman ein, nicht für den Roman über 
Kollektivschuld und Sühne, auch das wären Teilaspekte [dieser 
Dimension, die der Roman, indem er nur ihre Aspekte behandelt, 
bagatellisiert], sondern für das weite Panorama eines an allen 
Schrecken und Grauen, an aller Tragik und Komik des Lebens 
geschulten Bewusstseins, und dafür kann der Roman nicht der Ort sein, 
denn er konstruiert den Einzelfall und bietet ihn dem Leser zur 
Identifikation an. (57f., emphasis mine) 
 
Hildesheimer posits here that Auschwitz, because it has entered human consciousness 
and unconsciousness and thus altered Wirklichkeit, must also affect literature. Novels 
that aim to represent reality build on a dimension that excludes Auschwitz or, even if 
they include aspects of that reality, perhaps by describing concentration camps or 
arguing the guilt question, focus on particulars at the expense of a catastrophic whole 
and thus trivialize it. According to Hildesheimer, reality is no longer thinkable without 
Auschwitz, but only certain kinds of literature can create the reality that includes the 
dimension of Auschwitz. The Holocaust confronted human conscious- and 
unconsciousness so fully that reality now presents itself as a riddle requiring 
deciphering: Auschwitz and existence after Auschwitz form the riddle. Because there 
are no satisfactory answers, but only ersatz noise or silence, the writer must lend 
expression to the disorientation experienced in a world that lacks coherence. She 
cannot plausibly represent reality in fiction by drawing on conventional narrative 
techniques that lead to closure. The poem after Auschwitz—Eich and Hildesheimer’s 
use of the term encompasses some novels and absurd prose—must make the silence 
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audible: “Man könnte sich an der Qualität der Fragen aufrichten, wie sie das 
Schweigen der Welt hörbar machen, wenn nicht gar zum Dröhnen bringen” (61, 
emphasis mine). While there is no promise of success, this “Dichtung” hopes “das 
Rezeptionsvermögen zu erweitern und das Bewusstsein (…) zu schärfen, (…) anstatt 
das Geschehen der Zeit durch fiktives Geschehen zu ergänzen” (61). This is the extent 
to which Hildesheimer is able to answer a normative and, according to him, “die 
wesentliche Frage an die Literatur,” that is, whether or not literature is capable of 
changing a person (60). Rather than responding in the affirmative, he cautiously states 
that if a text sharpens the consciousness for the dimension in which Auschwitz is 
included, literature “wäre (…) zumindest nicht vergeblich” (61).  
Hildesheimer does not dismiss the novel as such. But he insists that in order to 
pay tribute to reality, to the dimension that includes Auschwitz, novelists must bring 
to expression the permeation of the present by a murderous past that registers for 
many as incommunicable. This should not be confused with the Holocaust’s 
unspeakability, a notion that clouds much postwar discussion. Instead it refers to the 
affective disorientation in the present of those who experienced Nazi crimes as 
victims. The writer who acknowledges the dimension that includes Auschwitz also 
acknowledges this affective disorientation and must account for it by bringing it to the 
fore. The writer draws on her inner microcosm, which always, consciously or not, 
entails knowledge of Auschwitz, along with the vast number of impressions and 
experiences that account for life’s tragic moments as well as comical ones (58). She 
must trust this microcosm; it is the source of the writing process, which gives form to 
what is already present in her (un-) consciousness. According to Hildesheimer, her 
efforts help others to recognize the dimension that includes Auschwitz. The 
recognition and acknowledgement of Auschwitz is hoped to bring about interest in 
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socio-political involvement and thus affect politics. The writer’s Engagement in 
changing her readers’ attitude is thus the political mission of literature.84  
 Hildesheimer names examples of authors who master an articulation of 
Wirklichkeit: in the first lecture he lists Paul Celan, Ingeborg Bachmann, Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger, and, of course, Günter Eich; in the third he also discusses Ilse 
Aichinger and Peter Weiss. Reading their works selectively, he concludes that much 
of literature’s effect depends not on the author but on the reader: successful post-
Auschwitz literature “stellt einen Anspruch auf [sic] die Assoziationsfähigkeit des 
Lesers” (85, emphasis mine). The reader must follow chains of association that, while 
building upon each other, move further and further away from the actual theme. This 
movement mirrors what Hildesheimer promotes as the successful interpretation of 
fragmented memories, which also operates via associations that bring fragments into 
relationship with each other. With each association, even those leading away from the 
point of conception, another unconscious element is examined and illuminated (91). If 
the reader is willing to submit to and follow chains of associations, and if in the 
process he is encouraged to examine his own memory fragments, his awareness will 
be sharpened for the Auschwitz dimension of reality. In successful literature, what is 
articulated is “Verzweiflung (…) als kontinuierliche Lebenshaltung,” not to propagate 
despair as the only adequate response to Auschwitz, but to lead to the recognition “der 
Unaufhebbarkeit alles Zweifelns” (98). Verzweiflung describes for Hildesheimer a 
continuous process of doubting and the concomitant critical examination that unfolds 
new associative chains for further critical exploration, thereby widening one’s 
consciousness and allowing Auschwitz to arise from the unconscious and provoke a 
reaction to newly acquired awareness, which translates into socio-political action. 
                                                
84 Hildesheimer’s concept of literature’s function thus changed: in 1952, he had attributed to literature 
the attempt to remedy society’s shortcomings; by 1967, literature lost this function for Hildesheimer.  
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With the Frankfurt lectures Hildesheimer articulates what he believes to be 
literature’s purpose and its potential impact. Inherent in his insistence that reality 
reflected in literature must include the dimension of the Holocaust is a politically 
charged demand to work towards a memory culture conscious of others’ suffering 
(Jewish suffering in particular), but the Frankfurt lectures were not predominantly 
political. Except for expressing doubt that literature, even if otherwise effective, would 
ever reach the conscience of politicians (60), thus repeating his earlier statement 
regarding the incommensurability of writers and politicians, Hildesheimer does not 
engage in a political conversation vis-à-vis current events, at least not directly.85 
 His direct call to authors to produce literature reflecting reality should have 
been met by members of the Literaturbetrieb with enthusiasm. In the atmosphere of 
revolt and political unrest, of the winter of 1967/68, literary debates brought attention 
to the connection between literature and politics, demanding, in the words of Martin 
Walser, “kritische und damit realistische” literature.86 The criterion of importance was 
the same for both Walser and Hildesheimer: the reflection or representation of reality. 
Yet Walser’s call for realistic literature did not refer to a reality that was marked by 
the Holocaust. It referred instead to the reality of the workplace. In 1961, Group 61 
formed to promote political aspects of labor as literary theme, intended not as the 
                                                
85 At the time he delivered the Frankfurt lectures, Hildesheimer took a much more political position in 
his open letter to Peter Weiss. In response to the Six-Day War of June 1967, Weiss had accused the 
Israeli government and military of “Mentalität eines Herrenvolkes.” Although Weiss emphasized his 
overall solidarity with Israel, Hildesheimer appealed to Weiss’s Jewishness as well as arguing from the 
standpoint of his own to vehemently defend the position of the state of Israel against Weiss’s 
accusation. Braese summarizes their exchange, which, not only because it was the first public postwar 
disagreement of two German-speaking Jews but especially because it was on the topic of Israel, 
attracted a large audience and urged others to join the discussion on Israel. Braese, Die andere 
Erinnerung, 339-48; Weiss qtd. in: Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 340. Hildesheimer’s open letter 
earned him the respect of Adorno, who entered into correspondence with Hildesheimer as a result, cf. 
Hildesheimer, Briefe, 152f. Several others congratulated Hildesheimer on his open letter and thanked 
him for his frankness, among them Aichinger, Eich, Walter Jens, and Erich Fried. Cf. ibid., 153-57. 
86 Martin Walser, "Wie und wovon handelt Literatur," in Wie und wovon handelt Literatur. Aufsätze 
und Reden (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1973), 119-38, here 120. Emphasis mine. Qtd. in: Braese, Die 
andere Erinnerung, 384. 
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successor to Group 47, but as a political alternative aiming to encourage political 
involvement among the workforce. The group radicalized during the sixties and, 
because of internal conflicts among members, regrouped as Werkkreis Literatur der 
Arbeitswelt in 1969.87 Walser was an ardent proponent of Werkkreis, calling its three 
text collections published by the time of Walser’s writing “die wichtigsten 
Anthologien seit 1945.”88 In contrast to progressive Arbeitswelt literature Walser 
construed formalistic literature as conservative. In reference to Hildesheimer’s works 
Braese concludes from his reading of Walser’s text and Walser’s definition of 
formalistic (or mannerist) literature the following: Walser discounted the practice by 
which the author’s “Bewusstseinsattitüde” rather than material reality determined the 
content of literature.89 The author’s attitude, Hildesheimer’s microcosm, produces 
variations of what Walser considered Hildesheimer’s endless theme, “dass nichts mehr 
kommt und nichts mehr geht.” Referring to Beckett and, by extension, literary 
modernism, Walser dismissed “ebendieses ganze Endspielspiel [sic].”90 Walser here 
referred to Endgame, one of Beckett’s most influential works.91 Adorno took Endgame 
as an expression of melancholic contemplation, as Endgame essentially acknowledged 
metaphysical meaninglessness. Understanding Endgame, Adorno wrote, “can mean 
only understanding its unintelligibility, concretely reconstructing the meaning of the 
fact that is has no meaning.”92 Elsewhere Adorno wrote in reference to Endgame:  
 
                                                
87 For a succinct history of Group 61 and Werkkreis, cf. Ralf Schnell, "Die Politisierung der Literatur 
(1960-1968)," in Die Literatur der Bundesrepublik (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), 116-227; Gundel 
Mattenklott, "Literatur von unten--die andere Kultur," in Hansers Sozialgeschichte der deutschen 
Literature. Bd. 12, Gegenwartsliteratur seit 1968, ed. Klaus Briegleb and Sigrid Weigel (München: C. 
Hanser, 1992), 153-81, here 154-58.  
88 Walser, "Wie und wovon handelt Literatur," 125. 
89 Ibid., 120. 
90 Ibid., 121.  
91 Samuel Beckett, Endgame (New York: Grove Press, 1958). 
92 Theodor W. Adorno, "Trying to Understand Endgame," in Notes to Literature, vol. 1 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 241-75, here 243. 
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Beckett's plays are absurd not because of the absence of meaning, for 
then they would be simply irrelevant, but because they put meaning on 
trial; they unfold its history. His work is ruled as much by an obsession 
with positive nothingness as by the obsession with a meaninglessness 
that has developed historically.93 
 
Walser strongly resisted Adorno’s admiration of Beckett. He equated a conservative, 
elitist mannerism with the notion of meaninglessness that for Adorno manifested itself 
historically because of Auschwitz. In so doing Walser dismissed it entirely. Many of 
those whose ears still rang with Adorno’s dictum that to write poetry after Auschwitz 
was barbaric, which had influenced every discussion of postwar literature, sought 
refuge in realistic literature (as proposed by Walser) to resist Adorno actively. 
Hildesheimer, on the other hand, was affected positively by Adorno; his Frankfurt 
lectures, in which he defends absurd prose and expands on Adorno’s dictum, say as 
much. For literature to remain true to Wirklichkeit after Auschwitz, it had to forswear 
establishing meaning as a closed structure.  
 Comparison of Hildesheimer and Walser shows that, though both authors 
articulated a need for a politicized literature, they followed two different political 
agendas: one of remembering the past, in melancholic reflection on meaninglessness 
and continuous doubting, and one of surpressing the past, by emptying the present of a 
certain past and focusing on contemporary concerns as if disconnected from earlier 
events, especially genocide. 
 
Hildesheimer’s Microcosm: Masante 
In an important 1976 interview Hildesheimer remembers his literary 
beginnings as “eine unbeschwerte Zeit,” not only in the context of writing, “sondern 
überhaupt.”94 Entirely different from the period of Lieblose Legenden was his 
                                                
93 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (London: Athlone, 1999), 153. 
94 Durzak, Gespräche über den Roman, 274. 
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“Tynset-Masante-Phase,” which marked “das Ende des ‘straight forward’-Erzählens” 
because such narration had, at that point, lost its “Berechtigung.”95 After the 
publication of Masante, Hildesheimer explains this development as follows: 
 
Wie gesagt, die Bewusstseinsebene des Ich-Erzählers hat sich geändert, 
meiner Meinung nach erweitert, und nun sind diese Elemente 
vorhanden, die in „Tynset“ ja auch schon angedeutet sind: als Element 
der Angst. (…) Das sind alles Überbleibsel von Erfahrungen aus meiner 
Tätigkeit als Dolmetscher bei den Nürnberger Prozessen. Sie brauchten 
diese lange Strecke—über die „Lieblosen Legenden“ und über 
„Tynset“—um dann schließlich in völlig transponierter Form wieder 
zum Ausdruck zu kommen.96 
 
It is often suggested that Hildesheimer used painting as a means of psychic defense 
during his employment at the Nuremberg trials, and that the process of writing 
demanded he lower his defenses.97 After writing Masante, a process that took eight 
years, Hildesheimer contrasts painting with writing, emphasizing that painting was a 
“Flucht” that allowed him to forget: “Ich bin bei ‘der Sache’ und nicht bei der 
Verarbeitung eines Themas.” Writing, by comparison, was a compulsive processing of 
a theme; it is “ein eigentümlicher Zwang.”98 As the culmination of a compulsion to 
process his Nuremberg experiences, Hildesheimer wrote Masante, his most political 
prose work. Although Masante may be read as a sequel to Tynset—the narrator is 
identical, and he refers to some of the same characters—Masante is “ein Buch von 
                                                
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., 292f. 
97 Cf. Henninger, "Über ex(-)territoriales Schreiben," 8-16. 
98 Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Es gelingt mir längst nicht alles," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte 
Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker 
Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 747. In 1984 Hildesheimer expressed a similar sentiment, this 
time in reference to the looming environmental catastrophe: “Wenn ich am Arbeitstisch sitze und 
Collagen mache oder zeichne, dann verliere ich das Gefühl für jede Zeit und auch für unsere Zeit. Wenn 
ich aber am Schreibtisch sitze und nachdenke, dann guckt mich das bare Entsetzen an über unsere Zeit 
und unsere Lage, so dass ich absolut gelähmt bin.” Stern interview, qtd. in: Klaus Briegleb, 
"Weiterschreiben! Wege zu einer deutschen literarischen 'Postmoderne'?" in Hansers Sozialgeschichte 
der deutschen Literatur. Bd. 12, Gegenwartsliteratur seit 1968, ed. Klaus Briegleb and Sigrid Weigel 
(München: C. Hanser, 1992), 340-81, here 351. 
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heute, und zwar ein politisches Buch” and thus differs from Tynset, at least in the 
assessment of Hildesheimer, for whom Tynset was primarily a melancholic monologue 
and highly personal. Masante, in contrast to Tynset’s “Melancholie” and its adherence 
to “rein Persönliche[m],” “ist wesentlich realer und realistischer, auch härter, 
komischer, aber nicht lustiger.”99 However, the level of realism does not account for 
the novel’s political dimension, which lies not in Masante’s composition as a 
collection of realistic narratives, “sondern gerade in dem, was dazwischen steht, in der 
Beschreibung der Verfassung des Ich-Erzählers.”100 The same is true for Tynset, a 
book that Domin had identified as political in its own right. Whereas Hildesheimer 
remembers Tynset primarily for its rondo form and embedded narratives, which 
distract “notwendigerweise den Leser vom Zentralthema des Buches,” its central 
theme, after all, is Entsetzliches.101 Masante, too, includes multiple narratives, but its 
formalistic principle is different. The stories are much shorter, unfinished, and inserted 
into the text at different points as fragments. Rather than the carefully structured rondo 
form, which included several independent, closed narratives, a much more arbitrary  
“Zettelkasten” drives the narratives in Masante.102  
 Besides embedded narratives and the framing narrative coexisting in this way 
in an “uncertain relationship” in Masante,103 the outstanding formal difference 
between Tynset and Masante is that in the latter the narrator seeks a dialogue partner. 
Masante is not a monologue, as Hildesheimer had characterized its predecessor. In 
Masante, the narrator has a desire to communicate, to establish contact with another 
person, and to exchange ideas. According to Hildesheimer, Masante is more of a novel 
                                                
99 Hildesheimer and Prangel, "Interview mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," 5. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 The “Zettelkasten” principle is just as strictly composed as the rondo form: “Aus dem Zettelkasten 
ergibt sich eine anscheinend willkürlichere Komposition, die in Wirklichkeit gar nicht willkürlich ist,” 
ibid. 
103 Long, "Power, Desire," 602. 
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in this regard: “Es ist ohne Zweifel mehr Roman geworden, als ‘Tynset’ es gewesen 
ist.”104 Hildesheimer did not plan to return to the novel after the Frankfurt lectures; he 
did not want to go “zurück zum Roman.”105 Despite the inclusion of dialogue, the 
establishment of a goal for the narrator, and his documentation of the narrator’s quest 
to achieve this end, Hildesheimer still did not return to the conventional novel he had 
criticized in Frankfurt. Even the novelistic elements of Masante, for instance the 
dialogues between the narrator and Maxine, the keeper of the inn at which he stays, 
follow Tynset’s principle of associations and demand that the reader work with the 
text, thus sharpening her awareness for the Auschwitz dimension of reality. This 
dimension is as present in Masante as it is in Tynset, perhaps even more so. In a 
conversation about Masante, Hildesheimer repeats his Frankfurt guidelines for 
politically engaged literature dedicated to the representation of Wirklichkeit as 
containing a dimension of Auschwitz: the driving force of prose is not formal play but 
the author’s inner microcosm conveyed by formal means. Unless the inner microcosm 
already contains the writer’s “Programm, sein ideologisches oder sein existentielles 
Programm,” form alone will not amount to political engagement:  
 
Das Schreiben selbst ist ein bewusster Vorgang, bei dem man auf das 
Kompositorische, das Stilistische achten muss und nicht auf 
irgendwelche persönlichen Dinge. Man muss sich darauf verlassen 
können, dass das eigene Ich, das ideologische Ich, das existentielle Ich, 
automatisch beim Schreiben zum Vorschein kommt. Man darf es nicht 
bewusst hervorzerren. Ich kann nicht Missstände anprangern, indem ich 
sie tatsächlich erwähne, ich darf nicht die wahren Missstände 
erwähnen. Ich muss Parallelen ziehen, und ich muss mich darauf 
verlassen können, dass sie tatsächlich so wirken, wie sie gemeint sind: 
als ein Element meiner inneren Konstitution. (...) Formale Bewältigung 
ist das Vehikel, auf dem das automatisch ins Werk fließende 
Bewusstsein des Ich-Erzählers sich bewegt.106 
 
                                                
104 Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 287. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 291f. 
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Political engagement by an author is not, as Hildesheimer states elsewhere, writing a 
book about Vietnam: the description of factual events and causal relation is not the 
business of a writer, who deals with fiction.107 The form fiction takes is the result of a 
writer’s conscious deliberations; what comes to articulation is his inner microcosm, 
which exists independent of form. Asked whether Masante is “das Äußerste an 
Engagement (…), was man mit Literatur leisten sollte,” Hildesheimer responds that he 
at least exhausted his possibilities for combining the political with the literary.108 Any 
further steps towards the political would lead away from literature. “Engagement muss 
sein,” he says elsewhere, but he chose to be a writer, not a journalist: “Ich bin leider 
nicht zum homo politicus geboren, ich kann nur hoffen, dass der innere Mikrokosmos 
ein Bestandteil von mir ist, der sich automatisch und damit auch in allen Fiktionen 
äußert. Wenn er sich nicht äußert, gut, dann bin ich gescheitert.”109 Because his inner 
microcosm contains the experience of Nazi persecution, his “Beitrag zur 
Bewusstseinserweiterung” is not only colored by it but marks its defining 
characteristic.110 
 
Coming to Terms with Schrecken 
Not much happens in Masante. The insomniac narrator of Tynset, now fifty-
two years old,111 has arrived in Meona, a settlement on the edge of a desert, and he 
moves back and forth between his room and a bar that are both part of an inn called 
“la dernière chance.” The name is a pun on the location of the bar; less obviously, it 
alludes to the narrator’s final attempt to find the least populated place possible where 
he might write and give testimony (341, 348). The plot spans the afternoon and 
                                                
107 Hildesheimer and Prangel, "Interview mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," 6. 
108 Ibid., 5. 
109 Hildesheimer and Kesting, "Ende der Fiktionen," 64. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Hildesheimer, Masante, 169. From now on page numbers are included parenthetically in the text. 
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evening of one day, July 1 (158), and the following night, during which the narrator 
interacts with Maxine and Alain, the innkeepers and, briefly, an Irish policeman or 
military serviceman who frequents the bar. Asked about “das Hauptthema” of Tynset, 
Hildesheimer replied “das Entsetzliche.”112 Of Masante he says, it is “das Buch eines 
Scheiternden, der dem Schrecken nichts entgegenzusetzen hat.”113 At the end of Tynset 
the narrator is still functioning; at the end of Masante, he has vanished into the desert.  
The goal of the narrator’s travel is described only vaguely and is not fully 
discernible. At first the only clear explanation the narrator gives is to be away from 
Masante, his home in the Italian Renaissance city of Urbino.114 Meona is “Fluchtpunkt 
und Kontrapunkt zu Masante” (165), and that is the location’s sole value. The narrator 
appears to be on the run from “Schrecken” that overcame him at Masante. In Meona, 
he predicts, “Dinge” should lose “ihren Schrecken” (174). Because of his distance to 
Masante, the narrator believes he will be able, “Früheres abzustreifen” (174). 
Although he defends his reasons for leaving Masante (186), he leaves them unnamed. 
He arrives in Meona “unter dem ewigen Vorwand des Suchens nach bestimmten 
Dimensionen der Distanz” (216) and to settle accounts with other places, including, 
presumably, Masante, although there are in fact “viele” (186). For roughly the first 
quarter of the book, it thus seems as if the narrator were haunted in Masante by 
memories of earlier events (“Früheres”) and the horror (“Schrecken”) that attached not 
only to the past but also to the present. In Meona he hopes to create distance to both 
the setting of the horror and the horror itself.  
                                                
112 Hildesheimer, "Antworten über Tynset," 385. 
113 Wolfgang Hildesheimer and Dieter E. Zimmer, "Gespräch mit dem Autor: Wolfgang Hildesheimer. 
Rückzug aus der Zeit," Die Zeit, April 13, 1973. Emphasis mine. 
114 For several years Hildesheimer owned a house outside Urbino, named Cal Masante, and there he 
wrote most of Masante. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Abschied von Masante," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, 
Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig 
and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 705-11. Cf. a short prose piece, dated 1969, in which 
Hildesheimer developed some of the themes of Masante: Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Cal Masante," in 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden, Bd. II, Monologische Prosa, ed. 
Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 398-410. 
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Throughout the rest of the text, however, this initial logic—to get away from 
Masante because it provokes and gives home to Schrecken—evolves and turns out to 
be pretext (“Vorwand”). The narrator ultimately seeks distance from Masante in order 
to desire its presence; in the condition of “Nicht-zuhause-Sein” (173) he begins “mir 
Masante von fern heranzuträumen” (229). In fact, he seeks distance from Masante 
only to examine it and its horrors closely. Being in Meona, “ein extremer Ort, 
außerhalb der Welt von Masante” (247), encourages his mind to wander independently 
and to invite back into his consciousness those images that he had tried to forget in 
Masante (341, 347). The actual goal of his trip reveals itself to be the narrator’s wish 
and need to write. Near the end of Masante the narrator names the larger 
“Experiment” of which Meona is but a small piece. Here as elsewhere—in Masante, in 
the house further north in which he dreamt of Tynset, but also in hotel rooms of travels 
preceding Meona (173)—the goal is: “[n]iederschreiben um abzustreifen” (348). 
Instead of running from Schrecken, as he did in Masante, the narrator wants to make 
the Schrecken that haunts him present again in order to work through it. In Freudian 
terms, he wants to erinnern, wiederholen, durcharbeiten.115 Because Meona promises 
to be a place “wo nichts ist,” the narrator anticipates that “dort (…) es sich abspulen 
[wird],” without yet defining the it whose unfolding or unspooling he desires (232). 
He hopes to connect the images that emerge in the process, but in which constellation 
and to what end he is unsure himself: “Ich stelle fest: die Bilder kommen schnell und 
willig (...). Jetzt sollen sich Zusammenhänge ergeben und sich verknüpfen, so dass 
etwas entsteht, das ich brauchen kann. Aber was? Und wozu?” (247) Knowing that 
Schrecken “wirkt erst, wenn man ihn hinter sich hat” (161), the narrator deals with 
fragmented images that he yearns to form into a complete unit; in this vein, his self-
imposed task in Meona is to think “[e]inen Gedanken, oder auch nur den Seitenzweig 
                                                
115 Cf. Freud, "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through." 
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eines Gedankens, bis zur Reife (…) um ihn in ein Bild zu fassen, das in allem bis ins 
letzte stimmt” (167). Any thought or association could be “der rettende Gedanke” 
(187)—it could be the key to the riddle of Schrecken and might make sense of the 
fragments as which the narrator experiences his world in the aftermath of Schrecken. 
Therefore every memory, association, story, name—in sum: every “Ansatzpunkt” 
(233)—is worth investigation. And yet each point of departure also holds the danger 
of pulling the narrator back into Schrecken, without accomplishing the goal of making 
sense of it. Thus a paperweight, which the narrator brought from Masante and which 
sits on a stack of notes that serve him as aide-mémoire, is a warning sign from a 
transmission tower, reading “CHI TOCCA MUORE: Wer berührt, stirbt!” (271, cf. 
163) The “Zettelkasten” contains a number of invisible notes—perhaps memories the 
narrator is incapable of writing down or even able to remember consciously—and 
these notes share one “Grundmotiv,” namely Schrecken (220). The stack of notes 
exudes promise as well as threat. Perhaps the narrator would be able to make sense of 
his past if he consciously evoked individual memories and tried to relate them, but 
perhaps the traumatic, fragmented memories would be fatal.116  
Meona is no man’s land. It is an old caravansary with the ocean far to the east 
and a “Barbarenstaat” to the west (161).117 At the time of his arrival, only Maxine and 
Alain, a handful of scientists, and five members either of the police or the military, 
who guard against smugglers, are in Meona (164f.). Fascinated with names, the 
narrator says aloud “Me-o-na,” marveling at the first syllable, which for bilingual 
Hildesheimer perhaps evoked the first person singular, followed by a long omega and 
a short “ne,” which could inflect the construction as interrogatory. The name thus 
                                                
116 In 1965 Hildesheimer wrote his editor that the title of the new prose project was Toccata, 
emphasizing the importance of memory’s deadly lure for the entire project. Cf. Hildesheimer, letter to 
Dierk Rodewald and Klaus Ramm, December 25, 1965, Hildesheimer, Briefe, 141. 
117 Hildesheimer identified it as a settlement in Israel. Hildesheimer and Prangel, "Interview mit 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer," 7.  
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brings together the I, the end, and a question mark, setting the tone for the narrator’s 
search for story endings and perhaps his own death (165). Meona is a place in a 
process of gradual extinction (167), but this is not its most outstanding quality. What 
marks it as counterpoint to Masante and the narrator’s earlier home in the mountains 
(the setting of Tynset, 204) is that, on a map, Meona dissolves in the white space that 
marks the vast desert. Because Meona is unmarked, for the narrator Meona is “eine 
weiße Fläche auf der Jagdkarte aller Verfolger und Häscher” (219). 
 
Terror Travels in Sets of Two: Häscher 
Häscher is the key word in Masante. It is an archaic term for persecutor, and it 
appears more than forty times in the text.118 Häscher are carriers of Schrecken, a word 
repeated with almost the same frequency. It is “erschreckend,” for instance, how many 
parents choose to name their child Uwe, a name that the narrator, for whom names are 
red flags unleashing memories and associations, considers dangerous, for it appears to 
come “aus einem finsteren Ursprung” (169). Upon hearing the name Uwe, the narrator 
once experienced a “Schrecksekunde, die, wie so viele, durch Wiederholung wirkt. 
Die Sekunde vergeht, der Schreck bleibt” (170). The name Helmut, by contrast, 
provokes not fear but sadness: of the several Helmuts he knew, the one he liked 
committed suicide (157), perhaps because he was persecuted by Häscher. The small 
side remark, on the first page of the novel, that those people whom the narrator does 
not like do not commit suicide but act “im Gegenteil,” i.e., commit homicide, or even 
genocide, vaguely establishes the narrator’s position within a grid of victimization 
(157). While it is unclear whether he fell victim himself to the violence of Häscher, 
his victimization is suggested elsewhere (334).  
                                                
118 Lea counts forty-one times; I noted the term Häscher forty-six times. Cf. Lea, Hildesheimers Weg, 
92. In addition to Häscher, Hildesheimer uses the terms Sbirren, Schergen, and agentes in rebus 
synonymously (342).  
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Names such as Uwe and Helmut are “Anhaltspunkte” for the narrator (206). 
He furnishes his room at the inn with three personal items: a stack of note cards, the 
paperweight securing them, and a wall calendar. This is a Catholic calendar of saints 
and name days, and while each year the calendar is sent anonymously from Germany 
in a fruitless attempt to convert the narrator (157), the recipient treasures it for its 
wealth of names and the stories he associates with them. Names anchor the narrator’s 
life; “ohne sie wäre ich völlig verloren, mit ihnen bin ich es nur halb” (206). His is an 
obsessive interest in names: “mich hätte sogar interessiert, wie Rotkäppchen mit Vor- 
und Nachnamen hieß” (179). Interestingly his own name is of no importance to him 
(284), perhaps because he does not want Häscher to know it. But he collects other 
people’s calling cards, which he stores among his note cards or distributes as if they 
were his own to test whether he can “Fäden zwischen Unbekannten (…) spinnen, ein 
Gewebe von Ahnungen,” a game that sometimes ends with the discovery of dark 
secrets (235). The names and events marked by the church calendar all have violent 
secrets: reflecting on the day of the feast of precious blood, the narrator discovers the 
illegal practice of dealing in and forging relics (160); behind the celebration of the 
nine choirs of angels lies a history of auto-de-fé of those who disagreed on the exact 
number of choirs (170f.); the announcement of a world savings day spurred new 
waves of anti-Semitism (201); and Saint Simeon Stylites spread anti-Semitic 
propaganda and encouraged the burning of synagogues and the prosecution of 
innocents (319). The small calendar refers to a long history of inhuman criminal 
activity, including human trafficking (160) and murder (164); sexual violence against 
minors (170), women (191), and blood relatives (343); the Inquisition (275) and 
widespread witch-hunts (283, 286f.); and missionary services that brought austerity 
and violence (254). Not truth (“Wahrheit”) but church belief (“Glaubenswahrheit,” 
171) is the primary concern of a system imposed by papal authority, guarded by 
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cardinals, and maintained by a well-organized network of Häscher. For the narrator, 
the word Häscher evokes an image from the bible, of men whose only aim and 
activity is to produce fear and terror (273). 
The narrator’s list of crimes committed in the name of Christianity and his 
connection of church history with the employment of persecutors suggests that 
Masante, above all, is the product of Hildesheimer’s severe criticism of the church, 
especially the Catholic church (although he does not spare Protestantism either, cf. 
256). Braese favors this interpretation of Masante.119 While Hildesheimer’s critical 
engagement with Catholicism is evident, a result of his personal interest in the topic,120 
in my opinion it is incorrect to limit Masante to such a reading. While Häscher appear 
in the novel as foot soldiers of the church, hired by the pope as “Diener der absoluten 
Willkür und Gewalt des Kirchenstaates” (275), the emphasis in Masante lies on a 
different kind of Häscher, who, although well tolerated, are not actively engaged by 
the church (276). The Häscher who terrify the narrator are not those active in Middle 
Eastern harems (162) or in the Vatican police state (231); they are not the “Sbirren” of 
the Spanish Inquisition (275) or historical, long-forgotten “Fänger” or “Schergen” 
(273). Rather Häscher are Germans and Austrians of the narrator’s own generation: 
they are former Nazis, members of Hitler’s security police (203, 225), guilty of the 
genocide of the Salonika Jews (334). These Häscher were involved in the “final 
solution” (referred to by Hildesheimer as “endgültige Lösung,” 274) as “Vergaser” 
                                                
119 Braese combines his reading of church-related passages with those of instances in which the narrator 
objects to capitalism, connecting the two and arguing for an interpretation of Masante as a criticism of a 
link between Christianity and capitalism in postwar Germany. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 368. 
120 For a period of time Hildesheimer was quite attracted to Catholicism, later explaining that artists in 
general are drawn to the ceremoniousness of Catholic practice. He considered writing a book on 
Catholicism but eventually dropped the project for practical reasons: he did not want to invest the time 
it would take to read up on church history. Cf. Hildesheimer and Hillrichs, Ich werde nun schweigen, 
38. His intellectual and emotional engagement with Catholicism bore fruit in one prose piece, cf. 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Exerzitien mit Papst Johannes," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, Gesammelte 
Werke. Bd. I, Erzählende Prosa, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1991), 313-30. 
 202 
(291) and drove other victims into “Stacheldraht” (266). The Schrecken is thus clearly 
identified. The trauma that the narrator seeks to come to terms with is the Nazi 
genocide of the Europeans Jews. With anti-Semitic propaganda spread by St. Simeon 
and Luther alike (319, 276), the church contributed to an environment that enabled 
genocide, but it is neither the main target of the narrator’s criticism nor the source of 
his fear.  
The narrator, who may or may not have been a Jewish victim of Nazi 
persecution, has an impeccable memory for the names of Häscher he has met and their 
biographies. Flötterle shot his Greek girlfriend’s brother in Salonika (334) and is 
Fricke’s brother-in-law (203). Security police officer Fricke (225) acts only from a 
sense of duty (274) when he defiles a cemetery (202), presumably a Jewish cemetery. 
Tyrolian Kranzmeier brags of how he used to hit two sets of teeth with just one well-
placed punch (221). Religious and musically inclined murderer Motschmann (213, 
255f.)—or perhaps Mutschmann (328)—has a golden tooth on which his victims 
focused, knowing “dass jetzt alles vorbei ist” (213), and today he holds a desk job in 
which he fondly remembers the good feeling of intimidating his victim face-to-face 
(329). Perchtl wanted to become a priest until “der Zug der Zeit” called him to a 
different duty (256), which he executed with such vigor that he, like the transmission 
tower, should have carried a sign warning of his deadly powers (271). Starck, while 
drunk, strangled Dr. Szygmunt Weiszbrod, a crime of which judge Kabasta—known 
from Tynset as the murderer of Bloch—acquitted him (220).  Stollfuß is a friend of 
animals and nature, but not a people’s friend, and his former profession was to train 
dogs to kill “Leute (…) mit geschorenen Schädeln” (266f.), a method of killing he 
preferred over others, such as death by gas (291). Other Häscher—Völkl, Nekrepp, 
Globotschnik—join the group, but one of them, Schmitt-Lindau, is different: he was 
too gentle and was thus rejected for membership in the SA. As a philosopher with a 
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doctorate, he worked “an neuen ethischen Grundlagen,” sanctioning the system of 
Häscher he helped to refine (301). Most of the biographies are fictional, although 
those of Motschmann and Globotschink are based on the historical figures Martin 
Mutschmann and Odilo Globosnik, whom Hildesheimer knew for their extreme anti-
Semitism.121   
In stark contrast to the narrator’s extensive knowledge of the persecutors 
stands his ignorance of the victims. Despite his obsessive interest in names, he cannot 
remember the name of the person who suffered most immediately at the hands of 
Häscher: remembered at first only as a classmate—“wie hieß der?” (174)—who was 
fearful, “Gerber oder Felber oder Lüning” as the narrator alternately recalls the name 
(257), was actually “weit mehr als nur ein Mitschüler” (199). Late in the text the name 
Bloch, known as a murder victim in Tynset,122 “taucht aus irgendeiner Vergangenheit 
hervor, Bloch, sein Bild, sein Name, aber keine andere Eigenschaft als Furcht vor den 
Häschern” (272). Bloch is appended to the list of names but used interchangeably for 
the victim in general. The ambiguity created by the use of different names suggests 
that the narrator refers to many victims whose identities he would like to restore, 
though he fails because of their sheer quantity. The victim remains anonymous; she 
remains “kein bestimmter.” “Ich bin der, den Sie suchen,” the narrator once told (or 
imagines to have told) two Häscher. “‘Wir suchen keinen bestimmten,’” they replied 
(320). The reader is left to piece together the story of the classmate, who fell victim to 
Fricke or Motschmann (212) when they asked to see his identification card. Reluctant 
to show it and thereby help Häscher in pursuit of their victims (257), he hid in train 
stations and visited many places, including Tynset, on his flight (258). Found in 
                                                
121 Cf. Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 293. Durzak compared Masante to Alexander 
Kluge’s 1962 Lebensläufe. Anwesenheitsliste für eine Beerdigung, and Hildesheimer did not deny its 
influence. 
122 Hildesheimer, Tynset, 63. 
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Germany, he was beaten (321); he was forced to pack “ein wenig Besitz” and then led 
to “an einen verschwiegenen Ort, so dass er niemals mehr gesehen würde, weder 
lebend noch tot” (299). Finally he is chased down a street and across a bridge,  
 
es geht ein Winterwind, er bläst in Stößen, während man Bloch von 
hinten niederschießt, ihn in den Kanal wirft, wo sich sein Blut mit dem 
eisigen Abwasser mischt. Erst nach Tagen und Nächten zieht man 
ihn—er ist unkenntlich geworden—an einer anderen Brücke aus dem 
Wasser, während es schneit: Weihnachten steht vor der Tür, Leute 
tragen Weihnachtsbäume, zu Weihnachten—so munkelt man unter 
Nachbarn, aber Genaueres weiß niemand—, zu Weihnachten hat man 
wieder ein paar von den Kerlen abgeknallt. Das zur Zufriedenheit aller 
und zum Schutz der Bevölkerung, ja, es sind unruhige Zeiten, 
Krisenzeiten. (299)  
 
This passage references the complicity of large parts of the German and Austrian 
population in the persecution of Jews; it also connects several loose associative chains, 
from Christmas trees and wind to the traumatic Schrecken of Bloch’s end. Häscher, 
Bloch had told the narrator, always spread terror in sets of two (331); “[es sind] immer 
zwei, immer im Gleichschritt,” the narrator learns in Salonika (255) where he met 
Häscher personally (331). As result, the narrator is suspicious of pairs of men: “Wo 
zwei kommen, ist Vorsicht geboten, Angst ist am Platz” (228). Upon entering the bar 
for the first time, the narrator is relieved to see only one and “nicht zwei Tropenhelme, 
kein Grund zur Unruhe!” (167) At the bar, Maxine tells the narrator of a Christmas 
tree, left to her by two men (298), and suddenly the narrator panics and immediately 
considers leaving Meona, which no longer seems like a white space on the map:  
 
Dieser Weihnachtsbaum in der Wüste! Es werden wieder weiße 
Flächen sichtbar auf der Landkarte der Schrecken. Vielleicht ist das ein 
Zeichen, dass der Ausweg durch den Sand, für den Fall, dass 
irgendeiner ihn zu gehen beliebe, Gerber zum Beispiel oder Lüning, 
versperrt sei. (...) [I]ch [will] nicht dort sein, wo es Häscher antreibt, 
einen Motschmann, einen Schmitt-Lindach. Hätte denn Maxine von 
denen einen Weihnachtsbaum angenommen? Ich werde nicht lange 
hierbleiben, es hält mich nicht an einem Ort, wo eine unbekannte Hand 
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Kulturgegenstände verteilt, böse Kerne ins Idyllische verpacht; einen 
Punkt, der einbezogen ist in das Netz der Planer und Vermesser, die 
ihre Grenzen dauernd auswärts treiben, Unwirtliches wirtlich, 
Unheimliches heimisch zu machen, Bäume pflanzen oder schmücken 
und so den Boden vorbereiten für das Entsetzliche: Weihnachtsbaum—
Singen unter dem Baum—Hausmusik—Hausordnung—
Zuchtundordnung—Verhör und Folterung—Mord—Motschmann, 
Globotschnik, Perchtl— — (253) 
 
The existence of a Christmas tree in the desert unsettles the narrator. The tradition of 
the tree originated in Germany, was popularized by Luther—identified as an anti-
Semite and a proponent of Häscher (256)—and spread all over the Western world in 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. With the association of Bloch’s death, the 
complicit population carrying trees, and Maxine’s Christmas tree, the narrator fears 
that the tree foreshadows the arrival of Nazi Häscher in the desert. In one of only a 
very few direct references to Germany and Germanness,123 the narrator articulates his 
concern for German ambitions to territorial expansion: “Nichts gegen das Deutsche in 
seinen Grenzen, doch viel gegen den Anspruch, der es aus den Grenzen löst” (188).  
 The winter wind, and wind in general, evokes fear in the narrator, who 
associates it with Bloch’s death. The afternoon winds commence “die böse Stunde” 
when he is haunted by memories that force him “auf alle viere,” and fear is the 
emotional correspondent to wind (204f.). Thus the wellbeing of the narrator depends 
on “woher der Wind weht” (205), obviously referring not only to physical wind but 
political trends as well.124 “[D]amals,” when Starck killed Weiszbrodt, the laws 
dictated by political winds of the time protected a murderer (220). Although political 
winds shifted in the meantime, the narrator senses a growing desire for the return of 
legal safeguarding of murder, and because political winds go with the majority, he 
fears the near resurrection of the old system. Already Kabasta and Kranzmeier are on 
                                                
123 Infrequently he refers to city names, such as Nuremberg (175, 345) and Frankfurt (303)—
incidentally the sites of the two largest sets of Nazi trials.  
124 Cf. Hildesheimer’s reasons for leaving Germany.  
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their way into political office (220). The return of Häscher seems to the narrator 
imminent, since even in the current democracy former Nazis were not being 
prosecuted. Despite their murderous past, today they live “gut und gern” (266) in 
office jobs (272) and will die, unlike their victims, peacefully (266). In an image that 
overwhelms him, the narrator connects Häscher of Einsatzgruppen whom no one 
wishes to remember, the nameless victims who are forgotten (even honorably so), and 
the general satisfaction with this situation of amnesia and welcomed oblivion: 
 
[D]a erschienen Zeichen vergangener Schrecken, leuchteten Spuren 
vom Blut der Geiseln, erschossen von abziehenden 
Schreckensmännern, Umlegern, und da sind sie denn wieder, die 
Häscher [sic] 
 Motschmann, Kranzmeier, Fötterle, jünger als heute, vielleicht 
auch eine andere Generation, doch unverändert, gestiefelt und gespornt, 
im Einsatz, wie man es nannte, nennt und nennen wird. Ein Bild zwar, 
aber keine Geschichte mehr. Das Blut ist verblichen, die Opfer liegen, 
in Ehren vergessen, unter der Erde, die Angehörigen haben sich längst 
abgefunden, und Kranzmeier, Fricke und Kabasta weisen, gebläht in 
tiefer Befriedigung, auf Untaten, die seitdem begangen wurden und 
begangen werden, und lassen sich darüber vergessen. Aber ich, ich 
habe das Bild unter meinen Bildern. (216f., emphasis mine) 
 
Holding on to the images of Nazi persecutors, the narrator criticizes German and 
Austrian forms of Vergangenheitsbewältigung that discarded them. Unlike the former 
perpetrators he cannot compare their crimes with those of others. Nazis and Häscher 
are different from “Fänger” (273) and “Sbirren” (275), in so far as the former were 
“ausgerüstet mit der Zustimmung der Behörden, bedacht mit dem Behagen einer 
wachsenden Mehrheit, die sich nicht zu fürchten braucht, die den Schrecken gern 
billigt, weil er sie nicht trifft” (273). The narrator’s fear of Häscher and the status quo 
that may allow—that will probably allow—their return, is omnipresent, which is why 
he envies animals: not only do they forget yesterday’s “tödlichen Kampf,” but they 
also do not know any fear of tomorrow’s Häscher (184).   
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The narrator believes he has found protection against the winds in Meona, 
which are mysterious and frightening even to Maxine and Alain (312), when he sees 
the Irishman use an umbrella (227). Pondering the usefulness of umbrellas in the 
desert, the narrator recalls the history of the umbrella—and belatedly answers his 
question from Tynset as to who had invented it.125 While the story of the umbrella is 
fictional, Hildesheimer’s narrator remembers learning from schoolbooks that it was a 
poor tailor, “[gezeichnet] von der Würde des Scheiternden,” who designed the 
umbrella, much to the amusement of his neighborhood. The narrator then radicalizes 
the image by turning the tailor into a “Jud!” of whom everyone hoped, “dass die 
Vernichtung ihn treffe” (268). The narrator is suddenly confronted with the 
recollection that a few decades ago umbrellas were produced in Germany “aus 
Menschenhaut, was übrigens (…) nicht in den Schulbüchern steht” (269). The 
associative chain of umbrella, the extermination of the Jews, and human skin is later 
concentrated in another of the narrator’s memories, this one of Bloch, to whom one of 
the Häscher said: “‘ich möchte nicht in deiner Haut stecken, und, in der Tat, ich 
fürchte, du wirst auch bald nicht mehr drin stecken, Bloch’” (300). In Tynset Bloch’s 
murderer was identified as Kabasta, who today “steht (…) als Veteran auf der 
Landesliste” (220). In Masante the narrator’s knowledge of the history of the 
umbrella’s invention, known from school, thus led to cognizance of the continued 
existence of Häscher who remain unpunished in postwar Germany. This fact no 
textbook reveals. 
Gottlieb Hinkel, the Jewish tailor and inventor of the umbrella according to the 
text, is not unlike Don Quixote, “diesem größten Scheiterer, dem man zu ewiger 
                                                
125 Cf. Hildesheimer, Tynset, 266. In Masante Hildesheimer picks up several motifs he introduced in 
Tynset or earlier, most importantly Hamlet, whom the narrator sends into the desert as form of dismissal 
because his father’s death is, compared to other deaths, benign (263, 277-280); and Salonika, the Greek 
city that lost its Jewish population almost entirely to the persecution by Häscher (189, 196, 255, 300-
333).  
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Erinnerung Denkmäler setzen sollte” (189, cf. 268). Instead of commemorating him as 
a victim of ridicule and anti-Semitism, Hinkel is instead remembered as a fraud by the 
same textbooks that omit Nazi crimes. Hinkel, who became famous once he sold an 
umbrella to margrave Friedrich Wilhelm von Ansbach (another fictional character), is 
discovered to have posed as member of the nobility (269f.). Any violence he might 
have experienced was caused by his own doing, the textbook interpretation seems to 
suggest.  
The figure of von Ansbach appears twice in Masante. Previously, a list of 
animals—and one human—hunted by von Ansbach, was inserted into the text 
uncontextualized and without commentary by the narrator: 
 
1763 Milane, 
4174 Reiher, 
1647 Elstern, 
10084 Rebhühner, 
985 Fasane, 
939 Hasen, 
1 Halbbruder, über den jedoch die Geschichte der Jagd schweigt. (236f.) 
 
This list, extended by one chimney sweep the margrave shot to impress his girlfriend, 
records the exact number of victims, and it is reminiscent of lists compiled by 
Einsatzgruppen, the SS death squads.126 Besides the earlier mention of Häscher who 
are “im Einsatz” (216), this is the only instance in which Hildesheimer’s experiences 
at the Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg find direct expression in his work. 
Although the Häscher under consideration are Nazis and Schrecken refers to 
the Holocaust, as subtle but frequent side remarks such as “Zyklon” (165) or 
“Laderampe” (216) confirm, this specific event is not a singularity within history. 
Following the curious insertion of the list of hunted animals, the narrator recapitulates 
                                                
126 Cf. Lea, Hildesheimers Weg, 278. 
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the family history of his German girlfriend Niki Almesin, who is the only 
“wohlgeratene Tochter” in her family, and he concludes: 
 
[E]s entsteht eine saubere Reihe von Kämpfern, Raufbolden, Säufern 
und Mördern, die dafür sorgt, dass Geschichte entsteht. Vergeblich 
sucht man irgendwo den Atemzug eines humanen Gedankens oder auch 
nur einen Ausspruch, der Menschenwürde zu erkennen gäbe, oder 
einen, der sie zumindest in anderen erkannt hätte, aber nichts: keiner 
hat etwas zum Guten getan oder gesagt, keiner ist auf dem 
Scheiterhaufen geendet oder hat einen vom Scheiterhaufen gerettet. 
(237f.) 
 
In the view of the narrator history is the culmination of crimes against humanity. No 
one stands in for the victims to save them from murderous history; no one judges the 
perpetrators and restores the dignity of those victimized. When Niki’s family bears 
mentally ill children, her German relatives “schieben den Verfall auf fremdländischen 
Einschlag,” whereas it was incestuous relationships that caused genetic defects and 
altered the family, as the narrator knows (238). The family, instead of taking 
responsibility, looked for and found a scapegoat to blame, and this, according to the 
narrator, is how history repeats itself. Identical with history is time in general, that is, 
the passing of time that enables the unfolding of history. Therefore the narrator is 
“erschrocken” when he discovers among his notes a card that reads “ZEIT” (215). 
Time is another “four-letter-word,” like “FUCK” and “SHIT,” and it is the curse of 
time from which the narrator believes he suffers (215).  
 According to Masante the Holocaust may not have been the deadliest 
catastrophe, but it is the one that keeps the narrator in perpetual fear. Hildesheimer, 
who in later years shows great engagement in ecological initiatives and becomes an 
outspoken supporter of environmental groups such as Greenpeace, already makes 
known in Masante his concern that man is in the process of destroying life 
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altogether.127 Braese argues that the ecological subtext of Masante serves the purpose 
of articulating the extent to which Hildesheimer experienced the dimension of 
Auschwitz, which is similar to unavoidable environmental catastrophe in that both are 
fatal.128 Several environmental concerns—referenced as the exhaustion of natural 
resources and extinct insects (167), overfished bodies of water (217), deforestation 
(262), artificial overfeeding of animals raised for food (282), and industrial food 
(282)—mark this subtext of Masante, which is intimately connected to yet another 
history of abuse, violence, and misanthropy: capitalism.129 Hildesheimer links 
capitalism to the centuries-old practice of oppressing the poor (171) to sustain order 
between “Hütten” and “Palästen” (317).130 Häscher were first employed in the defense 
of that order, and in this role they matured to become the twentieth-century Häscher of 
the sort of Motschmann, Fricke, et al. In establishing this link Hildesheimer suggests a 
connection between capitalism and the Holocaust, and, more recently, environmental 
disasters: all three share as their cause human activity in disregard for life. It is via this 
connection that Masante, beyond addressing inadequate attempts at 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, anti-Semitism, and the affective instability of victims of 
                                                
127 Hildesheimer’s later writings attest to his commitment to environmental causes. Cf. his public 
statements in the 1980s, published originally in his local newspapers: “Klage und Anklage” (1984), 
“Notat eines Verlierers” (1986), and “In den Wind geschrieben” (1988), published in vol. VII of 
Gesammelte Werke. By the late eighties, after successfully protesting against various environmentally 
questionable projects in Grisons (such as a power plant at the Graina mountain pass), Hildesheimer was 
known as one who “öffentlich auftritt gegen alles, was die Umwelt gewissenlos ausbeutet.”  N. N., 
"Zorniges Beten. Wolfgang Hildesheimers Klage und Anklage," Neue Züricher Zeitung, August 11, 
1989. In a Stern interview in 1984 that received considerable attention, Hildesheimer said: “Ich glaube, 
dass in wenigen Generationen der Mensch die Erde verlassen wird. (…) Die Katastrophen unserer Tage 
sind irreversibel.” Qtd. in: Briegleb, "Weiterschreiben!," 351.  
128 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 372. 
129 The connection is further explored in a radio play that aired in 1974, and which Hildesheimer 
considered part of the Masante material, cf. Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Hauskauf," in Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. V, Hörspiele, ed. Christiaan Lucas Hart 
Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 401-44. For a discussion of Hauskauf, cf. 
Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 371n15.  
130 “Friede den Hütten! Krieg den Palästen!” was Büchner’s revolutionary call in the 1834 pamphlet 
Der Hessische Landbote. Hildesheimer’s admiration for Büchner’s political writings is manifest in his 
Büchner prize speech.   
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the past who can no longer negotiate the present, articulates a political agenda that is 
anti-capitalist and environmentalist. In the seventies, this should have resonated well 
with the left—but it did not, as the reception of Masante missed it more or less 
completely.  
 
Disappearance into the Desert 
 Towards the end of Masante, the narrator is increasingly attracted by the lure 
of the desert. Though in the beginning he experiences panic and fear at the sight of the 
desert (204) and seeks shelter in the bar (206), he later contemplates a walk through 
the desert as a possibility to see “Vergangenes im Licht einer neuen Sicht” (291). 
Because he has “die Eigenschaft der Sicht noch nicht im Griff” (291), he discards the 
idea quickly, but returns to it later in the full knowledge that he may die in the desert 
(347). His gradual leaning towards visiting the desert despite its danger goes hand in 
hand with the slow realization that he is failing to bear witness to the past in a manner 
that would allow him to work through it. The realization that “alle Ansätze (…) vertan 
[sind]” (166) drives him into the desert, presumably to commit suicide or at least to 
refuse resistance against dying. There is no Ansatz, no point for departure, for the 
future, as the present is an ongoing echo of the past. His “Ansatz ist verwirkt” (181). 
Furthermore, there is no use for testimony, for no one is there to listen. The following 
is one of the crucial passages of the text that accentuates the narrator’s resignation 
over history, his failure to change its course, and the fruitlessness of testimony: 
 
Was rede ich da vor mir her, was schwingt da mit, was verschweige 
ich? Was sollen die herausgegriffenen Beispiele, was versuche ich 
anhand ihrer zu retten? Eine Niederschrift anfertigen, die Nachkommen 
an mich erinnert? Ich habe keine. Und wozu erinnert bleiben? 
Wohl dem Anaximander! Er hat nur einen einzigen Satz gesagt, 
der steht. Gewiss, er hatte das Glück, ihn aus einer weithin unerkannten 
Welt greifen zu können. Die meine ist erkannt und ausgebeutet. Sie gibt 
keinen guten Satz mehr her. Den Punkt setzen, den Schlussstrich 
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setzen, meine Zeit ist vorbei. In Zukunft wird nicht mehr gesungen: es 
gibt keine Tonarten mehr zur Wahl. Nur noch eine. Nein, zwei: Befehl 
und Schrei. Wer nicht befiehlt oder schreit, der verstummt. 
Zeugenschaft abgeben? Für wen? Wovon? Von Gleichgültigkeit, 
Dulden, Versagen, Ohnmacht? Lieber ein Ende; der Pfahl im Fleisch ist 
besser als die muntere Salmonelle, nur eben, er schmerzt. Ich war „zu 
nichts bestimmt,“ zum Kämpfer schon gar nicht. Gern wäre ich einer 
von denen gewesen, die fahneschwingend über Barrikaden springen, 
ein Befreier unter Befreiern. Aber wer sind sie? Ein Mythos, ein 
schönes Märchen. (...) Die falschen Ordnungen sind eingesessen, 
eingesengt; wer sagt, dass sie ausrottbar seien, der irrt. Der kennt sie 
nicht, die Häscher, die Sbirren, Schergen, agentes in rebus und ihre 
Herren. 
„...denn sie müssen Buße zahlen und für ihre Ungerechtigkeiten 
gerichtet werden, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit.“ Wohl dem 
Anaximander! Und wohl der Ordnung seiner Zeit. (341f.)131 
 
Here the narrator questions his method. He picks examples of Schrecken as his 
classmate suffered them, neither addressing, let alone examining, his own experiences, 
nor explaining the circumstance in which he found “ein menschliches Ohr” (261), 
something he mentions casually (“übrigens”) but quickly dismisses (“aber das ist eine 
andere Geschichte,” 245). To give testimony in writing is pointless. There is no 
interest in his perspective of history, which is that of the victim who experienced not 
heroism but helplessness and the callousness of complicit bystanders. He is no “Held 
(…) der Tat” (206), he did not fight back (315), and because there is no audience for 
his testimony—not even Maxine—, which essentially would amount to justified 
accusations and require moral repair, he decides to go silent. He is aware that in his 
inner world “sich seit geraumer Zeit bereits eine Todesursache [bildet]” (346), and this 
Todesursache is the “neue Dimension[, die] in mein Bewusstsein getreten [ist], eine 
gefährliche Wachheit” (291). The narrator reaches the “Bewusstsein, in dem die 
                                                
131 By using the terms Häscher, Sbirren, Schergen, and agentes in rebus, the narrator refers to history as 
a succession of criminals operating in the name of the state or the church. Agentes in rebus were Roman 
imperial agents in the early middle ages; the Italian Sbirri served as papal police; Schergen, 
misleadingly translated into English as henchman, originally described court officers, including 
hangmen and torturers in the service of the court.  
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Dimension Auschwitz erhalten ist”132 und therefore recognizes that the world is 
divided into orders (“Befehle” by Häscher, the church, the police and military, 
capitalists, and politicians) and cries (“Schreie”). He is unwilling to participate, and 
thus his only alternative is silence. Every protest has been voiced, every rebellion 
attempted; there is nothing new for the narrator to try to change the course of history. 
Anaximander’s dictum read that those who commit crimes be punished according to 
the law of the time. However, the laws of the narrator’s time no longer punish the 
crimes committed against him in the past. He is alone with the repercussions of these 
crimes. He takes his loneliness to the last extreme, making it absolute by seeking 
death, not through salmonella-poisoned products of the industrialized world, but by 
the poles that mark the desert on the Häscher’s map and disclose his location (219). 
The mention of pole is significant: throughout the text the narrator referenced poles 
(189, 212, 219, 244ff., 322) as markers for both guidance and deception, and the 
frequent use of “Pfahl” and his ultimate death near the desert poles (364f.) suggests 
that he unconsciously considered suicide all along. 
 Resignation over his failure to give testimony—that is, the incapability to do 
so satisfactorily coupled with the lack of an audience—drives him into the desert. The 
typewriter that greets him upon arrival at the bar is simultaneously “Herausforderung” 
and “Abschreckung”; the narrator wants to write an elegy, a melancholic poem to 
lament death (177), but eventually he writes one line—“shall be back presently”—
before in fact disappearing into the desert (362). The failure to write his testimonial is 
intimately linked to the inability to remember and make sense of past events. He often 
reached “eine Ebene innerer Mitteilsamkeit,” in which “Teile des Gehirns (…) 
miteinander [kommunizieren], (…) Gedanken unter sich selbst [austauschen]” 
without, however, sharing with the narrator their “Resultat”: 
                                                
132 Hildesheimer, "Frankfurter Poetik-Vorlesungen," 57. 
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Dann war mir, als erschließe sich jener Zusammenhang, den ich hier 
suche, und erst in diesem Zusammenhang zwischen allem 
Ausdrückbaren, würde sich die Sache, Stoff und Form vereint, zu ihrem 
Hervortreten entschließen. Ich wartete auf den Augenblick der 
Überraschung. Doch der Augenblick kam nicht. Die Erkenntnisse dort 
oben in meinem Gehirn wurden mir nur vorgegaukelt, die schreibfähige 
Hand legte sich aufs Papier, die Worte bildeten sich nicht, die 
Erleuchtung blieb aus. 
 So saß ich vor dem leeren Blatt: nichts. (...) [E]ine Erkenntnis 
innen, die sich mir selbst nicht zu erkennen gab (...). Nicht verwertbar. 
(...) So verharrte ich in vergeblicher Hingabe an etwas vor langem 
Erlebtes, und doch nur in vager Erinnerung daran, und schließlich 
eroberte die Verstörung das Feld, der Moment erlosch: nichts mehr 
greifbar, der Augenblick für immer verloren—nevermore— (260) 
 
Erlebnis does not translate into Erfahrung for the narrator; he cannot make sense of it, 
although he knows that all the information is there, yet locked in his unconsciousness. 
If “die Stunden des Erlebens” were to coincide with “Erkenntnis,” that is, if he had not 
experienced traumatic events, “so wäre ich ein anderer” (336). As it is, he is haunted 
by lost memory fragments that he can find “nie mehr, und das Nichtgefundene wächst 
im Nimbus, steigert sich zur verloren Lösung aller Rätsel, dabei wäre es nichts 
gewesen als ein Zeugnis von Scheitern und Versagen” (187). Coupled with his 
traumatic memory is the feeling of survivor guilt; he is convinced that the full 
knowledge of his traumatic past would disclose that he failed to intervene and prevent 
it from happening. Guilt is thematized in Masante as strongly as in Tynset, albeit more 
subtly. From the onset the narrator feels the burden of his “Schuld an meinem 
Versagen” that results from failure to have acted heroically (158). But because he was 
“harmlos und für andere nicht schwierig,” he became an “ewig bestürzter Unheld” 
(179); his continuous consternation is the consequence of his inactivity. Maxine 
articulates the narrator’s self-accusation when she holds his gaze and says:  
 
„Sie haben verzichtet. Sie sind immer ausgewichen und haben anderen 
Ihren Platz überlassen. Das hat seine zwei Seiten. Manchmal erhalten 
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die anderen den Lohn, manchmal aber auch den Schlag, der Ihnen gilt. 
Ich kenne solche—ich kannte einen, ich habe vergessen wie er hieß, 
den wollte man erschießen, aber der Schuss hat einen anderen 
getroffen, der hinter ihm ging, und er hat sich nicht umgedreht, sonst 
hätte der nächste Schuss ihn getroffen.“  (315) 
 
Rather than respond to Maxine, the narrator flees the bar. He stops at the bar five 
times altogether, and each time she is awake, he engages in narrative competitions 
with Maxine. On this final visit the narrator runs away, owing Maxine a response. 
Maxine has the last word in their fragmented but prolonged dialogue that takes its 
specific form from the peculiar workings of memory. Maxine, herself unsure of her 
own past, tries to correct for this by absorbing the life stories of others and making 
them her own (306). She is a sponge full of memories, eager to share the curious ones 
and drowning in alcohol those she cannot bear (a habit the narrator formerly shared, 
cf. 260). The narrator challenges her to tell the sad tales, but in the end she proffers the 
final challenge. If she is correct in her characterization of the narrator, he feels 
responsible for and guilty of Bloch’s death. His guilt, be it real or perceived, is 
amplified by the process of aging: the older he gets, the more the gulf between him 
and the dead widens. His guilt lies in not having died earlier, along with the others 
(345f.). The narrator goes into the desert, symbolically reenacting the role of the 
biblical scapegoat in Leviticus, a role assigned to his Jewish community, expunged in 
the Holocaust. Through his act of self-abnegation, the narrator seeks to assuage his 
guilt and reunite with those other scapegoats, restoring connection with his lost 
community. The symbolism of the scapegoat and the desert has more to do with the 
plight of the lost Jews than with the plight of the forlorn narrator.  
  There is one other component that motivates the narrator to seek the desert. In 
addition to survivor guilt and to being unable to experience (erfahren) the past, and 
thus failing to give testimony adequately, fear drives the narrator. The Irish soldier or 
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policeman, who is stationed in Meona to control smuggling, warns the narrator upon 
their first encounter that he would end “auf allen vieren” if he were to continue 
running (166). The narrator is alarmed by the Irishman’s knowledge of his movements 
and also by the expression “on all fours,” which is a phrase that recurs later in the text 
and refers alternatively to the narrator’s mental state (204), to an episode at Niki’s 
home that points to a dark secret (241), and to the abuse Maxine suffered as child 
(252). Most disconcerting is the possibility that the Irishman may want to see the 
narrator’s identification card (166). From the practice of Häscher the narrator knows 
that checking identification is a pretext for violence (256, 329). Asked for his 
“Ausweis,” the victim knows, “dass jetzt alles vorbei ist” (213). Once the Irishman 
asks the narrator for his identification (353), the narrator’s plan to go into the desert 
takes concrete form, all the while the narrator reminds himself to show his passport to 
the Irishman later in the day: “Nicht vergessen: heute abend den Ausweis! Er [=der 
Ire] soll nicht noch einmal fragen müssen” (361, cf. 365). The reminder is useless: the 
narrator does not return from the desert. Once he steps outside La dernière chance, he 
is being lulled in by the wind (364) and moves from pole to pole until he no longer 
sees Meona (365). The next pole lures him with the message “TOCCARE”; it does 
not, however, reveal that those who touch will die (“CHI TOCCA MUORE,” 364). At 
the sight of Meona lost, as he stands by the pole to which he previously sent Hamlet 
(277), the narrator shakes “wie Espenlaub” (365) and hopes to be carried by the wind 
“über meine böse Stunde hinweg und weiter” (366). Thus the narrator is lost. Whether 
or not he dies remains unclear, although the ending suggests that he does. 
 As Hildesheimer explains, he wanted to get rid of his narrator: “ich lasse es 
offen, aber es ist wahrscheinlich, dass [der Erzähler] in der Wüste umgekommen ist. 
Für mich jedenfalls ist er weg, ich bin meinen Ich-Erzähler los.”133 Similar statements 
                                                
133 Hildesheimer and Prangel, "Interview mit Wolfgang Hildesheimer," 6.  
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appear in all major interviews regarding Masante.134 Already in 1968, Hildesheimer 
told interviewer and friend Walter Jens about Masante—then still with the working 
title Meona—that he would send his narrator into the desert, adding that with the loss 
of a narrator with whom he much identified, he would stop writing prose altogether:  
 
[D]er Ich-Erzähler ist am Ende nicht mehr da. Tynset hat da noch einen 
zweiten Teil zugelassen (…). Hier also ist kein zweiter Teil mehr 
möglich. Wenn du dich sehr stark mit deinem Ich-Erzähler 
identifizierst, dann hast du ihn natürlich verloren in dem Moment, in 
dem der Ich-Erzähler nicht mehr da ist. (…) Du musst bedenken, ich 
komme jetzt zum Ende, nicht wahr. Der Ich-Erzähler, mein Ich-
Erzähler, die exemplarische Figur, ist nach Meona nicht mehr existent. 
Ich werde also für ein größeres Prosawerk jetzt keine Figur haben.135 
 
Indeed, Masante was Hildesheimer’s final prose work: “Nach ‘Masante’ ist kein 
erzählendes Werk bei mir mehr möglich.’”136 Together with his narrator Hildesheimer 
adopted silence in consequence of the impossibility of giving testimony in an 
atmosphere of “Gleichgültigkeit, Dulden, Versagen, Ohnmacht” (341).  
 
The End of Fiction 
With Masante, Hildesheimer declared that he had reached the end of his 
fiction, and “The End of Fiction” is the title of a lecture he gave in 1975 at Dublin and 
Trinity Universities in Dublin and at several other locations in Ireland. Hildesheimer 
translated the text into German, and it appeared the following year in Merkur.137 In 
                                                
134 Cf. “Am Ende von ‘Tynset hatte ich diesen Ich-Erzähler noch. Am Ende von ‘Masante’ ist er 
wahrscheinlich in der Wüste verloren gegangen. Jetzt habe ich niemand mehr,” Hildesheimer and 
Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 286.  Elsewhere he points to “’Masante,’ worin der Ich-Erzähler 
buchstäblich in die Wüste geschickt wird. So bin ich meines Erzählers verlustig, ich kann ihn nicht aus 
der Wüste zurückholen,” Hildesheimer and Kesting, "Ende der Fiktionen," 54. 
135 Hildesheimer and Walter, "(Interview)," 91, 94. 
136 Hildesheimer and Durzak, "Potentielles Ich," 276. 
137 Hildesheimer, "End of Fiction"; Wolfgang Hildesheimer, "Das Ende der Fiktionen," in Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer, Gesammelte Werke in sieben Bänden. Bd. VII Vermischte Schriften, ed. Christiaan Lucas 
Hart Nibbrig and Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 141-58. The speech resulted in 
considerable interest in Hildesheimer, especially after its reprint in 1984, which caused a literary debate 
on the use of literature, H. D. Sacker, "Hildesheimer's Vision of Literature," Hermathena CXXI (1976), 
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essence, “The End of Fiction” marks a radicalization but also a refutation of 
Hildesheimer’s standpoint vis-à-vis literature after Auschwitz as expressed in the 
Frankfurt lectures. 
The rearticulation of Hildesheimer’s poetics was necessitated by the reception 
of Masante, which paralleled that of Tynset in its misappropriation of the novel. 
Braese discusses at great length one particular review by Joachim Kaiser, commenting 
on the dubious reaction from Kaiser, who had been a student of Adorno but 
nonetheless misread Hildesheimer’s narrator as a globetrotter (as opposed to a 
displaced person or emigrant) with “Hass auf Teutonisches.”138 Kaiser fails to grasp 
both Schrecken and Häscher as references to the Nazi past and insufficient attempts at 
working through this past. His criticism is that Masante lacks content: “Und wo? Und 
wann? Und wer? Um was geht es in, ja was heißt überhaupt ‘Masante’? Handfeste 
Informationen bitte: woran sind denn die Erinnerungen (…) und Ängste befestigt?”139 
Some of Kaiser’s other comments, in which he condemns what he believes to be the 
narrator’s elitist attitude in foregrounding victims over perpetrators (!), the narrator’s 
mocking of German soldiers, and his lack of motivation to analyze the source of his 
fears, prove that Kaiser read Masante without self-reflection and without consideration 
of Hildesheimer’s subjective experiences informing the text. Other reviewers remark 
upon the political aspects of Masante and confirm that the novel practices 
“Gesellschaftskritik,” but they lament the abstract construction that makes it difficult 
                                                
198-213; Hans Dieter Zimmermann, "Das Ende der Literatur und das Ende der Welt. Zu Wolfgang 
Hildesheimers Absage an die Literatur," in Poetik, ed. Hans Dieter Schlosser and Hans Dieter 
Zimmermann (Frankfurt/M.: Athenäum, 1988), 67-78; Briegleb, "Weiterschreiben!"; Stephan Braese, 
"'...as some of us have experienced it.' Wolfgang Hildesheimers 'The End of Fiction'," in Deutsche 
Nachkriegsliteratur und der Holocaust, ed. Stephan Braese et al. (Frankfurt/M., New York: Campus, 
1998), 331-49; Martin Lüdke, "Der Rest ist Schweigen. Wolfgang Hildesheimer und 'Das Ende der 
Fiktionen'," in Literarisches Krisenbewußtsein. Ein Perzeptions- und Produktionsmuster im 20. 
Jahrhunderts, ed. Keith Bullivant and Bernhard Spies (Munich: Iudicium, 2001), 182-83. 
138 Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 388-94, Kaiser qtd. in: ibid., 93. 
139 Kaiser qtd. in: ibid., 391. 
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for the reader to engage with it fully.140 Peter Horst Neumann, author of the scathing 
review of Tynset discussed previously, writes positively about Masante, calling it “das 
Meisterwerk eines großen Schriftstellers (…) und eines der wichtigsten Bücher seit 
langem.”141 Because he was involved in the editing process of Masante, however, he 
warns his readers that his opinion is perhaps “voreingenommen.”142 His glowing 
review is phrased cautiously and presents a contradiction in itself; thus it is quite 
typical of the mixed reception of Masante.143 
In the atmosphere of the Literaturbetrieb in the late sixties and seventies—with 
an emphasis on realism and an outspoken, direct political agenda of literature—
Masante was an outlier. Hildesheimer was greatly indebted to literary modernism, and 
Masante is written in respect for that tradition. Masante anticipates Hildesheimer’s 
“The End of Fiction,” the author’s second theoretical consideration of literature, in 
which he vehemently defends European modernism against the German 
Literaturbetrieb. Here he sides with British writer and critic Cyrill Connolly, who in 
the early 1940s had debated the use of literature in the context of catastrophe, and 
against the programmatic declaration of the first General Congress of Soviet writers in 
Moscow in 1934 that all literature acted in the service of antifascism. Connolly wrote 
in his diary, published in 1944 as The Unquiet Grave. A Word Cycle, that the “‘true 
function of a writer is to produce a masterpiece.’”144 In his speech, Hildesheimer 
hopes to answer the question whether “it really [is] the task of the writer today to write 
a masterpiece,” but he prefaces his response by referring to a time in which writing 
                                                
140 Geno Hartlaub, "Endstation Meona," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Volker Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1989), 261-63, here 262. 
141 Peter Horst Neumann, "Voreingenommene Bemerkungen," in Wolfgang Hildesheimer, ed. Volker 
Jehle (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1989), 264-68, here 268. 
142 Cf. the title of the review, “Voreingenommene Bemerkungen.” 
143 On the reception of Masante, cf. Stanley, Critics, 31-43. 
144 Cyril Connolly, The Unquiet Grave. A Word Cycle (London: The Curwen Press for Horizon, 1944). 
Qtd. in: Hildesheimer, "End of Fiction," 125. 
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meant “to escape from the hardships of everyday life and treat [oneself] to writing 
page after page of self-observation and memory; (…) in short: to creative exploitation 
of his [=the writer’s] pleasures and—more often—his depressions.”145 This art of 
writing—always performed in the first person singular and thus, for the most part, 
excluding “novels, plays or biographies”—brought forward a subjectivity that, in 
Connolly’s words, shows “‘lack of belief in the idea of progress [and an] interest in, 
mingled with contempt for[,] humanity.’”146 Hildesheimer declares his pronounced 
sympathy for an emphasis on subjectivity by stating that “I for one (…) have never 
been able to write abut anything but my potential self.”147 Having thus allied himself 
with Connolly and, by extension, literary modernism, Hildesheimer points to his 
opponent: German writers of a certain bent. Answering the question of literature’s 
function today (in 1975), he says: 
 
[I]s it really the task of the writer today to write a masterpiece? And 
while I, an older writer, would say: yes it is, it always has been and will 
be until the end of literature, you would find a majority of young 
writers—at least in Germany—who would sneer at you at the very 
mention of the word “masterpiece.” The task of the writer, they would 
say, is to contribute towards the changing of society. The more 
moderate ones see this task in sharpening consciousness and receptive 
faculties of the reading public in preparation of this change; the 
extremist ones would say: a writer who does not put his writing into the 
immediate service of world revolution is no writer but a parasite.148 
 
Considering the Frankfurt lectures in which Hildesheimer formulated the task of 
literature as widening the consciousness of the reader to include the dimension of 
Auschwitz, it may be reasonable to suggest that Hildesheimer self-identified as a 
moderately political writer in opposition of an extremist one. However, having drawn 
the line between European modernist and contemporary German political writers, he 
                                                
145 Hildesheimer, "End of Fiction," 128, 25. 
146 Ibid., 126. 
147 Ibid., 127. 
148 Ibid., 128f. 
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counts himself among the former and disregards the notion of political novelists 
altogether. This is evidenced by his negative reference to the 1934 writers’ congress in 
Moscow. There individualism “was turned into a term of abuse,” and the tradition of 
Proust and Joyce dismissed in favor of a realist literature that aimed to withstand anti-
fascism. As Hildesheimer knows from his own experience—one of his very rare 
autobiographical remarks, and one he omitted in the German translation!—literature 
did not make an impact on the political climate of the 1930s at all.149 While earlier 
Hildesheimer demanded that writers widen their audience’s consciousness and thus 
change readers’ awareness in such ways as to provoke socio-political action, in “The 
End of Fiction” he concludes that it is an illusion that writers and literature can change 
society. Although he clearly expresses the imperative that society must change, in his 
lecture he insists it will not happen at literature’s prompting. German writers who in 
1975 believe in their participation in the revolution should learn from history that 
literature is politically ineffective: “the intellectual is not taken seriously by the 
political, neither as an adversary nor as a support.”150 With reference to Grass, whose 
1968 campaign efforts may or may not have had an impact on the election outcome, 
Hildesheimer identifies himself as a member of the political left who propagates the 
abolition of capitalism. However, unlike Grass, he does not become politically active 
in his position as writer: 
 
The writer should make use of his name and his prominence to support 
a good cause, although we generally find him overestimating the value 
of his appeal. (…) All the writer can do is to justify the moral credit 
given to him by those who still believe in the ethics of his art and 
mission, and do good in every sphere offering itself. (…) But I doubt 
that the writer of fiction will ever be able to extend his professional 
activity to serve a great human cause. (…) He has to rely on his 
personal hope that his message as an essential constituent of his inner 
                                                
149 Ibid., 133. Cf. Hildesheimer, "Ende der Fiktionen," 150. For a reading of the German translation and 
its reception in Germany, cf. Braese, Die andere Erinnerung, 416ff. 
150 Hildesheimer, "End of Fiction," 129. 
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microcosm, which is or should be his individual gift as well as his 
professional heritage[,] expresses itself automatically, unconsciously in 
his work. But he cannot choose this message. The message has to 
choose him.151 
 
Here he repeats his earlier conviction that the message he wants to convey precedes 
the creative process and reveals itself automatically, though not directly, and, he adds, 
certainly not through the invention of reality. There is no use in submitting oneself to 
hard labor in order just to write about it. The writer’s experience in the coal mine, for 
instance, is temporary and serves her literary ambition, while the experience of the real 
miner is permanent and defines his life. In direct reference to this particular German 
trend Hildesheimer posits that “the function of literature is not to turn truth into fiction 
but to turn fiction into truth: to condense truth out of fiction.”152 While Charles 
Dickens may have informed the reading public about the workhouse, Hildesheimer 
continues, this function of literature is now ceded to mass media, and the novelist’s 
creative impulse ought to be “not a direct reaction to outside events but to an inside 
process of sublimation.”153 If the novelist attempts to depict a fictitious event modeled 
after a real-life misery, he trivializes and degrades “hard and bitter facts as fiction.”154 
It is thus Hildesheimer’s “thesis that fiction has met its end.”155 
 Masante put Hildesheimer’s theory into practice: with Masante, the author 
reached the end of his fiction. He acknowledged that with his literature he had not 
reached a large audience that, as result of reading Tynset or Masante, rose in protest 
against the practice of forgetting and denial. If judged by the socio-political effects or 
societal change that his literature might have caused, Hildesheimer failed as a writer. 
However, by 1975 Hildesheimer no longer believed that literature was charged with 
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the mission of changing society. His microcosm was exhausted regarding the political 
message of the dimension of Auschwitz, at least in terms of literary production. He 
said what he thought “worth saying and [became] silent when it [was] said.”156 On a 
more personal level, Masante allowed Hildesheimer put to rest the Häscher that 
signified the history of the Holocaust: they are “abgetan—abgeschoben. Die Angst ist 
vorbei. (…) Ich habe sie [=die Häscher] mir vom Leibe geschrieben.”157 He reached 
the end “meiner Thematik als Erzähler,” although he continued to write, but no longer 
prose.158 The process of abtun, as he explained in the context of his “Fiction” speech, 
was intricately linked to working through trauma: 
 
Etwas anderes ist es[,] dass ein Schriftsteller ein Thema, sein 
Generalthema, schließlich erledigt und zu Ende behandelt hat. So ging 
es auch mir. Ich habe in meiner ganzen schriftstellerischen Karriere, 
wenn ich es so nennen darf, in meiner schriftstellerischen Entwicklung 
eigentlich immer nur ein Thema gehabt, in dem ich mich selbst als 
Substitut behandelt habe. Da ist eine bestimmte psychologische 
Entwicklung, und nun bin ich dieser Person ledig, ich habe sie nicht 
mehr, sie ist weg.  (...) Ja, das hat natürlich auch etwas mit Traumata zu 
tun.”159 
 
In writing Tynset and Masante, Hildesheimer worked through his own past: the 
activity of writing provided him with a process that helped him to come to terms with 
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the experiences of emigration, his service at Nuremberg, and life in postwar Germany 
as a Jew. His personal microcosm was filled with melancholic remembrance, and with 
Tynset and Masante, Hildesheimer brought it to articulation. Judged by his further 
literary and artistic production and his public interventions as a German-speaking 
intellectual, where thematization of the Nazi past was absent, Hildesheimer did indeed 
lay aside (abtun) his  “Generalthema.” On the basis of subjective experience, 
Hildesheimer’s melancholy position helped him to move past the stage of 
Trauerarbeit and allowed him to move on. It is important to emphasize that 
Hildesheimer, unlike Sebald, who may have done so indirectly, did not prescribe a 
melancholy position for others. Nowhere is melancholia suggested as the ethically 
adequate response to genocide. The only prescriptive position Hildesheimer takes is 
that after Auschwitz fiction is no longer a defensible form of literature—not only 
because of the Holocaust but also in the context of the contemporary post-Auschwitz 
world marked by the dimension of Auschwitz, capitalism, and the destruction of the 
environment. In an era where mass media carry information, fiction, as the invention 
of reality, trivializes actual reality. What remains for writers concerned with the 
Holocaust—as all writers ought to be after Auschwitz—is to express their inner 
microcosms to sharpen readers’ awareness of catastrophe without, however, 
demanding they succumb to endless melancholia. The dimension of Auschwitz that is 
present in the shared consciousness of political culture and historical awareness must 
become present in individual consciousness. But the reader ought not be trapped in 
this dimension, which would cause endless melancholia. Whether the reader, as a 
result of her broadened individual consciousness, becomes involved in shaping shared 
consciousness is up to her. The author, in opening his microcosm, neither imposes nor 
requires her participation.  
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Hildesheimer’s stance regarding the function of literature is clear. While it may 
be politically engaged via the articulation of the microcosm that automatically brings 
to light his political position, literature does not aim at socio-political action. As 
literature it evidences the author’s subjectivity. It seeks communication without 
requiring a partner. If readers are willing to follow highly subjective chains of 
association—chains that Hildesheimer deems the necessary results if authors write 
from inside their microcosms—they may realize which “good cause” writers are 
supporting, but recognition alone is not followed by action: it requires neither response 
nor active involvement. While Hildesheimer himself thus uses a melancholy style for 
authentic writing of the microcosm, in which associations are set free, he does not 
promise or even hope that it will lead to societal change. The melancholy style works 
on the subjective level of the author and the reader willing to decipher it; it does not, 
however, present an ethically adequate response of literature to genocide, as it does 
not ask for cooperation by an other.  
 In this regard melancholia is very different from ressentiment: those who 
articulate ressentiment demand a response from the addressee. They express 
ressentiment to open a dialogue, and their ressentiment is satisfied only when others 
engage with it, at which point it dissolves. Therefore the next two chapters examine 
ressentiment as an alternative mode for eliciting ethical responses. My work 
concentrates on Jean Améry who, like Hildesheimer, contributed to the German 
Literaturbetrieb from the periphery. He entered the public scene much later than 
Hildesheimer but gained a growing readership during the same time period in which 
Hildesheimer wrote and published Tynset and Masante. At the end of his career 
Améry, too, was resigned, yet he despaired not at the failure of literature as such but at 
the lack of critical attention and willingness on part of his audience to aid him in 
resolving his ressentiment and thus release him from his past. Unlike Hildesheimer, 
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Améry prescribed his own affective response to his victimization—his ressentiments 
that were provoked by the inattention his original injury received by postwar 
Germans—as a moral guidepost. Where for Hildesheimer melancholia ultimately 
marked a subjective position that had validity only on the personal level but did not 
directly call for socio-political action, Améry identified subjective ressentiments of 
Jewish victims of Nazi persecution as an objective criterion that determined where 
moral repair was needed on the public, socio-political level.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
“Provokation”:
1
 
Jean Améry’s “Ressentiments” 
 
In November 1964 the owner of Szczesny publishing house, Gerhard Szczesny, 
contacted Jean Améry to ask permission to reprint his essay on the intellectual in 
Auschwitz, which had appeared four days earlier in Christ und Welt,2 in the Szczesny 
almanac Club Voltaire.3 Améry granted Szczesny’s request and related to him his own 
plans for a project that would include the essay but for which Améry had not yet found 
a publisher.4 Ten days after his first letter to Améry, Szczesny tentatively offered 
Améry a book contract, which the author accepted.5  
Over the course of their correspondence regarding the project Améry sent 
Szczesny the titles of the five essays that would constitute the book, along with the 
book’s title. For his fourth essay he chose “Ressentiments. Ein Wort an die 
Deutschen,” and for the book title, Ressentiments. Bewältigungsversuche eines 
Überwältigten.6 The matter of ressentiments was central to Améry’s thought at the 
time, and he pursued it with urgency. However, Szczesny sensed that the word 
ressentiment and the concept it denoted might offend potential buyers; he therefore 
asked Améry to change the titles of both the book and the essay. The publisher’s belief 
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September 21, 1965), Hans Paeschke (September 4, 1965; October 6 and 27, 1965), in Améry, 
"Ausgewählte Briefe."  
6 Améry, letter to Szczesny, October 27, 1965 (DLA 81.1716a/4). 
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that ressentiments was “als negativer Begriff kaufhemmend”7 much surprised Améry, 
who had hoped that “gerade die Provokation eines solchen Titels (…) kauffördernd 
sei.”8 Rather than accepting any of Szczesny’s alternative titles for the book, Améry 
suggested Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, a phrase he had used before in his 1945 text, 
“Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes.” Améry also rejected Szczesny’s title for the 
fourth essay, “Die Deutschen,” insisting on “Ressentiments,” “denn um diese geht es 
(…) doch wohl mehr als um die Deutschen.”9 
The final product, Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. Bewältigungsbesuche eines 
Überwältigten, was published in the spring of 1966 and launched Améry’s career as 
“’Star-Autor’ des Szczesny-Verlages”10 and, in the eyes of some, as West Germany’s 
“moralische Autorität.”11 The book found its way over time into the works of Adorno, 
Primo Levi, and Imré Kertesz among others.12 Irene Heidelberger-Leonard and W. G. 
Sebald even consider Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne to be the first piece of German-
                                                
7 Szczesny, letter to Améry, January 24, 1966 (DLA 81.2304/1). 
8 Améry, letter to Szczesny, January 26, 1966 (DLA 91.1717a/3). Cf. Gerhard Scheit, "Nachwort [zu 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne]," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 2, Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, 
Örtlichkeiten, Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre, ed. Gerhard Scheit, (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), 629-711, 
here 653. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Améry, letter to Szczesny, February 5, 1967 (DLA 81.1718a/4). 
11 “Das wissen heute eigentlich all wichtigen Leute hier.” Horst Krüger, letter to Améry, July 23, 1969 
(DLA 81.2053/10). 
12 Adorno discussed Améry’s “Tortur” essay in his 1965 Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik; he referred to 
Améry in Negative Dialektik without naming him. Cf. Martin Vialon, "Jean Améry. Philosoph der 
Aufklärung im Spiegel seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Theodor W. Adorno," in Kritik aus Passion. 
Studien zu Jean Améry, ed. Matthias Bormuth and Susan Nurmi-Schomers (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
2005), 119-43, here 120; Detlev Claussen, "Eine kritische Differenz. Zum Konflikt Jean Amérys mit 
Theodor W. Adorno und Max Horkheimer," in Jean Améry (Hans Maier), ed. Stephan Steiner (Basel, 
Frankfurt/M.: Stroemfeld/Nexus, 1996), 197-207. Kertész takes Améry’s “Ressentiments” as a starting 
point to compare ressentiments to his own so-called revenge by writing, Imre Kertész, "Der Holocaust 
als Kultur," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 9, Materialien, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2008), 399-414. Levi responds to Améry’s “An den Grenzen des Geists” in Primo Levi, The 
Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage, 1989). In addition, several 
writers have engaged with Améry’s essays, most notably Alfred Andersch, Efraim (Stuttgart, Hamburg: 
Deutscher Bücherbund, 1967); Ingeborg Bachmann, "Drei Wege zum See," in Simultan (Munich: Piper, 
1972); W. G. Sebald, Austerlitz (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2003). 
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language Shoah literature, unfortunately overlooking or underestimating other 
important Jewish-German voices in the process.13   
Améry would publicly recall the genesis of Jenseits as having resulted from a 
chance meeting with former Wehrmacht soldier, active Group 47 poet, and radio host 
at Süddeutscher Rundfunk (SDR) Helmut Heißenbüttel, who had invited him to write 
an essay on his experience in Auschwitz.14 But Améry, who had occasionally 
freelanced for SDR since 1960,15 in fact sought out the radio station’s support for a 
project that he had long planned, but for which he had little hope of realizing for lack 
of an audience.16 However, the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial had generated 
unprecedented interest in Auschwitz, and the timing seemed promising for a public 
broadcasting station to commit financially to Améry’s project. SDR assigned 
Heißenbüttel, who was in charge of the division “Radio-Essay,” to enter into contract 
negotiations with Améry. These were successful, and Heißenbüttel became, in 
Améry’s words, “[d]ie Schlüsselfigur für meine ganze schriftstellerische Existenz.”17  
Within two months of their first meeting Améry finished “An den Grenzen des 
Geistes,” which Heißenbüttel considered “einen der wichtigsten Beiträge zu diesem 
Thema überhaupt.”18 A much shorter print version of the radio text was published in 
                                                
13 Ralf Piorr and Jens Hoffmann, "Jean Améry und die öffentliche Sache (Interview mit Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard)," Die Wochenzeitung, October 31 2002. In the interview Heidelberger-Leonard 
observes: “Améry ist ohne Zweifel der erste jüdische Schriftsteller deutscher Zunge, der Schoah-
Literatur geschrieben hat.” Sebald considers Améry to be the first ‘authentic’ voice in the literature of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung that made earlier attempts obsolete (with the exceptions of Peter Weiss and 
Wolfgang Hildesheimer), W. G. Sebald, "Jean Améry und Primo Levi," in Über Jean Améry, ed. Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard (Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Winter, 1990), 115-23, here. 15f.  
14 Améry recounts the story of the supposedly chance encounter with Heißenbüttel repeatedly. Cf. 
Améry, Örtlichkeiten, 470f.; Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 97; Jean Améry, "Statt 
eines Vorwortes: Gestatten Sie mir, dass ich mich vorstelle " in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 9, Materialien, 
ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 15-18, here 17. 
15 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 186. 
16 Améry, letter to Karl Schwedhelm, January 18, 1964, in: Améry, Briefe, 101f. 
17 Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 96. 
18 Heißenbüttel, letter to Améry, May 13, 1964 (DLA 81.1877/5). 
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Christ und Welt, where it was discovered by Szczesny.19 In the meantime, 
Heißenbüttel agreed to broadcast Améry’s still to be written sequels to the Auschwitz 
essay. Améry finished “Die Tortur” in January 1965, which was followed in July and 
November by “Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?” and “Ressentiments.” The 
author completed the series in January 1966 with “Über Zwang und Unmöglichkeit, 
Jude zu sein.” The success of the first essay gave Améry the chance to publish in Hans 
Paeschke’s Merkur, where his next essays on torture, Heimat, and ressentiments 
appeared before a much larger audience than radio alone could reach. With the 
publication of all five essays in Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Améry landed “ein[en] 
spektakuläre[n] Triumph (…), wie er nur in seltensten Fällen einem Schriftstellerleben 
zuteil wird.”20 
In this chapter I focus on Améry’s moral philosophy of ressentiments, which I 
link to the concept of resentment in Anglo-American moral philosophy and contrast 
with a specifically German understanding of ressentiment as influenced by Friedrich 
Nietzsche. I examine the unique mode of inquiry by which Améry develops and 
supports his concept of ressentiment, a line of argument that is of interest specifically 
because it is personal and subjective, yet still applicable outside Améry’s realm of 
experience. Because of its applicability to Améry and to victims of persecution in 
general, the concept of ressentiment warrants analysis in the context of postwar 
Germany. I propose to read Améry’s philosophy of ressentiments as an intervention in 
the ethical landscape of West German Vergangenheitsbewältigung, an intervention, 
however, that was misunderstood at best. Amery’s philosophical position was not well 
received in his time, for it challenges the former persecutors to acknowledge and 
                                                
19 Because of a misunderstanding and much to Améry’s concern vis-à-vis his obligation to SDR, his 
Swiss news agency sold an abridged version to the Zurich Weltwoche long before the essay was 
scheduled for broadcast.  In Weltwoche (June 6, 1964), the text served as opener to a number of articles 
on Nazi concentration camps that were collected for this occasion. 
20 Scheit, "Nachwort [zu Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne]," 669f. 
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apologize for wrongdoing before the past can be morally repaired. Améry’s 
ressentiments were interpreted as vindictive and recriminatory, and his insistence on 
their moral purchase was seen as obdurate bitterness impeding social progress. 
Contrary to this view, I argue, ressentiments are necessary and salutary stimulants of 
vibrant and participatory Vergangenheitsbewältigung, prompting active coming to 
terms with the past, in stark contrast to the passive helplessness of the melancholic 
affect currently privileged as the condign response to the Holocaust. That is, 
ressentiment, in the public sphere, is a viable ethical alternative to melancholia. 
I introduce Améry’s philosophy of ressentiment through a reading of his essay 
of the same title and two earlier texts that anticipated the 1965 essay in important 
ways. The essay provides of a description and analysis of ressentiments that is, on the 
one hand, specific to Améry as a Jewish victim of Nazi persecution and, on the other 
hand, applies to victim ressentiments in general as occasioned by injuries that do not 
receive sufficient moral attention. Améry breaks with then common interpretations of 
ressentiments, which were often influenced by Nietzsche’s treatise on the concept. I 
argue that Améry breaks with the Nietzschean understanding of ressentiments by 
locating this concept as an affective mode in the realm of justice. Accordingly 
ressentiments become a moral sentiment because they point to past injuries in need of 
moral repair in the present. Améry arrives at ascribing ressentiments a moral value not 
via logical deduction but through examination of and reflection on the affective 
disorientation that he experiences when his past victimization lacks proper 
acknowledgment in postwar Germany. Thus his ressentiments take as their object two 
distinct wounds: an injury in the past, which Améry identifies in his other essays in 
Jenseits, and an injury in the present, which becomes the focus of “Ressentiments.” 
From a reading of the latter essay, I conclude that ressentiments are meant to hold 
ethical importance for a politics of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. They are conceived as 
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an affective vehicle via which Améry hopes to open a dialogue with his former 
tormentors and postwar Germans, work through his past together with them (hence the 
subtitle “Bewältigungsversuche”), and thereby achieve justice and reconciliation. He 
poses his ressentiments to invite self-mistrust and critical self-reflection among the 
Germans—what Jürgen Habermas called suspicion, as I discuss later—so that both 
may be joined by a desire to undo the unjust past.  
Before turning to Améry, I first revisit Anglo-American philosophical texts 
that address the issue of resentment and compare them with Nietzsche’s 
conceptualization of ressentiment in 1887. Nietzsche and Max Scheler—who further 
adapted Nietzschean ressentiment—influenced German understanding of ressentiment 
to such a degree that the concept was in effect incompatible with that of “resentment” 
in the tradition of moral philosophy. The use of the term ressentiment in the postwar 
context testifies to the prevalence in Germany after 1945 of the Nietzschean 
interpretation, which frames ressentiment in exclusively negative terms. Améry 
departs from this perspective to restore what he consideres the moral value of 
ressentiments for the context of post-Holocaust society. His defense rests in part on an 
implicit distinction he draws between ressentiment and revenge, a distinction 
complicated by a short-lived flirtation with violence that itself warrants examination.  
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Resentment, Ressentiment, “Groll”: Vice or Virtue?
21 
In Anglo-American philosophical literature the treatment of “resentment” is 
traditionally bound up with discussions of forgiveness, the philosophical inquiry into 
which marks, outside a religious framework, a fairly new undertaking. It began 
flourishing with the heightened interest in human rights and the emergence of a field 
of transitional justice in the 1980s and 1990s.22 With few exceptions, discussions of 
forgiveness, particularly in connection with truth and reconciliation commissions late 
in the twentieth century, consider resentment an obstacle that ought to be overcome in 
order for forgiveness to proceed.23 In a seminal study of 2008, philosopher Thomas 
                                                
21 The negative connotations of ressentiment are not restricted to its use in the German language. 
Resentment has an equally unfavorable reputation in the English-speaking world. By its broadest 
definition resentment is an angry defensive response to others’ actions that are perceived to violate 
intentionally our expectations or norms. However, since our perception of intention and our 
expectations are often misguided, resentment may erupt without a proximate injury and be mixed with 
unpleasant emotions such as envy, bitterness, disgust, shame, and fear. For different understandings of 
resentment, ressentiment, and Améry’s ressentiment, cf. ch. “Resentment and Assurance,” Margaret 
Urban Walker, Moral Repair. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2006). In my discussion of Améry’s ressentiment, I focus on the moral and social role 
of justified resentment in the context of extreme injuries with grave moral repercussions. 
22 Geoffrey Scarre states that forgiveness has been a neglected topic of moral philosophy until recently, 
when it emerged as a field of interest independent of the issue of punishment that had long been a 
concern of philosophers. Geoffrey Scarre, After Evil. Responding to Wrongdoing (Aldershot, UK; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), vii. The current discourse on forgiveness is new in so far as it 
considers forgiveness an ethical response to human rights violations in areas that transition from 
oppressive regions to democracies. Jeffrie Murphy may be considered the representative authority for a 
group of scholars who have focused extensively on the issue of forgiveness and thereby have also 
touched on resentment. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even. Forgiveness and Its Limits 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness. A 
Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
Many discussions of forgiveness, especially by human rights scholars, begin with or center on 
the evaluation of Desmond Tutu’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which helped in transitioning 
from South African apartheid to democracy. Tutu’s condemnation of resentment raises important 
ethical questions regarding the relationship between the victimized individual, who is not ready to 
forgive, and institutionalized forgiving. Cf. Scarre, After Evil, 99f. Thomas Brudholm’s study begins 
with a long discussion of Tutu and the South African TRC in order to prepare his readers for an analysis 
of Améry’s ressentiments. Thomas Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue. Jean Améry and the Refusal to 
Forgive (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008). 
23 In contrast to studies that condemn resentment as obstacle to forgiveness, philosophers concerned 
with moral responsibility acknowledge the importance of resentment. See for instance: Walker, Moral 
Repair; R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard 
University Press, 1994); Pamela Hieronymi, "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness," 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62, no. 3 (2001), 529-55. 
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Brudholm made it his “central endeavor” to introduce transitional justice scholars to 
the importance of resentments in order to challenge the supremacy of forgiveness as 
institutionalized by Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and he sought to 
accomplish this task by reading none other than Jean Améry.24 Before turning to 
Améry, I prepare the background for my own reading of his extraordinary essay on 
ressentiments with a discussion of different treatments of resentment and ressentiment 
to uncover their distinctive features. 
 Almost all mention of resentment in the Anglo-American tradition makes 
reference to Joseph Butler, who in 1726 published two sermons, one on resentment 
and one on forgiveness, in which he justifies “so harsh and turbulent a Passion as 
Resentment” against the word of the gospel to “Love your Enemies.”25 Reasoning that 
if indignation over injuries suffered by others is an adequate moral response and that if 
such indignation is “a Fellow-feeling which each Individual has in [sic] Behalf of the 
whole Species,” then resentment—indignation when the injury concerns ourselves 
rather than others—is equally “one of the common Bonds, by which Society is held 
together,” inasmuch as both indignation and resentment further the “Administration of 
Justice” when injury has occurred.26 Butler is careful to distinguish injury from 
naturally occurring pain or loss; resentment has as its object a premeditated 
“Wickedness” which it has “to prevent and to remedy” (145f.): “It [=the passion of 
resentment] is to be considered as a Weapon, put into our Hands by Nature, against 
Injury, Injustice, and Cruelty” (147). Thus the teaching of the gospel “must be 
                                                
24 Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, xiv. Prior to his book, Brudholm published a summary article, 
Thomas Brudholm, "Revisiting Resentments. Jean Améry and the Dark Side of Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation," Journal of Human Rights 5 (2006), 7-26. 
25 Joseph Butler, "Sermon VIII. A Sermon Upon Resentment," in Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls 
Chapel, To Which are added Six Sermons, Preached at Publick Occasions (London: John and Paul 
Knapton, 1749), 137-54; Joseph Butler, "Sermon IX. A Sermon Upon Forgiveness of Injuries," in 
Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, To Which are added Six Sermons, Preached at Publick 
Occasions (London: John and Paul Knapton, 1749), 155-77. Butler opens both sermons with Matt. 
5:43-44. 
26 Butler, "Upon Resentment," 143f. 
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understood to forbid only the Excess and the Abuse of this natural Feeling.”27 Butler 
identifies five chief abuses of resentment, four of which he dismisses as 
“Perverseness” because here the injury was imagined or misinterpreted and therefore 
provides no justification for resentment.28 The fifth abuse concerns “when Pain or 
Harm of any Kind is inflicted meerly [sic] in Consequence of, and to gratify, that 
Resentment, though naturally raised” (150), that is, when the emotional state of 
resentment leads to an act of revenge. The purpose of resentment is to relieve injuries, 
and revenge goes beyond that objective by causing additional harm.29 Where man has 
the duty to feel resentment or indignation when confronted with premeditated injury, 
God arrogates revenge to himself, according to Butler.30 The “Passion of Resentment” 
must not become the passion of revenge by this account, but must leave justice to 
social institutions where “the cool Consideration of Reason (…) might indeed be 
sufficient to procure Laws to be enacted, and Sentence pass’d.”31  Unfortunately 
Butler offered no advice for cases in which these institutions do not execute their 
responsibility.  
 For Butler resentment and forgiveness co-exist. His definition of forgiveness is 
not the overcoming of resentment, as many of his interpreters have proposed.32 Instead 
                                                
27 Butler, "Upon Forgiveness," 157. 
28 Butler, "Upon Resentment," 149f. Here resentment is confused with anger or envy. It is important to 
note that in today’s use of the terms “to resent” and “resentment,” the same confusion still applies. 
When we resent someone for something, in most case we are envious or angry without the occurrence 
of an actual moral injury. Cf. chapter IV, 223n21. 
29 Cf. Butler, "Upon Forgiveness," 160. 
30 Romans 12:19, “Vengeance is mine; I will reapy, saith the Lord.”  
31 Butler, "Upon Resentment," 152f. 
32 In his 2003 publication in which he defends resentments as a means of self-respect, Jeffrie G. Murphy 
repeats his earlier reading of Butler and arrives at the same conclusion: “[A]ccording to Butler, 
forgiveness essentially involves the overcoming of resentment,” Murphy, Getting Even, 58. Cf. chs. 1 
and 2 in Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy. Paul A. Newberry criticizes the apparent 
consensus that forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment and names Murphy as one of the main 
culprits who believe Butler to be the progenitor of this view. Newberry explains the frequent 
misinterpretation of Butler on the basis of differing underlying theories of emotion: whereas Murphy et 
al. assume that we have a certain control over emotions (and “turn off” resentment), Butler states that 
we can control actions only (in this case revenge), but have no control over emotions (such as 
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for Butler, “to forgive Injuries (…) is to keep clear of those Abuses before-
mentioned,”33 that is, to keep clear of revenge. The commandment to love one’s 
enemies is fulfilled in this view by “our natural Benevolence (…) [that] is always 
supposed” unless revenge, which “meditates [sic] Evil itself,” turns us into “the 
Author of Misery” (164). 
 Butler’s embrace of resentment as not merely a natural reaction to 
premeditated injury but as a requirement for justice was echoed by Adam Smith in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments published thirty years later, in which Smith writes that he 
“admire[d] that noble and generous resentment” (albeit a resentment subordinated to 
indignation).34 Some twentieth-century moral philosophers refer to Butler and Smith 
and assert even more strongly than Butler that to react with resentment to (real) 
injuries to oneself is not only a natural but also a necessary response of moral agents 
who thereby demonstrate their commitment to moral standards.35 John Rawls counts 
resentment as a moral feeling because it “invoke[s] the concept of right.” It detects 
when the moral code has been broken, and therefore it is related to our sense of 
justice.36 In a similar vein Peter F. Strawson considers resentment one of the reactive 
emotions that have an evaluative element that registers the transgression of a moral 
norm. In contrast to Strawson, who believes indignation but not resentment to be a 
moral attitude, R. Jay Wallace asserts that resentment is indeed a moral sentiment.37 
                                                
resentment). This is an important distinction. Cf. Paul A. Newberry, "Joseph Butler on Forgiveness. A 
Presupposed Theory of Emotion," Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 2 (2001), 233-44.  
33 Butler, "Upon Forgiveness,"165. 
34 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2004), 18. Qtd. in: 
Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 10. 
35 It is of course possible to experience feelings of resentment without believing that one has been 
morally injured (for instance, when one does not get the job one applied for because there were 
applicants who were equally or better qualified than oneself), but I exclude this form of resentment 
from my discussion.  
36 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Beknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 423. 
37 Cf. Wallace, Responsibility, 33ff. Wallace discusses Peter F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," 
in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London, New York: Routledge, 2003), 1-28. Strawson 
believes that indignation is a moral sentiment because it is a vicarious, reactive emotion in response to 
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He defines reactive emotions, including resentment, as constitutive of moral 
obligations in so far as they serve as a sort of control system, evaluating transgressions 
of moral expectations that one has accepted and to which one holds others.38 As 
Pamela Hieronymi writes, resentment is the result of three evaluations that determine 
the moral attention due an injury: the seriousness of the injury, whether or not the 
offender can be expected to adhere to moral obligations set by his community; and 
whether the victim knows that he ought not be wronged.39 Thus resentment is a 
reactive emotion to an injury to the self and a protest or protestation against the 
transgression of moral norms. People who never react to injuries with resentment are 
not “saint[s]”40 but, on the contrary, display a deficiency in their moral constitution.41   
 While Butler had a lasting influence on moral philosophers of resentment in 
the English-speaking world, German treatment of the topic received its greatest 
influence from Nietzsche. His condemnation of ressentiments in On the Genealogy of 
Morality irrevocably changed the use of the term in philosophical discourse and 
common parlance, leaving no room for the positive associations present in Butler. The 
English-language Oxford Companion to Philosophy includes a discussion of 
Nietzschean ressentiments along with a brief mention of Rawls and Strawson (but not 
                                                
an injury to others; by contrast, resentment is personal and in reaction to an injury to the self. Unlike 
Strawson, Wallace believes that we are obliged to evaluate moral transgressions that concern ourselves 
as well as injuries that concern others. He counts indignation and resentment as moral emotions. 
38 Cf. Wallace, Responsibility, 63, 66. Wallace defends as a secular concept the notion of “moral 
obligations” that has traditionally been associated with theological frameworks of ethics, pointing to 
Enlightenment moral conceptions based on practical reason that are similar to theologically informed 
ethics, cf. 64. 
39 Hieronymi, "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness," 530. She develops a fourth judgment to 
explain resentment, to which I return later. 
40 Murphy considers it equally possible that a person not responding to injury with resentment is a saint 
or a “servile personality” lacking self-respect, Murphy, Getting Even, 19. 
41 Cf. Scarre, After Evil. 101. Strawson makes a similar point regarding social life: the lack of reactive 
attitudes such as resentment speaks to the objectification of human relations, thus in his judgment, a life 
without resentment (as well as indignation and gratitude), is an impoverished life, Strawson, "Freedom 
and Resentment," 10f. 
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Butler) under the entry “resentment,” suggesting that the two terms are identical.42 
Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, influential contributors to current discussions of 
resentment (via their treatment of forgiveness),43 also mistakenly conflate the concepts 
of resentment and ressentiment.44  
 In her important defense of the role of resentment in moral life Margaret U. 
Walker cautions us not to confuse resentment with ressentiment. Nietzsche coined the 
latter term in his essays on the role of the slaves’ revolt in the founding of morality, 
which he assessed “as a kind of brilliant trick of the weak, who remain nonetheless 
despicable in their weakness.”45 Nietzsche identified the so-called noble man as the 
one who “has the power to requite good with good, evil with evil, and who really also 
engages in requital and is therefore grateful and vengeful.”46 By contrast, 
 
the man of ressentiment is neither upright nor naïve, nor honest and 
straight with himself. His soul squints; his mind loves dark corners, 
secret paths and back-doors, everything secretive appeals to him as 
being his world, his security, his comfort; he knows all about keeping 
quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily humbling and abasing 
himself.47 
 
Nietzsche famously attributed the “birth of values” to the man of ressentiment, who, 
lacking the power for real revenge, creatively replaced it with imaginary revenge48 by 
which “the weakness of the weak (…) itself [becomes] a voluntary achievement, 
something wanted, chosen, a deed, an accomplishment.”49 Ressentiment in Nietzsche 
                                                
42 The entry was prepared by Robert C. Solomon, in Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,1995), 771. 
43 Cf. Walker, Moral Repair, 113; Newberry, "Butler on Forgiveness," 233. 
44Cf. Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy. Griswold makes the same observation: Griswold, 
Forgiveness. A Philosophical Exploration, 45n5. 
45 Walker, Moral Repair, 120. 
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human I, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. 
Ernst Behler, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford: Standford University Press, 1995), 51 (section I.45). 
47 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Geneology of Morality, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 23 (section I.10). 
48 Ibid., 21.  
49 Ibid., 29 (section I.13).  
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acts as a source of transformation, turning attributes of weakness into ideals, thereby 
giving birth to Judeo-Christian morality, which ended the world of the noble man:  
 
The inoffensiveness of the weakling, the very cowardice with which he 
is richly endowed, his standing-by-the-door, his inevitable position of 
having to wait, are all given good names such as ‘patience,’ which is 
also called the virtue; not-being-able-to-take-revenge is called not-
wanting-to-take-revenge, it might even be forgiveness.50 
 
Although ressentiments play a key role in his critique of (slave/Judeo-Christian) 
morality, Nietzsche does not attempt to describe or explain them. Max Scheler sets out 
to correct this in his 1912 study, in which he defends Christian love against 
Nietzsche’s devaluation without diverging from Nietzsche’s negative assessment of 
ressentiments as such.51  
Scheler attempts to approximate the French term ressentiment by the German 
“Groll” and “Grollen,” which he describes as “dunkel durch die Seele wandelndes (…) 
Zürnen, das durch wiederholtes Durchleben von Hassintentionen und anderen 
feindseligen Emotionen schließlich sich bildet.” He identifies three aspects that he 
considers characteristic of ressentiment (his preferred term, after all): it intensifies 
through an affective rather than intellectual memory of the injury, described as “ein 
Nachfühlen, ein Wiederfühlen”; it detaches itself from the original hurtful experience 
and grows to infect everything; and it breeds hostile intentions (2). Scheler 
conceptualizes ressentiment not as an emotion, but as a psychological disposition that 
develops in tandem with the repression of one or more of several affects, namely 
                                                
50 Ibid., 30 (section I.14). This “forgiveness” is, however, not real forgiveness: according to Nietzsche, 
the only forgiving is forgetting, and forgetting is a strength of the noble man, not the weak. 
51 Max Scheler, Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt/M.: 
Klostermann, 2004). Intent on refuting Nietzsche, Scheler reworked his study until the final version of 
1923. He introduced a distinction between Christian love (as a universal value, cf. 29) and modern 
philanthropy (as product of ressentiment). He thus denied that ressentiments played a constitutive role 
in Christianity or Judeo-Christian morality but configured them as the source of such 
“Täuschungswerte(n)” (17) as bourgeois values (62ff.). From now on page numbers are included 
parenthetically in the text.  
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“Rachegefühl und –impuls, Hass, Bosheit, Neid, Scheelsucht, Hämischkeit,” of which 
the lust for revenge is by far the most important (4).52 Unlike Butler, for whom 
resentment was an emotion and revenge an action, Scheler distinguishes between the 
affect of wanting revenge and the state (rather than emotion) of ressentiment. In the 
latter, the original emotion experienced at the time of the injury becomes permanent 
and transforms into a state detached from the original experience. If ressentiment 
intensifies through the constant “Immer-wieder-Durch- und –Nachleben der Emotion,” 
which is the original emotion that precedes that of wanting revenge (2)? 
 According to Scheler, the urge for revenge stems from the inhibition (and thus 
failure) to defend oneself at the moment of offense, an inhibition resulting from the 
anticipation of defeat were one to attempt self-defense. Scheler’s key terms are 
“Ohnmacht” and “Hemmung.” In the face of the offender, the offended feels 
impotence and helplessness (“Ohnmacht”), and the recognition of his or her own 
impotence leads to the physical inhibition (“Hemmung”) of acting in defense, even in 
small measures such as a gesture of outrage or a verbal articulation of protest (5, 7). 
The crucial emotion accompanying the offense is helplessness. Because of the 
inhibition, a defense is postponed to a time when it becomes an act of revenge; in the 
meantime, the offended resorts to the affect of “Rachegefühl.” If an offense is either 
avenged or forgiven, the injured no longer harbors vengeful feelings; if neither 
revenge nor forgiveness is possible, the offended repeatedly experiences helplessness 
and thus remembers the offense through affective memory. Over time, repetition 
                                                
52 Avishai Margalit draws an interesting distinction between an emotion and a disposition. In discussing 
how we remember emotions and thereby relive them, Margalit observes that in our awareness of a 
disposition we may forget what triggered it, whereas reliving an emotion is tied to the original event 
that is constitutive of the emotion. That is, our recollection of an emotion is connected to the original 
event; a disposition appears to us independent of a cause. We are no longer conscious of the original 
trigger. Cf. Avishai Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 129. This understanding is similar to Scheler’s, where a repressed emotion gives rise to a 
seemingly inexplicable disposition. 
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amounts to an inescapable emotional perception of Ohnmacht that becomes permanent 
and extends beyond the circumstances of the original assault. Moreover, as 
ressentiment grows, both the offense and the desire for revenge are repressed (8, 25f.), 
and all that remains is helplessness. Scheler identifies “Ressentimenttypen,” 
individuals who are prone to succumb to ressentiment (for instance, wives and 
apostates), as well as social contexts such as marriage and church that promote the 
development of ressentiment (18ff.). The most powerful ressentiment arises when 
continuous helplessness is interpreted as fate, and in agreement with Nietzsche Scheler 
names Jewish ressentiment as the strongest of all:  
 
Das—wie Nietzsche mit Recht hervorhebt—ungeheure jüdische 
Ressentiment ist doppelt genährt durch das Zusammenwirken des 
ungeheuren Nationalstolzes dieses Volkes (“auserwähltes Volk”) mit 
einer Jahrhunderte als Schicksal empfundenen Verachtung und 
Zurücksetzung” (9). 
  
Scheler concurs with Nietzsche in writing that Jewish ressentiment amounts to 
“ein[em] ganz allgemeine[m] Wertnegativismus” by which values are revaluated (27). 
It is obvious from this short summary that “resentment” (as discussed in the 
English literature) and ressentiment (in Nietzsche and Scheler) correspond to different 
concepts. Wallace succinctly discusses their differences and concludes that 
ressentiment is about one’s lack of something that one wishes to possess, such as 
power.53 Scheler does not consider the moral reality of an injury but focuses on the 
absolute helplessness experienced in the face of power so all-encompassing as to make 
even a word or a gesture of protest (rather than physical self-defense) impossible. In 
the case of ressentiment the injury is irrelevant for Scheler; it is the absence of power 
that is at stake. Resentment, on the other hand, is about the breach of moral obligations 
and not the lack of something one wishes to possess. As Wallace contends, the two 
                                                
53 Wallace, Responsibility, 247. 
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overlap and enforce each other occasionally—such as in instances where we feel 
entitled to a certain treatment and are disappointed not to receive it, and we imagine 
transgressions of moral norms by those who do.54 Resentment here mingles with envy, 
and in this configuration it is closest to what Nietzsche considered ressentiments.55 
In his analysis of Améry’s essay “Ressentiments,” Thomas Brudholm takes 
great pains to “position Améryean ressentiments between the familiar concepts of 
resentment and ressentiment.”56 In his introductory chapter, he states that Améry’s 
ressentiments “seem close to the morally legitimate and socially valuable emotion 
conceptualized as resentment in (…) moral philosophical works” but that they also 
“reveal(s) certain affinities to ressentiment as conceived by Nietzsche and Scheler.”57 
Intent on rehabilitating Améry’s ressentiments from the bad reputation that Brudholm 
believes they suffer because of their linguistic resemblance to Nietzsche’s term, he 
cites evidence that supports reading Améry as a moral philosopher of resentment, 
concluding in his epilogue that Améry’s ressentiments function as “resentment 
proper.”58  In his differentiation between resentment proper and ressentiment proper, 
and in his efforts to win for Améry the right kind of resentment, Brudholm fails to 
acknowledge appropriately that there is no German word for either concept. When 
Améry uses the French word ressentiment, he does so for lack of a German 
translation, not because he is in agreement with Nietzsche. Obviously familiar with 
him (even seeking an association with him by titling his book so as to evoke 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil), Améry acknowledges Nietzsche’s record of 
ressentiment, but he does so in order to justify his ressentiments against Nietzsche. 
                                                
54 Ibid., 246f. 
55 Walker distinguishes between disgusted, bitter, envious, shamed, and fearful resentment, and her 
treatment of envious resentment (or resentful envy, as she also calls it) is informative, Walker, Moral 
Repair. 129-133. 
56 Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue. 12. His emphasis. 
57 Ibid., 12.  
58 Ibid., 173. 
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Rather than resorting to the unsatisfactory “Groll” that Scheler had proposed (and then 
abandoned) or using the most literal translation “Empfindlichkeit” (suggested by The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy), Améry stuck with the French term.59  
The word ressentiment has been in French usage since the sixteenth century. 
According to the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, the noun originally 
denoted a strong affect of lasting quality, which allowed for positive as well as 
negative connotations. Ressentiments appear as subjects in works of Montaigne, 
Molière, and others, and although the meaning increasingly lost its neutrality and 
acquired a negative sense, it was mainly associated with the sensation of a physically 
injured party who may or may not pursue vengeance. The quality of ressentiment that 
is important to Améry, and which is absent in Nietzsche, is its emphasis on reflection. 
Beyond the suffering of pain, ressentiment denotes the ability to reflect on one’s injury 
and its effect of altering the perception of one’s surrounding. Ressentiment is “‘als 
nachhaltig bewußte Empfindung’ vor allem des Schmerzes stets reflexiv,”60 thereby 
requiring that its bearer examine the feeling of anger and seek active engagement with 
it. The notion of reflection, inherent to the meaning of pre-Nietzschean ressentiment 
and of such importance to Améry, is also absent in the modern English rendering of 
the concept. Only in Butler does resentment take two forms: sudden anger that flares 
at the occurrence of injury but evaporates quickly and “settled and deliberate” 
resentment that reflects on the gravity of the injury and is “plainly connected with a 
Sense of Virtue and Vice, or moral Good and Evil.”61 
                                                
59 As Brudholm argues, Améry borrows the French term because of Vladimir Jankélévitch’s use of it in 
his contribution to the 1965 debate over the statue of limitations of murder in France. Cf. Brudholm, 
Resentment's Virtue, 90. Nancy Wood, however, contends that Jankélévitch’s elaboration on 
ressentiment in fact postdates Améry’s and “seems directly influenced by Améry.” Both refer to the 
following essay: Vladimir Jankélévitch, "Shall We Pardon Them?" trans. Ann Hobel, Critical Inquiry 
22 (1996), 552-72. I argue that, as Améry contends, ressentiment is a “geläufiges Fremdwort” and thus 
a natural choice, Améry to Szczesny, January 26, 1966 (DLA 91.1717a/3). 
60 "Ressentiment," in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried 
Gründer (Basel: Schwabe, 1992), 921. 
61 Butler, "Upon Resentment,"140, 143f. 
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According to the Wörterbuch entry, Nietzsche’s usage permanently changed 
the perception of ressentiment, so that today it is largely associated with “ein[em] 
moralisch minderwertige[m] Gefühl” that needs to be overcome.62 How much did this 
common understanding influence Améry in writing “Ressentiments”? How pervasive 
was the term in the postwar German context?  
Although he quotes Adorno, who in 1948 said that “it was already considered a 
form of boring ressentiment to remind people of the extermination of the Jews,” 
Brudholm claims that the term ressentiment was uncommon in postwar Germany.63 
But there is no evidence in the letter exchanges between Améry and his various editors 
that either the term or the concept required explanation; from the cautious warnings he 
issues, it is quite clear that the idea of victims’ ressentiments is expected to evoke a 
predictable set of responses. In a letter to Heißenbüttel that accompanies his 
submission of the essay for broadcast, Améry acknowledges that it “ist nun, wie man 
einst gesagt hätte, ‘starker Tobak’—hoffentlich nicht allzu stark für Ihre Hörer.”64 
Receiving no reply from Heißenbüttel, Améry worries that “die immerhin 
beträchtliche Vehemenz des Essays” may have caused Heißenbüttel “interne 
Schwierigkeiten” at the radio station.65 When this turns out not to be the case, Améry 
writes Heißenbüttel that “Ressentiments” was, in fact, meant “in gewisser Weise [als] 
eine Provokation und ich warte schon mit einiger Ungeduld auf eventuelle Publikums-
Reaktionen.”66 In contrast to Heißenbüttel, Hans Paeschke shows marked concern for 
the effect Améry’s essay might have on the readers of Merkur: “Das Kapitel 
                                                
62 "Ressentiment," in Historisches Wörterbuch, 922.  
63 Detlev Claussen, "Nach Auschwitz. Ein Essay über die Aktualität Adornos," in Der 
Zivilisationsbruch. Denken nach Auschwitz, ed. Dan Diner (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 1988), 54-69. Qtd. 
in: Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 90; cf. Brudholm 90n10. Cf. Claussen, "Eine kritische Differenz," 
198. 
64 Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, November 24, 1965, in: Améry, Briefe, 142. 
65 Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, January 26, 1966, in: ibid., 161. 
66 Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, February 24, 1966, in: ibid., 164. 
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Ressentiments liess ich mir von Herrn Szczesny kurz geben und bin ziemlich 
schweißgebadet (…) [aber ich werde] die Ressentiments den Merkur-Lesern zu 
schlucken geben.”67 Though Améry hoped to provoke his audience, neither 
Heißenbüttel nor Paeschke report any negative responses.68  
Paeschke’s caution was not entirely unjustified, as the suspicion of a 
ressentiment-laden attitude impacted public opinion and, in the instance of Jewish 
ressentiments, destroyed careers. In his study of West German historians and the 
historiography of the Holocaust, Nicolas Berg concentrates on Polish-Jewish historian 
Joseph Wulf, who settled in Germany after having been liberated from Auschwitz.69 
Wulf assiduously studied the history of the Third Reich, an occupation that brought 
him in touch with Améry.70 Berg calls Wulf the earliest historian of National 
Socialism, yet Wulf was refused entry to the circle of academic historians and denied, 
in particular, any professional connection with the Munich Institute of Contemporary 
History, which had been founded in 1949 for the study of the Nazi era. Analyzing 
Wulf’s exchanges with the Institute and with Martin Broszat in particular, Berg 
concludes that authorship by Jewish historians was “generell tabu.”71 Under the 
pretext that Jewish authors had ressentiments and therefore could not achieve the 
objectivity required for historical research, they were excluded from the historical 
profession throughout the 1950s.72 Berg defends the thesis, “dass die Ressentiments, 
                                                
67 Paeschke, letter to Améry, January 10, 1966 (DLA 81.2089/1). 
68 After “Ressentiments” is aired, Heißenbüttel mentions the response of the audience in a single 
sentence: “Die ‘Ressentiments’ haben übrigens ein gutes Echo gehabt. Mit gut meine ich auch nicht nur 
auf äußerem Wiedergutmachungspathos Beruhendes.” Heißenbüttel, letter to Améry, March 22, 1966 
(DLA 81.1979/3).  
69 Cf. ch. 3.3, Berg, Der Holocaust. 
70 The DLA Nachlass of Améry includes the short Wulf-Améry correspondence. 
71 Berg, Der Holocaust, 363. 
72 Berg arrives at this conclusion in the Wulf chapter. For a brief discussion of the changing relation 
between objectivity and professionalism in the twentieth century, cf. Dominick LaCapra, "Writing 
History, Writing Trauma,” 38f. LaCapra states that the common strategy reaching objectivity denies 
transferential implications, and it rejects the notion that there are “actual and desirable interactions 
between self and other.” More recently, LaCapra writes that in the case of extreme events, such as the 
Holocaust, objectification, because it impedes affective responses, puts the investigator (in our case, not 
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die Wulf und Poliakov [=Wulf’s co-author] entgegengebracht wurden, so groß waren, 
dass sie von den Autoren vorweggenommen werden mussten und in die Konzeption 
ihrer Bände Eingang fanden.”73 Thus Léon Poliakov and Wulf wrote in the 
introduction to Das Dritte Reich und die Juden that they had ressentiments because 
they were Jewish, but that they drew on “übermenschliche ‘wissenschaftliche’ 
Objektivität” in order to provide for an unbiased account of the history of the 
Holocaust.74 Among Jewish historians, Berg concludes, “’Ressentiments’ war die 
immer wieder geäußerte Selbstverdächtigung.”75 
Although Adorno, Wulf and Améry use the term ressentiment to refer to 
ressentiments held by Jewish victims, these victims’ ressentiments are not the only 
ones at stake. Berg concludes that Wulf and other Jewish intellectuals anticipated the 
charge of ressentiments (and along with it, the charge of bias) because non-Jewish 
Germans harbored ressentiments against the Jews in the wake of the Holocaust. In Von 
der Unfähigkeit zu trauern Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich include a lesser-
known section on taboo and ressentiments that offers a psychoanalytical explanation 
of such German postwar ressentiments. The Mitscherlichs explicate connections 
between a taboo and the ressentiment that develops over one’s inability to violate the 
taboo while simultaneously observing others violate it.76 Surveying news stories in 
which West Germans recount their visits to European countries where they were 
treated with “Ressentiments” as if “die deutschen Militaristen hier und dort Böses 
                                                
Wulf but Institute members) “in the untenable or at least questionable position of the bystander,” 
Dominick LaCapra, "Experience and Identity," History in Transit. Experience, Identity, Critical Theory 
(Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 35-71, here 70. The early Institute prized 
objectivity at the price of considering and engaging with victims of the Nazi regime. 
73 Berg, Der Holocaust, 363, 
74 Qtd. in: ibid., 363, 
75 Ibid., 364. 
76 Cf. Mitscherlich, Unfähigkeit zu trauern, 110-135. 
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verbrochen hätten,”77 the Mitscherlichs concluded that such reports, in which 
euphemisms and the subjunctive cover up atrocities, show clearly that many Germans 
placed a taboo on “einem für unberührbar erklärten Erinnerungsbereich,” specifically 
on the memory of crimes committed in the name of the German people during a Nazi 
past that was otherwise perceived by many Germans as heroic.78  The taboo deflected 
feelings of shame over the military defeat and the moral bankruptcy that had 
discredited one’s past. The taboo dictates not remembering a criminal history in which 
one’s own people is implicated, and those who obey the taboo constitute a reference 
group from which everyone who violates the taboo is purged. Confronted with people 
who openly articulate their memories of suffering inflicted by the Nazis, the reference 
group charges those violators with ressentiments, that is, with the malicious 
Nietzschean will not to forget and not to forgive.79 At work here is the mechanism of 
projection. Because postwar Germans envied victims for their ability to speak about 
the past, and because they could not articulate these negative affects without admitting 
their own guilt, they projected their negative feelings onto others, where they are 
interpreted as ressentiments.80 For the Mitscherlichs postwar Germans harbored 
“envious resentment (or resentful envy)”81 and charged with ressentiment those who 
remembered the past from the perspective of victims, but who remembered this 
victimization (according to the charge) with malicious delight in shaming the 
Germans. In the Mitscherlich presentation resentment and ressentiment are difficult if 
not impossible to distinguish.  
                                                
77 The Mitscherlichs cite a report from an international conference in Prague, where, during a 
sightseeing tour, the guide pointed out sites of war crimes. The quotation stems from the report, qut. in: 
ibid., 121. Emphasis mine. 
78 Ibid., 121. The opinion polls after the Frankfurt Auschwitz trial serve as another example: 39 % of 
Germans do not want to learn any more of “‘diese Dinge,’” qtd. in: ibid., 123. 
79 A prominent target of postwar ressentiments was Karl Jaspers. Cf. Jean Paul Bier, "Jaspers 'Die 
Schuldfrage'," in Deutsche Nachkriegsliteratur und der Holocaust, ed. Stephan Braese et al. 
(Frankfurt/M., Germany, New York: Campus, 1998), 271-82, here 273. 
80 Cf. Mitscherlich, Unfähigkeit zu trauern,111ff., 126f. 
81 Walker, Moral Repair, 130. 
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What psychoanalytical projection described by the Mitscherlichs achieves is 
the reversal of a historical victim-perpetrator dichotomy; Germans in this dynamic see 
themselves as victims of unforgiving “Ressentimentträger.”82 The controversy 
surrounding Thomas Mann’s return to Germany is one example of German 
ressentiments, and ressentiments were also felt towards and then projected onto Jewish 
voices, such as those of Adorno, Wulf, and Améry. The possibility that the Nazi 
regime’s victims justifiably felt ressentiments because of real crimes that were covered 
up did not occur to many Germans.83 This was the environment of confused 
sensibilities, negatively laden ressentiments, taboos on the past, and lack of 
consideration for victims, in which Améry advanced his defense of ressentiments in 
order to provoke a dialogue—not a series of accusations—between former victims and 
perpetrators.  
 
 
 
                                                
82 Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 90. 
83 Cf. Mitscherlich, Unfähigkeit zu trauern, 124. In her article on Améry’s “Ressentiments,” Aleida 
Assmann discusses German ressentiments still in place today, exemplified for her by Martin Walser. In 
his 1998 speech in the Frankfurt Paulskirche accepting the German Peace Award, Walser employed a 
rhetoric that adhered firmly to the postwar taboo. He charged others with ressentiments against 
Germans, namely those who use Auschwitz as “Moralkeule” in “[der] Routine des Beschuldigens,” 
particularly against him, who sometimes “nirgends mehr hinschauen kann, ohne von einer 
Beschuldigung attackiert zu werden.” Martin Walser, Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels 1998. 
Ansprachen aus Anlass der Verleihung (Frankfurt/M. 1998). (Online text accessed September 15, 2010, 
http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/dokumente/WegeInDieGegenwart_redeWalserZumFriedenspreis/index.ht
ml.) References to crime or responsibility were absent, despite the chosen topic. As Assmann notes 
further, Walser disassociated himself from precisely those intellectuals (e.g., Jürgen Habermas) who 
promote the transformation of Germany’s memory culture so that it includes German crimes. Aleida 
Assmann, "Two Forms of Resentment. Jean Améry, Martin Walser and German Memorial Culture," 
New German Critique 90 (2003), 123-33, here 130. In an interview following his Paulskirche speech, 
Walser completed the reversal of the relationship between victim and perpetrator; referring to literary 
critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki, Walser stated: “[Er ist] der Täter, und ich bin das Opfer. (…) Herr Reich-
Ranicki, in unserem Verhältnis bin ich der Jude.” Qtd. in: Briegleb, Missachtung und Tabu, 280. 
The German preemptive accusation of ressentiments turns on the premise that ressentiment is 
negative. If Améry succeeds in rehabilitating ressentiments morally, then this tactic loses footing, 
because the necessary negative construction is not there to cast the target of the accusation (the victims) 
in a bad light. 
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Améry’s Contribution: The “Ressentiments” Essay 
 In his preface to Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne Améry states that he wrote his 
first text on Auschwitz after twenty years of silence —challenged by the Frankfurt 
Auschwitz Trial—and that the writing broke a “dumpfer Bann” after which “plötzlich 
alles gesagt sein [wollte].”84 Améry reflects retrospectively that this book was “eine 
Katharsis (…), alles Verdrängte kam wieder hoch und wurde nun geistig 
durchgearbeit.”85 Only during the process of writing did he discover that “ich zwar 
manches bedacht, aber es viel zu wenig klar artikuliert hatte.”86  
Améry employs reasoned argumentation but goes beyond empirical 
verification and logical deduction, using speculation and empathy to attain intellectual 
grounds,  
 
Räume, in denen ‘la raison’ nicht zum flachen Raisonieren führt. Dies 
ist der Grund dafür, warum ich (…) stets vom konkreten Ereignis 
ausgehe, mich aber niemals an dieses verliere, sondern es stets zum 
Anlass nehme für Reflexionen, die hinausgehen über raisonnement und 
Raisonnierfreudigkeit in Denkbezirke, über denen ein ungewisser 
Dämmer liegt und liegen bleiben wird. (18)  
 
Through reflection on ressentiments, which was “ein langsames und mühseliges 
Vorwärtskommen im bis zum Überdruss Bekannten,” he realizes that this supposed 
knowledge had remained abstract for him and that the darkness of this abstraction can 
be illuminated only if he accepts himself as “der einzig brauchbare Ansatzpunkt” from 
which to reflect on the past (21). With his ressentiments Améry places himself at the 
site of the injury, from which he addresses his contemporary Germans, the majority of 
whom “sich nicht oder nicht mehr betroffen fühlen von den zugleich finstersten und 
kennzeichnendsten Taten des Dritten Reiches” (22).  
                                                
84 Améry, "Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne," 20.  
85 Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 98.  
86 Améry, "Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne," 20. From now on page numbers are included 
parenthetically in the text.  
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In a short introduction outlining the task at hand and his subject position, 
Améry formulates his main thesis, according to which ressentiments make a specific 
moral demand: to reverse time and history. Because it cannot be reversed in reality, 
time is essentially amoral, but Améry suggests a paradoxical solution that would 
effectively reverse history and render ressentiment unnecessary in his view. The essay 
ends with a highly pessimistic assessment of the chances that his solution will be 
realized. The origins of “Ressentiments” can be traced back to at least two earlier 
texts, which I discuss in conjunction with the 1965 essay.  
 
Améry’s Task 
Améry begins “Ressentiments” with an apology for his lack of tact. In the 
opening essay of Jenseits Améry tells of a well-meaning friend who advised him not 
to refer to Auschwitz too many times because his audience—West Germans—was 
allergic to this ostensibly geographical term, which carried historical and political 
significance (23). Améry disregards the advice and with it certain “Rücksichten” that 
have no place in examining the past he contends; he certainly does not intend to 
uphold a taboo (23f.). “[A]uf die Gefahr hin, schlechte Figur zu machen,” he refuses 
to be circumspect but wishes to illuminate (“erhellen”) his ressentiments for those, 
“gegen die sie sich richten” (120, 126).  
 
Mir ist nicht wohl in diesem friedlichen, schönen, von tüchtigen und 
modernen Menschen bewohnten Lande. Warum, das hat man schon 
erraten: Ich gehöre jener glücklicherweise langsam aussterbenden 
Spezies von Menschen an, die man übereinkommensgemäß die 
Naziopfer nennt. Das Volk, von dem ich spreche und das ich hier 
anrede, zeigt gedämpftes Verständnis für meinen reaktiven Groll. Ich 
selber aber verstehe diesen Groll nicht ganz, noch nicht—und darum 
will ich mir in diesem Aufsatz über ihn klar werden (…). Ich spreche 
als Opfer und untersuche meine Ressentiments. (119) 
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On a rhetorical level, this passage foreshadows the general tone of the essay, which 
oscillates between the descriptive-argumentative and the polemical, and between 
sincerity and irony.87 On another level, this passage also establishes the basic 
parameters of the essay’s argumentational structure: the topic (ressentiments), the 
problem (incomprehension), the task (clarification), the point of view (that of those 
victimized by the Nazis), and the addressee (all Germans, regardless of background).88  
As Brudholm astutely observes, Améry’s task quickly shifts from clarification 
and analysis to shielding his ressentiments from condemnation.89 Rather than coming 
to understand why he harbors ressentiments, Améry’s objective becomes the 
justification of this affect, which is frowned upon by “Moralisten und Psychologen” 
alike (121). In particular he registers the need to defend his ressentiments against 
Nietzsche, whose works are widely regarded as the final word on the topic, and 
against psychologists, who view ressentiments as a lingering injury of imprisonment, 
which they dismiss as “KZ-Syndrom(s).” Both Nietzsche and the psychologists view 
bearers of ressentiments as “verbogen” (126f.). With this in mind Améry settles on the 
ultimate task of his essay and puts forward a thesis that is extraordinary in the postwar 
context: “[Verbogen zu sein] stellt mir aber auch die Aufgabe, unsere Verbogenheit 
neu zu definieren: und zwar als eine sowohl moralisch als auch geschichtlich der 
gesunden Gradheit gegenüber ranghöhere Form des Menschlichen” (ibid.). 
Ressentiments are, in Améry’s conception, the “Emotionsquelle jeder echten Moral” 
(148). Beyond a mere philosophical category, ressentiments fulfill a social function in 
                                                
87 Améry’s shifting terminology (“Groll” and ressentiment) further complicates the understanding of the 
essay, as evidenced by a number of different interpretations. Cf. ch. 13, Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 
160-169.  
88 Cf. Ibid., 83.  
89 Ibid., 92. Améry’s vocabulary changed from “über [Ressentiments] klar werden” and “untersuche[n]” 
(119) to “radikale Analyse” (120), “Justifizierung” (121), and, finally, to “[Ressentiments] schirmen” 
(127).  
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the public sphere, and it is this function, overlooked by Nietzsche and psychologists, 
about which Améry intends to educate his German audience.   
 Améry is thus more concerned with morality and history than with justice in a 
legal sense. At stake is the moral repair of past wrongdoings rather than a judicial 
confrontation with the past, the failure of which he found amply demonstrated. Were 
Améry to draw conclusions from reading “Kempner, Reitlinger, und Hannah Arendt,” 
he would justify ressentiments, 
 
weil auf der öffentlichen Szene Westdeutschlands immer noch 
Persönlichkeiten agieren, die den Peinigern nahestanden, weil trotz der 
Verlängerung der Verjährungsfrist für Schwer-Kriegsverbrechen die 
Verbrecher eine gute Chance haben, in Ehren alt zu werden und uns—
triumphierend, dafür bürgt ihre Aktivität in ihren großen Tagen—zu 
überdauern. (120)90 
Disappointment with judicial failings does not trigger Améry’s ressentiments; instead, 
they are prompted by his growing recognition that just twenty years after their defeat, 
Germans have regained the “Zufriedenheit des guten Gewissens” (147).  
 
The Origins of Améry’s Ressentiments 
 It is important to note that Améry believes it is not his injuries themselves, but 
society’s failure to acknowledge them properly, that is the seed of his ressentiments. 
Améry remembers that on the day of his liberation from Bergen-Belsen he harbored 
no ressentiments for his manifold injuries, neither torture nor imprisonment, nor the 
loss of both Heimat and language (lost by sharing both with his tormentors) provoked 
resentful feelings, because Améry was certain in 1945 that the world’s contempt 
                                                
90 Améry most likely refers to British historian Gerald Reitlinger, whose books The Final Solution and 
The S.S. were translated into German in 1956 and 1957. Robert Kempner was the German-Jewish 
attorney who served as the assistant to U.S. chief prosecutor Robert H. Jackson at the Nuremberg IMT. 
He is credited with the discovery of the Wannsee protocol.  
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would reduce a morally bankrupt Germany to a “Kartoffelacker- und Ruinen-
Deutschland” without political or economic power (123).  
Améry does not exaggerate here. From a text completed in 1945—and 
probably begun in Auschwitz91—it is clear that he believed Germany had isolated 
itself irretrievably and was a pariah. In “Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes” he 
wrote that the most tragic period of German history was about to begin, and that this 
was the moment Thomas Mann had predicted with his fictional Goethe’s speech: “’Ich 
habe Angst, dass einmal der gebundene Welthass sich gegen das deutsche Volk 
richten könnte…’”92 Améry contended that all Germans were collectively guilty 
according to international opinion and subject to hatred and revenge. In his 1945 
writings he distanced himself from the verdict of collective guilt. Because he did not 
believe in the collective guilt of the Germans that justified calls for revenge, he sought 
to articulate a pedagogic project for their moral reeducation.93 In contrast to Hannah 
Arendt, who denied the “Verantwortungsfähigkeit” of the Germans,94 Améry firmly 
believed that the German people were able to assume moral responsibility, which in 
itself would already contribute to their moral betterment. The Nazi elite, however, 
which had undergone an irreversible “Erziehung der Umenschlichkeit” to reach their 
Nietzschean goal of total power, was beyond the realm of education and corrigibility 
in his view, and Améry demanded their “physische Extermination” regardless of 
                                                
91 Cf. Scheit, "Nachwort [zu Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne]," 630. 
92 Améry, "Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes," 500. The British chief prosecutor would use the 
same quote in his opening remarks at the Nuremberg IMT; however, he mistakenly attributed it to the 
historical Goethe. Cf. Stephan Braese, "Versetzte Gleichzeitigkeit. Darstellungen bis 1949," in Shoah in 
der deutschsprachigen Literatur, ed. Norbert Otto Eke and Hartmut Steinecke (Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 2006), 21-42, here 25. 
93  “Wir wollen nochmals festhalten: Der begangenen infernalischen Greuel in Konzentrationslagern 
und Gefängnissen hat sich das deutsche Volk in seiner Gesamtkeit nicht schuldig gemacht.” Améry, 
"Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes," 525. 
94 Arendt, "Organisierte Schuld," 31. Améry does not reference Arendt directly. Arendt’s article 
appeared in English in 1945.  
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individual guilt.95 Aside from this numerical minority, he felt, the Germans were by 
and large good-natured (“gutartig”) and, though guilty of failing to prevent the Nazi 
crimes, “umerziehbar (…) und besserungsfähig.”96 The task of reeducation fell to 
those intellectuals who had upheld German spirit (“Geist”) within the Third Reich all 
along, namely to members of the inner emigration. Despite their failure at political 
opposition, Améry credited them with the continuation of Geist, if “man überhaupt 
geneigt [ist], sie [=Neuerziehung] ernstlich und mit brauchbaren Mitteln zu 
unternehmen.” Améry failed to clarify to whom the “man” refers, to the carrier of 
Geist or the German people.97 Despite the optimism permeating the text, Améry left 
his reader with a final doubt as to whether the Germans would ever understand the 
term humanity (“Humanität”) in more than merely abstract-philosophical terms, that 
is, if they would ever act on it politically and morally.98 
  In a second text predating “Ressentiments” by just a few years, Améry 
revisited the question of German reeducation. “Im Schatten des deutschen Geistes” 
was part of a series of essays Améry wrote between 1958 and 1961, and which he 
published in 1962 as Geburt der Gegenwart. Introducing a book on cultural 
developments in Western countries (Germany, France, Great Britain, and the U.S.) 
since 1945, he recalled that after the end of the war, after “Coventry, Hamburg, Lidice, 
Dresden, Oradour, nach Auschwitz und Malmédy,”  
                                                
95 Améry, "Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes," 509, cf. 509-513. Améry’s recommendation recalls 
Morgenthau’s plan to execute all “arch-criminals.” It circumvents the problem that the prosecution later 
faced at the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials, namely proving murderous intention for each defendant. For 
Améry, membership in any of the Nazi elite groups was evidence enough of murderous intentions, 
regardless of individual action. In his membership acceptance spech at Deutsche Akademie, Améry 
explicitly introduced himself as someone who had fully agreed with the Morgenthau plan that was still 
a “sehr milde Lösung,” Améry, "Statt eines Vorwortes,"16. In 1945 Améry also demanded that all 
writings of Nietzsche be destroyed. While others were already rehabilitating Nietzsche from the 
reputation as the favorite philosopher of National Socialism, Améry was adamant about his assessment 
of Nietzsche, and this would not change.  
96 Améry, "Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes," 526. 
97 Ibid., 534. 
98 Ibid., 534. “Wir getrauen uns nicht abzuschätzen, (…) ob dieses Volk also jemals politisch den 
Begriff der Humanität erfassen wird.” 
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Deutschland (…) vor der Nötigung einer kollektiven politischen Auto-
Psychoanalyse [steht]. Es steht vor dem geschehenen Weltunheil, das 
ihm zur Last gelegt wird, und es soll an seine Brust schlagen, so 
fordern es die Völker und so verlangen es seine eigenen Söhne, sofern 
sie sich unschuldig wissen an den Taten des Dritten Reiches. Die 
Aufgabe ist schwer. Zu schwer. Dass Deutschland sich weigern wird, 
sie zu lösen, liegt auf der Hand.99 
 
While he acknowledged the refusal of Germans to make amends, i.e., to beat their 
chests in admission of guilt and supplication for forgiveness,100 Améry did not 
articulate ressentiments over this—not yet. It appears that in the late 1950s he was 
merely an observer; he subordinated the issue of moral rehabilitation to the question of 
cultural development. However, from the chapter on Germany (“Im Schatten des 
Dritten Reiches”), it becomes clear that he took postwar literature as a point of 
departure in addressing the question of whether West Germany had broken with its 
history of National Socialism. He observed that postwar literary production was 
dominated by a handful of non-Jewish writers who wrote dubious (“zweideutig”) 
works, and he concluded that because no revolution against Hitler had taken place, 
most literature—including that of Alfred Andersch, for instance—remained in the 
shadow of the Third Reich.101  
Améry stated in “Im Schatten des Dritten Reiches” that he arrived at this 
conclusion during his first visit to West Germany (in 1952), when 
                                                
99 Jean Améry, Geburt der Gegenwart. Gestalten und Gestaltungen der westlichen Zivilisation seit 
Kriegsende (Olten, Freiburg i.B.: Olten, 1961), 11. 
100 Cf. Luke 18:10-14. 
101 Améry, Geburt der Gegenwart, 13. The Germany chapter is republished in the Werke edition: Jean 
Améry, "Im Schatten des Dritten Reiches (Deutschland-Kapitel aus: Geburt der Gegenwart)," in Jean 
Améry Werke. Bd. 2, Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre, Örtlichkeiten, ed. 
Gerhard Scheit, Jean Améry Werke (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), 535-99, here 560-578. Améry is 
critical of the debate between actual and inner emigration that distracts from the main problem: the 
absence of Jewish writers. The return of non-Jewish German emigrants was politically possible, 
whereas Jewish emigrants’ return was emotionally impossible, in Améry’s view, due to “Millionen 
Leichen” blocking the way. Cf. Améry, Geburt der Gegenwart, 13; Améry, "Im Schatten des Dritten 
Reiches," 563. 
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“Wehrmachtsdeutsch” and the “Blick von damals” belied the first impression by 
which Germany seemed “ein vollständig fremdes Land” and the Germans a bettered 
people.102 On this visit he had also noticed that the media were dominated by a 
“Mischung von moralischer Aburteilung des Dritten Reiches mit dem 
komplizenhaften Augenzwinkern nach den ‘kleinen Leuten,’ die dieses Reich trugen” 
(545) and thus he was unconvinced that German democracy was built on anything 
more than sand: 
 
Wenn dennoch sich kein glückliches Verhältnis herstellen will 
zwischen dem Besucher und diesem Lande, dann müssen die Gründe 
hierfür wohl im Politischen liegen. Das unklare Gefühl, dass alle 
Herrlichkeit dieses Landes, die demokratische der klaglos 
funktionierenden Institutionen, die wirtschaftliche, die kulturelle, die 
soziale, auf Sand gebaut ist, legt sich dem Gast drückend auf die Brust 
und lässt ihn nicht wieder froh werden. (Ibid.) 
 
For this reason, Améry considered the pedagogic project of reeducation to have failed 
and resorted to explaining the reasons for its failure. With his growing disappointment 
he recognized that it was, after all, the “Mehrheit der individuellen Deutschen” who 
were implicated in Nazi crimes and who would not accept their murderous past as 
national history because many of them regarded the Third Reich as the “Epoche mit 
dem persönlich-existentiellen Höhepunkt” (550). The “deutsche Revolution”—either 
politically in the past or morally in the present—would have been the only possibility, 
“das Dritte Reich zu überwinden und gleichzeitig dialektisch ins 
Geschichtsbewußtsein einzugliedern” (553). The conflict between “dem geschichtlich 
ehrlosen, persönlich aber vielfach ehrenvollen Abenteuer des Dritten Reiches” 
experienced by many Germans crippled their capacity to follow democracy whole-
heartedly. This resistance, coupled with Cold War policies that fostered Allied 
                                                
102 Améry, "Im Schatten des Dritten Reiches," 538, 541. From now on page numbers are included 
parenthetically in the text.  
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leniency towards Nazi criminals, undermined attempts at democratization, in his view, 
which were dwarfed by “Vertuschung und Restauration” (558).103 Hence Améry’s 
unhappy relationship (“kein glückliches Verhältnis,” 545) with Germany gave rise to 
his ressentiments.  
The 1965 essay echoes Améry’s earlier sentiments and directly links his 
ressentiment to the German Wiederaufbau and the economic miracle in particular. 
Instead of having turned into a potato field, bereft of any political or economic power, 
Améry writes, Germany quickly became, because of Cold War politics that released 
the country from its pariah existence, one of the most important Western European 
nation-states and therefore “guter Boden” not for potatoes but for Améry’s 
ressentiments (124f.). What Améry had believed to be international consensus that 
intended for Germany to become nothing but an agricultural wasteland, never again to 
pose a military threat, was quickly replaced by a different consensus, namely that 
“[n]ur ganz verstockter, moralisch verdammenswerter und geschichtlich schon 
abgeurteilter Hass (…) sich an eine Vergangenheit [klammere], die offensichtlich 
nichts anderes war als ein Betriebsunfall (…) an dem das deutsche Volk in seiner 
Breite und Tiefe keinen Anteil hatte” (126). Rather than beating their chests, Améry 
felt that Germans quickly began to concentrate on their own suffering during and after 
the war and chose to come to terms with the past “auf ihre Art” by channeling all 
energy towards the economy, thus avoiding the past (125). “Der Deutsche, erwachend 
aus der gewaltigsten Niederlage seiner Geschichte, vollzog nach dem Kriege eine 
Flucht in die Wirtschaft.”104 This assessment preceded the Mitscherlichs’ conclusion, 
                                                
103 Adorno arrived at similar conclusions at approximately the same time (1959), Theodor W. Adorno, 
"Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit," in Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 
10/2. Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft II, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1997), 555-72. 
104 Améry continues, “Er machte die Wirtschaft zu seiner großen persönlichen und nationalen 
Aufgabe.” Améry, "Im Schatten des Dritten Reiches," 597f. In the 1945 text, Améry had pointed out 
already the one national characteristic he could detect among Germans: their dedication to work. He 
arrives at an explanation for National Socialism that does not focus on militarism but on the 
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that the resurrection of the economy, rather than the construction of a strong 
democracy, became the Germans’ “Lieblingskind.”105 
 
The Time-Warp of Ressentiment 
By contrast Améry insists in 1965 on the truth of the collective guilt thesis, not 
because Germans shared a collective mindset (which would be “blanker Unsinn”), but 
because the sum of all forms of guilt—“Tatschuld, Unterlassungsschuld, Redeschuld, 
Schweigeschuld”—statistically implicates all of them (134f.).106  Although the notion 
is taboo and “unberührbar,” Améry must “an ihm festhalten” to be true to his 
experience as victim of collectively administered crimes (134), yet the discrepancy 
between his judgment of collective guilt and the world’s consensus of collective 
innocence (“kollektive Unschuld”) renders him an outcast: “Ich bin belastet mit der 
Kollektivschuld, sage ich: nicht sie. Die Welt, die vergibt und vergisst, hat mich 
verurteilt, nicht jene, die mordeten oder den Mord geschehen ließen” (138).  
                                                
internalization of work, as Germans deemed work to be a duty to follow, no matter whether the work 
was meaningful. The Nazis knew how to take advantage of this mindless adherence to duty, and Améry 
declares the “irrationale Bessenheit von (gleichgültig welcher) Sache, die man um ‘ihrer selbst willen 
tut,’ das heißt, (…) von der man nicht weiß, warum man sie tut” to be the origin of unquestioning 
German support of Nazi policies. Améry, "Zur Psychologie des deutschen Volkes," 517f. Gerhard 
Scheit believes that a comparable concept is at work in Hannah Arendt’s “Selbstlosigkeit.”  Scheit, 
"Nachwort [zu Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne]," 633. On her 1950 visit to Germany, Arendt recognized 
a “Selbstlosigkeit” in the Germans’ “fieberhafte[n] Geschäftigkeit” of processing the past: “Beobachtet 
man die Deutschen, wie sie geschäftig durch die Ruinen ihrer tausendjährigen Geschichte stolpern und 
die für die zerstörten Wahrzeichen kein Achselzucken übrig haben[,] oder wie sie es einem verübeln, 
wenn man sie an die Schreckenstaten erinnert, welche die ganze übrige Welt nicht loslassen, dann 
begreift man, dass die Geschäftigkeit zu ihrer Hauptwaffe bei der Abwehr der Wirklichkeit geworden 
ist.” Hannah Arendt, "Die Nachwirkungen des Naziregimes. Bericht aus Deutschland," in In der 
Gegenwart. Übungen im politischen Denken II (Munich: Piper, 2000), 38-63, here 45. Améry clearly 
mirrored Arendt’s thought in “Im Schatten des Dritten Reiches.” 
105 Mitscherlich, Unfähigkeit zu trauern, 19. 
106 Améry makes second mention of Meister Pfeiffer. While in Auschwitz, Améry worked as a clerk at 
I.G. Farben under the supervision of Pfeiffer. In the 1945 “Psychologie” text, Améry describes Pfeiffer 
as “ein[en] gutartige[n] Mensch[en],” who suffered from the German disease of valuing work over life, 
therefore treating his workers brutally (515). By 1965, Améry’s benevolent, even apologetic, stance 
towards Pfeiffer has changed completely. Pfeiffer is one of the examples Améry lists in his discussion 
of German guilt in which all were implicated (137).  
 259 
For Améry this postwar isolation recalls his loneliness during torture. The 
original injury of the past, because it remains unrecognized, is experienced 
continuously in the present: the postwar injury prevents the wound of the original 
injury from healing. The affectively inflected memory keeps Améry, in Schelerian 
manner, tied to his past. He is aware that with the passing of time the gap widens 
between him and the future-oriented society in which he lives. He reflects on this 
condition in one of the most striking passages of the essay: 
 
Es ist meinem Nachdenken nicht unentdeckt geblieben, dass das 
Ressentiment nicht nur ein widernatürlicher, sondern auch ein logisch 
widersprüchlicher Zustand ist. Es nagelt jeden von uns fest ans Kreuz 
seiner zerstörten Vergangenheit. Absurd fordert es, das Irreversible 
solle umgekehrt, das Ereignis unereignet gemacht werden. Das 
Ressentiment blockiert den Ausgang in die eigentlich menschliche 
Dimension, die Zukunft. Ich weiß, das Zeitgefühl des im Ressentiment 
Gefangenen ist verdreht, ver-rückt, wenn man will, denn es verlangt 
nach dem zweifach Unmöglichen, dem Rückgang ins Abgelebte und 
der Aufhebung dessen, was geschah. (...) Jedenfalls kann aus diesem 
Grunde der Mensch des Ressentiments nicht einstimmen in den unisono 
rundum erhobenen Friedensruf, der da aufgeräumt vorschlägt: Nicht 
rückwärts lasst uns schauen, sondern vorwärts, in eine bessere, 
gemeinsame Zukunft! (128, emphasis mine) 
 
Améry’s self-description as the “man of ressentiments” evokes, of course, a 
comparison with the Nietzschean man of ressentiments who (in Dostoevsky’s literary 
realization) never forgets but “remembers [his] injury down to the smallest, most 
ignominious details” and demands repayment with an “interest accumulated over all 
the years.”107  Brudholm argues that Améry’s image of the ressentiment-laden victim 
more closely resembles Walter Benjamin’s angel of history, who gazes at the past with 
the desire to undo it.108 Recall Benjamin’s angel of history:  
 
                                                
107 F. M. Dostoevsky, "Notes from the Underground," in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: The New American Library, 1975), 60.  
108 Cf. Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 105, 109.  
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His eyes are wide, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. Where a 
chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which 
keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel 
would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been 
smashed.109  
 
Brudholm draws the connection between Améry and Benjamin’s angel based on their 
repulsion at the sight of history. The angel’s wings become caught in the storm of 
progress that transports him into the future, but to which he keeps his back turned. 
Ressentiment similarly fixes Améry with his back to the future and his gaze upon the 
past, absurdly demanding that he would turn back time and undo history. This is the 
condition that psychologists designate as “verbogen” and that impedes its bearer’s 
well-being, as Améry freely admits. But he defines it as a form of humanness morally 
superior to future-oriented forgiveness. Améry is invested in a social and 
philosophical concept of ressentiment that is applicable to human, not angelic, terms 
of morality. With indirect reference to the angel of history while simultaneously 
addressing proponents of forgiveness, Améry states he is too “flügellahm” and will 
therefore resist “dem ethischen Höhenflug” dictated by those who concentrate on the 
future and demand of him “hochfliegend” to internalize his injury and practice 
emotional asceticism (128f.).110 Rather than flying backwards into the future, like the 
angel of history, Améry does not fly at all. This does not mean that he does not 
conceive of a possible future. However, he will not reach the future as long as his 
ressentiments tie him to his past.  
 This warped condition, by which one’s possession by the past blocks the 
future, might seem to resemble the condition of traumatic experience, though it would 
                                                
109 Benjamin, "Concept of History," 392. 
110 Améry refers by name to the Jewish-French publicist André Neher, who advocates silence and 
thereby, according to Améry, “emotionelle(r) Askese” in regard to one’s suffering. Améry charges him 
with demanding from the victims the same sort of internalization that Neher presumes the perpetrators 
practice vis-à-vis their guilt. Améry refuses to engage in that form of “Parallelismus” (129).  
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perhaps be wise not conflate the two. As has been widely suggested, Benjamin’s 
distinction between Erlebnis (as isolated experience) and Erfahrung (as integrated 
experience) is helpful in understanding trauma, which entails an extreme event that its 
victim is intellectually and emotionally unable to comprehend fully and contextualize 
and which remains unintegrated unless it is worked through.111 Dominick LaCapra 
argues that traumatic experience, in contrast to a traumatic event, which is situated at a 
specific point in the past, is elusive and invades the present with memories of the past. 
Traumatic memory, he continues, “lives on experientially and haunts or possesses the 
self,” thus effectively collapsing past and present and foreclosing the possibility of 
engaging in the present as social agent.112 Both Sebald and Brudholm connect 
Améry’s temporal warp to hypermnesia, William Niederland’s term for traumatic 
memory as an overstimulation of affectively inflected memory of the past intruding 
into the present.113 Améry himself asserts that he is “nicht ‘traumatisiert’” (175) and 
rejects the notion of Niederland’s survivor’s syndrome because it objectifies the 
subjective experience by labeling it as pathological (127).114  
The issue at hand is not to decide whether Améry suffered from traumatic 
experience (or whether his suicide was a delayed consequence of his trauma), but to 
put ressentiment and its temporal sensibility in the larger context of trauma, which is 
not limited to processes of acting out but also covers those of working through. Rather 
than acting out traumatic experience, I argue, ressentiments figure in the realm of 
                                                
111 Cf. Benjamin, "Baudelaire," 319. LaCapra, "Experience and Identity," 55; Dominick LaCapra, 
“Trauma Studies: Its Critics and Vicissitudes,” History in Transit. Experience, Identity, Critical Theory 
(Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press), 106-143, here 117. 
112 LaCapra, "Experience and Identity," 55f. 
113 Sebald, "Jean Améry und Primo Levi," 121f. Cf. William Niederland, Folgen der Verfolgung. Das 
Überlebenen-Syndrom (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1980), 230; Brudholm, Resentment's Virtue, 107. 
114 Améry refers directly to H. Paul and H. J. Herberg, Psychische Spätschaden nach politischer 
Verfolgung (Berlin, New York: Karger, 1967). It is safe to assume that he was familiar with William 
Niederland, who first described the survivor syndrome in 1961. Jan Philipp Reemtsma has discussed the 
“Ressentiments” essay as evidence of Améry’s trauma. Cf. Jan Philipp Reemtsma, "172364. Gedanken 
über den Gebrauch der ersten Person Singular bei Jean Améry," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 9, 
Materialien, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 467-504, here 498ff. 
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working through. The processes of working through and acting out are closely linked, 
as both involve the repetition of traumatic events. However, as J. Laplanche and J.-B. 
Pontalis have argued, repetition in working through is “modified by interpretation 
and—for this reason—liable to facilitate the subject’s freeing himself from repetition 
mechanisms.”115 In working through, but not acting out, victims are able to distinguish 
between past and present; they recognize that they are living in the present with 
memories of the past. By no means is the goal of working through to achieve full 
closure by which the past is forgiven; rather, it acknowledges the past as a residue or 
“stain” that will indefinitely remain.116  
In agreement with LaCapra’s perspective on working through trauma as “the 
effort to articulate or rearticulate affect and representation in a manner that may never 
transcend, but may to some viable extent counteract, a reenactment, or acting out,” I 
understand Améry’s articulation of and reflection on his affective state of ressentiment 
as an effort to work through.117 Améry may not have been traumatized, but 
ressentiments require processes of working through that are similar to those necessary 
in the aftermath of traumatic events. Through the genre of exploratory essay, which 
may itself relate to processes of working through,118 Améry apprehends his past in a 
way that is meaningful for his present without trying to overcome the past. His 
ressentiments constitute an affective demand to reverse time; but rather than 
submitting to this absurd demand and acting out compulsively, Améry offers a 
                                                
115 J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(New York: Norton, 1974), 488f. LaCapra compares the processes of working through and acting out in 
the conclusion: Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust. History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca, NY; 
London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 205-224. 
116 Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998). 187. 
117 LaCapra defines trauma as the dissociation between affect and representation: “one disorientingly 
feels what one cannot represent; one numbingly represents what one cannot feel,” LaCapra, "Writing 
History, Writing Trauma," 42.  
118 Cf. Dominick LaCapra, Interview for Yad Vashem (June 9, 1998),” Writing History, Writing 
Trauma (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press), 141-180, here 178. 
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solution that requires Germans to accompany him in his task of working through, thus 
effectively freeing him from his loneliness if not from his past. 
 
The Subjective Role of Améry’s Ressentiments  
The irreversibility of time, according to Adorno, “gibt ein objektives 
moralisches Kriterium ab.”119 Améry’s essay is in essence a rebuttal of Adorno’s 
statement. According to Améry, it is the irreversibility (“Irreversibilität”) of time that 
is the cornerstone of amorality. Ressentiments are the reminder that the notion of time 
healing of all wounds is a platitude sidestepping genuine moral repair. Any German 
consensus that time will bring about forgetting or forgiving confuses, in Améry’s 
view, the physiological process of healing wounds with the emotional and mnemonic 
labor of working through that has little to do with time. For Améry, time itself has 
“nicht nur außer-, sondern widermoralischen Charakter.” Therefore  
 
[fordert] der sittliche Mensch (…) [die] Aufhebung der Zeit—im 
besonderen, hier zur Rede stehenden Fall: durch Festnagelung des 
Untäters an seine Untat. Mit ihr mag er bei vollzogener moralischer 
Zeitumkehrung als Mitmensch dem Opfer zugesellt werden. (133f.) 
 
The demand for the irreversibility of time is not to be met in real time, but in the realm 
of moral truth by attempting to actualize the conflict that, in a moral sense, has not yet 
taken place (“Aktualisierung (…) des ungelösten Konflikts,” 129). The conflict is to 
be actualized by the victim’s ressentiment, which in turn provokes “Selbstmisstrauen” 
in the perpetrator. Améry formulates a concrete task via which both sides, victims and 
perpetrators, work through and master (“meistern”)—but not forget—the past, as it is 
in spite of “ihrer radikalen Gegensätzlichkeit” their shared past (142).  Améry is at the 
                                                
119 Theodor W.  Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 2003), 88. I am still struggling with “Reversibilität” and whether Améry means reversal or 
reversibility by it. I believe that the reversibility of time is at the heart of his discussion: time is amoral 
because it can not ever be reversed. The reversibility of time would allow for a reversal of history.  
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present the prisoner of “der moralischen Wahrheit des Konflikts” (130), and he seeks 
release from the “noch immer andaurnden Verlassensein von damals” that, though 
originating with his experience of torture, extends to the present because neither his 
perpetrator nor the majority of Germans have morally realized the crime (131). He 
desires to pull his tormentor and postwar Germans into “die Wahrheit seiner [=des 
Verbrechers] Untat” so that they regret the past and desire to undo it as much as 
Améry does (131). In that instant, Améry and his tormentor would meet and hence 
transform their existence as counterhumans (“Gegen-Menschen”) back into a pre-
crime relationship among fellow human beings (“Mitmenschen”). The moral reversal 
of time would be complete (131), and the demand of Améry’s subjective ressentiments 
would be met.120 The reversibility of time is possible only in the subjunctive and can 
never be achieved in real time, yet for Améry the impossibility coexists along the 
possibility of desiring that time is reversible. This possibility allows for the otherwise 
impossible reversibility of time in moral terms. 
 Though she never mentions Améry, Pamela Hieronymi develops a theory of 
resentment that comes close to his understanding of ressentiment.121 Hieronymi seeks 
a concept of “uncompromising forgiveness”—that is, a form of forgiving that writes 
over an injury without erasing it, thus leaving behind a visible stain as reminder of the 
                                                
120 In the second essay of Jenseits on his torture experience Améry reflects on how the relationship 
between individuals radically changes as soon as one human being violates the physical boundaries of 
another purposefully and without intentions to relieve pain. With the first blow, “Weltvertrauen”—the 
trust in a world that rests on the reasonable expectation to receive help from an external agent when the 
body is in pain—is shattered. What accompanies the destruction of trust in the world is the 
transformation from Mit-Mensch to Gegen-Mensch. Eugene Goodheart argues that Améry’s call for 
self-mistrust on the side of the Germans is essentially a demand to avenge himself for the loss of trust in 
the world, cf. Eugene Goodheart, The Reign of Ideology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 
161. In “Die Tortur,” Améry essentially establishes a definition of National Socialism that rests on the 
assumption that the domination of Gegen-Menschen is its principle, cf. Jenseits, 63-67, 69-72. He 
closes the essay by saying that torture left him in the permanent emotional state of fear and ressentiment 
(85). Améry’s reflections on Nazi morality is repeated (and much expanded) by: Jonathan Glover, 
Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 
2000). (Glover does not mention Améry, however.)  
121 Hieronymi, "Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness." From now on page numbers are 
included parenthetically in the text.  
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injury.122 She associates uncompromising forgiveness with the articulation of 
resentment, which she describes as protesting “a past action that persists as a present 
threat.” The present threat lies in the implicit claim that a morally unrepaired injury 
makes about the injured party, i.e., that it is acceptable to treat a person in such a way. 
Hieronymi writes: “That—that claim—is what you resent. It poses a threat. In 
resenting it, you challenge it. If there is nothing else that would mark out that event as 
wrong, there is at least your resentment” (546). Unlike Nietzsche and Scheler, who 
frame ressentiment as a passive attitude of the helpless, Hieronymi stresses that 
resentment “is a fight response” (emphasis hers) that attacks the meaning of the 
injurious event (which in the absence of its acknowledgment as injury has no 
affirmative moral meaning) by affirming its wrongness (547). According to 
Hieronymi, resentment seeks not revenge but acknowledgment of the injury. 
Hieronymi mirrors Améry in contending that resentment challenges the tormentor to 
“himself renounce(s) the deed,” an act by which he “joins the victim in repudiating the 
wrong,” thus revoking the threatening claim and satisfying resentment (548, 521). In 
addition to the three judgments that Hieronymi related to resentment (concerning the 
injury, the injurer, the injured), she describes a fourth evaluation, of whether the injury 
goes unacknowledged and thereby poses a threat. It is this fourth judgment that founds 
resentment. Acknowledgment of the injury, e.g., in the form of an apology, 
undermines this fourth judgment such that resentment loses its footing without, 
however, calling into question the other three judgments. While the threat has passed 
and resentment qua protest is resolved, there is no need to abandon the notion that the 
                                                
122 Avishai Margalit points out that forgiveness is often conflated with the pretense that an injury did 
not happen in the past. Yet even God leaves a mark on Cain, who is forgiven, so as to remember the 
past sin. Margalit establishes the opposition between erasing (of writing, with an eraser) and crossing 
out or writing over (with a pen). Margalit and Hieronymi both aim to articulate a notion of forgiving 
that maintains and preserves the acknowledgment of a past wrong. Margalit, The Ethics of Memory, 
197ff. 
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injury was wrong, that the tormenter should have acted differently, and that the victim 
ought not to have been treated in that way (548f., 552). This, I believe, matches the 
meaning of Améry’s ressentiments exactly. If the Germans acknowledge the injuries 
inflicted on him without requesting the total forgetting of the injuries in return, his 
ressentiments would be satisfied. 
 Améry received such acknowledgment from one reader of “Ressentiments,” 
Inge Werner. In her long correspondence with Améry she is full of self-doubt, and she 
is at pains to describe her relationship to her (Jewish) husband, whom she married 
only after the war. Her reflections prompt Améry to write: 
 
Was Ihren Fall betrifft, möchte ich meinen, dass gerade Sie die 
„Zeitumkehrung“ (soferne [sic] der Begriff einen guten moralischen 
und geschichtlichen Sinn haben kann) bereits vollzogen, dass die 
Aktualisierung des Konflikts schon Wirklichkeit wurde. Sie haben ja, 
indem Sie sich ständig Ihrer Wurzeln, die Sie sich nun ja wahrhaftig 
nicht aussuchten, bewusst blieben und zugleich einen ganz neuen Platz 
in dieser Welt gewannen, ganz neue Einsichten fasten—Sie haben 
damit im eigentlichen Wortsinne „bewältigt,“ d.h.: sind Herr geworden 
Ihrer Vergangenheit und damit Ihrer Gegenwart. Jetzt wissen Sie, 
wohin Sie gehören, das ist schon alles. Der Rest wäre Literatur oder 
Psychologie. Die „Kehre“ ist vollzogen.123 
 
Werner has actualized the conflict and in acknowledging the crimes committed against 
Améry shares his desire for the reversibility of time. His human dignity is restored, the 
moral reversal of time completed. 
 
 The Objective Role of Victims’ Ressentiments 
A key term that Améry employs is “Selbstmisstrauen.” His ressentiments are 
there to invite Germans to mistrust themselves and their national identity. In addition 
to the subjective demand to reverse time, ressentiments have the “objektive Aufgabe” 
                                                
123 Améry, letter to Inge Werner, Mai 18, 1967, in: Améry, Briefe, 219. 
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(141) to provoke a transformative actualization of the conflict “im Wirkungsfeld der 
geschichtlichen Praxis” (129). Améry means by this, in concrete terms, German 
historiography that engages the war generations as well as German youth. Their joint 
effort must effect the inclusion of the history of Nazism in German national historical 
consciousness. Therein lies the historical function of Améry’s ressentiments (and 
those of victims of the Holocaust): once the crimes of the Nazi past have entered 
national awareness as morally true crimes (rather than heroic deeds or inevitable 
byproducts of warfare), the absence of a German revolution against Hitler becomes 
superseded (141). Améry formulates the objective task of ressentiments in a passage 
worth quoting at length: 
 
Gestachelt von den Sporen unseres Ressentiments allein—und nicht im 
mindesten durch eine subjektiv fast immer dubiose und objektiv 
geschichtsfeindliche Versöhnlichkeit—, würde das deutsche Volk dafür 
empfindlich bleiben, dass es ein Stück seiner nationalen Geschichte 
nicht von der Zeit neutralisieren lassen darf, sondern es zu integrieren 
hat. (…) Hält aber unser Ressentiment im Schweigen der Welt den 
Finger aufgerichtet, dann würde Deutschland vollumfänglich und auch 
in seinen künftigen Geschlechtern das Wissen bewahren, dass es nicht 
Deutsche waren, die die Herrschaft der Niedertracht beseitigten. Es 
würde dann, so hoffe ich manchmal, sein vergangenes Einverständnis 
mit dem Dritten Reich als die totale Verneinung nicht der mit Krieg 
und Tod bedrängten Welt, sondern auch des eigenen besseren 
Herkommens begreifen lernen, würde die zwölf Jahre, die für uns 
andere wirklich tausend waren, nicht mehr verdrängen, vertuschen, 
sondern als seine verwirklichte Welt und Selbstverneinung, als sein 
negatives Eigentum in Anspruch nehmen. Auf geschichtlichem Felde 
würde sich das ereignen, was ich vorhin schon hypothetisch für den 
engen individuellen Kreis beschrieb: Zwei Menschengruppen, 
Überwältiger und Überwältigte, würden einander begegnen am 
Treffpunkt des Wunsches nach Zeitumkehrung und damit nach 
Moralisierung der Geschichte. Die Forderung, erhoben vom deutschen, 
dem eigentlich rehabilitierten Volke, hätte ein ungeheures Gewicht, 
schwer genug, dass sie damit auch schon erfüllt wäre. Die deutsche 
Revolution wäre nachgeholt, Hitler zurückgenommen. (142f.) 
 
 268 
The moral rejection of National Socialism necessitates that this past first become part 
of national consciousness, and here Améry outlines the task that he envisions for 
German youth. Améry grants youth their innocence but warns them not to call proudly 
on that innocence whenever faced with the past. He demands of them polemically that 
if they do not want to live “geschichtsfrei,” they should not recall Goethe without 
similarly invoking Himmler (140). He repeats: “Wiederholt sei: Zur deutschen 
Geschichte und Tradition gehören fürderhin auch Hitler und seine Taten” (141).124 
With national consciousness that includes not only a usable past but also the history of 
National Socialism, Améry argues, German youth would constantly practice mistrust 
vis-à-vis their own traditions and thus prevent future catastrophes. 
Twenty years later, at the peak of the Historikerstreit that debated whether and 
how to integrate the Nazi past in national historical consciousness, Jürgen Habermas 
called for an “obligatory attitude of suspicion” among the Germans.125 Taking Jaspers’ 
collective liability as a point of departure, Habermas argued that this liability carried 
over to future generations because “our form of life is connected” with those of 
previous and future generations through a web of traditions and a “historical 
milieu.”126 Because this milieu has been “poisoned by unspeakable crimes” and now 
carries “the images of that unloading ramp at Auschwitz,” all Germans are bound by a 
shared, intersubjective liability for the victims. The liability entails in particular two 
distinct tasks: to maintain a relationship with Israel that is not normalized but 
manifests humility, and to keep alive the memory of the victims that must go beyond 
                                                
124 Améry (140f.) directly refers to Thomas Mann’s 1945 speech, “Deutschland und die Deutschen,” in 
which Mann rejected the—then—popular idea of two Germanys, one good/innocent, and one 
bad/guilty. Just as there were not two Germanys, Améry states that there are no two histories of 
Germany, one honorable to be told and one murderous to be forgotten. Cf. Mann, Deutschland und die 
Deutschen. 
125 Jürgen Habermas, "Historical Consciousness and Post-Traditional Identity. The Federal Republic's 
Orientation to the West," in The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 249-68, here 250.  
126 Jürgen Habermas, "On the Public Use of History," in The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and 
the Historians' Debate (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989), 229-40, here 233. 
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mere intellectual form.127 Liability also implies a critical, rather than a nationalist 
evaluation of one’s own traditions, and it is here that I find Habermas’s concept of 
suspicion closely linked to Améry’s of mistrust: 
 
After Auschwitz our national self-consciousness can be derived only 
from the better traditions in our history, a history that is not 
unexamined but instead appropriated critically. The context of our 
national life, which once permitted incomparable injury to the 
substance of human solidarity, can be continued and further developed 
only in the light of the traditions that stand up to the scrutiny of a gaze 
educated by the moral catastrophe, a gaze that is, in a word, 
suspicious.128 
 
In the preface to the 1977 edition of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Améry had made 
the same two demands Habermas formulated: observing a renewed wave of anti-
Semitism, Améry urged German youth to protect democracy, first, by fending off the 
resurgence of anti-Semitism and securing a positive relationship with Israel, and 
second, by taking a critical stance vis-à-vis the German national past (15ff.).   
In the 1980s, during the Historikerstreit, Habermas (whom Améry trusted to be 
an uncompromised leader of the youth129) advocates a reflective, “scrutinizing attitude 
towards one’s own identity-forming traditions” in opposition to conservative 
tendencies that aim at normalizing the Nazi past in order to create identity based on a 
usable (and revisionist) past. After Auschwitz—after shredding to pieces the “deep 
layer of solidarity among all who have a human face”—this is no longer acceptable.130 
Rather than affirming continuities that extend through the Nazi period, the task at hand 
must be explicitly problematizing “a past that we no longer shunt aside.”131 The 
                                                
127 Cf. ibid., 229, 233. 
128 Emphasis mine. Ibid., 234. The German original for “suspicious” is “argwöhnisch,” Jürgen 
Habermas, “Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie,” Eine Art Schadensabwicklung (Frankfurt/M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1987), 137-44, here 142.  
129 Cf. Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 59. 
130 Habermas, "Historical Consciousness," 251. 
131 Ibid., 266. 
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suspicious gaze cannot be trained in the environment of a purely conventional identity 
based on the particularism of a nation, and Habermas proposes the concept of a “post-
traditional” (or post-conventional) identity based on universalist values such as 
democracy and human rights as a solution. In the forming of this “more sober political 
identity,” German youth play a crucial role.132  
From Améry’s conceptualization of the objective task of ressentiments—which 
is ultimately an enforcement of the liability that had been advocated twenty years prior 
by Jaspers, albeit with an emphasis on the social aspect of national liability, and again 
by Habermas twenty years later—it is obvious that Améry has no interest in revenge. 
He repeatedly says as much in Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: “[E]s handelt sich, 
wenn ich mich recht erforscht habe, nicht um Rache” but “[u]m die Erlösung aus dem 
noch immer andauernden Verlassensein von damals” (131). By the actualization of the 
conflict he does not seek “die moralische Denkunmöglichkeit” of vengeance (142). 
Ultimately, it is the desire for reconciliation that lies at the heart of Améry’s 
ressentiments. I agree with Horst Maier, who concludes his reading of 
“Ressentiments”: “Tief unter der harschen Schicht der Unversöhnlichkeit liegt eine 
erstaunliche Versöhnungsutopie.”133 The therapeutic core that Heidelberger-Leonard 
sees in Améry’s ressentiments will not lead to closure, but it will open a space for 
dialogue.134 After all, it had been his hope, as expressed in the original preface to 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, that his ressentiments would motivate people to want 
to become Mitmenschen again (22).   
 
                                                
132 Ibid., 256f.  
133 Horst Maier, "Hitler zurücknehmen. Zum antinazistischen Imperativ bei Jean Améry," in 
Ressentiments. Rede im Süddeutschen Rundfunk am 7. März 1966. Mit einem Essay von Horst Maier, 
EVA-Reden (Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1995), 47-87, here 65. 
134 Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Jean Amérys Selbstverständnis als Jude," in Über Jean Améry 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1990), 17-27, here 20. 
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The Reception of “Ressentiments” 
In the essay’s final paragraph Améry returns to the term “Groll,” which he had 
used only once at the beginning. He now replaces it with the neologism 
“Nachträgerei,” thus arriving at a translation of ressentiment that implies the two 
meanings Améry has so carefully excavated: it denotes carrying the past into the 
present, to carry the past beyond its ending that is the present. It also means that 
something is carried after someone, i.e., to, someone.  As a Nachträger Améry carries 
the injury of his past not only into the present but also to the Germans, so that they can 
relieve him of his burden. His ressentiments operate in an intersubjective dimension 
inasmuch as they require the attention of those to whom they are directed; they are a 
moral address that invites a response. 
 The response that came, however, was not the desired one. Jenseits von Schuld 
und Sühne received much positive attention by the German press, yet most reviewers 
shied away from discussing the “Ressentiments” essay. In many reviews only the four 
other essays are explicitly mentioned. This is especially noteworthy in the case of 
Horst Krüger’s review in Die Zeit. Améry and Krüger developed a long-lasting 
friendship after Krüger sent him Das zerbrochene Haus, which Améry believed to be 
the best personal reflection on the Nazi period penned by a German.135 Krüger’s 
review is undoubtedly very positive, yet he too abstained from mentioning 
“Ressentiments,” despite admiring Améry for speaking up—“dieser einfachste und 
natürlichste Akt, [der] in unserem Land offenbar noch immer der schwierigste ist.”136 
                                                
135 Krüger and Améry met in 1966, when Krüger invited Améry to write essays for the night program of 
Südwestrundfunk of which he was in charge, much like Heißenbüttel at SDR. Krüger, letter to Améry, 
January 27, 1966 (DLA 81.2052/1). In response to Das zerbrochene Haus, Améry acknowledges how 
different his experience was from Krüger’s, and yet how both men shared a common perspective 
despite their differences because they respected this difference. Améry, letter to Krüger, August 31, 
1966 (DLA 81.1656/9). Their friendship becomes troubled when Krüger envies Améry his success and 
accuses him of not spending enough time in Germany to write about the country. Cf. correspondence in 
1974, in particular: Krüger, letter to Améry, December 17, 1974 (DLA 81.2055/8).   
136 Horst Krüger, "Bericht vom beschädigten Leben. Jean Amérys Essayband Jenseits von Schuld und 
Sühne," Die Zeit, September 23, 1966. The review is republished (with an incorrect publication date): 
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Other reviews are full of misrepresentations: Heinz Abosch misquotes “die 
Erinnerung” instead of ressentiments as the “Emotionsquelle jeder echten Moral”; O. 
E. H. Becker speaks of Améry’s love of and trust in the Germans; and one newspaper 
mistypes the reviewer’s headline as “Bewältigte Vergangenheit.”137 Only two reviews 
are the exception: a review in Spiegel focuses exclusively on “Ressentiments,” 
vaguely calling Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne the “anti-anti-Semitism of a non-non-
Jew,” without drawing any concrete conclusions for Germans, as if ressentiments were 
Améry’s private matter.138 The more exceptional is Hans Schwab-Felisch’s Merkur 
review, in which the author recommends “Ressentiments” as a text of greatest 
relevance for “uns Deutsche” and “jeden nicht-jüdischen Leser.” According to 
Schwab-Felisch, Améry effectively ended the postwar silence, and “[w]ir müssen 
diesen neuen Ton zur Kenntnis nehmen.”139 Alfred Andersch was among those who 
did so—but did he listen carefully?140 
                                                
Horst Krüger, "Bericht vom beschädigten Leben," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 9, Materialien, ed. Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 161-66, here 162. Krüger’s print review is an 
expanded version of a letter Krüger sent Améry as his first reaction to reading Jenseits. Cf. Krüger, 
letter to Améry, September 2, 1966 (DLA 81.2056/6). 
137 All cited reviews are part of the Améry Nachlass at “Dokumentationsstelle 
Zeitungsausschnittsammlung: Material aus dem Nachlass” at DLA. Maria Améry annotated the 
reviews, but did not always give complete bibliographic references: Heinz Abosch, "Moral der 
Erinnerung," Stimme, September 1968; O. E. H. Becker, "Die Mission der Voreingenommenheit," Der 
Tagesspiegel, September 23, 1966. The source of the article “Überwältigte Vergangenheit” is unknown, 
however, a note sent by the publisher to Améry reports that the headline was a “Satzfehler”; the original 
review was “Unbewältigte Vergangenheit.” 
138 Author unknown. Only the title relates Améry’s essay to the Germans: "Stachel der Deutschen," Der 
Spiegel, no. 32 (1966), 67.  
139 Hans Schwab-Felisch, "Die Probe auf das Individuum," Merkur (November 1966), 1098-1100. 
Améry wrote to Hans Paschke, editor of Merkur, that Schwab-Felisch was one of the very few readers 
who had properly understood the text. Cf. Améry, letter to Paeschke, November 21, 1966, in: Améry, 
Briefe, 195. Additionally Hilde Rubinstein wrote a very engaged review in which she reflects on 
Améry’s ressentiments, but ultimately she rejected them, Hilde Rubinstein, "Bewältigungen des 
Übermächtigen," Kürbiskern, no. 1 (1967), 150-59.  
140 I chose to discuss Andersch’s literary engagement with Améry over Ingeborg Bachmann’s because 
of the former’s involvement in the formation of the Literaturbetrieb as social conscience of West 
Germany, cf. ch. I. Heidelberger-Leonard has written on Bachmann’s engagement with Améry, cf. 
Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Ingeborg Bachmann und Jean Améry. Zur Differenz zwischen der 
Ästhetisierung des Leidens und der Authentizitat traumatischer Erfahrung," in Jean Améry im Dialog 
mit der zeitgenössischen Literatur. Essays, ed. Hans Höller (Stuttgart: Hans-Dieter 
Heinz/Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart, 2002), 103-16; Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Versuchte Nähe. 
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 On the occasion of Améry’s sixty-fifth birthday in 1977, Andersch wrote a 
Festschrift in his honor. Reviewing Améry’s life and work in rather great detail, 
Andersch failed to mention Améry’s position vis-à-vis West Germany that figures so 
prominently not only in Jenseits but in most of Améry’s texts.141 Indeed, Andersch’s 
sole acknowledgment of Améry’s past as a victim of National Socialism came in an 
“Adnote” that served to advertise his own book: 
 
Nicht behandelt in dieser Rezension wird der jüdische Aspekt von 
Amérys Existenz, obwohl Améry ihn deutlich zur Debatte stellt und 
ihm in “Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne” ein eigenes Kapitel eingeräumt 
hat. Ich habe dem Thema des deutsch-jüdischen Intellektuellen einen 
Roman gewidmet, “Efraim,” und den Umstand, dass Romane in der 
heute zwischen den Hauptideologien geführten 
geisteswissenschaftlichen Debatte als nichtexistent betrachtet werden, 
kann ich nicht berücksichtigen. Ich verweise also, was meine 
Differenzen und meine Übereinstimmungen mit Améry hinsichtlich des 
“Zwanges und der Unmöglichkeit, Jude zu sein” betrifft, auf “Efraim.” 
(289) 
 
If Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne inspired Andersch to write a book, presumably 
Andersch accepted Améry’s invitation to a mistrustful and suspicious stance regarding 
his own past; in this light Efraim deserves a closer (if brief) look. 
 Efraim tells the story of a Jewish-German emigrant who returns to postwar 
Berlin on behalf of his London boss, Keir Horne, to look for Horne’s illegitimate 
Jewish daughter Esther, whom Horne had not tried to rescue from Nazi Germany.142 
With Andersch’s biography in mind, Sebald concludes that in the character of Horne 
                                                
Ingeborg Bachmann und Jean Améry," in Jean Améry im Dialog mit der zeitgenössischen Literatur. 
Essays, ed. Hans Höller (Stuttgart: Hans-Dieter Heinz/Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart, 2002), 117-28. 
For a more general comparison of Bachmann and Améry, cf. Karl Bartsch, "Grenzverletzungen des 
Ichs. Ingeborg Bachmanns späte Prosa und Jean Amérys 'Bewältigungsversuche'," Literatur und Kritik 
229-230 (1988), 404-14. 
141 The only exception is a short excursus on Améry’s interpretation of current German intellectual 
movements (esp. Adorno), cf. Alfred Andersch, "Anzeige einer Rückkehr des Geistes als Person," in 
Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 9, Materialien, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 
269-90, here 284f.  
142 Alfred Andersch, Efraim (Stuttgart, Hamburg: Deutscher Bücherbund, 1967). From now on page 
numbers are included parenthetically in the text.  
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Andersch touches on the “trauma of his own moral failure.” As Sebald reports, 
Andersch divorced his Jewish wife and left her and their daughter in grave danger in 
order to gain admission to the Reichsschrifttumskammer, but he conveniently 
reclaimed his Jewish family when this was useful in seeking leniency at POW 
camps.143  Yet Andersch identifies not with Horne but with the Jewish character 
George Efraim. As the narrative strand of the search for Esther becomes secondary in 
the novel, Efraim’s reflections on the period of National Socialism and his escape 
from the Nazis come to the fore. If Andersch took Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne as 
model for Efraim, he did so only to depart from it: “Juden, memoriere ich einen 
Augenblick, deutsche Juden, jüdische Deutsche, Deutsche, aber das in der 
Wortkombination verborgene Problem interessiert mich nicht weiter; es ist überholt” 
(153f.). Although Efraim acknowledges that there is a problem—the one Améry wants 
to actualize—author Andersch dismisses it in one concluding phrase.   
Andersch’s dismissal is based on his interpretation of the past as chance and 
not causality. He has Efraim say: “Es ist ein purer Zufall, dass vor zwanzig Jahren 
jüdische Familien ausgerottet wurden, und nicht ganze Familien zwanzig Jahre früher 
oder später. (…) Leute, die Erklärungen dafür bereit haben, sind mir höchst 
verdächtig” (50). Stephan Braese detects in Efraim a passage that Andersch took 
verbatim from a witness at the Auschwitz Trial. Because Andersch juxtaposes the 
quotation with Efraim’s accusation of the dubiousness of all explanations of the 
Holocaust that link it to a “Wirkung eines Willens” (229), Braese concludes that 
Andersch fundamentally undermined the witness, who had testified precisely in order 
to decide upon guilt and to reject the notion of chance.144 Ruth Klüger, in a similarly 
critical assessment of Efraim, argues that Andersch deliberately used the Jewish 
                                                
143 W. G. Sebald, "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. On Alfred Andersch," in On the Natural 
History of Destruction (New York: Random House, 2003), 105-42, here 135, 117-121. 
144 Cf. Braese, "Frankfurter Auschwitz-Prozess," 236. 
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perspective in order to claim the victim’s authority “für die Feststellung, dass es keine 
feststellbare Ursache für die Shoah gebe.”145 This conclusion echoes a German 
sentiment of the time; it is certainly not the critical engagement with the past Améry 
had demanded.146 The reception of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, as exemplified by 
Andersch, ignored the active, self-reflective role Améry wanted his readership to 
assume. Instead, Jenseits was absorbed in the common practice of the Literaturbetrieb 
to interpret Jewish commentary selectively and to ignore specifically Jewish 
perspectives.    
 
The Trading of Blows 
Améry’s ressentiments grew stronger over the years because they reached only 
a few Germans. Although he had written Heißenbüttel at the conclusion of their joint 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne project that he had enough of Auschwitz and wanted to 
write “weder von Nazis noch von Juden” ever again, he kept returning to the topic, 
which “sich (…) aufdrängte” everywhere, even when that meant that he would 
                                                
145 Ruth Klüger, "Zeugensprache: Koeppen und Andersch," in Bestandsaufnahme. Studien zur Gruppe 
47, ed. Stephan Braese (Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1999), 173-81, here 179. 
146 It is therefore surprising and, frankly, quite puzzling that Améry wrote a very positive review of 
Efraim in which he called Andersch a victim of Hitler! Jean Améry, "Efraim--oder die kluge Skepsis," 
in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 5, Aufsätze zur Literatur und zum Film, ed. Hans Höller (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2003), 151-57, here 152. One explanation could be that Améry somehow felt indebted to 
Andersch: just three months before, in response to reading Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Andersch 
had written Améry a long and personal letter in which he called Jenseits “eines der Grunddokumente 
unserer Zeit” and Améry’s appropriation of National Socialism (in the “Tortur” essay) the “klarste(n) 
Definition dieses Tatbestandes.” (Although Andersch discusses each of the essays individually, he 
notably mentions “Ressentiments” in a single sentence: “Auch das Kapitel über die konstituierende 
Rolle des Ressentiments ist einleuchtend, hebe diesen Begriff in eine neue Dimension.” Améry marked 
this passage of Andersch’s letter for emphasis.) Andersch, letter to Améry, July 24, 1967 (DLA 
81.1785a/1). A second explanation could be that Améry pitied Andersch: In light of the predominantly 
critical reviews Efraim received, Améry expressed in a letter to a friend how hurtful it is to receive that 
kind of rejection for one’s creative work. Cf. his letter to Ernst Mayer, November 9, 1967 (DLA 
86.746/9). Only in 1973 did Améry distance himself suddenly and with finality from Andersch, after 
the latter had celebrated Ernst Jünger publicly at the occasion of Jünger’s birthday, cf. Améry, letter to 
Andersch, June 21, 1973, in Améry, Briefe, 426-430.  
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become Germany’s “Berufsjude(n), beziehungsweise Berufs-KZler.”147 He kept 
rebelling  
 
gegen meine Vergangenheit, gegen die Geschichte, gegen eine 
Gegenwart, die das Unbegreifliche geschichtlich einfrieren lässt und es 
damit auf empörende Weise verfälscht. Nichts ist vernarbt, und was 
vielleicht 1964 [=bei Niederschreibung von Jenseits von Schuld und 
Sühne] schon im Begriffe stand zu heilen, das bricht als infizierte 
Wunde wieder auf. Emotionen? Meinetwegen. Wo steht geschrieben, 
dass Aufklärung emotionslos zu sein hat? Aufklärung kann ihrer 
Aufgabe nur dann gerecht werden, wenn sie sich mit Leidenschaft ans 
Werk macht.148 
 
Améry took every possible opportunity to intervene passionately in the German public 
sphere. He openly challenged former SS-member Hans Egon Holthusen and Hitler’s 
favorite minister Albert Speer; he harshly criticized Sebastian Haffner; he condemned 
the rise of new anti-Semitism; and he sounded the alarm to the failings of the Left. Yet 
all this seemed to matter too little, even when he reached a large audience via print 
media, the radio and, increasingly, television. One of the farthest reaching 
consequences of his activism came about in 1974, when the Federal Court of Justice 
opened preliminary proceedings against him for suspicion of supporting the RAF.149  
While Améry never approved of terrorism and therefore even decidedly distanced 
himself from his intellectual role model Sartre, for a short period Améry entertained 
an uncertain affiliation with philosophies of violence. Because Primo Levi is often 
invoked as the supposedly forgiving counterpoint to Améry, the next section concerns 
Levi’s intellectual affinity with Améry as well as Améry’s flirtation with violence.  
                                                
147 Améry, letters to Heißenbüttel, March 4 and May 17, 1966, in Améry, Briefe, 165, 177.  
148 Améry, Jenseits, 18f. 
149 Cf. Stephan Steiner, "In Extremis. Gewalt und Gegen-Gewalt im Werk von Jean Améry," in Jean 
Améry (Hans Maier), ed. Stephan Steiner (Basel, Frankfurt/M.: Stroemfeld/Nexus, 1996), 99-110, here 
106. Améry never supported the RAF; the 1974 proceedings were based on a misinterpretation of 
Améry’s comment regarding hunger strikes of RAF terrorists in Stammheim prison: he supported 
hunger strikes, not the RAF. 
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 “Im Gegensatz zu Primo Levi bin ich kein Verzeiher,” Améry wrote in 1967 to 
Hety Schmitt-Maass, who had just returned from a meeting with Levi, whom she 
described to Améry as “frei von Ressentiments (…) und völlig über den Dingen 
stehend.”150 Schmitt-Maass was then the press officer at the Hessian ministry of 
education, and she had first contacted Améry the previous year to tell him of her 
efforts to introduce Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne (as well as Primo Levi’s Survival in 
Auschwitz, translated into German in 1961) as mandatory reading in all Hessian 
schools.151 Schmitt-Maass’s interest in Nazi camps went beyond reviewing literature 
for the ministry, and she corresponded with several camp survivors, among them 
Hermann Langbein, Primo Levi, and Jean Améry, with all of whom she developed 
long-lasting epistolary friendships.152 She had a habit of sending photocopies of letters 
from third parties to her immediate correspondents; by this means Levi learned of 
Améry’s unfavorable comparison. He responded many years later in his 1986 book 
The Drowned and the Saved, saying that he was not, as “Améry called me[,] ‘the 
forgiver.’ (…) I am not inclined to forgive, I never forgave our enemies of that time 
(…) because I know no human act that can erase a crime; I demand justice, but I am 
not able, personally, to trade punches or return blows.”153 He rejected Améry’s 
ressentiments, which he considered to be a “Zurückschlagen or ‘returning the blow’ 
morality.”154 Nevertheless, it has been suggested that Levi, too, articulated 
ressentiments that were not unlike Améry’s.155 
                                                
150 Améry, letter to Hety Schmitt-Maass, September 28, 1967, in: Améry, Briefe, 248.  Schmitt-Maass, 
letter to Améry, September 10, 1967 (DLA 86.984/16). 
151 Cf. Schmitt-Maas, letter to Améry, November 29, 1966 (DLA 86.984/1).  
152 She also instructed her daughter, who worked as a librarian at Harvard, to order Jenseits von Schuld 
und Sühne for the library collection, among other German publications on the camp experience she 
considered “Pflichtlektüre.” Schmitt-Maass, letter to Améry, February 28, 1967 (DLA 86.984/2).  
153 Levi, Drowned, 137. The sixth chapter, “The Intellectual in Auschwitz,” is essentially Levi’s answer 
to Améry’s essay “An den Grenzen des Geistes,” included in Jenseits. 
154 Ibid., 135.  
155 Cf. Cynthia Ozick, "Primo Levi's Suicide Note," in Metaphor and Memory (New York Knopf, 
1989), 34-48. 
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 The intellectual battle between Levi and Améry is relatively well 
documented.156 In contrast to his earlier autobiographical writings, The Drowned and 
the Saved was a collection of essays that were both autobiographical and analytical 
and, in the judgment of Enzo Traverso, they stylistically resembled Améry’s Jenseits 
von Schuld und Sühne.157 One chapter, “The Intellectual in Auschwitz,” is  dedicated 
entirely to Améry’s essay on the intellectual (from Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne). 
Levi opens his critique of Améry’s essay (“his bitter, gelid essay”) with the 
admission that “to polemicize with a dead man is embarrassing and not very royal,” in 
particular when the one absent was a “potential friend and most valuable interlocutor” 
whose work Levi regretted not having translated into Italian.158 He lists as the most 
important difference between himself and his “companion and antagonist” Améry 
(142) not the loss of Heimat but Levi’s inability “‘to return the blow.’” Quoting 
Améry’s description of an event in the camps where Améry had defended himself with 
physical force,159 Levi comments: “‘Trading punches’ is an experience I do not have, 
as far back as I can go in memory; nor can I say I regret not having it.” (136). This is 
not entirely true; immediately following this assertion he recounts an instance where 
he, like Améry, “tried to defend myself” against physical abuse by another inmate, 
“and [I] landed him a kick on the shin with my wooden clog.” However, Levi decided 
that rather than trading blows he would “delegate punishments, revenges, and 
                                                
156 Cf. Sebald, "Jean Améry und Primo Levi"; Karin Lorenz-Lindemann, "Wieviel Heimat braucht der 
Mensch? Aspects of Jewish Self-Determination in the Works of Jean Améry and Primo Levi," in The 
Jewish Self-Portrait in European and American Literature, ed. Hans-Jürgen Schrader et al., Conditio 
Judaica. Studien und Quellen zur deutsch-jüdischen Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte (Tübingen, 
Germany: Niemeyer, 1996), 223-30; ch. 3, “The Victim’s Resentment,” in: Wood, Vectors of Memory; 
cf. ch. “Als Intellektuelle in Auschwitz: Jean Améry und Primo Levi,” in: Enzo Traverso, Auschwitz 
denken. Die Intellektuellen und die Shoah, trans. Helmut Dahmer (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 
2000); Arne Johan Vetlesen, "A Case for Resentment. Jean Améry versus Primo Levi," Journal of 
Human Rights 5 (2006), 27-44; cf. ch. 8, “The Passion of Reason: Reflections on Primo Levi and Jean 
Améry,” in: Goodheart, The Reign of Ideology. 
157 Traverso, Auschwitz denken, 253f.  
158 Levi, Drowned, 130, 127. From now on page numbers are included parenthetically in the text. 
159 Cf. Améry, Jenseits, 162. 
 279 
retaliations to the laws of my country” (137). Levi interprets the “anguish-filled essay” 
(138) on ressentiments as Améry’s morality of trading punches, and he views Améry’s 
insistence on this morality as a possible key to understanding his suicide: 
 
I admire it, but I must point out that this choice, protracted throughout 
his post-Auschwitz existence, led him to positions of such severity and 
intransigence as to make him incapable of finding joy in life, indeed of 
living. Those who “trade blows” with the entire world achieve dignity 
but pay a very high price for it because they are sure to be defeated. 
Améry’s suicide, which took place in Salzburg in 1978, like other 
suicides admits of a cloud of explanations, but, in hindsight, that 
episode of defying the Pole offers one interpretation. (136) 
 
In the final chapter of The Drowned and the Saved, Levi resorts to language that, 
according to Cynthia Ozick, attests to Levi’s own ressentiments, and which, if 
ressentiments are a key to understanding suicide, explains Levi’s own death.160 In the 
chapter “Letters from Germans,” Levi recollects the genesis of Survival in Auschwitz 
and reflects on his reaction to the news that the book would be translated into German, 
which he describes as “the violent and new emotion of having won a battle” (168). 
Only then did he realize that the book had not Italians but Germans as its audience: 
“its true recipients, those against whom the book was aimed like a gun[,] were they, 
the Germans. Now the gun was loaded. (…) The hour had come to settle accounts, to 
put the cards on the table” (168). Reading “Letters from Germans,” Ozick concludes 
that the text is “the record of a man returning blows with all the might of the human 
fury, in full knowledge that the pen is mightier than the fist,” and that Levi’s “rage” 
and “deadly anger” drove him into suicide.161  
This may be too strong an inference, though Levi certainly uses the gun 
metaphor to imagine corralling Germans and forcing them to confront the moral truth 
of the crimes they committed against him. In a way, he is “actualizing the conflict.” 
                                                
160 Cf. Ozick, "Primo Levi's Suicide Note," qtd. in: Wood, Vectors of Memory, 66f.  
161 Qtd. in: Wood, Vectors of Memory, 66. 
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Levi is articulating ressentiment not unlike Améry’s, and he directs it against the 
Germans collectively. He quotes from letters he received from German readers in 
response to Survival in Auschwitz, and while he notes that those forty Germans were 
hardly representative of all Germans, he recognizes within this small sample repeated 
attempts to defend the presumed innocence of the majority of the people. Like Améry, 
Levi calls the notion of collective guilt misguided, yet he insists on a collective 
liability by reminding his readers that “Deutschtum,” as the sum of “traditions, 
customs, history, language, and culture,” must include from now on a consciousness 
of the Nazi crimes committed in the name of the German peole (183f.).   
Let me return to the episode in which Améry traded blows with the Polish 
foreman who had treated all Jewish inmates in Auschwitz with extreme brutality. In 
the final essay of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Améry reflects on the impossibility 
and the necessity of being a Jew: because he lacked any cultural or religious 
association with Judaism, it was impossible for him to be Jewish, and yet the 
Nuremberg laws made him a prosecuted Jew, a fate from which there was no escape:  
 
Jude sein, das hieß für mich von diesem Anfang an, ein Toter auf 
Urlaub zu sein, ein zu Ermordender, der nur durch Zufall noch nicht 
dort war, wohin er rechtens gehörte, und dabei ist es in vielen 
Varianten, in manchen Intensitätsgraden bis heute geblieben. In der 
Todesdrohung, die ich zum ersten Mal in voller Deutlichkeit beim 
Lesen der Nürnberger Gesetze verspürte, lag auch dar, was man 
gemeinhin die methodische „Entwürdigung“ der Juden durch die Nazis 
nennt. Anders formuliert: der Würdeentzug drückte die Morddrohung 
aus. (154f.) 
 
This societal process of taking away his dignity paralleled “auf unserer, meiner Seite 
ein symmetrischer Prozess um Wiedergewinn der Würde. Er ist bis heute für mich 
nicht abgeschlossen” (158). The repossession of dignity depends largely on the 
individual’s revolt against the degrading experience; as example, Améry retells the 
story of the Polish foreman who, by abusing him physically, impugned his dignity:  
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Ich schlug in offener Revolte den Vorarbeiter Juszek meinerseits ins 
Gesicht: meine Würde saß als Faustschlag an seinem Kiefer—und dass 
dann am Ende ich, der körperlich viel Schwächere, es war, der unterlag 
und heillose Prügel bekam, hatte keine Bedeutung mehr. (…) Mein 
Körper, wenn er sich zum Hieb anspannte, war meine physisch-
metaphysische Würde. (…) Ich war ich als Schlag—für mich selbst und 
für den Gegner. (162).  
 
In that instance Améry reclaimed his dignity by responding to violence with violence, 
and he sees in the reaffirmation of dignity the moral value of such immediate, reactive 
violence better described as self-defense than revenge.  
Once Améry read Frantz Fanon’s highly influential The Wretched of the Earth, 
his writings on violence began to include justifications of physical revenge.162 Fanon 
defended what he called redemptive or revolutionary violence as an inherent part of 
decolonization, and in the original and highly controversial preface, Sartre applauded 
(and perhaps misrepresented) Fanon’s promotion of violence.163 In a review of Jean-
François Steiner’s Treblinka Améry expresses great admiration for those camp 
prisoners who, in spite of no chance of success, revolted against their oppressors; he 
writes, in reference to Fanon, that violence might be redemptive in those cases, “wo 
vorher der Mensch nichts als erleidenes Objekt des geschichtlichen Ereignisses 
war.”164  By revolting, the Treblinka Jews morally transcended the limitations of their 
                                                
162 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (Grove Press, 2004). 
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revolutionary violence and Jean-Paul Sartre, cf. Emma Kathryn Kuby, “Between Humanism and Terror. 
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physical weakness. It is important to note that Améry still limits the justification of 
violence to extreme events and did not favor violence in general.  
A few years later, in a radio essay on Fanon, Améry expressly distances 
himself from George Sorel, whose Nietzsche-inspired Reflections on Violence made 
an unrestricted apology for violence by celebrating it as a transformative force of 
modern society.165 Unlike Sorel, however, Fanon’s justification of violence was based 
on the experience of oppression, which Améry believes he shared.166 He now fully 
accepts Fanon’s notion of redemptive violence. In unconditional agreement with 
Sartre, Améry views “rächende Violenz, im Widerspruch zur unterdrückenden” as 
“eminent human.”167 He writes, 
 
Es wird (…) im Akt der Violenz, die der Physik als irreversible 
erscheinende Zeit im Felde des Phänomenalen umgekehrt. Die erlittene 
Violenz wird ungeschehen gemacht. Der Unterdrücker, hineingerissen 
durch die vom rächended Unterdrückten ihm zugefügte Gewalt, wird 
Menschenbruder. Weißt du, wie das ist, wenn man das Eisen des 
Gewehrlaufs kalt an der warmen Haut spürt? Du weißt es jetzt. Du bist 
wie ich, der es zu spüren bekam. So wirst du im Augenblick, wo ich 
aus dem Gewalterleider zum Gewaltbringer werde, mein Mitmensch. 
(442) 
 
In yet another text, on the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, Améry describes the revolt as an 
absurd yet morally justified “Realisation humaner Rache” by which its participants 
found “ihre Eigentlichkeit.”168  
                                                
165  Sorel embeds in violence a regenerative force towards returning to a heroic civilization unrestricted 
by modern values currently upheld by the bourgeoisie, and thus violence itself becomes a sacrosanct 
end in itself. Cf. Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, ed. Jeremy Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). For a brief discussion of quasi-sacred violence, cf. the epilogue in LaCapra, 
History in Transit, 262-266. 
166 Améry dismissed Sorel mainly because Sorel’s notion of violence lacked any experiential basis, cf. 
Jean Améry, "Die Geburt des Menschen aus dem Geiste der Violenz. Der Revolutionär Frantz Fanon," 
in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 7, Aufsätze zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte, ed. Stephan Steiner (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 2005), 428-49, here 437. 
167 Ibid., 441. 
168 Jean Améry, "Im Warteraum des Todes," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 7, Aufsätze zur Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, ed. Stephan Steiner (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005), 450-74. 
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How do we explain this development in Améry’s thought from rejecting 
revenge to celebrating it? There is no single answer to this. Reading Fanon obviously 
challenged Améry’s position on violence, but whether Fanon provoked a genuine 
change of attitude or a mere inconsistency in Améry’s thought is unclear. In the 
Warsaw Ghetto essay Améry himself offers a justification for his radical call for 
revenge, which originates in the Nazi establishment of the “Gegen-Welt” of the 
camps. This counter-world confronted its imprisoned inhabitants with the paradox 
welcoming “das augenscheinlich Böse (die Rache) [sic]”  if one would “überhaupt 
Moral wiederherstellen” (469). By this argument, revenge is only apparently evil; in 
the context of a hostile world, it has a life-affirming quality that speaks to the 
adherence to moral values. In the counter-world created by the Nazis, who found their 
“Eigentlichkeit” in torture (as Améry argued in “Tortur”), the victims had to resort to 
revenge to adjust to this perverted moral reality.169 
Stephan Steiner suggests that it was Améry’s recognition that he, unlike 
prisoners in Treblinka and Warsaw, never attempted to fight his Nazi oppressors, and 
in the “Schock der versäumten Gegen-Gewalt,” Améry supported Fanon as a means of 
“making up.”170 This interpretation is founded upon Améry’s regret, voiced in the 
Fanon essay, never to have carried a gun.171 While Steiner offers an insightful reading 
of Améry’s violence-related texts, I think one must also consider the time during 
which Améry wrote of revenge in order to understand his flirtation with violence. 
Améry wrote the few essays that clearly defend vengeful, or redemptive, 
violence in 1968 and 1969, a time during which he witnessed renewed anti-Semitism 
in the form of anti-Zionism espoused by the new Left. After Israel’s defeat of the Arab 
forces in the Six-Day War in 1967, the image of the Jew as “herrischer Sieger, als 
                                                
169 Cf. Améry, Jenseits, 77f. 
170 Steiner, "In Extremis," 101. 
171 Cf. Améry, “Geburt des Menschen,” 441. 
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Besatzer” quickly replaced that of the Auschwitz victim in Germany (which had never 
been fully embraced), and suddenly anti-Semitism appeared to Améry as “wiederum 
ehrbar.”172 Although Améry has no personal relationship to Israel, as a Jew “im Sinne 
des Reichsbürgergesetzes vom 15. September 1935”—that is, as Jew in the eye of the 
anti-Semite—he views his alliance with Israel as “eine Sache der Existenz.”173 
According to Améry as long as Jews remain a target of aggression, the Left, bound by 
tradition to answer for the oppressed, ought to ally with them. Since the new Left 
rejects Israel in ignorance of the Nazi past (which it deemed history and done with) 
and under the pretext of anti-imperialism, every Jew in the world “[ist] noch 
schlechter dran (…) als Franz Fanons Kolonialisierte(r).”174 Out of this understanding 
Améry developed his intellectual affinity with proponents of violence—an affinity that 
lasted only briefly.  
By 1970, the terrorist activities of the RAF prompted Améry to distance 
himself decisively from philosophers of violence, who had (intentionally or not) lent 
terror organizations and their urban guerilla warfare an abstract justification that 
erroneously blurred the differences “zwischen Rio de Janeiro oder Montevideo und 
Paris oder Frankfurt.”175 Shortly before his death, in his intellectual self-portrait 
“Revision in Permanenz,” Améry revised “ohne Zaudern” his theoretical deliberations 
on violence because violence had become an abstract apology for real aggression. 
                                                
172 Jean Améry, "Der ehrbare Antisemitismus," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 7, Aufsätze zur Politik und 
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Theoretically, Améry mused, violent reactions to radical evil are of moral value, in 
practice, however, violence was inhumane in every instance.176  
Although Améry dropped the issue of violence (except to revise his earlier 
position), he remained a very careful observer of the developments of the new Left 
vis-à-vis Israel, and he distinguished himself as the first commentator on a particular 
kind of Left anti-Semitism.177 
 
Resigning from Ressentiments 
Améry began the “Ressentiments” essay with impressions from his travels 
through West Germany, a country described as blooming (“blüht”) with people whose 
efficiency stood in surprising contrast to their “träumerischem Geschichtsbewußtsein” 
(118). He then explained his ressentiments to the Germans in order to provoke their 
self-mistrust vis-à-vis their past, so that they would correct their sense of history and 
thereby work through the past together with victims to reach the moral reversal of time 
that would undo Hitler. In the closing section of his essay, however, Améry was very 
pessimistic that his labor would bear fruit. The dreamy historical awareness of 
Germany might not be counteracted by victims’ ressentiments; this sequence, he 
stated, might be nothing but “moralische(e) Träumerei” (144).  
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Améry pulled back his contribution. Cf. Broder, letters to Améry, April 3 and May 26, 1978 (DLA 
81.1857/1 and /3). 
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In the year of his death, Améry conceded that he had been speaking in the 
wind, hence the title of the essay “In den Wind gesprochen.”178 With great resignation, 
he no longer mentioned ressentiments, which had been replaced with 
“ohnmächtige[m] Zorn” (573). History overlooked Améry’s “essayistische(n) 
Auschweifungen” (583), which, in his view, did nothing to educate those he addressed 
(594); hence he left the “geduldige(r) Aufklärungsarbeit” to others (599). Mastering 
the past was no longer his “‘deutsch-jüdisches’ Problem” but a “Konfliktstoff 
zwischen dem deutschen Volk und seiner Jüngstgeschichte. (…) Aber das alles ist, 
wie gesagt, nicht Sache der Juden, sondern der Deutschen. Die Juden können dem 
deutschen Volke dabei nicht helfen, selbst dann nicht, wenn sie es leidenschaftlich zu 
tun wünschten.”179 No matter how strong the voices of Jewish victims might be, their 
words alone could not reverse time so long as they fell on deaf ears.  
                                                
178 Jean Améry, "In den Wind gesprochen," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 7, Aufsätze zur Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, ed. Stephan Steiner (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005), 573-600. 
179 Jean Améry, "Nachwort zur fünften Session des Jüdischen Weltkongresses," in Deutsche und Juden, 
ein unlösbares Problem. Reden zum Jüdischen Weltkongress 1966, ed. Abraham Melzer (n.p.: Verlag 
Kontakte, 1966), 103-07, 106f. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
“Es gab seither keine Jasage mehr”
1
: 
Jean Améry’s Lefeu oder Der Abbruch 
 
In her attempt to establish Améry as a novelist (rather than essayist), Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard has called it a tragic misunderstanding that Améry’s book 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne and the essay collections that followed were considered 
the “essayistische(n) Höhepunkt des Nachkriegs,” when for Améry they meant little 
more than a stepping stone towards a career as a literary writer.2 It is questionable 
whether Améry was ever acclaimed as the foremost essayist of postwar Germany or if 
he did in fact prefer literary over essayistic writing.3 However, it is indisputable that 
once Améry achieved considerable public recognition as an essayist, he sought to 
become a storyteller as well: “Ich wollte erzählen oder: auch erzählen.”4 
Remembering his early attempts at writing prose, Améry wanted to return to these 
beginnings. He began working on a hybrid form of narrative and essay, a project that 
resulted in the publication of the “Roman-Essay oder Essay-Roman” Lefeu oder Der 
                                                
1 Jean Améry, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 1, Die Schiffbrüchigen, Lefeu oder 
Der Abbruch, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 287-507, here 498. 
2 Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Nachwort [zu Lefeu]," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 1, Die 
Schiffbrüchigen, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
2007), 668-700, here 668. Améry cemented his success as essayist with the publications Über das 
Altern (1968) and Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre (1971), two works which, along with Jenseits von 
Schuld und Sühne, Améry considered his autobiographical trilogy. Jean Améry, Über das Altern, in 
Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 3, Über das Altern, Hand an sich legen, ed. Monique Boussart, (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 2005), 173-344; Jean Améry, Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre, in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 2, 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre, Örtlichkeiten, ed. Gerhard Scheit, 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2002), 179-350.  
3 For an interesting study of the complicated reception of Améry, cf. Rainer Brandenburg, "Zwischen 
Morosität und Moral. Jean Améry im Spiegel der Kritik," Modern Austrian Literature 23, no. 1 (1990), 
69-84. Brandenburg concludes that the many honors Améry received served to “wegloben” him. 
Whether Améry preferred narrative fiction over essay writing is unclear; after all, Lefeu and his later 
narrative work, Charles Bovary, are both, by his own definition, essay-novels. Cf. Jean Améry, Charles 
Bovary, Landarzt. Porträt eines einfachen Mannes, in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 4, Charles Bovary, 
Landarzt, ed. Hanjo Kesting (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006). 
4 Améry, Lefeu, 481. In this edition of the “Nachwort,” the word ‘auch’ is not emphasized, but it is 
emphasized twice in the original 1974 edition. Cf. Jean Améry, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch. Roman-Essay 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 172. 
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Abbruch in the spring of 1974.5 While Lefeu was commercially unsuccessful and 
hardly left any mark in the literary history of West Germany, Améry considered it his 
best and most important work, to which he referred time and again as his favorite and 
dearest book.6 Lefeu provided Améry with a platform to imagine his life differently, 
and he chose to imagine a character who, like himself, had survived Nazi persecution 
but—unlike Améry—withdrew entirely from public life until he considered the 
possibility of violence as a means to avenge himself. In this important regard Améry’s 
novel-essay warrants close examination in connection with the previous chapter. Since 
Améry places tools of vengeful violence into Lefeu’s hands, does Lefeu mark the 
author’s movement from his philosophy of ressentiments towards a politics of 
revenge?7  
 Heidelberger-Leonard in particular has frequently argued that Lefeu should be 
read as a continuation of or sequel to Die Schiffbrüchigen,8 the novel manuscript that 
Améry began in the mid-1930s and returned to after his liberation, but which 
remained—“glücklicherweise”—unpublished during his lifetime.9 Such a reading is 
based on certain personality traits shared by the main characters of both works. Améry 
planned Lefeu as “das Urbild des Mannes, der nein sagt,”10 a characterization that 
Heidelberger-Leonard applies to Eugen Althager, the protagonist in Die 
                                                
5 Améry, Lefeu, 484. Again, the double emphasis appears in the original: Améry, Lefeu (1982), 174.  
6 In a 1978 televised interview Améry said about Lefeu: “Unter den von mir geschriebenen Büchern ist 
es das verkaufsmäßig erfolgloseste, mir aber teuerste. Und ich glaube, es ist das Beste, was ich je 
geschrieben habe.” Reprinted in: Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 117f. Améry 
repeatedly called Lefeu his favorite book elsewhere, cf. Améry, letter to Hubert Arbogast, June 26, 1978 
(DLA 86.730/1). 
7 Dania Hueckmann is currently working on a dissertation at New York University, in which she 
anticipates reading Lefeu as Améry’s revenge fantasy. Dania Hueckmann, email to the author, April 19, 
2009.  
8 Ivonn Kappel convincingly argues against such reading, cf. Ivonn Kappel, "In fremden Spiegeln sehen 
wir das eigene Bild." Jean Amérys Lefeu oder Der Abbruch (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2009), 36-42.  
9 Améry, Lefeu, 481.  
10 Ibid., 482. 
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Schiffbrüchigen, as well.11 She draws thematic connections between the two texts, 
both of which touch on issues of suicide, language, and the decay of society. And she 
cites Améry’s short biography of his painter-friend Erich Schmid, published in 1959, 
as evidence that Améry had begun planning Lefeu as early as the 1950s—that is, once 
he had abandoned Die Schiffbrüchigen. Améry did indeed use Schmid as a model for 
Lefeu, but he dated his initial idea for the Lefeu project to the mid-1960s when he was 
working on Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne.12 Rather than attempting another 
comparative reading of Lefeu and Die Schiffbrüchigen, I exclude Améry’s early work 
from my analysis of the 1974 text, focusing on Lefeu oder Der Abbruch in order to 
examine it as the product of his evolving philosophy of ressentiments.13  
 
Essayistic Writing 
In a 1971 letter to his friend Ernst Mayer Améry lamented his decision to have 
abandoned narrative in favor of journalistic and essayistic writing and wondered 
whether, by the standards of “was man heute Prosa nennt,” he could pick up where he 
had left off with Die Schiffbrüchigen and still pass for an acceptable writer.14 In his 
                                                
11 Cf. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Lefeu oder der Abbruch--Summa der eigenen Existenz?," in Jean 
Améry, der Schriftsteller. Internationale Tagung zum 20. Todestag von Jean Améry in Brüssel, ed. Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard and Hans Höller (Stuttgart: Hans-Dieter Heinz/Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart, 
2000), 147-61. Reprinted in: Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, Jean Améry im Dialog mit der 
zeitgenössischen Literatur. Essays, ed. Hans Höller (Stuttgart: Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz/Akademischer 
Verlag Stuttgart, 2002), 163-78, here 166.  
12 Améry, Lefeu, 480. Améry mentions Schmid in connection with Lefeu starting in 1971. Cf. Améry, 
letter to Hans Mayer, November 16, 1971, in: Améry, Briefe, 384. 
13 Cf. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Autobiographische Geschichtsschreibung vor und nach Auschwitz. 
Jean Amérys Die Schiffbrüchigen (1934) und Lefeu oder der Abbruch (1974)," Zeitschrift für deutsche 
Philologie 123 (2004), 220-31; Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "'Das Problem der Neinsage, ihrer 
Herkunft und Zukunft.' Die Schiffbrüchigen als Vorübung zu Lefeu oder Der Abbruch," Text + Kritik 
99 (1988), 33-39; Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Lefeu oder Der Abbruch: Summa der eigenen 
Existenz?," in Jean Améry im Dialog mit der zeitgenössischen Literatur, ed. Hans Höller (Stuttgart: 
Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz/Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart, 2002), 163-78.  
14 Améry makes explicit mention of his early novel, asking: “Ist nicht allzu viel hingegangen seit den 
‘Schiffbrüchigen’?” Mayer had witnessed (and shared) Améry’s literary ambitions in the 1930s, when 
Améry wrote Die Schiffbrüchigen and both men edited the journal Die Brücke. Améry, letter to Ernst 
Mayer, November 16, 1971, in: Améry, Briefe, 384. Throughout the process of writing Lefeu, Améry 
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opinion contemporary prose suffered from the influences of post-structuralist literary 
theory. He was inspired to write Lefeu to contest literary trends of the day and stand up 
to postmodern “Wörterzerkleinerer.”15 He wrote Merkur editor Hans Paeschke: “Vage 
denke ich daran, die Kontestation [=Strukturalismus] zu kontestieren durch 
Produktion: etwas soll entstehen, was ich einen Roman-Essay nennen möchte und was 
das Absurde ad absurdum führen soll.”16 Améry specifically aimed to position himself 
as the intellectual contender of Michel Foucault and to address questions of language 
and its ability to represent reality adequately. Améry was familiar with Foucault’s 
1966 Lets mots et les choses and was in fact the first German-speaking intellectual to 
discuss it widely, especially at the time of its 1971 translation into German.17 
                                                
confides in Mayer his insecurities about writing narrative prose. Cf. Améry, letter to Mayer, January 17, 
1973, in: Améry, Briefe, 414.  
15 Améry, letter to Hans Paeschke, January 17, 1972, in: Améry, Briefe, 392.  
16 Améry, letter to Paeschke, December 16, 1971, in: ibid., 390. Améry’s relationship to post-
structuralism is well documented. In an important interview given by Améry shortly before his suicide, 
he summarized his polemical view on post-structuralism, which, in the early 1970s, he refers to by 
using the name of its predecessor, structuralism, as follows: “Ich habe den Strukturalismus immer für 
abwegig gehalten. Ich habe mich mit dem Strukturalismus beschäftigt, aber immer polemisch. Ich habe 
den Strukturalismus immer abgelehnt.“ Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 115.  
17 Or so Améry says in a letter to Rudolf Hartung at Neue Rundschau, August 26, 1971 (DLA 
81.1592/10). Hartung had asked Améry to write an essay about Foucault, to which Améry agreed, 
noting that he was “der erste im deutschen Sprachbereich, der seinerzeit auf ihn [=Foucault] 
aufmerksam machte.” Améry was miffed with Hans Paeschke when the Merkur editor commissioned 
someone else to cover Foucault, whom Améry believed to be “meine Thematik.” Améry, letter to 
Paeschke, December 12, 1976 (DLA 81.1698/9). Cf. Améry’s essays on Foucault 1973-78: Jean 
Améry, "Wider den Strukturalismus. Das Beispiel des Michel Foucault," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 6, 
Aufsätze zur Philosophie, ed. Gerhard Scheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 78-105; Jean Améry, 
"Michel Foucaults Vision des Kerker-Universums," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 6, Aufsätze zur 
Philosophie, ed. Gerhard Scheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 205-18; Jean Améry, "Michel Foucault 
und sein 'Diskurs' der Gegen-Aufklärung," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 6, Aufsätze zur Philosophie, ed. 
Gerhard Scheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 219-31. Several earlier (unpublished) texts are at archived 
under “Konv. Michel Foucault” (DLA, 81.1355).  
Améry derided Foucault as a mouthpiece of a new movement within French philosophy that he 
deemed highly dangerous: “Die neuen Philosophen lehnen im wesentlichen die französische 
Aufklärung ab, an der ich hänge. (...) [D]ie Ablehnung, die dort erfolgt, ist eine vollständig 
irrationalistische, sie läuft auf Nihilismus und totalen Kulturpessimismus heraus. Diese jungen 
Menschen, die das wirkliche Elend selber gar nicht erlebt haben, sondern nur vom Hörensagen kennen, 
die reden uns nun ein, wir lebten im Osten und im Westen in der Hölle. An dieser Hölle sei der 
Rationalismus schuld, das Denken, das Wissen, das den Menschen unterdrücke. Ich glaube nach wie 
vor, dass Denken und Wissen den Menschen befreuen. Ich lehne sie vor allem als Irrationalisten ab, die 
sie sind, zumal sie keine Alternative bringen. Sie sind gegen die Ratio, sie sind gegen jegliche Ordnung, 
sie sind Anarchisten. Ich weiß nicht, wohin das führen soll. Und ich kann sie nur als Symptom sehen, 
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Furthermore, Améry sought a platform to engage with contemporary ideas on 
language as expressed in literature, e.g., in Helmut Heißenbüttel’s D’Alemberts Ende, 
a book Améry refused to review, despite liking the author, because he had little 
sympathy for Heißenbüttel’s avant-garde poetics.18 As an antidote to the nouveau 
roman, Améry aimed to write the “Anti-Antiroman”19 that would reaffirm the power 
of language and of the narrating subject.20 
Améry’s motivation for Lefeu, in sum, was his personal desire to write prose, 
coupled with what he believed to be his obligation as a public intellectual to engage 
with contemporary thoughts on poetics and language. These separate drives required 
Améry to find a form that would suit both, and he believed he found it in the essay-
novel, a term he applied to Lefeu without providing a definition of the genre. He 
combined novel and essay to create a space in which “der Wunsch zu erzählen sich 
vereinigte mit dem Verlangen, eine höhere Reflexionsebene zu erklimmen.”21 Within 
a narrative framework and through the voice of a fictional character, he hoped to 
reflect on issues left untouched or insufficiently explored in his journalistic and 
essayistic writings. 
                                                
als Symptom einer Auflösung nicht nur aller Werte, sondern auch aller Chancen, die wir haben.“ 
Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 116f.  
18 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 286. Heidelberger-Leonard describes Améry and 
Heißenbüttel’s friendship as burdened by the two men’s differing opinions on poetic language, and she 
considers Lefeu the reason the friendship ended. This is not evident from their correspondence, which 
remains friendly and respectful even when Améry and Heißenbüttel disagree. In fact, Améry counted 
Heißenbüttel (and Rudolf Hartung) among “den ganz wenigen Menschen im Literaturbetrieb, die ich 
meine Freunde nenne.” Améry, letter to Hartung, August 21, 1978 (DLA 81.1595/6). For their differing 
opinion on literary form, cf. Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, July 18, 1972, in: Améry, Briefe, 400; 
Heißenbüttel, letter to Améry, August 2, 1972 (DLA 81.1983/15).  
19 Jean Améry, "Lefeu oder Der Abbruch. Konzept zu einem Roman-Essay," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 
1, Die Schiffbrüchigen, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2007), 649-60, here 660.  
20 Améry repeatedly lamented the loss of the subject and the lack of trust in language, which he saw 
crystallized in the nouveau roman and its (Heideggerean) proponents. Cf. Jean Améry, "Wege, 
Holzwege, Auswege des Neuen Romans," Schweizer Rundschau 63 (1964), 305-13; Jean Améry, 
"Vertrauen in die Sprache. Bemerkungen zu einer modischen Unsicherheit," Frankfurter Rundschau, 
November 19, 1973. 
21 Améry, Lefeu, 484. 
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Scholars of the essay agree that the only distinctive feature of the essay is its 
reluctance to submit to precise characterization; according to the author of the most 
recent comprehensive analysis of the German essay, Sargut !ölçün, the essayistic idea 
is not definable.22 In spite of the ineffability of the essay, a plethora of descriptions 
attempt to capture certain “essayistic virtues.”23 Ludwig Rohner, for instance, 
concluded in his 1966 study on the essay—an ambitious monograph of almost 1,000 
pages—that the essay is a “Stück betrachtsamer Prosa” that circles around one theme, 
proceeds associatively, and unfolds in dialogue with its imagined reader.24 The essay, 
albeit declaring “Formlosigkeit (…) zum Formprinzip,” is by his definition rigidly 
composed as “Denkerzählung” that aims at illustrating and reflecting on an event or 
concrete object to gain broader, abstract understanding.25 Most significantly, the essay 
is the subjective rendering of a personal experience or opinion. The essayist is a 
moralist, and often he documents his experience “gegen die Zeit” in an attempt to 
open his contemporaries’ eyes to a moral truth overlooked by society.26 According to 
Rohner the essay thus leads “through experience to truth.”27  
Beginning with Michel de Montaigne and Francis Bacon, the intellectual 
fathers of this literary genre new to the sixteenth century, the essay submits to radical 
subjectivity as its absolute authority, from which it arrives at larger truths.28 Friedrich 
                                                
22 Sargut !ölçün, Unerhörter Gang des Wartenden. Dekonstruktive Wendungen in der deutschen 
Essayistik (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998), 28. Although the study focuses on the first 
third of the twentieth century, !ölçün’s introduction is instructive on the essay in general. Cf. Ralph-
Rainer Wuthenow, “Der Essay (…) ist schlechthin nicht zu defnieren,” qtd. in: Dagmar C. G. Lorenz, 
Scheitern als Ereignis. Der Autor Jean Améry im Kontext europäischer Kulturkritik (Frankfurt/M.: 
Peter Lang, 1991), 95. 
23 G. Douglas Atkins, Tracing the Essay. Through Experience to Truth (Athens, GA: The University of 
Georgia Press, 2005), 4.  
24 Ludwig Rohner, Der deutsche Essay. Materialien zur Geschichte und Ästhetik einer literarischen 
Gattung (Neuwied, Berlin: Luchterhand, 1966). 
25 Ibid., 673f.  
26 Ibid., 676.  
27 Cf. subtitle of Atkins, Tracing the Essay. 
28 In the introduction to his Essais, Montaigne writes: “It is myself that I portray. (…) I am myself the 
matter of my book.” Michel Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame 
(Stanford: Stanford Univeristy Press, 1965), 2.  
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Schlegel emerged as the first German essayist and popularized the form in the 
eighteenth century. In line with Montaigne’s emphasis on the subjective nature of the 
essay and its ambition towards moral betterment, Schlegel defined the essay as a type 
of “Experimentalphilosphie” that originates in “der reinen Ethik.”29 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, the essay emancipated itself from the Enlightenment’s pedagogic 
mission to constitute and educate a public and metamorphosed into an “existentielle 
Kategorie” of the individual.30  !ölçün observes that for the first third of the twentieth 
century the essayist articulated his affective condition, which he describes in the 
decades between the wars as a melancholic “Bewusstsein des Scheiterns” coupled 
with the utopian hope of achieving harmony between subjective and empirical (or 
social) life.31 With these hopes dashed by World War II, the essay appeared to have 
been driven to extinction, and in the 1950s insecurities regarding the genre culminated 
in the anxious question of whether German writers were still capable of writing an 
essay at all. As late as the 1970s prospects for the essay’s survival in Germany were 
seen as dim.32 
Despite the decline in German essay-writing after the war, the form was not 
abandoned altogether, and its practitioners returned to its Enlightenment roots. In what 
is probably the most famous German treatise on the essay, “Der Essay als Form,” 
Theodor W. Adorno directly links the essay, with its evocation of intellectual freedom, 
to the Enlightenment. Moreover, he connects his fellow Germans’ “Unbehagen” and 
“Vorurteil” against the form to the failure of the Enlightenment project in Germany 
and the subsequent underdevelopment of intellectual freedom there.33 The peculiar 
                                                
29 Qtd. in: Rohner, Der deutsche Essay, 86f.  Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, 
Bd. 18/2, Philosophische Lehrjahre 1796-1806, ed. Ernst Behler (Munich: Schöningh, 1963), 202, 09. 
30 Cf. !ölçün, Unerhörter Gang, 32; Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 101.  
31 !ölçün, Unerhörter Gang, 32f.  
32 Ibid., 28, 30.  
33 Theodor W. Adorno, "Der Essay als Form," in Noten zur Literatur (Berlin, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 
1958), 9-49, 9f.  
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German disdain for the essay, Adorno writes, stems from its hybrid construction 
spanning the two domains of (irrational) art and (rational) science, which in Germany 
are rigidly separated. According to Adorno, the essay rebels against this separation: it 
reflects intellectually on the causes of strong affective responses in the past.34 It thus 
elevates the ephemeral and transitory—generally ignored by philosophy—as worthy 
of philosophical investigation, not to find “das Ewige im Vergänglichen” but to 
“[verewigen] das Vergängliche.”35 The essay thus relies on the subject to gain 
necessary insights about human relations and social connections that are beyond the 
grasp of empirical science, and the essayist obtains these insights exclusively through 
the articulation of his own “in Hoffnung und Desillusion zusammengehaltene 
einzelmenschliche Erfahrung.”36 
In an intellectual environment that Adorno describes as hostile to the essay, 
Améry deliberately decided on the essay form as the only written medium through 
which he could reflect on his past experiences. According to Dagmar Lorenz, Améry 
had successfully transitioned with Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne from journalism to 
essay writing.37 The essay, with its reflection on what caused a strong affect in the 
past, was the perfect medium for Améry to analyze his ressentiments. Abjuring 
melancholia or a hidden utopian goal, Améry’s essays conform to Enlightenment 
ideals of reason and at the same time follow closely Adorno’s prescription for the 
genre and his emphasis on affect. 
 In the preface to Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Améry explains that his 
“Überlegungen” or reflections are part of the early Enlightenment tradition and its 
“Willen zur Empathie”: rather than promoting logical deduction or empirical 
                                                
34 Cf. Ibid., 11. 
35 Ibid., 23, 25.  
36 Ibid.,11, 19.  
37 Cf. Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 108. 
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verification as an end, he uses these merely as a means to critique social reality.38 
Améry agrees with Adorno’s verdict that the essay is “die kritische Form par 
excellence”39; for Améry, the essay is not only an expository but a literary form, one 
that takes responsibility and has a function within the public sphere. In contrast to the 
historical and juridical analyses of the Holocaust that belatedly swept Germany in the 
1960s, Améry offered insights derived from direct experience rather than academically 
sound but abstract investigations. The essay form lends itself to Améry’s taking of the 
“ich” as the “einzig brauchbare[n] Ansatzpunkt.”40 Use of the first-person voice is 
crucial to Améry’s reflective attempts. In the autobiographical Örtlichkeiten (1980) 
that traces Améry’s life stations, the author speaks for large stretches through a third-
person narrator, yet in the final essay recalling the genesis of Jenseits von Schuld und 
Sühne the voice changes to the first person.  The “[i]ch” emerges in close proximity to 
“Auschwitz-Prozess.”  In other words the appearance of the “I” mirrors the historical 
emergence of the Auschwitz writer Améry, who is prompted by the Auschwitz trials 
to address his German audience. Améry playfully asks the reader of Örtlichkeiten 
where “das Ich, die erste Person” might have suddenly come from, and answers in all 
seriousness: “Ja, ich war es, der von Auschwitz reden wollte, in deutscher Sprache.”41 
For Améry, the “ich,” the self, becomes constituted—essayistically—only in the act of 
wanting to speak of Auschwitz, and to do so in German.  
Like Adorno’s ideal essay, Améry’s essays are non-systematic, fragmentary, 
and unbound by rules. They borrow freely from poetic language and allow for the 
exploration of margins, gaining momentum through association, suggestion, and 
reflection. Since Améry remembers experiences that were “die Negation positiver 
                                                
38 Améry, Jenseits, 18.  
39 Adorno, "Der Essay," 39. 
40 Améry, Jenseits, 21.  
41 Améry, Örtlichkeiten, 471.  
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Identität,”42 he depends on the essay form, which is distinct because it accounts for the 
non-identical, according to Adorno.43 What Adorno and Améry celebrate “is not only 
the essay’s open form and conscious lack of a dogmatic position but ultimately its lack 
of intellectual security, its lack of an affirmative ideal of truth.”44 Given his experience 
in the camps, Améry clearly refuses the idea of intellectual security and therefore 
needs to deny his readers any possibility of retaining the same.45 The incompleteness 
of the essay—the fact that it “nicht mit Adam und Eva an[fängt] sondern mit dem, 
worüber er [der Essay] reden will; er (…) bricht ab, wo er selber am Ende sich 
fühlt”46—serves to prevent Améry’s audience from identifying with him and his 
experiences. Améry explicitly states that it is necessary for the conflict between the 
past and the present to remain unresolved: “Ich rebelliere: gegen meine 
Vergangenheit, gegen die Geschichte, gegen eine Gegenwart, die das Unbegreifliche 
einfrieren läßt und es damit auf empörende Weise verfälscht.”47 The essay is 
representative of Améry’s rebellion because its thinking happens in fits and starts; it 
finds a tentative unity by juxtaposing, not harmonizing, the breaks and gaps from 
which it is constituted.48 The essay promises no easy healing but confronts the present 
with concrete past experiences on which it reflects.  
For Adorno, the essay gains substance precisely because it examines a lived 
experience in historical time.49 If truth has a temporal core, he continues, it must be 
history. The notion of truth here is important. Adorno celebrates the essay for it 
“entledigt sich (…) der traditionellen Idee von der Wahrheit.”50 Nevertheless, he 
                                                
42 Scheit, "Nachwort [zu Jenseits]," 656. 
43 Cf. Adorno, "Der Essay," 22. 
44 Peter Uwe Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought. Theodor W. Adorno (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1995), 234. 
45 Cf. the first essay, “An den Grenzen des Geistes,” Jenseits, 23-54. 
46 Adorno, "Der Essay," 11. 
47 Améry, Jenseits, 18.  
48 Cf. Adorno, "Der Essay," 35. 
49 Cf. Ibid., 24. 
50 Ibid., 25. 
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affirms the essay—and only the essay—as truth itself precisely because it denies 
completeness. The essay does not state the truth but is truth. It becomes truth 
specifically by reflecting on individual sensations that are, in comparison to the grand 
narratives of history, belittled by theory.51 The constitutive fragmentation of the essay 
and its pronounced exclusions would appear to entail untruth, yet for Adorno, truth 
must be articulated through untruth, which he defines as the absence of 
correspondence (Übereinstimmung) between language and reality.52 In fact, truth can 
only be approximated via untruth. The essay acknowledges that it is only a 
representation of an object or event, and that it is characterized first and foremost by 
its acceptance of the non-identity of language and reality (without denying language 
the ability to represent reality).53 As a consequence of this fundamental non-identity, 
language always negotiates truth by means of untruth. The essay addresses this 
problem consciously, which is why the deliberate inclusion of untruth is, according to 
Adorno, “das Element seiner [=des Essays] Wahrheit.”54 The essay, despite its 
subjectivity and the non-identity of language and reality, does not foreclose the 
possibility of arriving at intersubjectively valid and therefore true conclusions. Its 
approximation of truth, which never goes beyond an attempt or essai, makes the essay 
an appropriate written form for Améry to communicate his experience as a victim of 
the Nazis and to explore the condition of his survival in postwar Germany.  
 Because of their intrinsically personal and subjective nature, essays often 
evidence autobiographical elements. In Améry’s case they might even be said to 
replace the autobiography. All of Améry’s autobiographical writing takes the form of 
the essay, and almost all of his essays are autobiographical. The essay also overlaps 
                                                
51 Cf. ibid., 24. 
52 Hohendahl, Prismatic Thought, 235. Cf. Adorno, "Der Essay," 40.  
53 Cf. Adorno, "Der Essay," 38. 
54 Ibid., 41. 
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with the novel, as Rohner points out when he stresses the narrative qualities of the 
essay as form. Far from having created the essay-novel ex nihilo, Améry followed the 
example of Robert Musil, whose Mann ohne Eigenschaften is, by all accounts, the 
most famous of essay-novels.55 While Améry credits neither Adorno nor Musil for any 
influence on his own writing, his oeuvre is indebted to them both. Long before he 
finished Mann ohne Eigenschaften (1930-1942), Musil wrote an article on the genre in 
which he wrote in reference to the essay:  
 
Seine Gedanken sitzen unablösbar in einem Mutterboden fest aus 
Gefühl, Willen, persönlichen Erfahrungen und solchen Verbindungen 
von Ideenkomplexen, die nur in der seelischen Atmosphäre einer 
einzigen inneren Situation volles Licht empfangen und geben.56  
 
Améry’s main pursuit in writing the essays for Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne was to 
expose himself entirely to the light shed onto the self by one experience, and then to 
enlighten others to the human condition as he bore witness to it. The desire to 
compose a novel did not alter Améry’s conviction that he had to write from the center 
of the self, which is shaped by subjective experience. The essay-novel form, with its 
emphasis on personal experience and thus autobiographcal details, was Améry’s 
preferred choice to realize his narrative ambitions. It offered him the means to defend 
the individual subject and its communicable experience against what he saw as the 
pitfalls of structuralism and post-structuralism, namely the anti-humanist outlook 
shared by both movements, and their rejection of the Enlightenment subject.  
 
                                                
55 Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, in: Gesammelte Werke in neun Bänden. Bd. 1-5, ed. 
Adolf Frisé (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1978). Rohner contends that in addition to Musil (whom 
he counts, along with James Joyce, Virginia Woolf, André Gide, Marcel Proust, and Jean-Paul Sartre, 
among the most important international essay-novelists), Thomas Mann succeeded admirably at 
combining the novel with the essay, in particular in Doktor Faustus. Rohner, Der deutsche Essay, 573, 
575. Améry himself names Proust, Gide, Joyce, and Mann as inspiration, Améry, Lefeu, 484.  
56 Robert Musil, "Essaybücher," in Gesammelte Werke in neun Bänden. Bd. 9, Kritik, ed. Adolf Frisé 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1978), 1450-57, here 1450. 
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An Overarching Subplot 
In the early summer of 1972 Améry sent Hubert Arbogast, his editor at Klett 
publishing house, and Helmut Heißenbüttel of Süddeutscher Rundfunk a fairly 
detailed abstract of Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, which already included the text’s 
division into chapters according to plot development and essayistic reflection. Both 
men agreed to support the project on air and in print,57 which allowed Améry to work 
in his now-familiar manner of writing shorter pieces intended for one-hour broadcast 
installments before publishing the series of texts as a book. The essay-novel formally 
resembled all of Améry’s earlier essay collections, with one difference. In addition to 
six chapter-length essays united by a common thematic thread (in this case a 
storyline), Lefeu included the epilogue “Warum und wie,” which Améry intended to 
be read as part of the essay-novel. In it he reflected on the process of writing Lefeu, so 
as to limit the objectification of the novel by literary critics and to guide future 
interpretations.58  
Améry began writing Lefeu in the fall of 1972 and, as before, submitted each 
essay (or chapter, in this case) for broadcast upon completion. He made final edits in 
the winter of 1974, and Klett published Lefeu oder Der Abbruch in March of that year. 
Anticipating a positive reception, Améry left his freelance position with Die Zeit; 
remaining in the post would have precluded a review of Lefeu in the paper because of 
conflict of interest considerations. He explained that now as a “Berufsschriftsteller,” 
his livelihood depended on the free advertising that favorable reviews generated.59 
                                                
57 Améry, "Lefeu oder der Abbruch. Konzept." Améry recorded readings of Lefeu for broadcast, and he 
actively shaped the production by submitting suggestions for accompanying music. Cf. Améry, letter to 
Heißenbüttel, November 13, 1973 (DLA 81.1607/8). Süddeutscher Rundfunk paid Améry DM 2,400 per 
Lefeu installment. Cf. Heißenbüttel, letter to Améry, August 2, 1972 (DLA 81.1983/15). 
58 Cf. Améry, Lefeu, 502. Améry modeled his epilogue after Thomas Mann’s essay on the genesis of 
Doktor Faustus, “Entstehung des Doktor Faustus.” Cf. Améry, letter to Rudolf Hartung, December 12, 
1973, in: Améry, Briefe, 438. Although in the first edition of Lefeu the epilogue is printed entirely in 
italics, Améry meant it to appear identical in form to the main text and as “direkte Fortsetzung des 
essayistischen Teils der Arbeit.” Cf. Améry, letter to Günter Kunert, June 24, 1974, in: ibid., 457.  
59 Améry, letter to Rolf Michaelis, February 7, 1974, in: ibid., 440. 
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With the completion of Lefeu Améry evidently began to see himself as a professional 
literary author. Indeed, he entertained the idea of writing a film-script to televise the 
novel and even entered into (ultimately unfruitful) negotiations with Bayerischer 
Rundfunk to do so.60 He also began planning a new novel, revisiting the historical 
Macbeth story.61  
In the proposal written for Arbogast and Heißenbüttel, Améry had clearly 
stated that in Lefeu the essayistic element of reflection would propel the work and 
pose a “klares Übergewicht [gegenüber den Ereignissen].”62 The story itself would be 
fairly simple, and the characters would not amount to “Romanfiguren im üblichen 
Sinne,” but lack individualized language, traits and appearance in favor of their equal 
ability to reflect.63 At stake in Lefeu, Améry insisted, was to legitimize beyond doubt 
“das Vertrauen in die Sprache,” and this endeavor was to guide both the shape of the 
novel and its plot.64  
At least in the first four chapters the story of the Parisian painter Lefeu indeed 
seems secondary to reflections on a handful of abstract topics, foremost among them 
language, decay, and time. In the proposal Améry had identified three narrative 
strands, “die erste and wichtigste” of which describes the demolition of Lefeu’s home, 
an uninhabitable former factory building set to be replaced by modern construction, a 
process that forces Lefeu out of his apartment after he loses a lawsuit against real 
estate investors. The second storyline traces Lefeu’s negotiations with German art 
dealers who hope to sell his paintings for large profits in Germany, a country with 
great demand for art consumption because of its booming economy. Though Lefeu’s 
painterly style is out-of-date by international standards, the art dealers hope to market 
                                                
60 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 293. 
61 Cf. Améry, letter to Hubert Arbogast, February 21, 1975 (DLA 81.1644/1). 
62 Améry, "Lefeu oder der Abbruch. Konzept," 649. 
63 Ibid., 652. 
64 Ibid., 649. Emphasis in the original.  
 301 
his dark city landscapes aggressively as a paradoxical form of avant-garde nostalgia 
(or melancholia) by calling the style metaphysical realism. The third plot concerns 
Lefeu’s girlfriend Irene, a poet striving for “modernste Ausdrucksmittel” that in fact 
are nonsensical, thereby participating in what Améry believed to be contemporary 
trends in language philosophy that fashionably declare the death of language itself. To 
strike a blow against proponents of the death of language, Améry entertained the 
possibility of Irene committing suicide after she has lost language.65  
Améry planned these three narratives to be the “Hauptachsen” of Lefeu oder 
Der Abbruch, around which minor events would take place. In the exposé he describes 
one of these “angedeutete[n] Nebenhandlungen”: 
 
Bei einer Reise nach dem Béarn fährt er [=Lefeu] an dem Komplex 
„Gaz de Lacq“ vorbei, sieht die Flammen in den nächtlichen Himmel 
stechen. Wurden nicht seine Eltern in Deutschland vergast und 
verbrannt? Es scheint so. Jedenfalls bringt der Eindruck des Flammens 
und Flackerns und die Beziehung seines Namens zum Feuer ihn auf 
den Gedanken, jene in seinem Pariser Stadtviertel neu errichteten 
Gebäudekomplexe, denen nicht nur seine äußere Wohnung, sondern 
auch seine innere—seine optische Welt—zum Opfer fallen soll, in 
Brand zu stecken.66 
 
This minor subplot clearly concerns Améry’s two major affective and intellectual 
battles: Nazi-victimization and redemptive violence.  
The visit to Gaz de Lacq occurs in the fifth chapter of Lefeu, where it marks 
the breaking point of the narrative. Lefeu’s recognition that his parents were murdered 
and his subsequent statement “ich erinnere mich” (italicized for emphasis and repeated 
several times) signal the involuntary eruption of repressed memories. After having 
written the Gaz de Lacq episode, Améry is unable to return to his reflections on 
language—channeled through Lefeu—as the primary concern of Lefeu; in fact, Améry 
                                                
65 Ibid., 650. 
66 Ibid., 651. 
 302 
posits the temporary defeat of language when his narrator Lefeu is confronted with 
traumatic memories. With Lefeu’s ride through Lacq, the focus of the novel shifts 
from a defense of language to a question of redemptive violence. Lefeu’s arbitrary 
survival of a murderous past leads him to suffer survivor’s guilt and to seek to redeem 
the past through a violent act against Paris and himself. The uneasy decision to avenge 
himself (and his parents) becomes the overarching theme of the remainder of the 
novel. If Améry had initially aimed to contest the fragility of language (and thereby 
Foucault and contemporary language theories), he ends up revisiting the question of 
his own past and contemplating possibilities for revenge.  
  
Lefeu, né Feuermann; Améry, né Mayer? Lefeu as “Auto-Existenzanalyse”
67
 
 Améry had furthered his early reputation by writing the series “Bildnisse 
berühmter Zeitgenossen” for the St. Galler Tagblatt. In 1959 he submitted to the paper 
a short portrait of his friend, the largely unknown painter Erich Schmid, entitled 
“Bildnisse (un)berühmter Zeitgenossen: Unbekannter Maler E.S.”68 Because Schmid 
served Améry as a model for the character of Lefeu, the article warrants attention.  
Améry had met the Viennese artist Schmid in Austria before both emigrated to 
Antwerp, and they were incarcerated together in St. Cyprien and Gurs. Unlike Améry, 
Schmid stayed in southern France after his escape from Gurs and joined the Maquis, 
the armed guerrilla bands of the French resistance, to avoid persecution by the Vichy 
regime. Schmid fought the Germans in the French army after France’s liberation 
before settling permanently in Paris once the war ended. There he resumed his 
                                                
67 Améry, Lefeu, 497.  
68 Reprinted in: Jean Améry, "Die neuen Mönche. Bildnisse (un)berühmter Zeitgenossen: Unbekannter 
Maler E.S.," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 1, Die Schiffbrüchigen, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, ed. Irene 
Heidelberger-Leonard (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 643-49. 
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painting career, which had been disrupted by the Nazis, who had considered his work 
“degenerate,” and by the strenuousness of emigration.  
Améry and Schmid stayed in close contact, exchanging letters and visiting 
each other frequently; Schmid considered Améry his best friend.69 In the newspaper 
article Améry omitted mention of his friendship with Schmid, and he also elided the 
fact that Schmid was Jewish and that the artist’s parents had perished in Auschwitz.70 
Améry prefaced the article by commenting that not only famous people shape history, 
but also “Unberühmte, Noch-nicht-Berühmte, Niemals-berühmt-Werdende, (…) 
Scheiternde.” In the text he did not emphasize Schmid’s past as a Jewish victim 
(though he did describe his resistance activities), but focused rather on his postwar 
struggle to succeed as an artist.  
In 1945, after years of enforced artistic inactivity, Schmid came to the painful 
realization that he was unable to compete with contemporary artists and that his 
paintings, once considered avant-garde, had become outdated. He experimented with 
abstract art but returned to his relatively more realistic style in a refusal to bow to the 
pressures of the contemporary art market. Améry’s most pressing question in the 
article was whether Schmid “zum ‘Gestrigen’ geworden [war], nachdem er kaum ein 
‘Heutiger’ gewesen ist?”71 Améry identified with Schmid’s failure to succeed on a 
career path that had seemed so promising in the 1930s, a failure thrust upon him by the 
Nazis, whose persecution had forced him to emigrate from Austria illegally and go 
into hiding. Améry saw his own fate mirrored in Schmid’s: he too had had to abandon 
what he considered his evolving career as a literary writer, a career he could not restart 
                                                
69 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 275.  
70 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, "Nachwort [Lefeu]," 669.  
71 Améry, "Neuen Mönche," 647. Améry’s fascination with this question is apparent in the 1961 
publication Geburt der Gegenwart, in which he ponders the artist’s position vis-à-vis growing demands 
of the market. Cf. chapter “Kultureinheit der Konsumgesellschaft,” in: Améry, Geburt der Gegenwart. 
241-300. In the English translation, the subtitle to the book is Culture in a Consumer Society. 
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after 1945. Unlike Améry, who adapted to the demands of the day and worked in 
journalism for decades, Schmid refused to do so; he became a “Neinsager” (a term 
discussed below) and the model for Lefeu. The Schmid/Lefeu character in this way 
acts as a counterpoint to the successful public figures Améry had covered in his earlier 
portrait serie.72  
The similarities between Schmid and Lefeu are easy to detect. Most obviously, 
Schmid’s living situation informed the setting of Lefeu. Both Schmid and Lefeu live in 
almost uninhabitable spaces that reek of dirt and filth but consist of a certain 
“pittoreske Elendsästhetik.”73 Améry used the French term clochard (tramp) to 
describe both men. Lefeu’s painting L’oiseau de malheur, whose symbolism of the 
curse of the hook-nose has such importance for the novel, was in fact a Schmid 
creation that belonged to Améry, who had previously mentioned it in his article of 
1959. Scattered throughout the novel are clues to Lefeu’s background. Read in reverse 
order, they tell the story of an assimilated Jew from southern Germany (not Austria) 
who fled the Nazis and joined the French resistance, and whose parents were 
murdered in a Nazi extermination camp. This is Schmid’s biography. 
In the epilogue Améry reflects on how Lefeu oder Der Abbruch broke free 
from its author’s intentions during the writing process. Though planned from the 
outset as an essay-novel, Améry had anticipated hewing predominantly to the 
essayistic form, one that he defended as the premier written expression for every “sich 
bildendes, sich entwickelndes Ich, [das] vor der Welt und gegen sie steht.”74 However, 
                                                
72 As Lorenz points out, Améry’s early writings display a fascination with success that does not belong 
to the author but rather is a response to his audience’s demand for success stories. Lorenz, Scheitern als 
Ereignis, 107. The series resulted in the publication of three portrait collections. Cf. Jean Améry, 
Karrieren und Köpfe. Bildnisse berühmter Zeitgenossen (Zurich: Thomas Verlag, 1955); Jean Améry, 
Teenager Stars. Idole unserer Zeit (Rüschlikon-Zurich, Stuttgart, Vienna: Albert Müller Verlag, 1960); 
Jean Améry, Im Banne des Jazz. Bildnisse grosser Jazz-Musiker (Zurich: Albert Müller, 1961).  
73 Améry, "Neuen Mönche," 645. 
74 Améry, Lefeu, 484. From now on page numbers are included parenthetically in the text.  
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the novelistic element of the project allowed him to experience a freedom of 
association (490) that he would have otherwise suppressed, which gave rise to a 
multitude of images, “die autonom wurden und aus dem Unterbewusstsein neue und 
wieder neue, in Wahrheit uralte, aber weggesperrte, hervorholten und in das Werk 
einschoben” (496). The power of these images, Améry continues in the epilogue, 
forced him to undergo “eine Art Auto-Existenzanalyse” (497).  
Thus the character of Lefeu, initially modeled after a concrete person 
(Schmid), became a reflection of Améry’s own autobiography. The parallels between 
the two are manifest immediately in the stories of their names: Améry had changed his 
from Maier, Mayr, Mayer, and his fictional character “machte Lefeu aus Feuermann, 
Feiermann, Feyermann” (474f.). According to the author, Lefeu was the “summa” of 
his life, “eine Bilanz der eigenen Existenz, des eigenen Denkens” (495). Guided by his 
“hartnäckig selbstgrübelnde (um nicht gestelzt zu sagen: ich suchende, ich findende) 
autobiographische[n] Intention” (482) that infused all of his essay collections since 
Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Améry used Lefeu as canvas to investigate the 
possibility of his own “Neinsage” (481) and his “Protest gegen die Epoche” (485). It 
was time, Améry wrote, “endlich deutlicher zu sprechen,” about his position both on 
language and on “Revolution und Violenz” (483). Experiencing a phenomenon 
hitherto unknown to Améry as essayist, what he called a “Phänomen der Entgrenzung” 
and “Selbständigwerdung der Arbeit” (490f.), Améry remarked that his own person 
“drängte (…) sich in die Figur, füllte sie aus, formte sie um” (497), resulting in his 
identification with Lefeu (498). The fusion of author and character is fundamental to 
the form of the text and dissolves the intended balance of novelistic and essayistic 
elements. Repeatedly Améry’s essayistic voice interrupts the narrative of Lefeu, and 
this textual entanglement determines much of the structure of the novel. In this regard 
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the identification of Améry with Lefeu far exceeds the autobiographical information 
incorporated in the text.  
The merging of Améry and Lefeu has another important stylistic impact on the 
essay-novel: both author and his character generously incorporate French into German 
prose. The French language carries great significance for Améry; it was the language 
that offered him a home in 1941, after the Flemish-speaking population of Antwerp, to 
which he originally had fled, delivered him to the Germans. After his escape from the 
prisoner camp in Gurs Améry returned to Belgium, but this time he settled in the 
French-speaking city of Brussels, which gave him, at least for a couple of years, a 
greater sense of security.75 French was the language not only of one of the countries 
that defeated the Nazis, but also of the Vichy regime that collaborated with the Nazis;  
still Améry preferred French in everyday conversation and for reading, a preference he 
did not see as contradictory to his own written output, which was, for the most part, in 
German. In an article written shortly after the publication of Lefeu Améry defends 
bilingualism as a source of creative productivity. Rather than corrupting his mother 
tongue, he argued, foreign languages enriched a writer’s ability to explore and play 
with his native language all the while protecting him from using current neologisms. 
More importantly, the fusion of foreign and native languages allowed emigrated 
authors like himself to describe their “Exilexistenz.”76 The use of French in Lefeu, as 
Améry stated in an interview regarding the essay-novel, gave expression to his 
situation as an exiled writer who depended on inventing and imagining his native 
language: “Mein Deutsch ist sicher zum Teil ein veraltetes Deutsch, zum Teil aber ein 
solches, das (…) ich mir ganz selbst, weil ich im fremden Sprachraum lebe, erarbeitet 
habe. (…) Ich musste mir mein Deutsch erfinden. In dieses von mir erfundene Deutsch 
                                                
75 Cf. Améry, Örtlichkeiten," 421.  
76 Jean Améry, "Vom immerwährenden Schriftsteller-Exil," Schweizer Rundschau 77, no. 10 (1975), 5-
9, here 8.  
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sind selbstverständlich sehr viele französische Elemente eingegangen.”77 Améry 
considers it obvious that French ought to have entered his prose, and while he admits 
that the free use of French vocabulary challenges his readers he defends his choices as 
one of the Lefeu’s greatest assets. 
The identification of the author with his character explains why Lefeu’s ride 
through Gaz de Lacq and his subsequent remembrance of his parents’ deportation, 
conceived in the abstract as mere subplot, become the crucial episode in Lefeu, 
supplanting the issue of a neo-positivist language philosophy that Améry had deemed 
paramount at the outset. Instead Lefeu’s plan to commit a violent act, against the city 
of Paris (as an act of revolution against contemporary society) and against himself (to 
execute the death sentence the Nazis had proclaimed), dominates the rest of the novel. 
Nowhere else in Améry’s oeuvre did the author reference the issue of survivor’s guilt 
so openly (without, however, reflecting on it!). According to Améry, “das ewig 
Autobiographische” played a role here as well: while imagining Lefeu preparing for 
his suicide (through arson), he associated images of his own survival: 
 
Während Lefeu bei Andersens Märchenmädchen Schwefelhölzer 
kaufte und in einer Garage einen Kanister Benzin forderte, dachte ich 
an die Selektionen, durch deren enge Maschen ich unbegreiflicherweise 
geschlüpft war. Kein Verlass war gewesen auf den SS-Arzt, der anno 
44 mich abtastete, ob ich schon schlachtreif sei. Der Kerl hatte 
abgelassen von mir, weiß nicht warum. Seine Nachlässigkeit hatte ich 
seit 1945 schon so oftmals korrigieren wollen. (506) 
 
Elsewhere Améry had already asked the question that Lefeu set out to answer: 
 
Damals, als ich in so fünf bis sechs verschiedenen deutschen 
KZ-Lagern von Kälte und Prügeln versehrt einen Tag erwartet 
hatte, dem anzubrechen nie beschieden war, musste der 
berühmt-berüchtigte „qualitative Sprung“ sich ereignet haben. 
Es gab seither keine Jasage mehr: das Reich des Todes hatte 
sich aufgetan in der Welt. Man überlebte nicht. Nur Lemuren 
                                                
77 Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 121.  
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waren aus dieser Nacht aufgestiegen. Oder, wie es im Lefeu 
heisst: man hatte kein Recht, das Überstehen zu überstehen. Die 
Widersinnigkeit meiner Existenz stand in mir selbst vor mir. 
Warum spielte ich das längst verlorene Spiel noch mit? (...) 
Warum spielte ich den Schriftsteller, ich, der in irgendeinem 
längst durchgepflügten Massengrab hätte seinen Platz finden 
sollen? (498f., emphasis mine)78 
 
In writing Lefeu and imagining his character living a Neinsage (explained below) in its 
full consequence, Améry admitted that he himself had failed to do the same. Despite 
his admiration for Schmid’s rejection of contemporary trends that, had he participated 
in them, would have allowed him a more comfortable life, Améry, at least in his own 
opinion, had sold himself to the demands of the day by writing newspaper articles for 
a German audience, rather than novels in French. As he concludes in the epilogue, 
Lefeu/Schmid “führte eben die Existenz (…), die durchzustehen ich selber die 
Courage nicht hatte” (482).79 Even though Améry identified with Lefeu, Lefeu and 
Améry were not identical; rather, the author created the character to explore the 
Neinsage that he saw as the alternative to his own postwar life.80  
 
 
                                                
78 Améry defines this qualitative leap elsewhere as “échec,” as the irreversible failure or loss of self-
confidence and subsequent loss of trust. To suffer from the échec means: “die Welt verwarf ihn [=den 
Kaufmann, ein Opfer des échec], ehe noch der Tod ihn aus der Welt nahm und die Welt verwarf. Man 
kann, grundsätzlich, im échec leben. Dies aber auf schimpfliche, gleichsam ‘unnatürliche’ Weise.” Jean 
Améry, Hand an sich legen, in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 3, Über das Altern, Hand an sich legen, ed. 
Monique Boussart (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005), 173-344, here 225.  
79 Coincidentally Améry tried to persuade Schmid to abandon his “Neinsage” by plotting his success: 
Améry’s wife Maria, using her maiden name, contacted the Austrian Gallery (in Vienna) to ask why 
Schmid, whose painting L’oiseau de malheur was on the cover of Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, was not 
represented in the gallery. As a consequence, Austrian gallerists got in touch with Améry to facilitate 
negotiations with Schmid. Améry urges Schmid to coorperate, fearing that Schmid, as Lefeu had, would 
refuse the offer to exhibit in his native country. Améry, letter to Schmid, September 25, 1974 (DLA 
86.768a/10). Schmid, who recognized himself in Lefeu, appreciated Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, as 
evidenced by his correspondence with Améry. Cf. Schmid, letter to Améry, without date (DLA 
86.982/7). As if Lefeu were a premonition, Schmid later faced the demolition of his own house. Cf. 
Schmid, letter to Améry, October 9, 1974 (DLA 86.982/4). 
80 Another crucial difference between Améry and Lefeu is, of course, the circumstances under which 
they survived Nazi terror: unlike Améry, Lefeu did not experience the camps. 
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Jean Améry’s Summa: Lefeu oder der Abbruch 
 The following reading of the essay-novel’s narrative development highlights 
those aspects that show how Améry converged on the topics of revenge and 
ressentiment. I begin with a general presentation of Lefeu’s “Neinsage,” which 
concentrates in the first two chapters, “Verfall” and “Erfolg,” on his refusal to vacate 
his house and exhibit his art in Germany. I then turn to the fourth chapter, “Die 
Jasager, der Neinsager,” in which Lefeu begins to examine specific reasons for his 
withdrawal from society, breaking the silence that surrounds his past. The third part of 
my investigation turns on the crucial Gaz de Lacq episode (in the fifth chapter, “Die 
rote Mütze”). I will address the resurgence of Lefeu’s suppressed memories and his 
subsequent loss of language, a circumstance he had believed impossible (chapter 3, 
“Die Wörter und die Dinge”). Lastly, I attend to two mythical figures that accompany 
Lefeu after his breakdown, Feuerreiter and l’oiseau de malheur, who provoke him to 
take vengeance in the final chapter, “Nachtflug.” The goal of my reading of Lefeu is to 
show that Améry, despite his fascination with redemptive violence, finally rejects it as 
a means for ending injustice. Lefeu offered Améry the opportunity to imagine a virtual 
counterpoint to his own postwar reality, but to his own surprise Améry emerged as 
strong opponent to any valorization of violence upon completion of the essay-novel. 
 
The Protest Against Time: Lefeu’s General “Neinsage” 
 Among the many codes Améry employed in Lefeu—for instance, 
“Glanzverfall” symbolizing the commercialization of culture and the quick succession 
of fashions—Lefeu’s “Neinsage” stands out as the driving impulse behind the essay-
novel’s narrative movement and essayistic reflection.81 The phrases “Neinsager” and 
                                                
81 Lorenz considers not “Neinsage” but “Glanzverfall” (and thus Améry’s cultural criticism) the 
overarching theme of Lefeu. Cf. Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 149. Lefeu’s “Neinsage” responds to 
the art market, but only on the most obvious level. 
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“Neinsage” are not uncommon in German and were brought to prominence by Bertolt 
Brecht’s 1931 school opera Der Neinsager.82 In Brecht’s piece the protagonist refuses 
to act according to tradition, insisting on using his rationality rather than following 
superstitious ritual. Even in a post-ritualistic, rationalized society, “Neinsage” is for 
Brecht the outcome of thinking for oneself and reflecting on one’s situation, which 
often goes against the consensus of a blindly accepting majority. Améry first used the 
term “Neinsager” to characterize Herbert Marcuse, whose Vernunft und Revolution he 
reviewed in 1968, but he had long before been fascinated with the idea of someone 
who refuses to accept society’s “Majoritätsurteile” (389), and he modeled all of his 
prose protagonists as Neinsager.83 By insisting on writing essays—as an individual 
reflecting “vor der Welt und gegen sie” (484)—Améry chose the appropriate form to 
express “Neinsage” himself. 
 In the beginning Lefeu’s Neinsage is associated with his refusal to vacate his 
house, accept compensation for his loss, and move into the newly built apartment 
complex to which he has been assigned by the city. The first chapter tells the story of 
Lefeu’s legal battle against “Immobilien-Paris-Seine” (294, 308). Refusing to join the 
majority of tenants in leaving the building, Lefeu retains a lawyer to defend his right 
to remain in his home, a former factory with an atmosphere of progressive decay 
informing much of Lefeu’s artistic work (313). Only two tenants, his fellow artists 
Destré and Vandamme, join Lefeu in the fight; together they write to all major 
newspapers (294) in the vain hope that the public will support their cause. In the 
subsequent chapter, Lefeu is still optimistic that he can stop the demolition; he trusts 
                                                
82 Bertolt Brecht, Der Jasager und Der Neinsager. Vorlagen, Fassungen, Materialien, ed. Peter Szondi 
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1996). 
83 Cf., e.g., Jean Améry, "Der Neinsager: Aber ist Herbert Marcuse auch die revolutionäre 
Führergestalt?," Die Zeit, February 23, 1968. Eugen Althager is Améry’s earliest “Neinsager” (in Die 
Schiffbrüchigen). Lorenz, who has analyzed the unpublished prose fragments Améry produced in the 
late 1940s, concludes that all of Améry’s main characters have been “Neinsager.” Cf. Lorenz, Scheitern 
als Ereignis, 138.   
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that “die öffentliche Meinung (…) ihre Stimme erheben [wird]” (326). By chapters 
three and four, Lefeu has realized that his lawyer lacks sufficient power and the public 
sufficient interest to save him. Although the demolition is under way and both Destré 
and Vandamme have left the building (387), Lefeu remains in what are now the ruins 
of his home (402). Finally forced to leave, he still refuses to move into his new 
apartment and instead spends the nights either on the street or with his former 
neighbors (452). In the final pages of the novel Lefeu returns to what is left of his 
home to set himself on fire (478f.) 
 Beneath the tale of Lefeu’s battle with real-estate developers lies Améry’s 
critique of the judicial practice of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Rather than accept 
money as a form of reparations, Lefeu wants to seek justice in court, but the legal 
system fails him and makes adequate prosecution impossible. Moreover, the public is 
indifferent to the crime and uninterested in justice. Lefeu’s refusal to vacate his home 
is his insistence that the crime in the past has not been amended in the present and 
remains an open wound. The building’s ruined state attests to this wound, evoking 
images of a bloody wing violently ripped off of a living bird (403). The bird is 
generally considered—in Western and indigenous cultures alike—a symbol for the 
immortality of the human soul. Wings are interpreted positively as the ability to 
transcend earthly confinements, however, they also mark demonic forces such as the 
unstoppable passing of time.84 In the context of Lefeu, one may argue that Lefeu’s soul 
is punctuated and remains a wound that the passing of time cannot heal. According to 
Améry’s philosophy of ressentiments the passing of time worsens the injury and 
counteracts the healing of the soul. Whether or not Améry chose deliberately the 
image of a bird for its symbolism is debatable. It is undeniable that he was inspired by 
                                                
84 Cf. Hope B. Werness, The Continuum Encyclopedia of Animal Symbolism in Art (New York: 
Continuum, 2006), 44f., 443.  
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Schmid’s painting L’oiseau de malheur. The early mention of Lefeu’s home as a 
bloody bird’s wing introduces the motif of Unglücksvogel, which is of great 
prominence in the later part of the novel, as discussed below.  
 Lefeu’s Neinsage is not limited to his refusal to leave his apartment, an 
understandable reaction. Less understandable is the decline of a lucrative offer to 
exhibit his art, whereby he refuses the very success his livelihood depends on. By the 
end of the first chapter, Lefeu’s agent, Jacques, representing the fashionable Parisian 
gallery Beaumann, has established connections to a gallery in Düsseldorf that sends 
delegates to Lefeu’s apartment to negotiate a deal (317). The German art dealers meet 
with Lefeu four more times in the next chapter to convince him to exhibit in 
Düsseldorf (326, 332, 346, 353). During these visits they present the painter with a 
detailed marketing strategy, which includes labeling his art as metaphysical realism 
(326) to guarantee the artist’s success. It is possible that Lefeu briefly contemplates 
accepting the offer, thinking that his girlfriend Irene might benefit from his success as 
well (363), but in chapter four he asks Jacques to write to the German gallery to 
decline the offer (411). In the final chapter the representatives from Düsseldorf speak 
to Lefeu once more, hoping that he will revoke his decision, but despite their efforts he 
reiterates his refusal (452ff.). 
 Lefeu’s Neinsage to success in Germany is superficially the consequence of his 
self-exile from the contemporary culture industry, captured by Améry’s neologism 
“Glanzverfall.” More importantly, however, Lefeu refuses to exhibit in Germany. 
Although the reader does not learn of Lefeu’s Jewish background and his parents’ 
death in the Holocaust until much later, it is obvious from the beginning that the 
Germans’ presence is unsettling to Lefeu. His final decision not to deal with the 
Germans, combined with the many intertextual references to German literary 
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artifacts,85 speaks to the tension that the author Améry experienced in postwar German 
society, a tension between attraction to and identification with German culture, and 
reluctance to participate in it. 
 Lefeu’s refusal to vacate his home and his refusal to succumb to success thus 
both suggest forms of criticism of postwar Germany, but this is not immediately clear 
either to Lefeu or to the reader. Rather, Lefeu’s unexamined Neinsage appears at first 
to be primarily bound to the physical symptoms of decay, which interest him for 
aesthetic and moral reasons. 
 The apartment Lefeu so vehemently defends is in a state of decline and 
neglect; it is populated by objects marked by different stages of decay: a dirty sink that 
Lefeu uses as a urinal, dirty dishes, a cracked, dirt-colored wall on which hangs a 
painting of the same color, a charred letter from the lawyer on top of a broken table, a 
dust-covered floor stained by paint, a rumpled bed with dirty sheets (291). Lefeu is 
himself almost indistinguishable from these objects: he is but a gray and unshaven 
face reflected in the mirror (ibid.), embedded into the house as if house and tenant 
were one organism: “Wir [=Lefeu and Destré] sind in diesem Haus verwurzelt. (…) 
Unsere Körper sind verwachsen mit den schmutzigen Tüchern; diese wiederum 
reichen tief in den verfaulendenen Fußboden” (295). Lefeu’s fascination with decay 
and his defense of it speak to his aesthetic concern not with conventional beauty but 
“Verfallsschönheit” (299), a concept based on the proposition that the process of 
decay reveals things that are otherwise “ungeahnt” (296). Beauty, by Lefeu’s 
                                                
85 While Lefeu includes references to many icons of French culture as well—for instance to writers Paul 
Verlaine, Stéphane Mallarmé, Arthur Rimbaud, and painters Eugène Delacroix, and Paul Gauguin, 
etc.—the framework of cultural reference is decidedly German. Despite the inclusion of French phrases, 
literary quotations are of German origin. The only literary passage in French stems from Thomas 
Mann’s Doktor Faustus. Cf. Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 163. Literary German references include 
those to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Hölderlin, Novalis, Hugo von Hoffmannsthal, 
Heinrich Heine, Franz Kafka, Rainer Maria Rilke, Heinrich and Thomas Mann, Alfred Andersch, Peter 
Weiss, and Friederike Mayröcker.  
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definition, depends on differentiation that produces unexpected associations (300). 
The cracks in his apartment wall conjure up different Rorschach images (296) or a 
map of paradise (301), and they inspire him to paint said wall “ixmal” (321). Through 
the process of decay objects become “differenzierter, vielfältiger” (301), thereby 
lending themselves to aesthetic contemplation much more than what is captured by the 
common “Begriff des Schönen als des Bequemem, Glatten, Gesunden, 
Lebenskräftigen und (…) Lebensfördernden” (299). Lefeu’s refusal to accept this 
standard concept of beauty, which is based on the supposed supremacy of “rational 
expandierenden Lebens” (298), is therefore not only an aesthetic choice but also a 
manifestation of his rejection of a certain belief system, clearly articulated in the 
postwar German discourse of Wiederaufbau, according to which the future trumps the 
past for the sake of life’s expansion and rejects the old, decaying, and ugly. Lefeu’s 
preference for decay over newness—of “Differenzierbarkeit nicht Funktionalität” 
(305)—is, in the majority view, irrational because it is “aufzufassen als Negation des 
sich lärmend und glänzend (…) bekräftigenden, dem Wettkampf und der Selektion 
verschworenen Lebens” (308). His dislike for the promotion of life-enhancement does 
not mean that he harbors a death wish or that he negates life altogether (296). On the 
contrary, Lefeu’s insistence on the beauty of decay is in affirmation of life, because 
decay works in “Bereiche[n] des Moralischen” (299). Whereas Lefeu never explicitly 
states how morality figures in the phenomenon of decay, Améry defended the natural, 
slow process of decay against “Glanzverfall” to shield it from active demolition meant 
to make room for something new. Through Lefeu’s fascination with decay, Améry 
gives “dem Abbruch, dem Niedergang, der etwas Miserables hat (…) einen gewissen 
humanen (…) Wert, eine gewisse Würde.”86 Although Lefeu himself has no 
                                                
86 Améry and Hermann, "Jean Améry im Gespräch," 119. Améry had likewise defended the dignity of 
the aging process in humans. Cf. his 1968 essay collection, Améry, Über das Altern. 
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explanation for his admiration of decay, the use of the word “Selektion,” which in 
German almost always connotes extermination camp selections, inserts the Nazi past 
in Lefeu. Lefeu rejects life-enhancement because he has witnessed and suffered from 
the effects of a regime that murdered “selected” groups of the German population in 
the name of enhancement and purification.  
 Jacques speculates that Lefeu, who still paints like Kokoschka (as did 
Schmid)87 and has thus failed to keep up with contemporary art (303), develops his 
“Verfalls-Philosophie (…) [und] Verfalls-Ästhetik” (305) with an insistence on what 
is old, to shield himself from the present, where, according to Jacques, Lefeu believes 
himself to be a  “Zukurzgekommene[r]” (303) and to have been cheated out of 
something he thinks he deserves. In short, Jacques accuses Lefeu of being the 
Nietzschean man of ressentiments who has turned his defeat on the art market into a 
virtue by declaring that which is no longer in demand to be of value. In retort, Lefeu 
denies that his protest against newness, as manifested in his fascination with decay, is 
at all connected to an “Anhänglichkeit an Altes” (306), arguing that decay is trans-
temporal and therefore a protest against “zeitliche(r) Phänomene” altogether (309). It 
is unclear how decay, which signifies transience and the passage of time, defeats 
temporal categories except by leaving marks of the past in the present and thus 
collapsing time. Decay predicts that the present, as well as the future, will have a past, 
too. In lieu of explanation, Lefeu simply insists that decay points “in die Zeitlosigkeit” 
and is thus better “als zeitfreudiges, zeituntertäniges, zeithöriges [Leben]” (309). His 
is a protest against the passing of time, and from the “Ressentiments” essay we know 
that Lefeu’s author Améry voiced the same protest in order to point to an injury in the 
past that society failed to acknowledge in the present. Lefeu’s valorization of decay is 
                                                
87 Cf. Améry, "Neuen Mönche," 645.  
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thus intimately linked to ressentiments, but contrary to what Jacques had suspected, 
not to ressentiments of the Nietzschean kind.  
 Though Jacques can no longer accept any of Lefeu’s paintings because they do 
not sell at Beaumann, the Düsseldorf gallerists are “entschlossen” to introduce them to 
the German art market with “Donnerschlag oder Fanfarenstoß” (327). Despite their 
offer of a large sum of money, the promise of enthusiastic headlines, and TV 
interviews with prominent hosts, Lefeu is not “tickled to death [sic]” (328) at the 
prospect of success, as Vandamme later admits he would have been (335). The second 
chapter explores why Lefeu refuses success, the reason for which cannot be explained 
“monokausal” (328) because the refusal is only one symptom of Lefeu’s general 
“Abwendung von der Welt” (330). By his definition, the contemporary (Western) 
world is but a series of commercialized fashions from which Lefeu wants to withdraw, 
and so he tells his German visitors: “nein danke, ich mag nicht und ich will nicht und 
enfin” (331). When the Düsseldorf gallerists feign understanding for his contempt of 
the obsession with newness88 and explain to him that they are interested in his art 
precisely because Lefeu’s painting are suggestive of what has passed, he objects 
vehemently and dismisses any interest in the past: “Rückbesinnung wäre schlimm für 
mich. Das Allerschlimmste. Ich weiß von nichts. Was vergangen ist, das ist ver-
gangen [sic], man soll es nicht wieder an den Tag kommen lassen” (331). His 
paintings are neither the result of “Vergangenheitssehnsucht” nor “reaktionäre[n] 
Ressentiments,” and “die Lefeu-Erfolgsflucht [ist nicht] der neurotische Ausdruck 
solcher Rancune” (333). Lefeu does not lament the decline of civilization (338) as 
suggested by the gallerists who frame his art as a nostalgic yearning for an idealized 
                                                
88 Améry shares Lefeu’s contempt. Cf. Jean Améry, "Terror der Aktualität," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 
7, Aufsätze zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte, ed. Stephan Steiner (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005), 11-28. 
This article may be key in understanding Améry’s cipher “Glanz-Verfall,” by which he denounces the 
fashion to quickly change one’s opinion so that it adheres to an ever-changing public opinion, thereby 
betraying one’s own subjectivity.  
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past, and his refusal to compete with contemporary artists is not the result of such 
nostalgia. Rather than a turn towards the past, Lefeu exclaims, his Neinsage is a 
“Weigerung gegen die Zeit” as such (349).  
 In two instances, in connection with decay and his rejection of success, Lefeu 
has denied a special interest in the past but insisted that his Neinsage is a protest 
against time altogether. Because time is mentioned in reference to 
contemporaneousness and newness, Lefeu’s criticism of time is that it has a strong 
preference for one of its two counterpoints. It always predicts the future, a prediction 
accompanied by a promise to forget the past. This imbalance creates a value judgment 
by which the future figures more prominently than the past, and it is this judgment that 
levels all injustices, which makes time amoral. Herein lies Lefeu’s assumption that his 
fascination with decay is a moral protest. The concept of the present at stake in Lefeu 
is postwar Germany, and Lefeu’s insistence that his protest against time is moral in 
nature translates into his rejection of West German Wiederaufbau, a rejection that is 
based on moral grounds because Wiederaufbau levels past injustices, regardless of 
whether they have been amended and morally repaired.  
Lefeu’s friends call his irrational protest against time a “psychopathologische 
Verfassung” (305). Lefeu is aware of his “krankhafte Gemütszustand” but unable to 
define it. Moreover, he doubts that it is a symptom of illness and describes his 
rejection of newness and success “kerngesund” (306). His is a protest of the individual 
against what the majority of his contemporaries have declared to be desirable, and he 
understands that in their eyes he may suffer from a mental illness. After all, he rebels 
against “das sich in Permanenz einwägende Gleichgewicht der Majoritätsurteile” 
(389), but according to “ein mit Lefeu befreundeter Schriftsteller”—Améry himself!—
“[ist] die Haltung des Kranken, des Sterbenden (…) im Grunde menschlicher als der 
kerzengerade, aufrechte Gang” (329). Already in the “Ressentiments” essay Améry 
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argued that the protest against the amoral passing of time, which renders past 
injustices irrelevant in the future, manifests the humane and moral alternative to the 
belief that time heals all wounds, a belief considered healthy because it is associated 
with “Lebenskraft” (397). For Lefeu, the focus on living stems from altogether 
irrelevant “Zielvorstellung(en)” (ibid.). Hence his disregard for the “Majoritätsurteil,” 
in which he is not healthy, in favor of his very own “Wahrheitsurteile” (389).  
 Lefeu arrives at these subjective truths through relentless introspection, a 
process that mirrors decay’s workings of excavation and differentiation and by which 
he follows mnemonic chains of associations. Just as each crack in the wall leads to 
others, all of Lefeu’s memories intersect and draw him into deeper layers of memory, 
a process Lefeu identifies as painful (353), and thus he eschews following certain 
memories but tries to suppress them. Similar to the cracks on the wall are Irene’s 
blood vessels visible underneath her skin: both show “verworrenes Geäst” that throws 
out a dangerous net catching Lefeu’s memories (354). The descriptive entanglement of 
the human body with the inanimate material of its physical surroundings underlines 
Lefeu’s impression that he forms one organism with the decayed building. 
“[M]armorierende[s] Geäst auf den Oberschenkeln und an der Wand” provoke in 
Lefeu a deep thoughtfulness and reflectiveness (355) that, against his will, lead to the 
discovery of a “klagende[s] Gesicht” on the wall (350). Much later Lefeu is able to 
decipher the writing on the wall, “die [=Schrift] aber nicht vorwärts verweist auf das 
Kommende, sondern rückwärts läuft” (429). It is all that is left from a past that “die 
vergehende Zeit (…) wegwischte. Nur dass freilich das schon Ausgewischte, von der 
reinigenden Zeit Ausgewaschene bisweilen dann doch aus dem Dämmer 
hervorleuchtet” (ibid.).  For the bulk of the novel, Lefeu, conscious of his memories’ 
powerful pull, successfully keeps them at bay. Much like Améry’s writing process, 
Lefeu’s memory resists conscious control and breaks free through associative 
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movements that release “uralte, aber weggesperrte” images (496). The breaking 
through of memories picks up on the motif of another writing, the writing on the wall, 
which runs backward. This motif challenges the presumption that narrative structure 
necessarily relies on the notion of sequencing and temporality, traits generally shared 
by narratives. The writing on the wall is the essayistic thread that weaves through the 
novel and disrupts the temporal unidirectionality of the text.  
 
Discovering the Root of Neinsage: Lefeu’s Breaking Silence 
Even before Lefeu discovers the reasons for his Neinsage, he assumes it has to 
do with a personal experience requiring contemplation, and he therefore prioritizes 
introspection—“sie ist die Wahrheit des vécu” (320)—over engagement with the 
outside world. During the meeting with Jacques in which he requests that the agent 
decline the Düsseldorf offer, Lefeu explains that his Neinsage is not solely the 
rejection of the art scene, but also involves another component more difficult to detect 
(415):  
 
Es lassen sich im vorliegenden Zusammenhang tatsächlich ganz 
verschiedene Formen der Negation erst feststellen, dann notdürftig 
aufklären: notdürftig, da doch der Hauptbetroffene selber nicht genau 
Bescheid weiß um die Kausalprozesse, die in seinem Bewusstsein sich 
schneiden. (404) 
 
The episode at Gaz du Lacq brings forth the “Auflösung des Rätsels, dessen 
Entwirrung ich [=Lefeu] mich verweigerte” (429), but clues to the enigma are 
dispersed throughout the book for the reader to decipher. The first is offered in 
connection with Lefeu’s initial consideration of the Düsseldorf offer: 
 
Lefeu. Das Feuer. Oder Feuermann. Aber das ist lange her, es 
schimmert kaum noch herein in die Mansarde sans joie. Jacques weiß 
nichts davon. Man könnte, wenn man nur aufgelegt wäre, daraus 
Trinkkapital schlagen, Deutschland ist en vogue, der läppische 
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Erlkönig gefällt, wo man nichts—oder nichts mehr—davon weiß, wie 
die Männlein und Weiblein gefällt wurden, Strich um Strich, wie die 
Sichel surrt und droht: zum Tod! Das hat es auch gegeben, der Täter 
führte den schönen Namen Börries von Münchhausen, das weiß in der 
Rue Roquentin niemand. Und irgendwann, aber das müsste ein guter 
Eingeweihter sein, den es hier weit und breit nicht gibt, könnte man die 
Frage zur Diskussion stellen, ob die Neigung zum Verfall von dorther 
mitgebracht wurde, Erbstück einer so und so gearteten Zivilisation. 
(311) 
 
This is Lefeu’s first mention of his birth name, Feuermann, a name and by extension a 
past of which his friends know nothing. He claims this past is of little significance for 
his postwar life (“Rue Roquentin,” his address in Paris89), yet his existence lacks joy 
(“sans joie”) precisely because for Lefeu time is out of joint. He contemplates selling 
the story of his past to the French media, as the success of Michel Tournier’s Le Roi 
des aulnes (1970, trans. Der Erlkönig, 1972) attests to a certain French fascination 
with the Third Reich,90 a fascination based on the ignorance of mass murder, or, as 
Lefeu references the Nazi poet von Münchhausen in comparison with Tournier, 
perhaps even its tolerance. Lefeu suggests that his interest in decay (and his Neinsage) 
is the product of surviving a society that had condoned the disappearance of 
Feuermann, but he does not see the point in following this line of reasoning any 
further because there is no one who could empathetically relate to him. When 
Vandamme finally asks him why he knows how to speak German, Lefeu answers that 
he was deported from France to Germany as a forced laborer (336). He says to himself 
that this was not actually the case: “sondern. Sondern. Hat gar keine Bewandtnis mehr, 
vor dem Herrn sind tausend Jahre wie ein Tag, und einen Tag währte das 
Tausendjährige Reich” (338).  
                                                
89 The name of Lefeu’s street implicitly refers to Sartre, whose main character in Nausea is named 
Antoine Roquentin. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (New York: New Direction, 2007).  
90 Améry reviewed Michel Tournier very critically, taking his Der Erlkönig as evidence of a renewed 
and dangerous fascination in France with Nazism. Cf. Jean Améry, "Ästhetizismus der Barberei. Über 
Michel Tourniers Roman Der Erlkönig," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 5, Aufsätze zur Literatur und zum 
Film, ed. Hans Höller (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003), 174-88.  
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 Though Vandamme does not suspect that Lefeu is German (or Jewish, for that 
matter), the Düsseldorf gallerists are aware of Lefeu’s background (how so remains 
unclear). At their first meeting they ask him if he has any reservations about exhibiting 
in Germany, and they clearly indicate that they know he is German. They also know 
that he is Jewish, a knowledge they reveal by further mentioning the name of the 
original gallery owner with whom they are connected only “ganz fernher und auf 
gestörte Weise” (393): 
 
Es könnte ja sein, dass Sie gewisse Vorbehalte, nicht Vorurteile: 
Vorbehalte. Deutschl. Unsere Firma hieß vor dem Kriege Meyersohn, 
ein Weltbegriff, in Kunstkreisen natürlich nur. (…) Also jedenfalls 
keine Vorbehalte. Hm, nein, kaum. Historisch gesehen, sind unter den 
heutigen Akzelerationsumständen dreißig Jahre gleich drei 
Jahrtausenden. (318) 
 
Juxtaposed with the earlier statement on the duration of the Third Reich, this invites a 
suggestive inference: if postwar Germany seems to have lasted 3,000 years already, 
then the Nazi period, with its one-day duration (“einen Tag währte das Tausendjährige 
Reich,” 338), shrinks in importance and becomes negligible. Lefeu implicitly endures 
continued victimization throughout the postwar period precisely because the German 
public refuses to recognize the significance of the Nazi past for its present existence. 
The gallerists’ are solely interested in profit, hence they want to use Lefeu’s 
concept of Glanzverfall to promote his art as an avant-garde expression of a new 
philosophy. To avoid discomforting or alienating a German audience, they select from 
Lefeu’s large repertoire only his landscape paintings, leaving his political art behind. 
They suggest that he can succeed in Germany only if he presents himself as apolitical. 
Moreover, the gallerists prefer to leave Lefeu’s past unmentioned, for it is 
unmarketable in postwar Germany (327f.) 
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 Lefeu is himself silent on the silence regarding his past; he comments instead 
on his girlfriend Irene’s silence, broken only occasionally with “mots orduriers” 
(vulgar words) during sexual intercourse, that is, only with a “Transgressionsakt” 
(356). Her breaking of silence is a transgression, a breaking of taboos. Vis-à-vis Irene, 
and perhaps in reference to the German silence on his past, Lefeu ponders:  
 
Man müsste den Pfeil eines Wortes abschießen: es könnte das träge, 
eben noch quallige, aber jetzt schon der Versteinerung sich 
entgegenwandelnde Schweigen brechen. Die Sehne gespannt, jäh 
losgelassen—und das Geschoß sitzt tief im Steine und macht ihn zur 
quellenden Wunde (355f.) 
 
The silence surrounding him and his past is a “[g]efährliche Ruhe,” which so agitates 
him that he, in place of the gallerists, “sich rückwärts wendet, was er doch um jeden 
Preis hätte vermeiden wollen” (378). In the process of turning back, Lefeu, who first 
considered entering “elende Kompromisse” with the Germans (342), concludes that he 
must turn down their offer, and that he must do so to break the silence. Perhaps the 
stony façade of Wiederaufbau behind which postwar society hides would, if Lefeu 
broke the taboo placed on the past, crack open to reveal an old but still open wound. 
Via the initial reflection on Irene’s refusal to communicate reality intelligibly, Lefeu 
finally arrives at a new determination to speak out himself about his own past 
experience.  
In contrast to Lefeu Jacques is identified as Jasager. Not only does he, like the 
gallerists from Düsseldorf, follow the trends of the day—first existentialism, then 
structuralism and psychoanalysis (391)—but he also chooses to cooperate with the 
Germans in spite of a past in “den miesen Regionen im Osten” (393), from which he 
only narrowly escaped. His background, though largely an untold story of survival in 
 323 
Eastern Europe that Lefeu simply abbreviates by the phrase “eia popeia”91 (386, 391, 
393), connects Jacques with Meyersohn and son (393), yet he has come to terms with 
history and seems unbothered by the presence of the German gallerists, who own 
Meyersohn’s gallery because Meyersohn and his son did not, like Jacques and Lefeu, 
survive Nazi persecution. When Lefeu finally dictates to Jacques his Neinsage to the 
Germans, his decision is bound to the fate of Meyersohn, which Lefeu, unlike Jacques, 
has not succeeded at suppressing completely.  
 
Ich frage nur: Kann einer Dreck fressen und Gold scheißen? Er kann es 
nicht, mon ami Jacques, und Gott weiß, dass ich merde verschlungen 
habe von frühauf. Feuermann. Geschichtsdreck. (…)  
Und damit sei der Entschluss gefasst. Ich diktiere, wenn Sie erlauben. 
(…) Es muss ein Ende haben mit den Besuchen der Herren aus 
Düsseldorf, sie stören den Abbruch meiner Person und meines Hauses. 
(...) Er [=Lefeu] wünscht, weiterhin so schlecht verkäuflich zu sein wie 
bis zur Stunde und empfiehlt sich Ihnen durch uns aufs höflichste. 
Signatur. Nachschrift. 
Was geschah mit Meyersohn?  
Was geschah mit Meyersohn? 
Und mit seinem Sohn? 
Ich wiederhole: Was geschah mit Meyersohn? Und mit seinem Sohn? 
[Jacques:] Aber das sind junge Leute, Lefeu, wie sollten sie eine solche 
Frage beantworten können? Welchen Zweck kann es überhaupt haben, 
die Vergangenheit aufzurühren? [Lefeu:] Aufrühren, Jacques: und 
schon taucht aus der Tiefe der Schmerz herauf und trübt alle Wasser. 
Wir Franzosen (...) haben uns arrangiert (...), delektieren uns an dem 
„Erlkönig“ Michel Tourniers. (...) Aber wir beide, Jacques, dem eia 
popeia (...) an der Wiege gesungen wurde, und Lefeu (...), sind nicht 
Frankreich. (…) Frankreich ist leicht. Wir sind schwer. (…) Es ist die 
Nacht des Vergessens und einer Neinsage, die sowohl Leben ist wie 
Tod. (407, 410ff.) 
 
                                                
91 “Eia, popeia, was raschelt im Stroh” is an old children’s song, first published in Des Knaben 
Wunderhorn in 1808, that laments extreme poverty. Des Knaben Wunderhorn also includes “Walte Gott 
Vater,” a lullaby dating back to the fourteenth century, in which the phrase “eia popeia” is frequently 
used. Cf. Achim von Arnim and Clemens Brentano, eds., Des Knaben Wunderhorn. Alte deutsche 
Lieder gesammelt von A. v. Arnim und Clemens Brentano (Berlin: v. Arnimsche Verlag, 1846). It is 
unclear if and how the phrase is connected to Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, which Lefeu 
mentions as Jacques’s place of origin.  
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While Jasager (in the plural) have reconciled themselves to the past by allowing 
time’s passage to aid forgetting, Lefeu, the lone Neinsager, stands, as he says himself, 
“außerhalb der Geschichte” (406) and refuses to accept the passing of time, even 
though he does acknowledge some sort of transformation that turned the past into 
“Geschichtsdreck” in the present. He declines the Germans’ offer because he does not 
want to participate in a culture of forgetting that is uninterested in learning about 
Meyerssohn and makes even Nazism marketable. He protests against profiting from 
the merde that history has handed him and that still contributes to his own (rather than 
his house’s) demolition. And rather than referring abstractly to “Vergangenheit,” 
Lefeu is ready to speak about his concrete experience of Nazi persecution, even if the 
process of remembering is painful and threatens his life. 
 The realization that his Neinsage is intimately linked to contemporary society’s 
simultaneous forgetting of the Nazi crimes and the rehabilitation of the Nazis—a 
realization at which Lefeu arrives only once he is confronted with the gallerists from 
Germany, the first postwar Germans he meets, as far as the reader knows—prepares 
him to uncover memories of his own traumatic past. 
 
The Return of Memory and the Subsequent Crisis of Language 
The fifth chapter of the novel appears to be a complete break with the rest of 
the text.  Aside from a few mentions of Irene and the Düsseldorf gallerists at the 
beginning (418), none of the three supposedly central narratives—the demolition of 
the building, Lefeu’s interactions with the gallerists, and Irene—retain any 
significance here. Instead, the chapter concentrates exclusively on Jacques’ car ride to 
Pau to attend a gallery opening, on which he is accompanied by Lefeu, and Lefeu’s 
immediate return to Paris by train upon remembering his parents’ deportation. Lefeu’s 
determination to stir up the past was but preparation for his discovery of the truth of 
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his own past, which is “nicht so leicht aussprechbar” (408). This leads to his own 
crisis of language.  
The car ride on a French “route départmentale” (419), lined on both sides by 
rows of poplars (420) and thus reminiscent of Améry’s ride from Brussels to 
Breendonk,92 has been foreshadowed throughout the previous chapters. Irene’s poem 
on poplars (292, 314, 343, 358f., etc.) creates in Lefeu “die Impression einer Autofahrt 
über eine route départmentale” (359, cf. 314). Lefeu’s subsequent painting of poplars 
that reach “direkt in the rostroten Himmel” (351) combines Irene’s poplars (and the 
highway associated herewith) with the frequent yet subtle mention of red paint (293, 
310, 324). As Lefeu works on this particular landscape painting (in which he departs 
from his usual subject matter much to the gallerists’ dislike because they fear that 
Lefeu’s red skies are reminiscent of the red sky produced by the SS massacre of 
Oradour-sur-Glane in 1944, cf. 351, 353), his mental image of poplars marching 
alongside the road calls forth the memory of a German marching song idealizing the 
Westerwald. This is a memory of dangerous nationalism against which he shields 
himself with a song of the French resistance. When this does not fend off the image of 
marching Germans, he destroys the composition of the painting altogether, “denn der 
Bildner heißt Lefeu. Lefeu” (352). By repeating his name, Lefeu reasserts his identity 
and interrupts the march of Germans, effectively interfering with history, at least in his 
imagination.  
 The mental associations that trouble Lefeu are often evoked by fire, real in the 
streets of Paris (376) and imagined in his paintings (310). Triggered by fire, these 
associations themselves have the destructive force of burning flames. Throughout the 
text, Lefeu compares associations created by words, such as Irene’s “Pappelallee,” to 
raging flames: “eines der brennendsten Probleme der Wörter,” he says in connection 
                                                
92 Cf. Améry, Jenseits, 32. 
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with his Neinsage and Meyersohn, “ist und bleibt ihre unmittelbar und unaufhebbar 
wirkende assoziative Gewalt” (412), which brings about “‘Dinge’ oder, wenn man 
will: psychische Fakten” (413). This mechanism is mirrored on the textual level, 
where word associations lead to essayistic exploration. Like the “feuerwerkshaften 
Vorstellungsreihen” of words (361), memories too are imagined as fire and flame (cf. 
“aufflammende(n) Erinnerungen,” 353). Most obviously, the name Lefeu points to fire 
(le feu), but it also alludes to the deceased (feu) and to things on fire (en feu). Imagined 
fire infuses Lefeu’s home, “die Rue sans jolie, die Rue sans espoir, sans vouloir et 
sans temps,” as if it were a “magisches Symbol” (310). In the absence of joy, hope, 
will, and time, the reflection of fire saturates his home with memories. Lefeu’s 
memories enter his consciousness like the conflagrations of which they are 
reminiscent, that is, of the Holocaust as symbolized by extermination camp chimneys 
and crematoria. As magic symbols, fires of the Holocaust continue to flare in Lefeu’s 
mind and exist as psychic fact determining his experience of postwar society.  
The associative cluster of highways, poplars, red paint, fire, and, at its center, 
Lefeu’s past tied to the history of Nazi Germany, has thus been underlying the text all 
along and surfaces in chapter five, where it conjures up in Lefeu “den ganzen 
Komplex, den ich vergrub in die letzten mir noch erreichbaren Tiefen meiner 
Existenz” (426). En route to Pau, Jacques and Lefeu pass Lacq, one of the world’s 
largest producers of sulfur. From the natural gas pool surrounding Lacq flames diffuse 
into the sky, coloring it as red as Lefeu imagined it in his paintings. Stirred by this 
visual stimulus combining the color of sulfur (yellow, evoking the yellow star of 
David) with flames is a memory that Lefeu attempts to chase away by demanding that 
Jacques tell him their precise location, hoping that Jacques’ repetition of “C’est lou 
Gaz de Lacq” will anchor Lefeu in the present reality. Jacques’ attempt to soothe his 
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friend fails; for the first time, Lefeu imagines the deportation of his parents and their 
death in Nazi extermination camps: 
 
Sehen Sie den Himmel? So habe ich ihn hundertmal gemalt: rot. Und 
so sehe ich ihn zum erstenmal. Wo sind wir hingeraten? Das ist nicht 
Pau, da findet keine Vernissage statt (...), da ist der schwarzrote, aber 
mit jedem Kilometer, den Ihre Schaltbrett klickend aufzeigt, röter 
werdende Himmel. Jacques, wo sind wir? C’est lou Gaz de Lacq, sagen 
die einheimischen Bauern (...). C’est lou Gaz de Lacq. Lacq: Gemeinde 
im Département Basses-Pyrénées, am Ufer des Gave de Pau, 700 
Hektar, bedeutende Naturgasvorkommen, Pipelines nach zahlreichen 
Regionen, Schwefelproduktion. Aus Schwarz ward Rot, aus Rot wird 
Blau: da stechen Flammen in den winterlichen Nachthimmel, Jacques. 
C’est lou Gaz de Lacq. Da erleuchten sie jählings die Hügel und 
Wiesen und wehenden Pappeln, Jacques, halten Sie an! C’est lou Gaz 
de Lacq. Blitze aus der Erdentiefe. Feuer aus den Eingeweiden des 
Bodens. Der ganze Himmel flackert jetzt bläulich. Lacq: Gemeinde im 
Département Basses-Pyrénées, bedeutende Naturgasvorkommen. Es ist 
ein ziemlich weitläufiger Industriekomplex, wir haben ihn bald hinter 
uns, dann sind es nach Pau, Centre, Hotel Henri IV, vielleicht zwanzig 
Minuten. Halten Sie an: ich erinnere mich. 
Feuermann, Stuttgart. Stiefelfüße, schwer aufgesetzt. Gepolter und 
Gelächter im Korridor. Raus mit euch—oder so. So oder anders muss 
das gewesen sein. Eilige Hände in Schränken und Laden, das Nötigste 
wird mitgenommen, aber was ist das Nötigste? So oder anders. 
Vielleicht auch Schluchzen einer alten Frau und bebende Finger, die 
nach einem EK I suchen. Züge: Räder müssen rollen für den Sieg, 
unnötiges Reisen verlängert den Krieg. Nötige Reisen ostwärts, 
unerlässliche Fahrten durch Tage und Nächte, deren Ziel die Flammen 
sind. C’est lou Gaz de Lacq. (423f., emphasis in original) 
 
Lefeu repeats “ich erinnere mich” thrice more. Even though his memory is late 
returning, it does so “um so drangvoller” (428). Since he was absent from his parents’ 
house, his memories of their arrest and deportation do not stem from concrete 
experience, but from his imagination, but they exist as psychic facts nonetheless. 
Lefeu did not witness their murders nor those of so many more, and he is overcome 
with survivor guilt: “Ein furchtbar großer Pluralkreis: sie. Eux. Les autres. Und wenn 
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ich rede, ich, im Singular, dann ist mein Geplapper das Zeugnis eines unbegreiflichen 
Fehlgeschicks” (429).  
 In the earlier chapters Lefeu repeatedly attests to his faith in the capacity of 
language to communicate reality, and he defends the “Kommunikationstauglichkeit” 
of language against Irene’s “Geplapper” (314) derived from the merely fashionable 
but to Lefeu untenable belief that language stands as autonomous entity, separated 
entirely from social reality (356f.). Her “Geplapper”—a poetics conceived of chains of 
phonetically similar but semantically unconnected words that together hold no 
meaning—had reached “das Limit” (361) and were “Weltverleumdnung” (356). As a 
neo-positivist (326) and an admirer of the early “Herr[n] Ludwig Wittgenstein” (368), 
Lefeu believes firmly, “[d]ie Sprache gibt wieder, was in der Welt, die alles, was der 
Fall ist, der Fall ist: nicht weniger und nicht mehr” (367). Lefeu confronts Irene’s 
“zerhämmerte(n) Sprachtrümmer(n)” with his own faith in Wittgenstein, whose early 
work, the Tractatus Logio-Philosophicus, taught him to verify the world through 
language so as to remain “am Sinn des Satzes haften” (292).93 He lectures Irene that 
Wittgenstein comprehended both world and language until “er aber nicht mehr begriff 
und weiter begreifen wollte”: when Wittgenstein renounced his early philosophy and 
uttered “das Unbegreifliche”—namely that language does not necessarily reflect the 
world but is composed mainly of language games independent of the social world—he 
lost “alle drei: sich selbst, die Sprache, die Welt” (367).94 Though Lefeu recognizes 
the fundamental difficulty of translating reality, including images (325) and 
                                                
93 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1996). Wittgenstein asserted that language, by the sense its sentences conveyed, reflected 
the world in a logical way. The sense of a sentence was the result of an arrangement of names that 
correspond to objects in the world, and the specific arrangement within the sentence reflects a possible 
arrangement of objects in the world.  
94 Wittgenstein renounced the language philosophy of the Tractatus in his posthumously published 
work. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1958). 
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“psychische Fakten” (413), into language, he insists that this “Übersetzungsakt(es)” is 
possible because it is absolutely necessary (325).  
 Faced with his past in the vision of the gas flames in Lacq, however, Lefeu’s 
own speech becomes “Geplapper.” Burdened by the knowledge of his parents’ 
murder, he struggles to put into words these images of their deportation; consequently 
his previously firm belief in the precision of referential language and the 
communicability of reality is radically shaken. Both prosaic-documentary and poetic 
language fall short of articulating his parents’ “Erlebnisfaktum” in its entirety, even 
though they convey meaning and have been used with such frequency that their 
distinct vocabularies, like “verrecken” (429) or “ein Grab in den Lüften,” are 
“vollkommen ausgelaugt” (424).  Lefeu directly references Paul Celan, whose poem 
“Die Todesfuge”95 shows such “Impotenz vor der Wirklichkeit” (425) that it is “nichts 
wert” (427). Words are not adequate “um Zeugnis abzulegen” (425f.), and Lefeu sees 
no choice but “auf die Aussage zu verzichten” (424). This is not an abdication of 
language but a recourse to something other than referential language, perhaps captured 
in “Geplapper.” “Geplapper” is, beyond Lefeu’s name for a type of senseless speech, a 
near anagram of “Pappel” and thus corresponds to the associative cluster that led 
Lefeu to imagine his parents’ murder in the first place. He begins several times to tell 
of his parents’ arrest, but each time he pauses to correct himself and begins anew, 
growing more dissatisfied with each attempt. Finally, he returns to and accepts Celan’s 
“Gräber [im] Himmel, ich komme nicht los von den Wortstauungen, die mir die 
Wirklichkeit verstellen” (427). Although his parents’ experience is not fully 
communicable, Lefeu must resist the urge to remain silent, because to do so would 
amount to concealing their past: “Und doch hieße schweigen, verschweigen. Ich habe 
                                                
95 Cf. “ein Grab in den Lüften,” “ein Grab in den Wolken,” “ein Grab in der Luft.” Paul Celan, "Die 
Todesfuge," in Die Niemandsrose, Sprachgitter (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 2001). 
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verschwiegen durch Jahr und Tag,” but the memory of his parents suddenly “fordert 
meine Rede heraus, die falsch ist” (ibid.). Lefeu posits the defeat of language before a 
traumatic reality, and yet he demands to speak up, even at the risk of distorting 
experience. The duty to speak of the past exceeds language’s inadequacy to the task, 
and furthermore it overrides the tormenting “Gefühlsverdichtung” suffered by the 
victim of traumatic experience, who hopelessly struggles to resolve the contradiction 
of being unable to testify to it, all the while challenged by the crushing necessity to do 
just that (428).  
 After the Lacq episode Lefeu partly recants his belief in referential language 
because of his recollection; in his memory he bore witness to the loss of himself, 
language and the world. He seeks forgiveness from Irene: “Längst bin ich mir nicht so 
sicher des Sinnes der Sätze, meine Freundin, muss manches dir abbitten. Pappelallee, 
zum Beispiel” (459). The reference to Irene’s poplar poem evokes the entire complex 
of victimization which he and his parents suffered, and of which Irene was aware all 
along. Lefeu’s demolition of language occurs in light of the recognition that there 
exists “keine gemeinsame Sprache von (…) verdinglichender Betrachtungsweise und 
subjektiver Evidenz” (500). His subjective evidence is that history ended with graves 
in the air and that he cannot survive his survival: for this truth, there are no sentences 
whose sense is extrinsically verifiable. Subjective evidence—experience and 
memory—remains beyond the grasp of neo-positivist language theories. 
 Lefeu’s linguistic breakdown at Gaz de Lacq is not his first. Shortly after 
asserting the capacity of language to articulate anything, language fails Lefeu as he 
speaks to the Düsseldorf gallerists, who have just alluded to a possible emotional 
conflict that exhibiting in Germany may cause him. Language fails him precisely at 
the moment in which he affirms its infallibility and, more importantly, in connection 
to Germany and the renewed national pride of its inhabitants: “Deutschl… Man kann 
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darüber spr. Über alles” (alluding to the first stanza of Germany’s national anthem, 
“Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,” which, since 1945, is no longer sung; 318). 
Lefeu reflects on his difficulties to communicate with the gallerists, but while he 
searches for rational arguments, he stops mid-sentence at the remembrance of his own 
name: “Ihr Vokabular und ihre Syntax gehören dieser Zeit und ihrem Lande an, 
während ich selbst. Feuermann. Zu lange her” (332). There are in fact several 
instances where Lefeu’s language breaks prematurely, either when speaking directly to 
the gallerists or talking about them or about Germany. Taking a page from the 
“Ressentiments” essay, I would contend that Lefeu and the Germans cannot 
communicate as long as they remain invested in temporally distinct planes (of past and 
future) and therefore fail to overcome their status as Gegenmenschen. Although the 
gallerists reach out for Lefeu, they cannot bridge the gulf between them; they come 
“von weit her, sehr weit her, wenn Sie wüssten, wie weit her, das sind Strecken, über 
die keine Autobahn führt” (347). The real reason for Lefeu’s inability to communicate 
properly with the Germans lies not only in the language’s change in syntax, but also in 
their conflicting understanding of their shared pasts. While the mention of autobahn 
seems to refer to distance in space rather than in time, it also involves a temporal 
dimension, as the construction of German autobahns rapidly accelerated after Hitler’s 
rise to power in 1933. Where many Germans might consider the autobahn system a 
successful public works project that significantly decreased unemployment in 
Germany during the thirties, others, including Lefeu, might foreground the autobahn 
system’s other roles, namely those in the service of military logistical planning of war 
and genocide. 
  
From the Void of Referential Language: Feuerreiter and l’Oiseau de Malheur 
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 Following their defeat in the war, the Germans—“Volk und Wagen im 
Gewühle”—returned “von all dem Graus [und] machten sich emsig an den 
Wiederaufbau” without any memory of their crimes and those who had suffered from 
them (431). Part of the passage just quoted is taken from the revised 1841 version of 
Eduard Mörike’s poem “Der Feuerreiter” (1824), and it is the figure of Feuerreiter 
that haunts Lefeu on his return from Pau and seeds the idea of avenging his parents.96  
According to tradition, Feuerreiter, who wears a red cap to warn the populace of an 
outbreak of fire, is Swabian (like Lefeu) and burns to death (like Lefeu’s parents but 
unlike Lefeu himself). Feuerreiter’s death is marked in the poem by the line “Husch! 
da fällt’s in Asche ab,”97 a line Lefeu repeats several times in reference to his parents’ 
murder. 
The original version of the poem portrays an heroic Feuerreiter who sets out to 
extinguish fire. Mörike’s revision of the poem holds a certain amount of ambivalence, 
for Feuerreiter is now depicted as smirking while conjuring “freventlich die Glut.” 
The revision injects the idea of arson into the poem. At least this is how Améry must 
have read the poem, for in the Lefeu proposal he associated “des Feuerreiters ‘rote 
Mütze’” with “Brandstiftung.”98  
Améry quotes from “Der Feuerreiter” extensively in Lefeu,99 beginning with 
Lefeu’s ride through Lacq, where the painter first imagines seeing the red cap. With 
the memory of this mythical (430) figure of Feuerreiter, Lefeu enters a system of 
                                                
96 “Volk und Wagen im Gewühle // Kehren heim von all dem Graus,” Eduard Mörike, "Der 
Feuerreiter," in Deutsche Gedichte, ed. Benno von Wiese (Berlin: Cornelsen, 1993), 407-08. The 
Améry Werke edition includes the original 1824 version of Mörike’s poem, which is missing these 
lines. Eduard Mörike, "Der Feuerreiter," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 1, Die Schiffbrüchigen, Lefeu oder 
Der Abbruch, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007), 660-661. 
97  Stanza IV, line seven of the original version. Line seven in stanza V of the revised version reads: 
“Husch! da fällt die Asche ab.” For the folklore of Feuerreiter, cf. Rainer Pohl, "Zur Textgeschichte 
von Eduard Mörikes 'Feuerreiter'," Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 85 (1966), 223-40. 
98 Améry, "Lefeu oder der Abbruch. Konzept," 656. 
99 With the exception of the line “Husch! da fällt’s in Asche ab,” which is from Mörike’s original 
(1824) version of the poem, Améry quotes from the revised (1841) version.  
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cultural references that continue to connect him to the Heimat from which he was 
expelled, on the one hand, and which is reminiscent of Nazi rhetoric, on the other: 
 
Die Rote Mütze. Heimsuchung, Heimholung. Es ging ja irgendwo im 
Schwäbischen vor sich, man sah ihn grinsen vom Dachgestühl, 
freventlich die Glut besprechen und erblickte in der gleichen Region 
viel später die Männer, die anhielten vor den Häusern und die dem 
Verrecken Versprochenen heraus- und davon schleppten. (...) Ich 
erinnere mich. (430f.)  
 
With the cultural “Heimholung,” which also carries shades of the Nazi initiative Heim 
ins Reich,100 Lefeu recognizes that he too had been destined (by the Nazis) to be 
murdered, and this recognition leads to the realization that his Neinsage follows not 
only from his parents’ murder but also from the arbitrariness of his own survival:  
 
Husch, da fiel’s in Asche ab. Ich hätte dort und damals—es begann im 
Schwäbischen und endete im Osten—mich recken müssen und nicht 
mich räkeln zwischen den Schenkeln Irenes. Husch, ich aber überstand, 
das ist der niederträchtigste Zufall ohne Notwendigkeit; Zufall 
entgegen der Notwendigkeit. Ich sagte nein, ins Allgemeinste hin, ohne 
zu wissen, dass dies die uneinholbar verspätete Jasage zum Husch war: 
ich fiel nicht in Asche ab, damit waren alle Türen zugefallen. (...) So 
kam ich auch meinem Nein auf seine erste, verwehte Spur. (431f.) 
 
Lefeu’s Neinsage to his participation in postwar society is a consequence of the Nazis’ 
proclamation of his death sentence, from which he was inexplicably spared but which 
he belatedly accepts. Because Feuermann is gone, Lefeu ought not remain: 
“Feuermann gibt es nicht mehr, darum sollte es Lefeu nicht geben. Die Logik ist 
unangreifbar” (435).  
Immediately upon drawing this conclusion, Lefeu leaves Jacques to return to 
Paris. Feuerreiter, who accompanies Lefeu, replaces “die Ohnmacht der Sprache” 
(432) and whispers into Lefeu’s ear that where there is no word, there must be deed 
                                                
100 Heim ins Reich referred to a Nazi policy to encourage foreign nationals of German descent to 
“Germanize” their regions and bring them “home” to the Reich. The initiative went hand in hand with 
ethnic cleansing of areas intended to be part of “Greater Germany.” 
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(468). Lefeu imagines the deed that seems most appropriate for Feuerreiter (and 
Feuermann), arson. On the train ride to Paris—a trip he has made before, after his 
flight from the prison in Gurs (where both Schmid and Améry had been incarcerated, 
435)—he begins plotting to set Paris aflame (441).  
Seen in retrospect, the idea of arson was not introduced with Feuerreiter but 
permeated the text from the beginning. Lefeu’s red skies and horizons speak to fire, 
and the painter recalls admiringly the arsonist who burnt down a Paris drugstore, in 
Lefeu’s interpretation thereby protesting against the “cool jazz dieser Zeit” (376). 
Once Feuerreiter appears to Lefeu in Lacq, he too is imagined as posing his Neinsage 
against “die kalten elektrischen Feuer des Glanz-Verfalls” by means of arson (sic, 
436). Returning to Paris, Lefeu imagines himself as arsonist, a picture captured by the 
phrases “Benzinkanister. Leise Tritte durch die Korridore des Neubaus. Ein paar 
Schwefelhölzer” (441). He repeats these phrases almost as a mantra (468, 475). He 
imagines the trial that follows his arrest, where it is his defense lawyer who will be 
able at last to describe what happened to Lefeu’s parents, and who does so as he 
appeals to the court to forgive Lefeu’s crime: 
 
Und schließlich wollen wir nicht vergessen, dass der Angeklagte 
erfahren musste, seine gesamte Familie, namentlich aber die greisen 
Eltern, seien der teutonischen Barbarei zum Opfer gefallen: sie wurden, 
wie manche französische Bürger auch, im Osten des damaligen 
deutschen Reiches durch Zufuhr von Gas erstickt und danach in den 
berüchtigten Krematorien verbrannt. (446f.) 
 
Resorting thus to imagined legalistic rhetoric to narrate “unleugbar Tatbestände” with 
“Eindeutigkeit” (315), Lefeu appears to have rediscovered his faith in the power of 
language. Indeed, Feuerreiter is gone, at least for the moment, once Lefeu reaches 
Paris (447).   
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 Another companion besides Feuerreiter links Lefeu to his past and makes the 
Jasage impossible: l’oiseau de malheur. Much to the initial excitement of Jacques and 
the German gallerists (371), Lefeu began work on a new painting depicting a creature 
at once man and bird, with a nose that “ragt als Schnabel feindselig in die feindliche 
Welt” (369). Lefeu identifies both his home and himself with the bird, an oiseau de 
malheur, or Unglücksvogel, not because it brings bad luck (as Feuerreiter does) but 
because it is affected by misfortune. The ruined building, of which just one wing 
remains, reminds Lefeu of the bloody wing violently ripped from a bird’s body, and he 
paints l’oiseau de malheur in remembrance of its death struggle  (403). Moreover, he 
is the bird; his is the “scharfschnabelige[r] Vogelkopf” (403, cf. 436), his is the 
“vorgereckte Schnabelnase” (418). The shape of his nose not only reveals his 
resemblance to the bird but links him also to Meyersohn, so that he imagines the 
Düsseldorf gallerists remarking to him that “der scharfe Krummschnabel (…) jene 
Nase [ist], an der Meyersohn und Sohn einen der Ihren erkannt hätten” (452).101 
Although at first eager to obtain the painting, the gallerists lose their interest once 
Lefeu tells them about the bird, whose “schlechte(n) Stunden (…) vielleicht schon 
vorgezeichnet [waren], als er aus dem Ei kroch, irgendwo im Schwäbischen (…), denn 
er ist ein deutscher Vogel, das muss auch einmal klar ausgesprochen werden” (453). 
At Lefeu’s insistence that he is the oiseau de malheur and that his misfortune is linked 
to his birth in Germany, the gallerists from Düsseldorf turn the painting down, 
“schweigen betreten (…) mit einer Spur von Ungeduld” (ibid.). The Germans do not 
react to Lefeu’s indirect accusation, and he becomes more direct, telling them of his 
                                                
101 Maria Lassmann interprets this scene differently. She reads the capitalized possessive pronoun not as 
an imagined dialogue between Lefeu and the gallerists in which the Germans speak, but understands the 
sentence spoken by Lefeu in address to the gallerists: in her view the Germans are, like Lefeu, Jewish. I 
disagree with this reading. Cf. Maria Lassmann, "Vom Gedächtnis des Körpers. Überlegungen zur 
Gestaltung von Jean Amérys Roman-Essay Lefeu oder der Abbruch," Germanistische Mitteilungen 63 
(2006), 7-20, here 14n22.  
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expulsion from Swabia and the loss of his Heimat. Despite searching for a new home, 
he has existed since then as “Herr Ohneland,” while the Germans walk about “lastlos 
mit hübschen Schiurlaub-Gesten,” pretending not to know of any “Unglücksvögel(n)” 
(454). For the second time, the Germans refuse to engage with Lefeu’s appeal to speak 
of his past.102 
 In his imagination Lefeu travels the Paris skies as l’oiseau de malheur without 
knowing his destination or the pathways that could lead to it. “[I]n den Lüften [gibt es] 
keine sichtbaren Wege oder Pfade” (458), only Celan’s graves to which Lefeu sees 
himself destined. Above the city—among the graves—Lefeu meditates on his 
“Unglück” (459), which he describes as “der schwarze Kern, aus dem alle Schwärzen 
meines Daseins strahlenförmig sich in die Welt vorantreiben” (474). Although Lefeu 
cautions that the term “Unglück,” just like the expression “[m]ein Herz ist schwer,” 
which he uses in reference to his misfortune (467, cf. 479), is a “mythische[r],” 
imprecise term loaded with clichés (457, cf. 466f.), he insists on using it, because any 
explanation of causality betrays his “vécu” (467), the point “in dem die existentiellen 
Fakten sich verdichten” (475). He is not helped by causal explanations for historical 
events but demands the Germans’ acknowledgment of his Unglück, which, for Lefeu, 
has mythic proportions and thus resists historical analysis.   
The images of l’oiseau de malheur and Feuerreiter occasionally blur and 
blend, and then Feuerreiter demands of the bird—of Unglücksvogel Lefeu—to effect 
the 
 
Aufhebung der Stuttgarter Schmachstunde (zitternde Hände kramten 
nach einem EK I, über das der Büttel nur die Achseln zuckte) und 
Auslöschung eines schmählichen Überstehens. (…) Da klappern die 
                                                
102 In several places throughout the novel, Améry references his Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne essay 
“Wieviel Heimat braucht der Mensch?” directly. Elsewhere Lefeu cites from the text verbatim (Lefeu, 
445).   
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Hufe und wiehern in die Nacht die Gelächter des Zornes, denn jetzt soll 
die Untat ausgelöscht werden durch die Untat. (437) 
 
Feuerreiter calls on Lefeu to avenge his parents’ deportation and to end his own 
survivorship of persecution: he demands the deed (Tat) that undoes the original crime 
(Un-Tat), but which itself is a new crime (Untat). Feuerreiter in effect calls for violent 
revenge, the concept of which author Améry had rejected in “Ressentiments.” Lefeu 
does not finish his painting of the bird, and he leaves the incomplete work with 
Jacques, to whom he explains that he has to abandon the bird for something 
“Bedeutenderes” (468), ostensibly another painting, called “Paris brûle. Ich habe so 
oft rote Himmel gemalt, dass ich nun endlich einmal Flammen [sic]. Es hängt dies 
zusammen, Jacques, mit meinem Unglück, gegen das ich endlich aufstehe… Nach so 
vielen Wahrheiten endlich einmal die letzte Wahrheit: ihr Name sei Tat” (468). He 
repeats his plans to Vandamme and adds as explanation a confession of his true 
background:  
  
Ich komme von dorther, da haben Sie die Wahrheit, die ich verschwieg, 
weil ich mich doppelt schämte: wollte nicht Vertreiber, Vernichter, 
nicht Vertriebener, Vernichteter sein in unserem Kreise, machte Lefeu 
aus Feuermann, Feiermann, Feyermann. Ja, die Stunden der großen 
Feyern und großen Feuer sind da. Eine neue Arbeit: Paris brûle. Il brûle 
et ich brülle. (...) Es wird nicht ganz leicht sein, das heulende Gebrüll 
ins Optische zu übertragen, doch traue ich mir mehr zu als je zuvor, da 
ich ja den schwarzen Kern entdeckte: mein Unglück. Und bin 
besonnen, es zurückzunehmen. Weiß nicht wie. Habe so meine Pläne, 
die freilich, kaum dass sie gefasst sind, mir entgleiten. Denn es kommt 
nach so vielen Wahrheiten die letzte Wahrheit: ihr Name sei Tat. Der 
Unglücksvogel ist beendet, das neue Werk Paris brûle wird begonnen. 
Es ist zu malen mit großen Pinselstricken, so als schritte einer weit aus 
mit der Hand, als spränge oder sprengte er voran, gleich dem 
Feuerreiter, die Bewegungen kommen direkt aus dem Schultergelenk. 
(475) 
 
With Lefeu’s rediscovery of his Unglück, which for the author Améry is physically 
located in his shoulders that tore while he was tortured by the Nazis, he plans the deed: 
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while he is shouting (brüllen), Paris has to burn (brûler). Only through action does 
Lefeu stand up against his Unglück (468), which awaits, “dass die Flammen es 
auslöschen” (475).  
 Lefeu returns to the ruin of his former home to finish the painting. Equipped 
with knowledge of his past, he brings to his painting a fervor that seems to flow 
“direkt aus dem Schultergelenk, besser und leichter als zuvor” (477). Along with the 
red sky and the gray city of Paris, Lefeu now also paints Feuerreiter, whose red cap 
shares the sky with l’oiseau de malheur (477f.). New to the composition are “tief in 
der Ecke drunten, durch gelbe Flecken verschandelt, die schon Verbrannten, 
deretwegen das Schultergelenk sich regt. Ein Bart wird erkennbar, gespreizte Angst 
und Reckverreckfinger (…) Reck-Verreckfinger” (ibid.). Yellow paint, scarcely used 
before (“ein einzelnes gelbes Licht,” 310; “ein geisterhaft gelbes Licht,” 324), now 
figures consciously in Lefeu’s painting as symbol of the memory of those murdered in 
extermination camps, the carriers of the yellow star of David that marked them as 
Jews. Améry’s shoulder has become the shoulder of the painter who translates into 
image the writer’s missing words on Jewish victims of the Holocaust, effectively 
substituting non-referential language when referential language failed the author.  
But the result is not satisfactory. Lefeu fears that “Monsieur Beaumann oder 
die Herren aus Düsseldorf” will distort the truth as “surrealistische(r) Phantastik” 
(478). The painting must be destroyed to prevent that the “Stunde der Wahrheit” be 
degraded by commercial success (ibid.). Lefeu sets it on fire without taking 
precautions against spilling gasoline on himself. It is unclear whether or not Lefeu 
intends to immolate himself with the painting and thus wants to commit suicide. 
Regardless of his intentions, someone discovers him and calls an ambulance: 
 
Ich bin so gut wie unverletzt, nur ist mir sterbensübel. (...) Das Bild ist 
hin, Paris brûle. Und die Hose nur leicht angekohlt, es ist so gut wie 
nichts. Nur übel ist mir. (...) Ich bin ganz heil, bis auf die Übelkeit. 
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Heil! sage ich. Heil! Heil! Wie schnell das geht, so eine fliegende 
Ambulanz. Il n’est pas blessé, absolument pas. C’est plutôt le cœur, le 
cœur qui flanche. Le cœur ?  
Das Herz? Ich ahnte es. Es war zu schwer. Et maintenant il 
flanche. C’est ça, Docteur ?  
Oui, restez tranquille. (479) 
 
Lefeu’s repeated affirmation that he is “heil” (safe and unharmed) is unconvincing and 
instead reminiscent of the Hitler salute. With the diagnosis that his heart is failing, 
Lefeu ends: against all clichés of a broken heart, Lefeu’s heart carried too heavy a 
burden (“Mein Herz ist schwer,” 377, 467), and he dies of heart failure.103 Both 
Dagmar Lorenz and Irene Heidelberger-Leonard argue for reading Lefeu oder Der 
Abbruch from the perspective of the dying Lefeu, merely remembering the events 
leading up to his end.104 This reading is not altogether compatible with the observation 
that the ride through Lacq and the return of Lefeu’s memory provide too sharp a break 
between the demolition/success narrative and his ultimate decision to destroy himself. 
Given the anticipation of arson, Lefeu’s suicide, if it is indeed suicide, is surprising 
and suggests a link between redemptive violence and self-destruction, which I explore 
in the following section. 
  
“Mein Aufstand gegen mein Unglück”: The Issue of Redemptive Violence 
Revisited 
Lefeu arrives at the necessity of action through the recognition that, despite his 
initial confidence in the capacity of language to communicate reality, his Unglück is 
intensified by others’ intentional silence as well as his own doubts regarding 
referential language. He is the Unglücksvogel because he fell victim to the Nazis, and 
although he survived persecution, he was one of very few to do so. His past 
                                                
103 Heidelberger-Leonard proposes to read Lefeu as narrated by a dying Lefeu who remembers the 
demolition and the drive to Pau in retrospect. Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, "Nachwort [Lefeu]," 681. 
104 Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 175. Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, "Nachwort [Lefeu]," 681.  
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Unglück—the murder of his parents, Meyersohn and Sohn and millions more—
extends into the present, where Lefeu is burdened with survivors’ guilt and has no 
opportunity to work through his past in social relations with others because an 
impenetrable silence surrounds it. Once Lefeu links his present protest—his Neinsage 
manifested in refusal to succeed, in fascination with decay, and in insistence on living 
in an uninhabitable building—to his past, he has the desire to commit a radical act 
beyond quiet passivity, namely that of active violence. He seeks the renewal of the 
past conflict through revenge; he wants to balance violence with redemptive violence.  
The issue of redemptive violence took on such importance to Améry that it 
transformed the entire Lefeu project, which acquired an “objektiv-
gesellschaftskritischen Charakter,” as Améry writes in the epilogue (494). There he 
states that during the process of writing, which had all along been influenced by 
questions of violence (496), he finally concluded that redemptive violence, a term he 
uses synonymously with Sartre’s revolutionary violence, was not the key to ending 
injustice. Instead, its bloody results negated “jede Philosophie der Violenz” (496, 
494f.). With Lefeu, Améry continues, he revised his earlier ideas on violence—“alte, 
vertraute, ja geliebte Vorstellungen”—and broke with Sartre as a consequence 
(ibid.).105  
                                                
105 Améry agrees with Wolfram Schütte, who views Lefeu as Améry’s departure from Sartre. Cf. 
Améry, letter to Schütte, May 14, 1974 (DLA 81.1571/3). Early on Améry had been strongly influenced 
by Sartrean existentialism, and for decades he considered Sartre his intellectual father. He wrote many 
reviews, articles, and essays on Sartre; among the more important are: Jean Améry, "Der 
Existentialismus in Frankreich," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 6, Aufsätze zur Philosophie, ed. Gerhard 
Scheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 11-17 (1945); Jean Améry, "In die Welt geworfen. Jean Paul 
Sartre," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 4, Charles Bovary, Landarzt, ed. Hanjo Kesting (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 2006), 189-97, (1955), Jean Améry, "Jean-Paul Sartres Engagement," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 
6, Aufsätze zur Philosophie, ed. Gerhard Scheit (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 47-67 (1968). First signs 
of a departure from Sartre appear in the 1971 essay “Existenzsorgen,” in: Améry, Unmeisterliche 
Wanderjahre, 268-294. Améry made his final break with Sartre in 1974, cf. Jean Améry, "Sartre: Größe 
und Scheitern," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 4, Charles Bovary, Landarzt, ed. Hanjo Kesting (Stuttgart: 
Klett-Cotta, 2006), 238-66 (1974). Améry most obviously dissented from Sartre by writing a novel-
essay in which he corrected Sartre’s reading of Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary: L’Idiot de la 
famille (1971). Cf. Améry, Charles Bovary, Landarzt. 
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This revision is obvious in the text, where, for example, Lefeu imagines arson 
in several different ways. Before meeting Feuerreiter and in connection with the Nazi 
past, he already mentions the burning of Paris (“Paris brûlera. Paris schmorera,” 409, 
cf. 400). On his way back from Lacq, he plans to burn only newly-built apartment 
buildings (441). He eventually sets a fire while in the remains of his building (478f.), 
ostensibly to kill himself, but instead of self-immolation he burns the painting “Paris 
brûle” (479). Lefeu does not burn down Paris; he abstains from avenging himself 
through violence against his exterior world, but sets himself and his creation alight 
(495).  
In the abstract to Lefeu Améry anticipated distancing himself from redemptive 
violence and thereby Sartre, its supposed intellectual father. Améry identified as the 
main “geistige Problematik” of chapter five (the Gaz de Lacq episode and subsequent 
return to Paris) the “Sinn und Widersinn der aus luzider Neinsage und (gleichfalls 
luzidem) Ressentiment resultierenden Violenz,” which promises at first to be the 
“letzte[r] Ausweg des ver-gewaltigten [sic] Menschen.”106 Améry planned for Lefeu to 
consider avenging his parents’ deaths before coming to the conclusion that revenge is 
“sinnlos,” and the issue of violence an intellectual and political “Grenzbegriff, aber 
keine Maxime.”107  
In the proposal Améry planned Lefeu’s submission to the silence surrounding 
his individual Unglück for the final chapter, originally titled “Kapitulation.” The 
reader loses sight of Lefeu just as he has surrendered: “dann verlieren wir ihn [=Lefeu] 
aus den Augen.”108 The last chapter is the only one whose title Améry changed from 
                                                
For a concise but insightful overview of Améry’s engagement with existentialism, cf. Sylvia Weiler, 
"Jean Améry. Begründer der deutschsprachigen Shoah-Literatur?," Études Germaniques 59, no. 2 
(2004), 377-96. See also Hanjo Kesting, "Nachwort (zu Charles Bovary)," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 4, 
Charles Bovary, Landarzt, ed. Hanjo Kesting (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 339-402, here  350-366.  
106 Améry, "Lefeu oder der Abbruch. Konzept,"657.  
107 Ibid., 657f.  
108 Ibid., 659.  
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its provisional title: it became “Nachtflug” in the final version. Lefeu does not submit 
to the Germans’ silence, but continually questions his Unglück even after having 
abandoned the idea of revenge. It also speaks to Lefeu’s change of attitude regarding 
language, which he continues to use despite his difficulties engaging it.  
 In one of the most important essayistic passages in the book, Lefeu reflects on 
violence and revenge, taking as his point of departure not his parents’ murder but his 
own violation while imprisoned in Gurs (440). The passage is strikingly similar to 
Améry’s 1966 meditation on returning the blow. In response to the physical mutilation 
caused by the blow, and to mental scarring inflicted by abuse in general, Lefeu 
contemplates, it is the body that wants to strike back with violent, physical force.  
 
[A]uf den Schlag, den körperlichen oder seelischen, will der Leib den 
Gegenschlag versetzen. Gegengewalt ist (…) der letzte Ausweg, den 
der vergewaltigte Mensch sich sucht. Hierin ist der sakrale Urgrund 
einer jeden Vorstellung von Rache zu sehen: in dieser körperlichen 
Unruhe, dieser Gleichgewichtsstörung, die beide erst nach dem 
vollzogenen Akt der Vergeltung gleich gehoben werden und zur 
Befriedung gelangen. (438) 
 
Even though the impulse for physical revenge is natural, he continues, acting on it is 
unacceptable, for it creates further violence, leading in turn to new injury demanding 
its own vengeance:   
 
Dass dergleichen [=Vergeltung] keine gesellschaftlich-politische 
Maxime sein kann, ist klar, da jeder Gegenschlag ein Schlag für sich 
ist, der seinerseits wieder vergeltend-reaktives Verhalten forderte, so 
dass die Geschichte am Ende nichts wäre als eine unzerreißbare Kette 
von Taten-Untaten. (Ibid.) 
 
Society introduced jurisprudence to protect itself from such an outcome and, even with 
secularization, kept the taboo on revenge firmly established by Christianity. Though 
the wound he received in Gurs in 1940 is still open after more than thirty years (440), 
and though his urge to return the blow stems from a moral sense of “Gerechtigkeit,” 
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Lefeu concedes that revenge is “unmöglich” (meaning here unacceptable rather than 
impossible, 448) both in the abstract and as a concrete plan of action. In this light, 
Feuerreiter’s whisper is ridiculous: “Ridikül ist die ganze Idee, belachens- und 
beklagenswert” (441). Despite this assessment, at which Lefeu arrived with the “return 
to lucidity”109 and subsequent reflection, the idea of revenge nevertheless lingers, 
provoked by the expression of “Husch” that references the burning of his parents, and 
which repeatedly resurfaces in Lefeu’s consciousness, even as Feuerreiter disappears 
(447f.).  
The force keeping alive Lefeu’s desire for revenge is his ressentiments. 
Although he affirms the need for jurisprudence to regulate the repair of wrongdoing, 
the law does not help the injured victim who “verlangt nach der Zurücknahme des 
Erlittenen durch den Akt des Erleiden-Machens” (438). Because redemptive violence 
is proscribed by law and conscience (which Lefeu identifies as “das interiorisierte 
Gesellschafts-Gesetz”), the violated individual’s life is, according to Lefeu, who 
contemplates ressentiments on his return from Lacq to Paris, 
 
bleibender beschädigt als es das vordem durch ein Erleiden, an dessen 
Zurücknahme er [=der Verwundete] noch hatte glauben können, 
gewesen war. Die Psychologie spricht von Ressentiments, das sagt 
nicht viel, wiewohl das Wort als solches von der Sprache gut erfunden 
wurde. In Tat und Wahrheit wird das unterdrückte Ressentiment, nicht 
anders als das vorgeblich durch Bewusstmachung und höhere 
Einsichten gleichsam von sich selbst gereinigte, zum Triebverzicht, der 
(...) grausam die menschliche Gestalt amputiert (...). Eine unauflösliche 
Kontradiktion zwischen dem sozial Gebotenen und Gebieterischen und 
dem spezifisch humanen Verlangen des Individuums nach 
Zurücknahme (oder vielleicht: Aufhebung der Irreversibilität und damit 
der Zeit) bricht auf. (439) 
 
According to Lefeu—and his author Améry—, ressentiments grow out of the inability 
to fight back in self-defense at the time of injury. What pains him more than this 
                                                
109 Cf. ibid., 657. 
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inability is that society not only expects him to suppress the desire for revenge (as a 
belated form of self-defense), but to suppress ressentiment over the injury—even 
though Lefeu’s ressentiment is a moral demand to repair past injustice. What makes 
the postwar world hostile to Lefeu is the gulf between his moral demand and society’s 
prohibition. Where he seeks relief from a condition defined by his subjective 
“Gewissheit, dass er sein Überstehen nicht überstehen konnte, nachdem alles, was 
seines Namens und seiner Art war, (…) in den Feueröfen eines deutschgewordenen 
Ostens als Rauch in die Lüfte stieg” (455), the majority of Germans (symbolized by 
the gallerists) shrug off his ressentiments as the delayed late effect “eines historischen 
Missgeschicks” (457).   
As in his previous “Ressentiments” essay, Améry defines ressentiments (via 
Lefeu) as the moral demand for the reversal of time, so as to undo history. Lefeu 
knows that his ressentiments have  “kein Recht gegen die Zeit” (379), and that he is 
someone 
 
der sich rückwärts wendet, was er doch um jeden Preis hätte vermeiden 
wollen, denn er weiß, dass die weiter schreitende Zeit allerwegen Recht 
hat gegen ihn: nur weil sie weiter schreitet, so einfach ist das, während 
er am Orte verharrt oder gar ins Abgelebte flieht. (378) 
 
Time, by its natural passing, is against him (382), and so is “die Wirklichkeit des 
geschichtlichen Geschehens” (406) that is shaped as much by the interpretation of 
events as by the events themselves. This interpretation of history is subject to the 
consensus of a majority that does not necessarily act reasonably or morally (391). 
Lefeu, whose Neinsage is an offensive  “Gegenrede gegen den Diskurs der Zeit” 
(407)—against the discourse of time in general and the contemporary discourse of his 
present in particular—and the expression of his ressentiment, positions himself outside 
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society and trusts experience alone: “das blinde Selbstvertrauen” is the only mindset 
possible (406).  
 Against his “subjektive Evidenz,” a psychic fact that makes itself evident in the 
external world and by which his personal history and potential self ended “mit den 
Gräbern in den Lüften” (499), the natural passage of time has abetted the process by 
which society objectifies the past and, in the case of the Holocaust, historicizes it as 
the “banality of evil” (500). Améry writes in the epilogue that evil is banal only for 
those who enacted or witnessed it, never for those who suffered from it. While the 
passing of time may level all injustices in the eye of society, which calculates the well 
being of the larger society dependent on this leveling process, the injured individual 
views time as not so much leveling as prolonging those injuries. His subjective 
evidence of suffering runs counter to society’s objective and comparative evidence, 
according to which Hitler was “[e]in Schurke unter anderen” and Auschwitz “eine 
blutige Episode unter so vielen” (499). By society’s standard, concentrating the issues 
of history and time around the past injury amounts to “Geschichtsfälschung oder sogar 
Geschichtsblindheit” (500). In defense of a practice that concentrates on past injuries 
Améry offers no arguments but points to his subjective evidence, an affect that 
escapes objectifying historicization. To express it is not only his “Menschenrecht” but 
constitutes “Menschenwürde” as such.110 Although it violates the principles of reality, 
resistance against the passing of time constitutes humanness when faced with the 
irrationality of being.  
Améry’s complete trust in the self, which is shaped entirely by its experience 
and his insistence on the moral superiority of his ressentiments include a 
“tiefverborgene Vision einer Gegenwelt” (333), in which Lefeu has an impact on the 
social consensus on how the crimes of the Nazis should be interpreted. The past stands 
                                                
110 Améry, Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre, 313f.  
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irreversible, but the future can change the meaning of the past; through its 
reinterpretation, the past is altered despite the impossibility of its reversal. The future 
can “jede Vergangenheit in jedem Augenblick umdeuten und verändern” (442). 
Drawing on the example of his art, which may seem of little value to his 
contemporaries but may attract considerable attention in the future, thereby revising 
present judgment, Lefeu defines history as “das in der Zeit neu sich knüpfende Netz 
von Beziehungen und Meinungen” (380). If history includes not just the past but also 
its future interpretation, Lefeu still has the chance to affect history. Therehore he holds 
on to his ressentiments.  
 
The Failure of Lefeu oder Der Abbruch 
Just as he had done for his other essays, Améry extensively toured West 
Germany to promote Lefeu oder Der Abbruch. During a reading in Mainz, Améry 
identified his own insecurities regarding the success of Lefeu: “Die Frage des 
Gelingens bleibt offen.”111  
In her analysis of the book Lorenz concludes Lefeu oder Der Abbruch failed in 
both executing the essayistic novel (as compared, for example, to Musil’s Der Mann 
ohne Eigenschaften) and reaffirming the status of language. Unlike Musil’s 
“‘Möglichkeitsdenken’,” through which conflicting thoughts and interpretations lead 
productively to the full saturation of a topic, Améry’s attempt at reaching higher 
understanding collapses due to the increasing metaphorization of Lefeu’s 
reflectivity.112 Lorenz makes particular note of the inclusion of an utopian idea in 
Musil and its absence in Améry.113 She defines the essay-novel in terms of its utopian 
perspective, in which an essayistic (circular) thought process opens up the possibility 
                                                
111 Page 3 of the four-page document “Lefeu-Lesung Mainz” (DLA 81.1448).  
112 Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 165, 167.  
113 Ibid., 175ff. 
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of overcoming crises. In Améry’s essay-novel Lefeu’s circular movement of reflection 
does not permit him to discover new paths but spirals inward until it culminates in his 
own self-destruction. While I agree that Lefeu perhaps is a failure overall, at least by 
the standards Améry himself established, I do not agree with Lorenz that the failure 
lies in its rejection of a utopian perspective.  
If Améry aimed to write an antidote to the nouveau roman, his intention was to 
correct particular shortcomings. In a 1964 article on the nouveau roman Améry had 
specifically criticized its lack of an omniscient narrator and its underdevelopment of 
characters, its missing chronology and opacity of plot, and the absence of 
“Vordergrundrealität” or “Banalrealität.”114 The particular lack of descriptions of 
every-day life, through which novelists otherwise evince their adherence to Améry’s 
conception of literature’s social obligation, led him to condemn the nouveau roman 
and its strategies of alienation, although he admired some of its practitioners. 
Irrespective of whether Améry correctly captured the features of the nouveau roman 
and justly criticized it based on these characteristics, it is interesting to observe just 
how much Lefeu oder Der Abbruch fits his description of the nouveau roman instead 
of acting as its counterpoint. While Lefeu follows a relatively coherent chronology of 
events,115 its narrator is neither omniscient nor are its characters fully developed. The 
blurring of “Gedachtes und Gesprochenes,” a practice Améry had criticized in 1964,116 
is but one of the strategies of estrangement. The essay-novel’s style, characterized by 
unmarked quotations from a variety of German literary sources, by neologisms 
(“Glanzverfall”/“Glanz-Verfall”), word play (“Pappellallee Geplapper”), the inclusion 
of French vocabulary, and the application of French grammar rules to German verbs 
                                                
114 Améry, "Wege, Holzwege," 308.  
115 Within the overarching chronology, which is easy to discern, a few short episodes are difficult to 
place in relation to each other or make it difficult to decide whether they happened at all. Cf. Jacques 
and Lefeu’s dinner, chapter 4; Irene’s possible suicide, chapter 6.  
116 Améry, "Wege, Holzwege." 307.  
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(“schmorera,” 409), further this estrangement.117 The semantic confusion caused by 
Améry’s peculiar style undermines the linguistic lack of ambiguity that he claimed to 
want to achieve. This becomes most evident in the description of his 
“Vordergrundrealität”: in 1964 Améry had insisted that everything is communicable, 
including “Todesangst,” which “innerhalb des Gefühls- und Chiffreschemas der 
Alltagsrealität erfahren und dem Mitmenschen mitgeteilt [wird].”118As we have seen, 
Lefeu struggles to put into words precisely his traumatic memory of the deportation of 
his parents. By his own standard then, Améry’s essay-novel failed on the level of both 
form and content.119 
In his review of Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, Sven-Claude Bettinger throws up his 
hands and concludes that the book is “im Grunde genommen nicht zu rezensieren, 
weil nicht voll erfassbar.”120 While he designates Lefeu a “Meisterwerk,” he wishes 
readers luck persevering (“durchhalten”) and enduring (“ertragen”) its pages.121 
Bettinger’s review is typical of Lefeu’s mixed reception. In his study of the overall 
reception of Améry, Rainer Brandenburg concluded that while the essay-novel 
received mostly negative reviews, almost all reviewers deeply regretted having to 
criticize it so harshly.122 The review in Die Welt thus ends with the judgment that 
                                                
117 For a discussion of style in Lefeu, cf. chapter 6.4, Lorenz, Scheitern als Ereignis, 154-168. For an 
analysis of intertextual references, cf. Susan Nurmi-Schomers, "Blick aus dem 'Nocturama.' 
Intertextuelle Perspektiven auf Jean Amérys Lefeu oder Der Abbruch," in Kritik aus Passion. Studien zu 
Jean Améry, ed. Matthias Bormuth and Susan Nurmi-Schomers (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005), 145-74. 
For the inclusion of French and the Frenchication of German, cf. Jean Paul Bier, "Zum Begriff der 
Stilrelevanz. Mehrsprachige Stellen in Lefeu," Jahrbuch für internationale Germanistik 11, no. 1 
(1979), 271-82. 
118 Améry, "Wege, Holzwege," 308f.  
119 Améry himself recognized the formalistic similarities between Lefeu and the nouveau roman. Cf. 
Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, February 15, 1973, in:  Améry, Briefe, 418. He even compares Lefeu 
with Heißenbüttel’s work, indirectly asking his friend for forgiveness for having previously criticized it 
harshly. Cf. Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, January 5, 1974, in: Améry, Briefe, 412f. (Note that the 
printed version incorrectly states the year. The letter was written in 1974, not 1973.) 
120 Sven-Caude Bettinger, "'Nein-Sagen' oder Kompromisse?," Tribüne 13 (1974), 5798-800, here 5800.  
121 Ibid., 5799. 
122 Brandenburg, "Zwischen Morosität und Moral," 77.  
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Améry’s project “ist nicht gelungen, leider.”123 Another reviewer is conscious of his 
“hartes Urteil,” which he articulates “mit aufrichtigem Bedauern.”124Die Zeit, for 
whose review Améry traded in his freelance position, discusses Lefeu in neutral terms, 
although criticism lurks between the lines.125 The Swiss Tages-Anzeiger summarizes 
the prevalent sentiment vis-à-vis Lefeu: the book is “nicht im üblichen Sinn ‘lesbar’” 
but “peinlich” and “geht (…) dem Leser schlicht auf die Nerven”; however, because 
of Améry’s humanistic commitment, his novel-essay will endure against time.126 Even 
when reviewed for radio, where Améry had his most faithful supporters, reviewers, 
among them Helmut Heißenbüttel, expressed disappointment, however subtly.127 Most 
newspaper reviews lamented the discrepancy between Améry’s intention for an essay-
novel and the final result, in which the essayistic reflection trumped the novel.128  
Améry was shocked by the reception of his essay-novel. Positive feedback on 
the manuscript and subsequent predictions for great success from editors and friends 
had led him to believe that Lefeu would be at least as well received as his previous 
publications had been.129 Hubert Arbogast had predicted that book critics would have 
                                                
123 Karl Alfred Wolken, "Leben und Sterben des Malers Lefeu," Die Welt, September 12, 1973. Wolken 
calls the attempted essay-novel “doch nur einen Zwitter.” 
124 Harry Neumann, "Die Verführung der Analyse. Amérys Porträt eines Nonkonformisten--mehr Essay 
als Roman," Saarbrücker Zeitung, October 31/November 1, 1974. 
125 Cf. Hans-Horst Henschen, "Auf der Suche nach dem Roman," Die Zeit, June 21, 1974. 
126 Jürgen Altwegg, "Ergreifendes Beispiel einer 'Condition Humaine' im 20. Jahrhundert. Jean Améry 
schrieb einen Roman-Essay in zwei Sprachen," Tages-Anzeiger, August 14, 1975. 
127 I refer to copyrighted material found at DLA. Heißenbüttel provided the manuscript for a radio 
review that aired May 2, 1974, at Westdeutscher Rundfunk. While the tone of his review is neutral, his 
only positive remarks regard the autobiographical intention of Lefeu.  
128 Cf. Martin Wettstein, "Trümmerhaufen der Ideen," Neue Züricher Zeitung, July 9, 1974. Wettstein 
compares the essayistic reflection to “einem unaufhörlichen Erguss nach dem Dammbruch” and 
laments the “Widerspruch zwischen Form und Absicht.” Cf. Hans Bender, "Einer, der nein sagt," 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 18/19, 1974. Bender criticizes Améry for following his intention “ohne 
Plan.” Cf. Harald Hartung, "Elemente einer berauschenden Befreiung. Über Jean Amérys kreisende 
Monologe," Neue Rundschau 85 (1974), 322-25, here 323. Hartung warns the reader not to trust the 
narrative: as novel, he concludes, Lefeu disappoints. However, read as a series of essays—as “kreisende 
Monologe—Lefeu is worth the readers’ time and attention. 
129 Améry is sure of positive feedback among his friends and peers within the Literaturbetrieb but fears 
the opinion of the general reader. Thus he writes to his friend Ernst Mayer: “Bislang habe ich fast 
ausschließlich gute bis begeisterte Urteile, aber das sagt natürlich nichts über die schließlich allein 
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“viel zu rühmen”130 and that Arbogast had secured himself a “Fußnote in der 
Literaturgeschichte des Jahrhunderts” by having overseen the genesis of such an 
important book.131 However, the best known literary critic at the time, Marcel Reich-
Ranicki, wrote a scathing review for the prestigious FAZ, mocking the essayist for 
having attempted to write literature by titling the review “Schrecklich ist die 
Verführung zum Roman.”132  
Reich-Ranicki begins his review with a short summary of Améry’s life and his 
achievements, noting the dubiousness of the Auschwitz survivor’s role as “moralische 
Instanz” in West Germany, into which Améry, according to Reich-Ranicki, the 
beloved specialist for the “unbewältigte Vergangenheit,” was forced. Without 
pursuing this interesting observation further, Reich-Ranicki blames Améry for having 
taken advantage of this situation by engaging in a project he would otherwise not have 
pursued: “auch er wollte einen Roman schreiben.” Rather than stressing that Améry 
wanted to write a novel in addition to essays (“er wollte auch einen Roman schreiben” 
vs. “auch er”), Reich-Ranicki insinuates that Améry is just one of many others who 
dream of a career as novelist, thereby belittling his intentions, intellect, and experience 
as writer. In the summary of Lefeu that follows, Reich-Ranicki includes the insulting 
remark that it is exactly those successful authors, “[die] den Wohlstand genießen,” 
who, to assuage their bad consciences over their wealth, create characters who are 
poor to fight struggles, “zu denen sie selber verständlicherweise nicht die geringste 
Lust haben.” Given the financial insecurity that Améry experienced for most of his 
life, this is quite offensive. Reich-Ranicki continues in this manner. Améry writes 
                                                
relevante Durchschnitts-Meinung, die sich etablieren wird.” Améry, letter to Mayer, February 1974, in: 
Améry, Briefe, 441.  
130 Arbogast, letter to Améry, April 26, 1973 (DLA 81.2027/1). 
131 Arbogast, letter to Améry, March 29, 1974 (DLA 81.2028/2).  
132 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, "Schrecklich ist die Verführung zum Roman," Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, June 1, 1974. 
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“wirr und oft geschmacklos,” his essay-novel is “eine oberflächliche Plauderei” and an 
altogether “literarische Degeneration,” a particularly ill-chosen term, given the Nazi’s 
labeling of Jewish art as degenerate (entartet). After accusing Améry of turning to the 
novel because he deemed it to be the lesser, and therefore easier, form of writing, 
Reich-Ranicki mocks Améry for his epilogue explaining why he had chosen the essay-
novel. Reich-Ranicki ends his review: “[Améry liefert] gleich die 
Gebrauchsanweisung, die dem Leser und dem Kritiker die Lektüre erleichtern soll. 
Das ist menschenfreundlich. Aber wenn sich etwas nicht gebrauchen lässt, ist auch die 
Gebrauchsanweisung überflüssig.”   
Several of Améry’s friends in literary circles were outraged by Reich-Ranicki 
and vociferously supported Améry, including Wolfram Schütte, who countered with a 
very thoughtful and positive review of Lefeu oder der Abbruch in Frankfurter 
Rundschau, in which he called it a “Proust’sches Meisterwerk.”133 Neither his support 
nor that of Helmut Heißenbüttel, Rudolf Hartung, Horst Krüger, or Hans Paeschke 
mattered to Améry,134 who tore up his personal copy of Lefeu as result of Reich-
                                                
133 Wolfram Schütte, "Tabula Rasa oder am Ende doch eine Illusion? Jean Amérys Roman-Essay 'Lefeu 
oder Der Abbruch'," in Jean Améry Werke. Bd. 9, Materialien, ed. Irene Heidelberger-Leonard 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008), 189-201. Schütte’s review first appeared in Frankfurter Rundschau, July 
6, 1974. Cf. Schütte, letter to Améry, June 20, 1974 (DLA 81.1921/5). 
134 Immediately following Reich-Ranicki’s review, Heißenbüttel wrote Améry a handwritten note (not 
on official letterhead): “Ich möchte Sie mir mit aller Überzeugungskraft, die mir zu Gebote steht, 
versichern, dass ich an Ihrer Seite stehe. Diese Reich-Ranicki-Kritik war ein Racheakt. (…) Eine 
Gemeinheit ohnegleichen. Etwas, das einmalig ist in der bundesdeutschen Nachkriegskritik. Sie müssen 
es nicht ernst nehmen.” (Emphasis in the original.) Heißenbüttel, letter to Améry, June 14, 1974 (DLA 
81.1984/10). Heißenbüttel speaks of the “revenge” of another survivor, cf. Krüger’s explanation below. 
To his editor Améry wrote that “der törichte Reich-Ranicki” came as a shock, but he 
continues: “Seit ich aber vor einigen Tagen mit Rudolf Hartung sprach, der mir versicherte, es werde 
R.R. eigentlich von keinem literaturverständigen Menschen mehr Ernst genommen, da er sich doch 
wiederholt der gröbsten und rohesten kritischen Missgriffe schuldig machte, bin ich, was die Qualität 
meiner Arbeit  anbetrifft, doch einigermassen beruhigt.” Améry, letter to Arbogast, June 16, 1974, in: 
Améry, Briefe, 452. Hartung had initially asked to write the Lefeu review for FAZ, but Reich-Ranicki 
insisted on writing the review himself. Cf. Hartung, letter to Améry, March 13, 1974 (DLA 81.1967/8.)  
Horst Krüger’s response is particularly interesting and might explain why Heißenbüttel spoke 
of revenge: “Zur Sache: natürlich hat Dir Ranicki mit der Gesamtbeurteilung Deiner lit. Existenz 
Unrecht getan. Selbst wenn man Lefeu für einen falschen Aufschwung oder eben eine Sackgasse Deiner 
Entwicklung halten sollte, so bleibt, was immer Du vorher geschrieben hast, in seiner moralischen-
politischen Bedeutung für unsere Jahre ganz unangetastet. Nur Du, Du allein hast die Beschädigungen 
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Ranicki’s review.135 In a bitter article on book critics written almost a year later, 
Améry, who almost directly refers to Reich-Ranicki by addressing FAZ critics, 
lamented the lack of “Autokritik” among them: “Nur die frechsten Esel bilden sich 
ein, sie seien berufen, zu rechten und zu richten.”136 Reich-Ranicki’s review hit Améry 
hard, and it discouraged him from pursuing his plan for his Macbeth novel. He wrote 
to Arbogast that because of the failure of Lefeu—“mein bislang bestes Buch (…), 
[das] mit Drittklasse-Begräbnis in die Erde versenkt wurde”—he would not work on 
the “Projekt ‘Macbeth’”: “Wenn die Leute das, was ich ‘Roman-Essay’ nannte, in der 
von mir erarbeiteten Form nicht haben wollen, hätte es keinen Sinn, trotzig oder 
trutzig darauf zu beharren. Also vorläufig: Macbeth out.”137 When discussing his next 
essay collection, Hand an sich legen (1976) Améry even feels compelled to reassure 
                                                
aus der Nazizeit produktiv verarbeitet, ins Bewusstsein überführt und damit Deine Form des Überlebens 
gefunden. Das bleibt Deine Leistung. Dass R. sie so abwertet, ist wohl nur erklärlich, weil er sich dort 
getroffen fühlt. Er lebt ja—scheinbar—so weiter, als sei nie etwas gewesen, als schlösse 1945 ziemlich 
nahtlos an 1933 an: man könne als Jude so weiter machen wie immer: Seine Form der Verhärtung, die 
ihn stabil und steril zugleich macht. Immerhin ist er nach 10 Jahren Hamburger Isolation sehr glücklich, 
diesen Apparat jetzt in der Hand zu haben. Er spielt dort jetzt ‚literarisches Leben,’ sozusagen ein 
Fußballsolo. Noch einmal stellt sich ihm die Welt so dar, als drehe sie sich tatsächlich um Bücher und 
Literatur.“ Krüger, letter to Améry, September 9, 1974 (DLA 81.2055/6).  
Hans Paeschke called Reich-Ranicki’s review an “Attentat” and promises Améry a positive 
review in Merkur, for which he recruits Alfred Andersch. Paeschke, letter to Améry, March 7, 1974 
(DLA 81.2067/2). Incidentally, Paeschke tried as early as March 1974 to convince Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer to review Lefeu, arguing that he would be “seiner malerischen Affektationen wegen der 
ideale Rezensent, von seinem Geschmack an Sprachreflexion ganz abgesehen.” Paeschke, letter to 
Améry, March 7, 1974 (DLA 81.2097/2). Hildesheimer declined to review Lefeu, explaining that he had 
too much to do to fully engage with Lefeu, although he had read one third of the text and found it 
“faszinierend.” Hildesheimer, letter to Paeschke, May 19, 1974, Hildesheimer, Briefe. 194.   
135 Cf. Heidelberger-Leonard, Améry Revolte, 290. The torn up copy is at the literary museum at DLA.  
136 Jean Améry, "Wozu Literaturkritik heute?," Basler Nachrichten, May 10, 1975. 
137 Améry, letter to Arbogast, February 21, 1975 (DLA 81.1644/1). Arbogast encouraged Améry not to 
abandon narrative writing altogether, and in 1978, Améry published Charles Bovary with Klett. In 
addition, he presented Arbogast with a proposal for a new narrative, Rendez-vous in Oudenaarde, which 
Arbogast deemed promising. Before Améry committed himself to working on the Oudenaarde project, 
however, he wanted to wait to see how Charles Bovary was received: “Wird man dieser Arbeit 
freundlich aufnehmen, dann und nur dann wird sie eine gute gewesen sein. Zweimal nun, erst mit 
‘Lefeu’ und jetzt mit dem Charles B., habe ich versucht, mich vor den Deutschen als ein ‘Dichter’ 
auszuweisen, einst glaubte ich ja, dass ich ganz gewiss einer sei. Versuch a [=Lefeu] missriet zu rund 
drei Vierteln. Wenn er mit Ch. B. nicht besser geht, werde ich mir wohl sagen müssen, ich erlag von 
früh auf einem Irrtum. (…) Darum auch mein Zögern mit dem ‘Rendez-vous in Oudenaarde.’” Améry, 
letter to Arbogast, August 29, 1978 (DLA 86.730/2). Améry did not finish the “Rendez-vouz” project, 
an early draft of which is included in Pfäfflin, Améry.  
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Helmut Heißenbüttel that this time, after Lefeu, he would abstain from bringing any 
literary ambition to his work.138 Just a few months before his death, Améry again 
decried the fact that the German public was interested only in the “‘Essayisten’ J.A.,” 
but not the writer. At that time he predicted that what Lefeu needed was time in order 
to be appreciated.139  
 
In the preface to the 1977 edition of Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Améry noted the 
steady rise of anti-Semitism in West Germany with great concern and justified the 
republication of his 1966 essay collection with the following two sentences: “Hier 
wird wieder einmal mit dem Feuer gespielt, das so vielen ein Grab in den Lüften grab. 
Ich schlage Feueralarm.”140 Améry took the role of Feuerreiter, but not the arsonist 
Feuerreiter from Lefeu oder Der Abbruch, but Mörike’s early Feuerreiter who sounds 
the alarm to warn of danger. Despite his serious flirtation with ideas of revenge and 
redemptive violence, Améry never seriously considered either as a viable option for 
himself. His resistance was non-violent, but it was resistance nonetheless: against 
forgetting the “moralische Kluft”141 between victims and perpetrators that would not 
cease to exist unless the Germans acknowledged their crimes. 
                                                
138 Améry, letter to Heißenbüttel, April 24, 1975 (DLA 81.1608/4). 
139 Améry, letter to Arbogast, June 26, 1978 (DLA 86.730/1). Cf. Améry, letter to Wolfram Schütte, 
September 18, 1975 (DLA 81.1571/5). Améry wrote Schütte that it would take “so rund 30 bis 50 
Jahre” until someone would appreciate Lefeu as much as Schütte had in his review.  
Indeed, in his 1980 study of twentieth-century Viennese literature, Ernst Schönwiese, who 
justified the inclusion of Améry based on the author’s 1930s editorial work in Vienna, praised Améry as 
the last of the great German-language essayists. In spite of his essayistic achievement, however, 
Améry’s most important work is, Schönwiese continues, Lefeu oder Der Abbruch: “Mit seinem ‘Lefeu’ 
gehört er [=Améry] in der Literaturgeschichte an die Stelle, wo von den großen Prosa-Epikern unserer 
Zeit die Rede ist.” In an encyclopedic essay collection of German-language Holocaust literature, 
Heidelberger-Leonard, in her entry on Améry, goes so far as to calling Lefeu oder Der Abbruch the only 
prose piece in which “die Erfahrung Auschwitz so präsent ist.” Ernst  Schönwiese, "Roman-Essay und 
Essay-Roman bei Jean Améry," in Literatur in Wien zwischen 1930 und 1980 (Vienna, Austria: 1980), 
181-89, here 182, 185; Irene Heidelberger-Leonard, "Jean Améry. Die Poetik des Sagens," in Shoah in 
der deutschsprachigen Literatur, ed. Norman Otto Eke and Hartmut Steinecke (Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 2006), 261-66, here 263.  
140 Améry, Jenseits, 17.  
141 Ibid., 15.  
 354 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Nuremberg and Frankfurt Auschwitz trials were the most visible attempts at 
judicial Vergangenheitsbewältigung by the Allies and, later, the West German state. 
Though they laid important foundations for the slowly developing memory culture 
regarding the Nazi past, in fundamental ways the trials were insufficient to the task of 
working through the past. It fell to the political establishment and the literary-cultural 
community of a postwar democracy to provide modes of public remembrance and 
mourning for the German people and thus enable processes of working through.  
The nascent Group 47 in particular assumed the role of a public German 
literary voice and conscience, but it rejected any suggestion of historical guilt and 
collective liability, washing its hands with the myth of a Stunde Null. As Klaus 
Briegleb convincingly argues, the group, whose members experienced World War II 
as soldiers in combat and therefore claimed “Schuldfreiheit” as their dogma, refused to 
engage in a discussion about the Holocaust, failed to problematize Jewish-German 
differences in West German society, and ultimately contributed to postwar anti-
Semitism precisely because it considered itself ethically appropriate while 
disrespecting Jewish experiences.1  
Having observed the unfolding of judicial and literary failures, Wolfgang 
Hildesheimer and Jean Améry emerged as critical Jewish voices who sought to 
intervene into the construction of a national memory culture by challenging, revising, 
and correcting an incomplete German perspective on the past. 
As my analysis of his oeuvre, with an emphasis on his novels Tynset and 
Masante, reveals, by the 1960s Hildesheimer already employed a register of ethical 
writing that articulated the complex, interconnected processes of mourning and 
                                                
1 Cf. Briegleb, Missachtung und Tabu, 12f., 15. 
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melancholia. Unlike more recent writers and scholars who focus on these categories, 
valorizing melancholia in particular, Hildesheimer did not prescribe them as 
exemplary modes of affective reparation. For Hildesheimer’s narrators, mourning the 
victims of the Holocaust became an impossible task that led to an affective and 
communicative impasse of permanent melancholia. Once trapped in the cycle of 
melancholic behavior, the individual forgoes the salutary practice of working through 
for the dead end of perpetually acting out. Although Hildesheimer was an important 
contributor to the discourse on melancholia that led to its present privileged position, 
he ultimately rejected melancholia as unproductive. While Hildesheimer himself used 
a melancholy style for the authentic writing of his inner microcosm that included the 
complicated dimension of Auschwitz, he did not promise—or even hope—that it 
would lead to societal change. Through my reading of Hildesheimer I defend the 
melancholy writing style on the level of subjective experience but conclude that it 
does not present an ethically adequate response of literature to genocide because it 
does not elicit cooperation by others or encourage involvement that may lead to socio-
political action. 
 In contrast to melancholia, ressentiment, as Améry conceived it, is an affect 
that seeks to engage the wider community. If met with empathetic attention, Améry’s 
affect of ressentiment enables future socio-political dialogue between victims and their 
community. In the essay “Ressentiments” (1966) Améry argued for the moral 
superiority of ressentiments as the most appropriate ethical vehicle for criminal 
redress. Rather than promoting hateful acts of revenge, ressentiments admit the 
opportunity for former victims and perpetrators to work through their pasts together, 
pasts that are shared yet subjectively experienced in radically different ways.  
In this regard melancholia is very different from ressentiment: those who 
articulate ressentiment demand a response from the addressee. They express 
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ressentiment to open a dialogue, and their ressentiment lasts only until others engage 
with it, at which point it is satisfied. Where for Hildesheimer melancholia ultimately 
constituted a subjective position that had validity on the personal level but did not 
directly call for socio-political action, Améry identified subjective ressentiments of 
Jewish victims of Nazi persecution as an objective criterion that determined where 
moral repair was needed in the public arena.  
Implicit in the works of both Améry and Hildesheimer is the notion that 
coming to terms with the past requires that subjective experiences of victims of 
wrongdoing be recognized. The melancholic affect employed in the writings of 
Hildesheimer honors the subjective experience through quiet, fragmented 
contemplation of the individual’s lost past. Yet melancholia, by itself, leaves both the 
individual and society in stasis, gaze affixed upon the past. Ressentiments as proposed 
by Améry use subjective experience as a social challenge to turn back and 
acknowledge responsibility for past wrongs, in order for victim and perpetrator to be 
able to look forward together. Though the articulation of ressentiment alone is not 
sufficient to provide solutions for moral repair, if met by response ressentiments serve 
as a bridge from an wounded past to a living future.  
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